Most historians are explicitly negative in their assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy in the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. According to them the only positive aspect of its activity was the raid of the cruiser Hamidiye in 1913, but they usually pass in silence over the fact that it failed to accomplish its main tactical principle. The navy is blamed for the loss of the Aegean islands and quite often even accused of cowardice in the face of the Greeks. But in fact, if we take into consideration the conditions in which the Ottoman Navy entered and was forced to conduct this war, we should rather praise it for its achievements. A navy as an institution is not only the group of officers and sailors on their vessels. No matter whether they do their best or not, they have to act within the political and financial frames over which they have no influence. Even the famous admiral Horatio Nelson would not have done his job better, having so obsolete and squalid ships manned by so poorly trained sailors and being forced to act in the atmosphere of permanent conflict between the naval command and the General Staff. Historians praise the commander of the Hamidiye Lt Com. Hüseyin Rauf for his brilliant raid, which indeed was an achievement in itself, but the biggest impact it had was on the morale of the Ottoman citizens and not on the conduct of war. At the same time they forget how important was the artillery support of the navy, particularly of the battleships for the land forces defending the fortified zone of Çatalca. When we analyze the command of the Ottoman Navy in the Balkan Wars we should also give some thought to the actual role of the British Naval Mission in Istanbul. Most Turkish historians claim that the successive commanders of this mission were in fact the commanders of the whole Ottoman Navy. But if they really were, would things have really gone so wrong during the Balkan Wars?