Personal rights of artificial intelligence in the context of doctrinal construction of protection of personal rights : can artificial intelligence be a subject of personal rights

Bibliogr. s. 201-207

The article attempts to answer the question whether artificial intelligence could become a subject of "its own" personal rights. In order to address this question, it is necessary to consider the axiological justification of the institution of personal rights, in order to decide what conditions would need to be met in order to consider the institution of personal rights of artificial intelligence as justified. The considerations carried out in the article allow to put forward a thesis that (self-)awareness in the intensity at least comparable to the intensity of (self-)awareness specific to a human being is a sufficient condition for recognizing that a given entity not only may, but also should become a subject of personal rights. However, it is not a necessary condition, because other justifications for possessing the above-mentioned attribute are also possible, not only (self-)aware artificial intelligence could therefore become a subject of "its own" personal rights. The article also draws attention to the fact that the attempt to answer the question of personal rights of artificial intelligence allows to see the advantages of the concept of the so-called institutional protection of personal rights. This is because on the basis of this concept it is easier to justify the institution of personal rights of artificial intelligence.