Naïve realism about unconscious perception

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1570-1

Naïve realism about unconscious perception

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Naïve realism about unconscious perception

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Bibliographic description

punktacja MEiN [2019]: 200

title:	Naïve realism about unconscious perception
author:	Zięba Paweł
journal title:	Synthese
volume:	196
issue:	5
date of publication :	2019
pages:	2045-2073
ISSN:	0039-7857
eISSN:	1573-0964
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-017-1570-1
URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1570-1
date accessed:	2019-12-02
notes:	Bibliogr s. 2071-2073. Autor podpisany na pub. Paweł Jakub Zięba
language:	English
journal language:	English
abstract in English:	Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception.
keywords in English:	unconscious perception, naïve realism, intentionalism, perceptual relation, consciousness
departmental parameterization:	200
affiliation:	Wydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofii
type:	journal article
subtype:	academic paper