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Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowe


Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowe

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dc.contributor.author Posłajko, Krzysztof [SAP13037382] pl
dc.date.accessioned 2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.available 2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.issued 2016 pl
dc.identifier.issn 1230-6894 pl
dc.identifier.uri http://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/32658
dc.language pol pl
dc.rights Udzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowa *
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode.pl *
dc.title Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowe pl
dc.title.alternative Irrealism and propositional attitudes pl
dc.type JournalArticle pl
dc.description.physical 133-144 pl
dc.identifier.weblink https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/821/626 pl
dc.abstract.en The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to defend my position against charges levelled by Tadeusz Ciecierski, and second, to venture into the possibility of an irrealist position concerning propositional attitudes. Regarding the first aim, I argue that the distinction proposed by Holton, between theories of truth and theories of truth-aptitude remains relevant, and allows for the joint acceptance of deflationary account of truth and a selective realist approach to truth-aptitude. As for the second aim, I consider several possible motivations for denying that sentences about propositional attitudes cannot be true, which do not rely on any substantial theory of truth. I also argue that even if we reject the strong form of irrealism about propositional attitudes, there is still space left for a moderate version of anti-realism concerning this domain. Such a position does not deny that propositions ascribing propositional attitudes might be described as true or false, but they are still not to be treated in a strongly realist manner. The anti-realistic element of this approach consists either in denying that the propositional attitudes are causally relevant or in claiming that they do not form natural kinds. pl
dc.subject.pl irrealizm pl
dc.subject.pl nastawienia sądzeniowe pl
dc.subject.pl deflacjonizm pl
dc.subject.pl realizm pl
dc.subject.en irrealism pl
dc.subject.en propositional attitudes pl
dc.subject.en deflationism pl
dc.subject.en realism pl
dc.description.volume 24 pl
dc.description.number 2 (94) pl
dc.description.points 15 pl
dc.description.publication 1,8 pl
dc.title.journal Filozofia Nauki pl
dc.language.container pol pl
dc.date.accession 2019-08-05 pl
dc.affiliation Wydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofii pl
dc.subtype Article pl
dc.rights.original OTHER; otwarte czasopismo; ostateczna wersja wydawcy; w momencie opublikowania; 0 pl
dc.identifier.project 2014/15/D/HS1/02722 pl
dc.identifier.project ROD UJ / P pl
.pointsMNiSW [2016 C]: 15

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Udzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowa Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Udzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowa