Online First 2024-11-18. Autor podpisany na publ. Callum Zavos MacRae. Badania te są częścią projektu nr 2022/47/P/HS1/02025, współfinansowanego przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki oraz Program Ramowy Unii Europejskiej w zakresie badań i innowacji Horyzont 2020 w ramach umowy o grantowej nr 945339 Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie

Until recently, many theorists defined domination such that it requires unequal power, and most others held that even if domination were not defined as requiring unequal power, a requirement of unequal power would nevertheless follow from the definition of what domination is. On these views, unless there is an imbalance of power between the two parties, there can be no relation of domination. However, two prominent theorists have recently broken from this consensus, on the grounds that people can depend on one another's arbitrary or uncontrolled wills even in contexts where there is no inequality of power. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: domination theorists have a powerful reason to hold that domination cannot take place without a power imbalance. Consequently, we should only accept definitions of the concept on which domination requires unequal power.