Legislative deliberations among various democratic bodies re- sult most of the time in some sort of compromise. Consequently, this compromise is often a major source of law in democratic countries. But what exactly does it mean “to reach a compromise” and, more impor- tantly, how does this phenomenon affect the quality of the regulations issued by a democratic body? Do the regulations issued as a result of compromise differ importantly from those resulting of a unanimous deci- sion? And if so, is the difference perceivable only at a purely linguistic level or does it entail further consequences? Shall we then avoid compro- mise or rather resort to it as often as possible? Finally, is compromise a source of interpretation? This paper is an attempt to provide at least a partial answer to most of the questions posed above. The answer seems not only a riddle at the theoretical level, but also has numerous practical consequences. It can affect the quality of the regulations issued as well as the level of legal certainty (or predictability) in a particular society, especially in those governed by continental (positivist) legal systems. Let us start this analysis with an attempt to define this complex and myste- rious notion of legislative compromise. There exists numerous definitions of what compromise could be, but there is one that seems particularly interesting: let us take a closer and critical look on Andrei Marmor’s definition.