Presentism and the notion of existence

doi:10.1007/s10516-018-9373-7

Presentism and the notion of existence

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Presentism and the notion of existence

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dc.contributor.author	Gołosz, Jerzy [SAP11017024]	pl
dc.date.accessioned	2019-04-01T13:52:38Z
dc.date.available	2019-04-01T13:52:38Z
dc.date.issued	2018	pl
dc.identifier.issn	1122-1151	pl
dc.identifier.uri	https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/71994
dc.language	eng	pl
dc.rights	Udzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa 4.0 Międzynarodowa	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/pl/legalcode	*
dc.title	Presentism and the notion of existence	pl
dc.type	JournalArticle	pl
dc.description.physical	395-417	pl
dc.abstract.en	The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance.	pl
dc.subject.pl	prezentyzm	pl
dc.subject.pl	eternalizm	pl
dc.subject.pl	dynamiczne istnienie	pl
dc.subject.pl	stawanie się	pl
dc.subject.pl	upływ czasu	pl
dc.subject.pl	endurowanie	pl
dc.subject.en	presentism	pl
dc.subject.en	eternalism	pl
dc.subject.en	dynamic existence	pl
dc.subject.en	becoming	pl
dc.subject.en	flow of time	pl
dc.subject.en	endurance	pl
dc.description.volume	28	pl
dc.description.number	4	pl
dc.description.points	20	pl
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s10516-018-9373-7	pl
dc.identifier.eissn	1572-8390	pl
dc.title.journal	Axiomathes	pl
dc.language.container	eng	pl
dc.affiliation	Wydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofii	pl
dc.subtype	Article	pl
dc.rights.original	CC-BY; inne; ostateczna wersja wydawcy; w momencie opublikowania; 0	pl
dc.identifier.project	ROD UJ / OP	pl
dc.identifier.project	2016/21/B/HS1/00807	pl
.pointsMNiSW	[2018 C]: 20