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Paul Ryan and the Press¹

Just as the office of the vice president of the United States has gained new importance during the past several decades, there is generally more information about vice-presidential activities in the national media. In addition to the governing period, broadened coverage also includes the presidential campaign, and there are certain periods of such when running mates receive extensive media exposure. Generally, this is also only periodical, unless one is Spiro Agnew, Dan Quayle, and Sarah Palin, as the conventional wisdom is that “if a running mate is still on the front page three days after their nomination, there is a problem” (quoted in: Ulbig 2010: 333).

At the same time it is very important to follow how the media – the press (or print media) in particular – cover vice-presidential candidates, as they seem to be the sole entity to do some evaluating of them. Running mates are picked by the presumptive nominees and their advisers, frequently with the purpose of maximizing their electoral chances. Convention delegates simply ratify the pick, and since “no one votes for the vice president per se,” (Schlesinger 1974: 483-484) as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote four decades ago, voters, on aggregate (Adkison 1982), rarely think of the second spot when considering their presidential vote, although on the individual level the vice-presidential candidate might have some slight influence (Romero 2001; Ulbig 2010). As electors simply follow voters’ instructions, the press seems to be the last resort for questioning and challenging the vice-presidential choice. And, as frequently at the time of their selection vice-presidential candidates are known only to a handful of political junkies, it is the duty of the press to introduce running mates to the American people. Thus, knowing how the press describes vice-presidential hopefuls might be critical for public opinion in their evaluation of the running mates, and maybe even the presidential vote of some citizens.

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Shortly after Paul Ryan's selection as vice-presidential candidate on the ticket with Mitt Romney, half of the American public viewed the pick as positive, while a quarter had no opinion about Ryan (Kopicki 2012). If this was to change during the course of the campaign, the information that would transform their evaluation would be acquired from the media. Even though the most common sources of political information are television and the Internet, the press and reporters, in particular those of major papers, still possess the trust of the public in many respects. Many a time print media stories are the source of TV reports and Internet content, not mentioning that major print media organizations own a vast number of web news services. This way, the same content that is printed in *The New York Times* or *The Wall Street Journal* appears on numerous websites, just as it has been with syndicated columns.

In this paper I am interested in how print media covered the recent vice-presidential candidate, Representative Paul Ryan, and the way he was introduced to the American people. Due to several reasons, which are not always clear, the press tends to cover and present vice-presidential hopefuls differently. When Republicans who were under the age of fifty, such as Dan Quayle or Sarah Palin, joined the presidential ticket, the coverage was that if they became vice presidents, not to mention the unthinkable happens, it would be nothing but a national disaster. When the only representative in recent memory, Geraldine Ferraro, became Walter Mondale's vice-presidential candidate in 1984, the narrative was that the only reason she had received the nod was because she was a woman: she "had been three terms in the House, but so [had] several dozen male congressmen no one ever heard mentioned for Vice President" (Germond, Witcover 1985: 356).

So was it different in the case of Paul Ryan, a 42-year-old representative from Wisconsin? Why? Did the press consider his selection as predictable or rather unusual? Was he considered as short-term, made to boost electoral chances, or rather a strategic choice, a person that would help to govern and be an influential player in the Romney administration? How did the press reports evaluate his choice in the context of the campaign dynamics? Would he, according to the press, help or rather hinder Mitt Romney? Finally, what leverage, whatever the electoral fortune of the Romney-Ryan ticket, would this nomination have on the future political career of Paul Ryan?

Data and methods

In order to answer these questions, a content analysis of a combined number of five American major newspapers and magazines will be conducted. The sources include three dailies: *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, along with two weekly magazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*. These titles were called by Stephen Hess the most influential in the U.S. news organization hierarchy (Hess 1981), and in his list he also included *The U.S. News and World Report*, as well as *The Washington Star*. I am not going to do so, as three decades have passed since Hess's study, and the dynamics of the U.S. press market is that the *Star* does not exist anymore, and *News and World Report* is not as influential it used to be. Thus the five newspaper sources are taken into consideration, the five that still constitute "an inner ring in the solar system of the Washington news gathering" (Hess 1981: 24). Not only is it also conventional wisdom, but apparently it has not changed according to Hess himself – he does not cover this issue in the most recent and final piece of his so-called "Newswork" series, *Whatever Happened to the Washington Reporters, 1978-2012* (Hess 2012). The content analysis of those sources was also successfully applied by Mark Rozell in his three volumes, where he assessed relations of the press corps with three American presidents, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush (Rozell 1989; Rozell 1992; Rozell 1996).

In this paper I am, however, interested in how the press reacted to the choice of Paul Ryan and how reporters described the Wisconsin representative in terms of his ability, or lack thereof, to influence presidential decisions and thus the presumptive Romney administration. The question of being "of presidential caliber," whether vice-presidential hopefuls possessed presidential qualifications or not, is one of the most central in the contemporary vice-presidential selection, even if its conceptualization and operationalization seem to be far from objective. Because what does having presidential qualifications mean?

This concept is far from being measurable, if this is at all possible. Basically, there is no school, college, or educational track whose graduates would be certified in having mastered the skills to lead the American nation. At the same time, we might argue that many a time those who were thought of as meeting all the necessary criteria turned out to be mediocre chief executives. And even some two-term commanders-in-chief were thought of as having not learned to become a leader even after their lengthy time in office. Yet, even if "no certain measure of ability to be President exists" (Goldstein 1982: 83), after each selection and every campaign, the consensus emerges whether

the candidate was a good choice, i.e. if it was safe for the country that they could have been a heartbeat away from the Presidency.

To examine this in relation to Paul Ryan, a qualitative analysis of newspaper articles will be conducted. Instead of merely counting and descriptively reporting the numbers of articles about Paul Ryan, I will evaluate the character of the press reports about him. First, I will start by shedding some light on his activities prior to the vice-presidential selection. Then I will discuss how the press portrayed Ryan within the five time frames that are the focal point of any vice-presidential candidate coverage: after the selection announcement, before and after the convention speech, around the vice-presidential debate, shortly before Election Day, and after the election is concluded. It is at this last point when the press evaluates running mates' contribution to the standard bearers' electoral fortunes and speculates about their role in the new administration or the political future, if the ticket happens to be unsuccessful.

Thus the articles between July 15th, 2012, and November 15th, 2012, will be examined, and the data collected by setting this time frame for each of the newspaper sources. The articles were collected by simply typing 'Paul Ryan' into the search engine of the *Proquest* database. Typically, before any general election campaign kicks off, the public is in the possession of less information about the running mate than the standard bearer. Yet it often changes with the dynamics of the campaign. Also, since "total information is, by definition, the sum of preexisting information and campaign information" (Bartels 1993: 724), it seems desirable to take a look at the coverage before and after the selection was made, as well as during the campaign.

Paul Ryan: the politician

Unlike Geraldine Ferraro, Dan Quayle, or Sarah Palin, Paul Ryan won the recognition of the national media long before he was selected as Mitt Romney's vice-presidential candidate. At 42, already serving his 7th term in the House, for a long time, and by all the examined press sources, Ryan had been considered as the "intellectual leader of the Republican Party" (Calmes 2012; O'Connor 2012; Tumulty, Sonmez 2012). Campaign worker and congressional staffer of such conservative champions as Sam Brownback and Jack Kemp, Ryan quickly found a way to become a Congressman himself. After the 2006 midterm elections, when GOP lost the majority in Congress, making George W. Bush a lame duck president, Republican congressional leadership made a few bold moves to prepare the party – both in government and in the electorate – for the post-Bush era. One of them was the promotion of

Paul Ryan. With the leadership endorsement, the seniority was bypassed, making Ryan a ranking member of the House Budget Committee (Fahrent-hold, Kane 2012). His role in this body rose significantly, culminating after the 2010 Republican House takeover, when he became the chairman of the Budget Committee, and an influential member of the Ways and Means Committee.

Ryan's visibility in these gatherings ensured his national stature due to several factors. First, with a degree in economics, Ryan knew his talk, gradually becoming the architect of his party's fiscal policy. As successor of Jack Kemp in the conservative movement, Ryan has considered himself as deeply influenced by the libertarian thinker Ayn Rand. This situates his views far right, which is visible in his policy proposals. Thus, when Ryan presented his versions of the United States budget, first in 2008, and then in 2009, 2010 and 2011, he instantly became a darling of the conservatives and Tea Party, as his proposals suggested spending cuts in many social welfare programs, with simultaneous income and corporate tax cuts. In recognition of his role as one of the Republican leaders, Ryan was selected to deliver his party's answer to the presidential State of the Union Address in 2011 (Barbaro 2012). Finally, after winning primaries in Washington, D.C., Maryland and Wisconsin, Mitt Romney reached the status of presumptive presidential nominee, and the press had already started their speculation about the potential vice-presidential choice. At first, Ryan was not among the heavyweights: reporters' types were closer to Senators Rob Portman of Ohio and Marco Rubio of Florida, who were soon followed by former Minnesota Governor and 2012 GOP nomination contender, Tim Pawlenty (Balz 2012). But closer to the selection announcement, Ryan's chances grew. With the speculations at their highest point, *The Wall Street Journal* issued a now-famous editorial asking "Why Not Paul Ryan?" The editorial board argued that "The case for Mr. Ryan is that he best exemplifies the nature and stakes of this election. More than any other politician, the House Budget Chairman has defined those stakes well as a generational choice about the role of government and whether America will once again become a growth economy or sink into interest-group dominated decline" (Editorial 2012). The board identified Ryan as the future of the Republican Party, exemplified by young, but already experienced, legislators such as Ryan, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, or California representative Kevin McCarthy, who presented their vision of the Republican agenda for the United States in the book *Young Guns: A New Generation of Conservative Leaders*, published in 2010. When, just one day after the editorial was printed, Mitt Romney announced his vice-presidential choice, the future had arrived.

Paul Ryan: the vice-presidential nominee

The choice of Ryan was examined by the national press on several levels. Distinguishing between the short-term and long-term criteria of vice-presidential selection, clearly the short term (tactical) are those that would boost a ticket's electoral chances, whereas the long term (strategic) would be those when the running mate is selected due to his/her prospective abilities in helping to govern (Nelson 1988; Hiller, Kriner 2008). From the electoral point of view, Ryan was seen as balancing the Republican ticket in several critical areas.

More than two decades younger than Romney, the vice-presidential candidate possessed impressive legislative experience, covering an area that the former Massachusetts governor lacked. While Romney was a proponent of less bureaucracy, less spending and tax cuts because his business instinct told him so, with a background in economics, Ryan was seen as being able to frame the ideas and views they both shared into the language of policy debate and proposals. As a devoted Catholic, the Wisconsin congressman was also expected to assure the religious voters and organizations, along with the culture warriors, that the Republican ticket, and the then administration, would be addressing values important to them.

From the campaign perspective, the selection of Ryan was perceived as Mitt Romney acting unusually boldly, when he could have easily settled with the safe choice of one of the finalists mentioned earlier. Yet the pick was also seen as the reset of a campaign, if not a potential game changer, similar to the one after Sarah Palin was chosen in 2008 (Heilemann, Halperin 2010), albeit in the opposite direction. It could have served as Romney's new opening in two respects. First, after clinching the Republican nomination, the Romney organization and the candidate himself had made several avoidable mistakes. Etch the Sketch, remarks about the London Olympic Games, and disastrous foreign trips to Great Britain, Israel, and Poland did not resonate well with reporters. The negative media spin, strengthened by Democrat-prepared ads, presenting Romney as a mediocre leader, could have cost the Republicans a lot (Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012a). Secondly, Obama's campaign strategy was to define Romney early as a heartless businessman who would wage war on the poor and would destroy the middle class. Considering that Obama's negative strategy was fully operational and in full force as of early summer 2012 (Thrush, Martin 2012), the selection of Ryan was supposed to cut it in half, forcing the president to change his tone, stop discussing his opponents personality, and start debating issues on a policy level (Baker 2012).

Particularly this second reason appealed to the journalistic world, which was tired of negativity and hoped to start covering a serious debate that would

concentrate on the most pressing areas of U.S. domestic policy. The press also pointed out the fact that finally there was a possibility for this. As both sides agreed that changes in the cost-generating federal government programs were needed, the only thing to do was to sit down and work out the details (Hook, Paletta 2012; Samuelson 2012). On the other hand, it is in the details where the devil is, not only in contemporary American politics.

What is interesting is that the choice of Paul Ryan also pleased the third group with vital stakes in this election – the Democrats. When Ryan presented his budget proposals, the Democrats argued that it would dismantle the system that Americans have been building since the initiation of FDR's *New Deal* and LBJ's *Great Society*. This argument was apparently a catchy one, as some points in Ryan's proposals were condemned by the American Catholic Church's highest authorities as being in opposition to Christian values of assisting the poor (Nicholas, Peters 2012). For months, when Mitt Romney emerged as the GOP primaries' frontrunner, and then presumptive nominee, Democrats painted him as agreeing with Ryan's vision of "ending Medicare as we know it" (Blake 2012; Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012b). So now, when Ryan was invited to join the ticket, this kind of narrative would be even stronger, and Democrats considered Romney's move as a political gift, particularly as it was not a secret that, according to the press hype, Ryan "was promised a role of administration's architect in a drive to enact a budget that shrinks the government and overhauls programs like Medicare" (Gabriel 2012a).

When it comes to reporting on the public opinion of Ryan, shortly after he was selected the shift was rather positive. In the Gallup/*USA Today* poll more of the people surveyed (50% to 30%) thought of Paul Ryan as qualified for the presidency (Kopicki 2012). In the *Washington Post*/ABC News survey, "38 percent viewed Ryan favorably, up from 23 percent who said so just a few days earlier" (Kopicki 2012). In general, Ryan gave Romney an expected boost with conservatives, which also translated into fundraising numbers – Romney campaign spokesman Andrea Saul reported that within 72 hours of the selection announcement, the campaign raised \$7.4 million online (Camia 2012).

As the media reacted to the selection of Ryan rather well – without a single mention that he was unqualified for the highest office – only time would tell whether Paul Ryan would deliver what was expected of him in the realm of the presidential campaign.

Paul Ryan: the campaigner

In a very interesting paper in which Diana Carlin and Peter Bicak tried to establish a theory about the purpose of vice-presidential debates, they argued that it is a venue in which “a candidate must demonstrate fitness to assume the presidency – an office he or she is not actually seeking; define his or her role as a vice president and demonstrate fitness for that office as well; contribute to a better understanding of the presidential running mate’s virtues; respond to attacks on policies and character in a manner that the presidential nominee could not; and lodge more direct attacks on the opponents, especially the presidential running mate, than could be made in a direct matchup between presidential nominees” (Carlin, Bicak 1993: 122). One might argue that these are the expectations and responsibilities of vice presidential candidates not only in the debates, but in the entire presidential campaign. If we add here running mates’ campaign tasks distinguished in classic vice-presidential scholarship, we can easily observe that in this respect Paul Ryan covered all of these tasks in the 2012 race.

One of the first occasions for such is when there comes a moment for the candidates to introduce themselves to the American people. This happens during the national party conventions, when candidates deliver nationally broadcast addresses, accepting their nominations and officially becoming their party’s nominees. Though Ryan’s speech was directed mainly to the conservative base, the press widely criticized the Congressman for several misstatements, including inaccuracy about when the General Motors plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, had been shut down, or that he accused the president of having rejected recommendations of the Simpson-Bowles commission (Parker 2012).

The most important role for Paul Ryan was in the vice-presidential debate with Joe Biden. Unexpectedly, the incumbent vice president, Joe Biden, was in a similar position to George H. W. Bush in the 1984 election. Both then and in 2012, the sitting presidents decisively lost their first presidential debates to, respectively, Walter Mondale and Mitt Romney. Thus, in both instances, the task for the vice presidents was not to lose again, and preventing the challengers from gaining momentum that could have turned the presidential race upside down.

However, the stakes in 2012 were even higher, as the first debate resulted in a complete reset of the race, even allowing Mitt Romney to have a slim lead according to several polls. Conservatives started to believe that the race was not yet over, as almost everyone interested had thought a week before. One of the exemplifications might be the fact that within 48 hours after the first

debate, the Romney campaign had raised as much as 12 million dollars in online contributions alone (Confessore 2012). So if Paul Ryan had followed the path, the Republican ticket advantage might have even increased.

Unfortunately for Ryan, he faced a Washington veteran who had been at the highest levels of American politics for nearly four decades, being first elected to the Senate in 1972, when the Republican running mate was only two years old. Before becoming vice president, Joe Biden had run twice for presidential nomination, and had kept minor, ranking, and major positions in two of the most important Senate bodies – the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary Committee. He also had gained valuable experience during the 2008 campaign, when he debated against Sarah Palin. From the opening statements, the debate was “sharp, spirited, and confrontational,” according to the press (Stanley 2012; Lee, Meckler, McCain Nelson 2012). Joe Biden was at the offensive from the start, defending the president’s and his record, and attacking Romney and Ryan’s policy proposals. In return, Ryan had chosen to deliver “point-by-point rebuttal” (Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012b), calmly and cautiously defending his standard-bearer and himself. He argued that it was actually the Democratic administration that was keen on “cutting \$716 billion in Medicare funding to finance the administration’s health care program” (Balz, Rucker 2012), coined as *Obamacare*. The debate was indeed lively and tough, and was viewed as not having a clear winner. It was described as one of the “meatiest political conversation in many years” (Editorial 2012a), but still a “first-rate performance” (Seib 2012). Unfortunately for Ryan, the instant polling showed Joe Biden as a winner, with a score of 48-44 in the CNN poll, and 50-31 in the CBS survey (Samuelson 2012). But even though Ryan had been unable to sustain the Romney momentum, the opinion of his performance was rather positive, even if the tone of the evaluation was slightly different, due to obvious reasons, in *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*.

What the media paid particular attention to during the course of the campaign was also how two people on the same ticket, Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, were to resolve their policy differences, as they were dissimilar in many ways. As it often is in political campaigns, it is better to hide or even omit some issues or policy proposals in order not to scare independent voters. Yet in 2012, it was impossible for Republicans to hide Ryan’s vision, in particular on changes to the Medicare program, as it was the centerpiece of his fiscal proposals and the path toward a balanced budget. Ideas of gradually turning Medicare into a voucher program, raising the eligibility age for Social Security, deep cuts in the food stamps program, and increasing the Medicare cost to \$6,400, as reflected in the *Congressional Budget Office* (CBO) estimate (Calmes 2012), were heavily exploited by the Democrats, and many reporters speculat-

ed how Mitt Romney might want to answer the allegations that it would also become his agenda if elected. What is striking here is the fact that within less than a day after the announcement that Paul Ryan had been selected, Romney's spokesman claimed that the GOP standard-bearer actually did not fully support Ryan's fiscal positions (Editorial 2012a), which caused some eyebrows to be raised in the press. Closer to the election, many in conservative circles were complaining that since the selection was made, "Ryan looked more like Romney – vague, cautious, and limited to present talking points" (Sonmez, Fahrenthold 2012), not the other way around, as they had hoped.

On the electoral hard-data level, Ryan did not help Romney much. If he had been selected with hopes of turning Wisconsin red and putting Ohio, where Ryan had studied at Miami University and still had many friends, into the Republican columns, the mission was unsuccessful. More importantly, a new national status also seemed unhelpful to the Ryan race itself, as he won with the lowest number ever – less than 55 percent (Kane, Fahrenthold 2012). Yet, as *The New York Times* reported, there were some that actually thought Ryan did more harm than good to Mitt Romney. One research fellow claimed that "Romney lost the election ... because of Paul Ryan," who supposedly had "moved Romney so hard to the right it was hard for him to move back to the middle" (quoted in: Santos 2012). One article in *The Washington Post* also stated that it was actually Ryan's plan for Medicare that had been the decisive factor in the race (Bouie 2012), although Ryan himself rejected this notion (Sonmez 2012) and it was not indicated in the post-election polls.

Paul Ryan: future GOP leader?

When the president of the United States is reelected, the next presidential cycle is one with a so-called open election, as the chief executive cannot hold the office for a third time. Thus, usually the day after the election day is already full of speculations about who might run in four years, and both vice-presidential candidates tend to be at the center of those speculations. When it comes to Joe Biden, people wonder whether in 2016 he would not be perceived as too old for the highest office, whether the Obama administration's record will be plausible enough to run on it in the Democratic Party contest, whether the vice president himself will decide to seek the nomination, and, most importantly, what Joe Biden would do if Hillary Clinton entered the race.

When it comes to Paul Ryan, the question goes far beyond 2016, as some argue that in the next cycle he will still be too young to run for the presidency (Barnes 2012). Ryan seems to be deliberately cutting himself off from those

speculations, claiming that his interests lie in policy debates, which he is able to influence through his current position in the House Budget Committee and the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee he wants to seek in the future (Tumulty, Sonmez 2012). At the same time, Ryan himself and the press cannot escape conversations about his future role in electoral politics.

Whereas the 2012 “defeat is a political career-ender for Mitt Romney” (Gabriel 2012b), this is not the case with Paul Ryan. As Paul Light argued, being as much as a vice-presidential candidate, even on a losing ticket, gives politicians a boost they might use to increase their electoral and political status. While “nothing helps ... look quite as presidential as campaigning, speaking and public liaison” (Light 1984: 117), it also gives several opportunities to meet state and local leaders, form friendships and alliances, and build coalitions which might prove useful and fruitful in the future. Before the selection, Ryan was widely known and admired among the highest levels of Republican circles, party leadership, the right-leaning media, think tanks and outside groups. Even before that he had developed quite an impressive fundraising machine, one of the most efficient among the House members. After the race, Paul Ryan’s name is now also known at the grassroots level. Not only has he reportedly gained more confidence (Tumulty, Sonmez 2012), but also “was invigorated by the race, despite the fears it would wear him down” (O’Connor 2012). What is also important from the electoral perspective is the very fact that in 2012 both Iowa and New Hampshire were swing states and required many presidential and vice-presidential candidates’ visits, in future Republican presidential primaries it might be useful that someone has already become acquainted with the turf there.

As John Heilemann argued, “Ryan’s GOP future is bright” (Heilemann 2012), even more so on the policy-developing levels. At the age of 42, he is already considered a top fiscal policy expert, and in years to come the generation of politicians born in the 1970s and later shall become more and more influential with the Republican leadership, and broadly defined circles. Thus, combining his expertise, alleged ability to speak to young, modern voters, and the very fact that whatever negotiations take place with the White House on deficit and debt reduction, debt limit, or fiscal issues, Ryan will be at the center of events. At the same time, being the “most high-profile foil to Obama and his policies” (Cillizza 2012), he will surely be the favorite of his party base. Therefore, with the national name identification, recognition as the policy wonk, and admiration among people from all three segments² of the Republican Party, along with donors and outside groups, Ryan’s vice-

² Party in government, party in the electorate, party as an organization, as identified by V. O. Key, Jr. (Key 1964).

presidential nod looks more and more like a win-win situation. According to Joseph Schlesinger's theory of political ambition, a "strategic decision is not whether to run but when to run: now or when the winning prospects are higher" (Schlesinger 1966). Whenever Ryan chooses to run for president, he shall be considered an instant frontrunner.

Conclusion: Paul Ryan and the press

Paul Ryan is the kind of politician reporters enjoy to have around: young, speaking modern language, articulate and knowledgeable, someone who knows what he is talking about. At the same time, he has been in politics long enough to learn how the media operates and the importance of soundbites, so he is frequently ready to deliver quotable phrases. If we add the reports of him being one of the most highly likable people among his congressional colleagues and holding an influential position in the U.S. House of Representatives, there seem to be no reasons why the media would disrespect him.

Thus, when he was elevated to the position of vice-presidential candidate, the media's reaction was very positive. This had previously not always been the case. The selection of Spiro Agnew, Dan Quayle, and Sarah Palin caught the media unprepared, possibly because these figures were not first line politicians, often not highly regarded in the most influential political circles.

This was not the case with Paul Ryan, who was unanimously judged as being of presidential caliber. Clearly, Ryan received a lot of criticism, yet it seems it was due to his policy proposals, and not on meritorial grounds. Even the most ardent critic of Paul Ryan, *The New York Times* columnist and economics professor Paul Krugman, never wrote that Ryan was unprepared for the role of second man. Thus, unlike Dan Quayle, whose coverage was not particularly positive, or Sarah Palin, whose relationship with the media has been probably the rockiest one in recent memory, Paul Ryan can be certain that in his future political career he will not have to face the entity many politicians fear the most – the press.

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