Does the Constitution provide otherwise? : on exceptions to the principle of direct application of the Constitution

Streszcz. ang. s. 73-74. Bibliogr. s. 74-75. Publikacja w wersji elektronicznej dostępna w bazie Lex PiP 2024/1/62-75. Dostęp wymaga logowania. Preprint udostępniony w porozumieniu z redakcją czasopisma. Ostateczna wersja tekstu zostanie udostępniona w OA po upływie okresu karencji.

The article deals with the interpretation of Article 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In the first part of the article, a critical analysis of the state of the art is carried out. In the second part, the author identifies one element omitted in the previous discussion. The author believes this element to be a key point for interpretation of Article 8(2) of the Constitution. The third part of the article provides arguments to support the statement about the interpretative key to Article 8(2) of the Constitution, and cites a few examples of exceptions to the principle of direct application of the Constitution. The most important findings are as follows. First, the Constitution provides otherwise on the direct application of its provisions. Second, the set of exceptions to the principle of direct application of the Constitution is not a group of constitutional provisions, but a group of circumstances in which the provisions of the Constitution do not apply directly. As an example, the effects of a judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal with the ‘deferral clause’ are pointed out. In this context, the article challenges the conventional understanding of the concept of exception to the principle of direct application of the Constitution.