After the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the out-break of conflicts related to that process the international diplomacy decided to introduce military missions, of various nature, in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, that is former Yugoslavian republics, where a war was waged in the first half of the 1990s. The Republic of Macedonia declared independence already in 1991, but it became independent peacefully; it did not mean, however, that the country was free from internal problems, for instance of ethnic nature, which escalated before the end of the twentieth century putting the Macedonian state on the brink of civil war on the eve of the new century. The escalation necessitated the invitation by the state authorities of international military missions to assist in stabilising the country’s internal situation.

Key-words: Macedonia, national minorities in Macedonia, military operations, international police operations, the Ohrid agreement, Macedonian-Albanian conflict

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts and wars in the Balkans, which began after the demise of the Yugoslavian state in the early 1990s, were of a multidimensional nature, so international diplomacy and organizations needed to show high flexibility and use non-standard methods in
solving crisis situations which were superimposed to create a tragic picture of the wars and conflicts, the impact of which can still be seen in the internal situation of the countries that emerged from Yugoslavia.

The Republic of Macedonia\(^1\) declared independence as early as 1991, after the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia. Macedonia was able to avoid its war fate, but this does not mean that it avoided problems with which republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to struggle. What is more, neither did it avoid the international involvement of diplomats and organizations nor military and police operations which were carried out for a dozen or so years (1992–2005). The UN, then NATO, and finally EU forces were stationed in the country. In the 1990s, the security of the Macedonian-Serbian border\(^2\) was high on the agenda in view of the need to respect the embargo imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at that time, as well as the aggravation of the conflict between Serbia and Albania. This might have led to an escalation of violence and the problem spreading to the territory of Macedonia for demographic reasons. All the more so that Macedonian Albanians took some more or less serious initiatives for the independence of the Macedonian territory they inhabited.\(^3\)

In view of the above, it is hard to believe that until late 1990 the Macedonian state was not perceived as an area at risk of ethnic conflict, though the Constitution and regulations of the situation of national and ethnic minorities were far from satisfactory to the Albanian minority, and this was reflected in the emergence of the above-mentioned initiatives. The Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 mentioned Macedonia as a country which had implemented reforms necessary to achieve rapid economic development. In February 1999, the UN peace mission came to an end, but in March that year the war in Kosovo broke out. This directly affected Macedonia’s internal situation and might have led to the destabilization of this relatively small country. Indeed, the conflict spread into Macedonian territory but the efforts of western diplomacy prevented its escalation. NATO was entrusted with the task to ensure stability. Later the European Union replaced NATO in performing this mission, and soon ended the military operation, supporting public order through the police mission which continued until the end of 2005.\(^4\)

\(^1\) The country’s official, internationally recognised name reads: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), but 120 states – including Poland – acknowledged the name: Republic of Macedonia. On 8\(^{th}\) April 1993 Macedonia was accepted as a member of the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

\(^2\) From 1992 to 2003 Serbia, along with Montenegro, were parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.


\(^4\) See: M. Donevska, ‘Approaches to Social Problem Solving in the Republic of Macedonia during the Period of System Transformation’ in M. Niezgoda (ed.), The Consequences of Great Transformation:
The aim of the present paper is to present the nature and level of international involvement through military and police missions on the territory of the Macedonian state, as well as to assess whether they were successful. The main research question is: did international involvement contribute to the improvement and stability of relations between Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians?

THE UN PEACE MISSION

The goal of the UN peace missions is to ensure international peace and stability. However, the problem is that such operations may take place in any part of the world where they can encounter various kinds of conflicts and different cultural contexts which calls for dynamic operations and flexibility to react to the situation. The basic areas for UN peace missions are as follows:

– conflict prevention and mediation;
– peacemaking;
– peace enforcement;
– peacebuilding.5

In line with these objectives, conflict prevention, mediation and peace-building activities were carried out in Macedonia. Further activities under NATO and later EU operations followed the same objectives. The United Nations Protection Force – UNPROFOR6 were deployed in the Republic of Macedonia in early 1993, upon the request of President Kiro Gligorov and after a UN reconnaissance mission at the turn of November/December 1992. Their task was to ensure the country’s stability and security by monitoring the borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania.

There were a few elements which might have raised instability along the border zone: with the risk that Serbs might have occupied a part of the Macedonian state (Serbs accounted for ca. 2% of the Republic of Macedonia’s population, living in its northern areas7), in particular after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army. It was not exclusively about the possibility of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but perhaps Serbian paramilitary organisations, playing a major role during the war in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, significantly influencing the situation.8 Belgrade’s

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8 The political leader of the Serbian Radical party and the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi, Osvetnici, Četnici) paramilitary groups Vojislav Šešelj instigated incidents in northern Macedonia even before the war. Ibid., p. 294.
political attempts, aimed at partitioning the Macedonian state between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece, should also not be ignored. Other factors might include the smuggling of goods into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which resulted in the UN imposing an embargo that was successively extended, as well as the above-mentioned situation of the Albanian minority which accounted for approx. 25% of Macedonia’s population, living in Serbian (within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Macedonian areas. In the years 1991–1995 international diplomacy was engaged in trying to bring the wars in Croatia and Bosnia to an end, but the appeals and endeavours of the Albanians did not go unnoticed. What is more, the situation of the Macedonian Albanians was far from satisfactory, and they expressed their concerns in the first half of the 1990s. Their frustration grew until the end of the 20th century. The Macedonians were aware that a contingent consisting of 500 people would not be able to defend their country, but the very presence of the UN forces was expected to safeguard stability and peace.11

On 31 March 1995, by virtue of the Security Council’s resolution S/RES/983, the UN mandate was transformed into three separate missions to the three republics.12 It was caused by the fact that despite everything their tasks were of a different nature and they operated in areas of jurisdiction of the three separate states. As to Macedonia, the UN Prevention Force (UNPREDEP)13 had basically the same scope of operation as the former one: monitoring and preventing threats to peace and stability in Macedonia.14 In 1997, in the aftermath of developments in Albania, the UN decided to reduce the contingent, which might on the one hand have testified to the opinion among international diplomats that the situation in Macedonia was stable and not aggravated, while on the other hand that it feared that the conflict might spread further to other regions inhabited by Albanians. Albanian people taking over weapon arsenals might have had tragic effects escalating the Kosovo problem and then the problem might have moved to Macedonia.

10 In February 1993 their number had grown to 700, whilst in 1995 it reached 1,096 troops.
12 UNPROFOR continued its mission in Croatia until March 1995 as the UNCRO (United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation), and in Bosnia and Herzegovina until December 1995 as the UNMBiH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The border control covered a section of 420 km, where 24 permanent and 33 temporary posts were deployed and nearly 40 patrols took place every day. After the outbreak of fighting in Kosovo in 1998, the patrols were strengthened and the border was monitored around the clock. In addition, the UNPREDEP cooperated with civilian agencies operating in the region, the OSCE, the European Commission’s mission and NATO, whose representatives appeared there to support Albanian interests in Kosovo. This involvement led to the war which began on 24th March 1999 with NATO air raids on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nearly a month earlier – on 28th February – UNPREDEP ended its operation in the Republic of Macedonia because of China’s veto, opposing the extension of its mandate. Curiously enough, China which supported Serbia’s interests, requested the withdrawal of the Prevention Force at that risky moment. What is more, as early as 1998 Macedonia was the scene of border incidents and explosions in various parts of the country. When the war began, hundreds of thousands of refugees were heading for Macedonia, illegally crossing the border in north-western areas, mostly inhabited by the Albanian minority. The flow of such a great number of Albanian people (approx. 360,000) threatened the stability of the Macedonian state, with the population of only two million, additionally aggravating inter-ethnic relations. No doubt, this situation had an impact on Macedonia’s accession to the European security organisation – Eurocontrol – as early as autumn 1998.

NATO’S INVOLVEMENT IN STABILIZING THE SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The conflict began to escalate in 2001, and the activities of the Albanian UÇK (ONA) contributed to this. Its members were recruited from Kosovo and groups operating in southern Serbia, declaring themselves to be the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveda and Bujanovac. These developments raised growing tensions in the north-western part of Macedonia, including assaults by armed groups. The Macedonian Ministry of National Defence, in cooperation with the OSCE, spared no effort to

15 ‘Misje pokojowe ONZ’.
16 China broke diplomatic relations with Macedonia in January 1999 because of Macedonia’s established relations with Taiwan.
19 In Macedonia operating as ONA – Osvobodilačka Nacionalna Armija. С. Мирчески, Алманах на Република Македонија..., pp. 41, 66.
regain control over the situation, but regardless of the fact that government forces outnumbered the enemy, their operations did not bring the expected results. On top of that, the ONA took the northern and eastern part of the country. In this situation the signing of the Stability and Association Agreement by the Macedonian authorities was a prudent and desirable act, in which the leading role was played by Member States of the EU. At the same time, the Macedonian authorities sought NATO’s assistance in solving the conflict. In mid-June, President Boris Trajkovski officially asked NATO for help. What is more, the situation alarmed foreign diplomats, fearing another Kosovo. It should be noted that at the time Macedonia participated in the Partnership for Peace, and the NATO manoeuvres were held twice in the country: in 1997 and in 1998.21

To prevent a civil war in Macedonia, the EU and the US sent their two representatives to the country: François Léotard and James Pardew, with the mission to watch over the dialogue between Macedonian and Albanian political parties. At the same time the NATO representative, Peter Feithow, was entrusted with a crisis management mission, and his “shuttle diplomacy” helped to establish contact with the rebels. Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski refused to talk with the ONA, but it was argued that talks with Albanian politicians might have been useless because it was not the politicians but the rebels who had placed the country’s security at risk and presented conditions for peace. Incidentally, these conditions were largely in line with the postulates of Albanian politicians, and ultimately the ONA leaders agreed to respect the peace agreement known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed on 13th August 2001 (though fighting was still going on at that point).22

The Agreement and related additional projects were to be implemented with the help of NATO23, the OSCE, the EU and the US. Disarmament of the ONA and the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement were major challenges, which also called for international involvement.24

The first goal was planned to be achieved in the second half of August 2001. The operation known as Essential Harvest was expected to continue for 45 days and was aimed at disarming the ONA and destroying confiscated weapons. 3,500 NATO troops were deployed to strategic sites such as the Kumanovo area, Petrovac airport, the outskirts of Skopje and Krivolak base in central Macedonia. All in all, the operation involved 4,800 soldiers from 13 countries organised within an inter-

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23 NATO helped to control the situation until the spring of 2001. Т. Чепреганов, ’Платот до независноста’, p. 19.

24 M. Carp, ’Zażegnany dramat’.
national brigade under British command (1,700 British soldiers participated in the operation). 25

According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the operation should have resulted in collecting approximately 85,000 pieces of various weapons, 5 million pieces of ammunition, 9,000 assault rifles, 2,000 semi-assault rifles, 800 sniper rifles of different calibres, 8,000 pistols, 1,500 machine guns, 20,000 grenades, 20,000 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, 500 heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, 900 rocket launchers, 3,000 Osa anti-aircraft sets, 300 hand rocket launchers, 150 Strzala missiles and 100 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Macedonian air force flights were banned over the areas on which the operation had been completed, withdrawing armament, tanks and howitzers. 26

Ultimately, the operation to collect weapons continued for 30 days and ended on the 26th of September. As a result, 3,875 pieces of armaments were confiscated and destroyed. The operation was hailed as NATO’s success, but different opinions were also expressed, such as those published in the Serbian media, stating that the Albanians got rid of outdated weapons, some of which dated from the First World War.

President Trajkovski asked NATO to stay in Macedonia in order to sustain the success achieved and support the process of change. Most troops were withdrawn, only a 700-person unit under German command, called Amber Fox and launched at the end of September, stayed in the country (the transfer of tasks continued until December 2001). Among the main responsibilities was to ensure the security of EU and OSCE observers. The planned term of mandate was one year, and the operation was followed by the last NATO operation – Allied Harmony. It was the follow-up of the previous operation and was expected to end in April 2003, when the European Union was to take over the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Macedonia.

THE EU MISSION

In April 2003, the European Union took over responsibility to help stabilize the internal situation in the Republic of Macedonia. The EU’s activities in Macedonia were twofold: in the long term it was aimed at cooperation with the European Commission in carrying out reform – e.g. assistance in police reform; in the shorter term, the operations focused on some selected issues, such as the Concordia and Proxima missions.

The first was carried out under the European Security and Defence Policy using NATO’s means and resources according to the Berlin+ agreement of March 2003. As stressed by researchers, the implementation of this project was a result of the operations


in the Balkans in the previous decade and the evolution of international interventions based on new methods of crisis management that are currently the basic element of the EU’s defence and security policy. The operation was expected to continue for six months and it actually ended on the 5th of December 2003. Its budget amounted to EUR 4.700 million, with the participation of 357 troops from 13 EU Member States and 14 from non-EU countries. The scope of the mission’s competences was adopted by NATO and envisaged the stabilization of the situation in the country and the supervision of the Ohrid Agreement’s implementation. 27

Whilst the mission was still being carried out, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski launched another project connected with police reform then being made and the National Strategy for the Reform of the Police, developed by the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affair in cooperation with experts from the European Union and the United States. 28 The strategy envisaged the closing of military missions to Macedonia whilst at the same time leaving international representatives who would, on the one hand, help to continue European security policy in the region, whilst on the other hand practically support the Macedonian state in sustaining its still fragile stability. The President opted for this concept, as he wanted to present Macedonia as a country evolving and nearing stability. The EU shared this position, agreeing to grant its support to reform the national security sector. In addition, the EU was to deploy a police mission in Macedonia. 29

The aim of this mission was training recruits, supporting the implementation of regulations under police reform and: the consolidation of law and order; including the fight against organised crime; the creation of a border police; building confidence in local police within the population; enhanced cooperation with neighbouring states in the field of policing, as well as consulting and monitoring the activities of medium- and high-level officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Prominent people in the country who wanted to combine law and order in combating such major issues as organized crime were patrons of the operation. In addition, the Macedonian police was in a difficult situation in view of its ethnic composition, which pursuant to the Ohrid Agreement was to reflect the country’s ethnic proportion, and this level has not been reached yet. Finally, the EUPOL Proxima mission began on the 15th of December 2003. In addition to 200 policemen and women representing EU countries, the mission was to be observed by representatives of the OSCE and the United States. This mission is considered unique be-


29 The project was finally endorsed in 2004. Its implementation began in 2006. Ibid., pp. 279; 281; M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating..., p. 91.
cause the EU institution joined their forces in order to assess how well the Macedonian police functioned and to strive to understand the needs of the country. As a result of the mission’s success, its mandate was extended by another year (until December 2005) at the request of the Macedonian government. The scope of the mission’s competences was similar to that of the previous one. Additionally it included border control, promotion of European police standards and enhancing police cooperation with neighbour states. Upon the completion of both missions, 1,605 people were employed in the police, but it was the result of wider comprehensive activities, conducted after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement.

Later, the continuation of the mandate in the same form was considered no longer necessary, but it was decided that police reform would be supported for six months by the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT). Their competencies included, first of all, sustaining existing achievements in stabilizing the political and social situation, implementing police reform, cooperation between the police and the judiciary and putting mechanisms of internal control in place. In addition, the team was expected to monitor police operations, support the proper functioning of border control and combat organised crime, as well as to help create an efficient police service following the EU standards. Cooperation under bilateral agreements with international organisations, such as the OSCE and individual states (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands), was also envisaged. The programme was intended to serve as a bridge between the police mission which was finally called EUPOL Proxima and the CARDS-funded programmes. This mission was different in nature from a “standard mission”. It was expected to have a real

30 Thus, more than 20% of Albanians should serve in the police structures (so far only 6%). Following the Agreement, the police were to be centrally controlled, but local commandants whose candidatures were proposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were to be selected by local authorities. A long-term process of police reform was carried out in line with the reforms resulting from the Pact on Stability and Association. Cf. more on this subject: R. Wóżnica, ‘Rola Unii Europejskiej...’ p. 279; M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating... p. 92.


impact on the progress of reforms in the police sector, *inter alia*, by the production of monthly reports to the Macedonian government. The structure of the programme was also different as it was directly accountable to the Special Representative.33

In June 2006, EUPAT’s tasks were taken over by the Twinning Project – the European Commission’s project of cooperation between the public administrations of EU Member States with selected candidate countries. In 2005, Macedonia received the status of official candidate, but in the Commission’s opinion reforms and transformation of the police were still needed.34

**SUMMARY**

The military and police peacemaking and social stability missions called for multidimensional activities of the international community. It needs to be stressed that in parallel with military and police operations, aid programmes, e.g. of the Council of Europe, the EU and EU and OSCE, bilateral aid programmes of individual countries (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands)35 were carried out in order to help the transformation of many public institutions and state legislation, adjusting them to EU standards. As regards the problematic national issue, theoretical ideas of the functioning of a multiethnic state were followed, though in the case of Macedonia satisfying the needs of the country’s largest – Albanian – minority was at stake. Paradoxically, the Ohrid Agreement was signed without considering the interests of the Macedonian state and with complete disregard of the Agreement’s impact on the country’s internal security, assuming that the entry of the Ohrid Agreement into force would automatically improve the Albanians’ attitude to the Macedonians and their readiness for sustained cooperation in social harmony.

Military and police operations in the Republic of Macedonia have been assessed as successful. Undoubtedly, stopping the escalation of the armed conflict and reaching compromise thanks to international mediation was the missions’ success. However, the greatest contribution to peace was the Macedonian government’s willingness to endorse the compromise solution, as they conceded to adjusting their policy to the postulates of the country’s largest national minority. It needs to be stressed that the change was not generally supported by Macedonia’s citizens; nor were the Albanians fully satisfied, at least some of them. So the question arose as to whether cooperation of both nations

33 All the more so that the Special Representative also represented the European Commission and was generally in charge of managing the EU’s aid. B. Przybylska-Maszner, ‘EUPAT – policyjny zespół do-radczy...’ , pp. 251, 253.


in the spirit of mutual understanding and respect was viable in the long term. Anyway, the compromise Ohrid Agreement had to be implemented under the supervision of the military, observers and representatives of international police forces from around the EU. What is more, local media showed their mistrust of international military and police missions, which suggested that the Macedonians feared that international diplomacy would take the Albanian side as was the case with Kosovo. On the other hand, the Albanians might fear attempts at disarming them without satisfying their requests, though the Kosovo case showed that they might try to reach their goals using various methods, including armed rising, without any consequences, and to actually succeed.

The Macedonian case shows that the implementation of the international community’s (i.e. leading international actors engaged in crisis resolution) objectives largely consisted of spreading propaganda of success, putting the military and police operations in a positive light, but without taking into account potential long-term social issues. The Essential Harvest operation may serve as an example in this respect; it aimed to confiscate 85,000 pieces of weapons from ONA armed groups but in fact less than 4,000 were collected.36

It should also be noted that EU politicians use European aspirations of such countries as Macedonia to force these countries to follow a policy on which allegedly the pace of the accession process would depend. Macedonia does not have such powerful patrons, as, for example, Croatia, so no help came to ease the restrictive nature of such instruments. Unfortunately, the word of mouth praising the country’s Europeanization and modernization has not translated into any tangible actions allowing the country to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. What is more, such praises might turn out incompatible with the actual policy. This was the case of Macedonia: in 1999 it was called a country of democratic change, whilst two years later it was announced that its constitution and legislation should be revised, as they did not meet the desired standards regarding the minority policy.37

According to Isabella Iannides, thanks to the implementation of the above-mentioned missions and programmes, Macedonia developed legal institutions at the regional and national levels which made it possible to depoliticize and decentralize such institutions, considering their ethnic aspect. However, is it nothing more than a positive assessment of the implementation of programme ideas, irrespective of their actual application and functionality? For example: would not decentralization of the Macedonian authorities raise fears that self-government of ethnic groups might lead to the disintegration of the state from within? The EUPAT programme may be given as an example here: according to Beata Przybylska-Maszner it was reform-oriented rather than focused on stabilizing the social situation.38

37 M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating..., p. 113.
However, the problem lay not in the lack of or disrespect of legislation, but the reluctance to cooperate with another ethnic group, which has been a serious issue throughout the entire Balkan region. Albanians have not fully used the pool of police jobs available to them because they are reluctant to take a job in this sector, which is rather telling, in view of the fact that the country’s unemployment rate is as high as 30%. This shows the motivation behind their revolt of 2001, which may be considered to be aimed at receiving tools to become more independent from the Macedonians than striving for equal rights in order to co-govern the country.39

Curiously enough, in 2006 some Albanian deputies opposed the passing of the resolution. The Act was prepared not only by the Ministry but also by international advisors in order to meet European standards. Rafał Woźnica writes that Albanian DUI-PDP politicians suggested that the mayors associated with that political group might break their cooperation with the police – a serious warning, considering the fact that they were leaders of 15 out of 16 communities with an Albanian majority.40

In November 2012, the Macedonian Parliament passed a new Act on the security sector, containing the controversial provision stating that the Head of the Public Security Office would be authorized to carry out surveillance and tapping without the approval of the judiciary. It raised the indignation of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Macedonia, which stated that this policy was a tacit transition to the police state. In reply to these words, the Police Minister Gordana Jankulovska denied the accusations that the Act broke human rights and freedoms, indicating that Croatia which accessed the EU in July 2013 passed similar regulations.41

In view of the Macedonian case one can conclude that the promotion of EU standards and the adjustment of national legislation have taken part of the nation’s Constitution-based sovereignty to satisfy ethnic minorities’ claims, but it has not brought the expected result – i.e. harmonious co-existence in the spirit of inter-ethnic respect, understanding and cooperation. This is probably what European politicians have in mind talking about the dysfunctions of the model of a multiethnic society. In its law-making and security policy-making, the EU spared no effort to create the necessary instruments to bring about the smooth functioning of a multi-ethnic society within a democratic country. The problem is that the actors involved are reluctant to use such instruments or consciously use them contrary to their original ideas. Paradoxically, though the EU enforces the standards of minority policies on its Member States, these are not completely respected in Western Europe. What is more, in practice they do not even satisfy their initiators.42

42 Participants in the missions to Macedonia mentioned their frustration resulting from their limited mandate, which sometimes prevented them from providing real help (whether through consultancy or action). M. Emerson, E. Gross (eds.), Evaluating..., pp. 95, 102.
Thus, the answer to the research question is rather ambiguous. One can argue that thanks to international involvement, relations between Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians in Macedonia have been stabilized in terms of de-escalation of the armed conflict. However, ethnic relations have not improved in terms of reconciliation and tolerance in the spirit of inter-ethnic cooperation to achieve common goals, such as the good of the common state and the country’s development towards attaining European standards in order to bring Macedonia closer to integration with the European Union.

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