Bibliogr s. 334-341. Publikacja ukazała się na stronie wydawcy 2.10.2024 roku. Finasowanie: European Research Rady (ERBN) w ramach programu badań naukowych i innowacji Europejskiej Rady ds. Badań Naukowych Horyzont 2020 (umowa o grant 805498), realizowanego w trakcie zatrudnienia autora w Interdyscyplinarnym Centrum Etyki UJ. W czasie przygotowywania rozdziału autor był stypendystą Fundacji na rzecz Nauki Polskiej (program START 2023)

Folk psychology is the common practice of interpreting behavior. Normative theories of it emphasize three elements. First, it relies on social norms (normativity) and is embedded in the social context, in which failed behavioral predictions require the application of restorative strategies. Second, it is not only explanatory and predictive in nature, but its primary function is regulative, involving mindshaping along with mindreading. Third, it not only serves multiple social purposes but consists of various mechanisms and strategies, rather than merely theorizing or simulating (pluralism). This makes the normative approach to folk psychology interesting for legal theory, as it focuses on the cognitive foundations for normativity and different mechanisms of mentalizing, which are crucial in legal practice. Moreover, the legal practice serves as a special case of folk psychological practice, with its explicit and sophisticated character of mental state attribution (including the use of folk psychological models) on one hand and the regulative aspect of legal norms on the other.