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Positive psychology on character strengths and virtues : a disquieting suggestion

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Positive psychology on character strengths and virtues : a disquieting suggestion

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dc.contributor.author Banicki, Konrad [SAP13008938] pl
dc.date.accessioned 2015-04-27T11:25:18Z
dc.date.available 2015-04-27T11:25:18Z
dc.date.issued 2014 pl
dc.identifier.issn 0732-118X pl
dc.identifier.uri http://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/5845
dc.language eng pl
dc.title Positive psychology on character strengths and virtues : a disquieting suggestion pl
dc.type JournalArticle pl
dc.description.physical 21-34 pl
dc.description.additional Bibliogr. s. 33-34 pl
dc.abstract.en The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed. pl
dc.subject.en Values in Action pl
dc.subject.en Character strenghts pl
dc.subject.en Peterson pl
dc.subject.en Seligman pl
dc.subject.en Unity of virtue pl
dc.subject.en Fact/value distinction pl
dc.description.volume 33 pl
dc.description.publication 0,6 pl
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.12.001 pl
dc.identifier.eissn 1873-3522 pl
dc.title.journal New Ideas in Psychology pl
dc.language.container eng pl
dc.affiliation Wydział Zarządzania i Komunikacji Społecznej : Instytut Psychologii Stosowanej pl
dc.subtype Article pl
dc.rights.original OTHER; otwarte czasopismo; ostateczna wersja wydawcy; w momencie opublikowania; 0; pl
.pointsMNiSW [2014 A]: 20


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