Ethical justifications of the public participation principle

Bibliogr. s. 43-44. Strona wydawcy: https://www.wuj.pl

W artykule omówione zostały niektóre etyczne racje przemawiające za zasadą partycypacji społecznej w kontekście przykładowych metod uzasadniania w etyce, takich jak metoda legalistyczna, konsensualistyczna, utylitarystyczna, aksjologiczna, antropologiczna, aksjologiczno-antropologiczna (personalistyczna). Skoncentrowano się w nim na logicznej strukturze tych metod, niektórych ich założeniach i konsekwencjach praktycznych.

This article discusses some ethical arguments in favour of public participation. It analyses logical structures of the arguments, their assumptions, practical consequences in management and logical limits. The article assumes that public participation is a fact and the principle of action. The fact of public participation consists in the voluntary participation of community members in managing its affairs. The principle of public participation requires the willingness to respect the will of members of a society in decisions concerning the community to which they belong. The article investigates ethical justifications of public participation understood as a principle of action. The analysis of the article shows that public participation is ethically justified when it has its basis in law (a legalistic argument), it is wanted by members of a society (a consensual argument), it is useful for the community - it minimises the risk of harmful social conflicts and abuses of power (a rule-utilitarian argument), it is consistent with human nature (an anthropological argument), it is a prerequisite for fair management of social issues (an axiological argument) and it is necessary for respecting human dignity (a personalistic argument). The article indicates some logical limits of the above arguments. As it shows beyond these limits the arguments can be abused in misinterpretation or manipulation, for example when one overlooks some relevant circumstances of participation or commits logical errors in reasoning. The use of the arguments discussed here requires a large number of logical assumptions and identification of a specific situation, which is usually very complex. Therefore, the above arguments require, in addition to extensive knowledge and skills of effective thinking, cognitive sensitivity to the specific circumstances that Aristotle called prudence, and especially - intellectual honesty, which he called „right reason” („orthos logos”).