Streszcz. ang. s. 1. Bibliogr. s. 10-12

The claim that so-called artificial intelligence (AI) can gain consciousness is on the verge of becoming mainstream. The thesis of this conceptual study is simple: There is no such thing as conscious AI. We argue that the association between consciousness and the computer algorithms used today (primarily large language models, LLMs), as well as those that would be invented in the foreseeable future, is deeply flawed. We believe that these flawed associations arise from a lack of technical knowledge and the way several new technologies (especially LLMs) work, which can create the illusion of consciousness. Moreover, we argue that the public discourse about AI is skewed by “sci-fitisation”, which involves the unsubstantiated influence of fictional content on perceptions of this technology. To justify our claim, we reveal the incoherence in the argument that several computer algorithms are treated differently from other computer algorithms despite congruent modes of operation and a reliance on binary code and semiconductors. We believe that mathematical algorithms implemented on graphics cards cannot become conscious because they lack a complex biological substrate. We emphasise that the recognition of the consciousness of LLMs on the basis of their assertions is flawed because the language usage of LLMs is strictly probabilistic. Unfortunately, because the remarkable linguistic abilities of LLMs are increasingly capable of misleading people, people may attribute imaginary qualities to LLMs. Thus, a socially dangerous phenomenon referred to as “semantic pareidolia” is reinforcing.