Bibliogr. s. 47-48

This paper examines the method of "ecthesis" (or "ekthesis") in the logical works of Aristotle, focusing on its function in the "Prior Analytics" and its development in the subsequent history of logic. While modern interpretations have largely emphasized formal procedures such as "reduction" and "per impossible", "ecthesis" has often been treated as marginal or dispensable. This study revisits that assumption through a combined textual and historical analysis. The first part offers a close reading of Aristotle’s demonstrations, showing that "ecthesis" operates through the introduction of a representative instance that makes the relation between premises more explicit. Rather than serving as a merely illustrative device, it appears as part of the reasoning itself in certain contexts. The second part traces the reception of "ecthesis" in later traditions, from its limited treatment in ancient and medieval commentaries to its marginalization in modern reconstructions, especially in the work of Łukasiewicz and subsequent formal approaches. Recent scholarship has begun to reconsider this marginal status, suggesting that "ecthesis" may contribute to the intelligibility of syllogistic reasoning. By situating "ecthesis" within both Aristotle’s texts and its historical development, the paper aims to clarify its role without overstating its significance, and to show how its interpretation has changed over time.