Badania są częścią projektu nr 2022/47/P/HS1/02511 współfinansowanego przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki i Unię Europejską Program badań i innowacji "Horyzont 2020" w ramach dofinansowania Marie Skłodowskiej-Curie nr 945339

One prominent line of support for nudging in screening programs is the claim that nudging can help "bad choosers" - that is, it can help some patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. In this article, I argue that due to the presence of epistemic risk in many screening programs, the argument that nudging can help "bad choosers" should be revised or rejected. Expanding on the work of Biddle, J. B. 2020. Epistemic risks in cancer screening: Implications for ethics and policy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 79: 101200.), I argue that epistemic risk undermines the argument that nudging can help to promote patient autonomy in the context of screening. Specifically, I argue that epistemic risk results in the inclusion of non-patient values and preferences in the screening process, which challenges the claim that nudging can help patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. I present four reasons to think epistemic risk undermines the argument in this way: (1) conflicting values; (2) lack of transparency; (3) limited autonomy in opting out; (4) unjustified manipulation. The presence of epistemic risk in screening programs means that nudging may not always be an effective means of promoting patient autonomy and informed consent. As such, epistemic risk poses significant challenges to at least one ethical justification of nudging in screening programs, and raises further questions about the role of nudging in promoting patient decision-making.