Kant and capital punishment : rigorism vs. abolitionism
author:
Bartula Piotr
editor:
Miklaszewska Justyna , Spryszak Przemysław
book title:
Kant wobec problemów współczesnego świata
date of publication
:
2006
place of publication : name of publisher:
Kraków : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
pages:
153-163
ISBN:
83-233-2065-9
978-83-233-2065-4
notes:
Recenzowane materiały z konferencji: Kant wobec problemów współczesnego świata, dn. 21-23 maja 2004 r., Kraków. Strona wydawcy: https://www.wuj.pl
language:
Polish
book language:
Polish
abstract in English:
The article presents the principal elements of Kant’s argument in favor of capital punishment, together with the arguments of the opposing side. The issues considered are deterrence, arbitrariness, the sanctity of life, and utilitarianism vs. Kantianism. Regarding deterrence, the abolitionist claims that there are no deterred criminals, and that a criminal who appeared in a world without capital punishment would also become one in a world with it;
the rigorist holds that it is our duty to risk the ineffective application of capital punishment, as a result of which we will perhaps save some victims and some criminals will perhaps be deterred. Regarding arbitrariness, the abolitionist claims that this penalty functions selectively and is therefore unjust, since due to error or ignorance on the part of the court persons
less deserving of being penalized might be put to death; the rigorist holds that selective justice is still justice. Regarding the sanctity of life, contrary to the claim that the death penalty undermines the sanctity of life, it can be shown that in offering the criminal in exchange for a premeditated murder, we honor him by acknowledging him as a free and rational being, assuming that a life marked by shame is worse than nonexistence. Regarding the dispute between utilitarianism and Kantianism, a utilitarian would say that the criminal is punished to serve as an example to others and deter them from crimes. The Kantian would answer that he has no right to treat the criminal as a means to the realization of his social project. He should be punished not because of the damage produced by him or for the sake of social benefits, but in accordance with his own deed, in which he esteemed the life of another person as inferior to the ends he set himself. He can therefore no longer remain under the care of the law which he himself overthrew. In the above context the following problems are also
considered: freedom, the discontinuity of the criminal, revenge, and the social contract.