Attributing responsibility for acts in passion : the problem of asymmetry

Streszcz. ang. s. 331. Bibliogr. s. 341. Publikacja recenzowana

An experimental research (conducted by D. Pizarro et al.) has revealed an asymmetry in assigning responsibility for morally bad and morally good actions taken under the influence of emotions. The asymmetry consists in that people tend to assign less responsibility to the agent if his/her morally bad action was made under the influence of emotions, but if his/her action was morally good then the fact that he/she took this action under the influence of emotions is not treated as justifying the diminishing his/her responsibility. This asymmetry is a puzzle that requires explanation. The article discusses the explanation proposed by the authors of the experiment (based on the concept of ‘meta-desires’) and offers an alternative explanation drawing on the distinction between an antecedent emotion (passio antecedens) and consequent emotions (passio consequens) proposed by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae.