Necessity and the physicalist account in Aristotle’s physics : difficulties with the rainfall example

Bibliographic description

punktacja MNiSW [2015 C]: 15

title:	Necessity and the physicalist account in Aristotle’s physics : difficulties with the rainfall example
author:	Olesiak Jarosław
journal title:	Diametros
issue:	45
date of publication :	2015
pages:	35-58
eISSN:	1733-5566
DOI:	10.13153/diam.45.2015.795
URL:	http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/795
date accessed:	2016-01-04
language:	English
journal language:	Polish
abstract in English:	The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rainfall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot be used in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.
keywords in English:	Aristotle, ancient philosophy, causality, teleology, necessity, nature, physicalism, rainfall example
affiliation:	Wydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofii
type:	journal article
subtype:	academic paper