Poprzednia wersja tego artykułu została zaprezentowana podczas the Seminariode Investigadores at Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM ,MexicoCity in October 2021. Niniejsze badania są częścią projektu nr 2022/45/P/HS1/04224, współfinansowanego przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki oraz Program Ramowy Unii Europejskiej w zakresie badań naukowych i innowacji Horyzont 2020 w ramach grantu Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie nr 945339

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties - the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view - have failed to answer the two questions satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms.