Constructivism and John Rawls’s concept of person

Recenzowane materiały z konferencji naukowej: Nowożytne rozważania o naturze ludzkiej, dn. 5-6 grudnia 2008 r., Kraków. Strona wydawcy: https://www.wuj.pl

This paper presents the problem of human nature by analyzing John Rawls’s concept of person and his method of constructivism. It is argued that the problem of human nature in Rawls’s theory is more important than it might seem at first. Rawls’s theory of justice is based not only on constructivism, but also on general facts about human nature. According to Rawls, human nature does not determine human activity, but it does affect the condition of human being, their self-understanding and the idea of justice. It does not mean that it is suffi cient for creating a pure theory of human nature, but it [Too ambiguous. Polish please - I need clarification of the intended meaning in order to correct this] shows complex relations between the idea of justice and other issues (not only stricte rational ones). Rawls is trying to answer an important question about the implications for politics of the general facts of human nature. According to Richard Rorty, Rawls (especially in Political Liberalism) does not create a strong philosophical concept of person (as compared to Locke’s or Kant’s), but instead tries to show the contemporary moral identity of citizens in a liberal democratic state.