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Persuasion Theories and the Linguist

The title of this paper is perhaps too presumptuous because the focal problem of the paper are a couple of issues related to persuasive effects in advertisements. What justifies the title, though, is that the paper attempts to combine what psychology tells us about persuasion with what the linguist can do while analysing a message which is supposed to be persuasive. The general assumption is that the most appropriate and natural framework within which to account for persuasion, social influence, or compliance gaining is the general theory of human action; linguistic behaviour being just one of many potential ways people may choose in order to influence other people. The paper is divided into two parts; first, I will focus on some aspects of persuasion and theoretical models of persuasion, then I will try to point out how a particular model of persuasion encourages a particular linguistic perspective. To be more precise, I will try to show why the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion is of particular relevance in the case of advertisements. Later, starting with the assumption that this model suggests that a linguist should pay more attention to what I call the third-level rhetorical effects, i.e. the rhetorical effects anchored in conceptualisations resulting from linguistic coding, I will analyse some examples of advertising slogans in which the persuasive effects result from the linguistic coding of the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL conceptual schema.

Persuasion

The central problem one has to overcome in establishing a definition of persuasion is that the *definiendum* is a broad term referring to a phenomenon of a truly protean nature. Not only do common sense definitions differ from those presented by scholars active in various fields, and the definitions given by scientists working within the same field stress differing aspects, but also, and most importantly, *persuasion as behaviour* has many facets; thus the definitions are either too general or too particular. To realise what a complex phenomenon persuasion may be, it is enough to think of the omnipresent co-existence of pictorial and verbal messages in advertisements. If we compare picture-based communication and verbal discourse, it is clear that the former

does not have an explicit syntax for expressing causal claims, analogies, and other kinds of propositions; arguments made through sequences of images can be said, *in principle*, to be more open to the perceiver's own interpretation than are verbal arguments. (Messaris 1997: 273)

Even if the two kinds of messages are meant to be complementary and mutually supportive, their persuasive impact is of different nature and calls for different explanations.

The approach embraced in this paper is that of a linguist, so it is language that is primarily brought into focus; nonetheless verbal persuasion understood only as the use of certain lexical items, structures, and ways of developing discourse – in short, as the use of language – is no more than a part of the persuasive process. In other words, a linguistic analysis, however broad, is never a full and comprehensive account of how somebody is “being persuaded.” On the other hand, a linguistic analysis, if it is to be adequate, must take into account a variety of extralinguistic factors.

It is exactly in the sense of *persuasion-as-behaviour* that the concept is defined by psychologists. In their monograph, Seiter and Gass (2004) provide 22 definitions of the term but they openly state that

[they] wish to acknowledge from the outset that [they] maintain no illusions about there being a “correct” definition of persuasion. Various scholars and researchers conceptualize persuasion differently and therefore subscribe to varying definitions of the term. And although there are *some* commonalities

among *some* definitions, there are as many differences as there are similarities. (Seiter and Gass 2004: 17)

The multitude of definitions reflects five basic issues about which there is no universal agreement among researchers. The issues are the following: 1) whether persuasion is intentional or not, 2) whether persuasion means only a successful activity, 3) whether persuasion refers only to conscious efforts, 4) whether persuasion is effected only via symbolic action, and 5) whether self-persuasion may also be legitimately called persuasion (Seiter and Gass 2004).

The analysis of the phenomenon as it is understood by various scholars leads to the conclusion that persuasion is a prototypical category: prototypical in the sense used in cognitive sciences. In other words, there are no clear sufficient and necessary conditions/properties that must obtain for a phenomenon to be called persuasion (which would be typical of classical categorization). Rather, individual instances of persuasion, particular persuasive attempts, share only *some* properties, and what really ties them all together within one conceptual category is “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein 1953).

This conclusion obviously reflects psychological reality and our common experience concerning the phenomenon of persuasion. The abundance of contexts, mediums, channels, and behaviours that are involved in persuasive efforts makes it impossible to provide a satisfactory and exhaustive description that could cover all instances counting as persuasion. Some actions aiming at influencing people are considered more prototypical cases of persuasion than others and there are also actions that will be regarded as persuasive attempts by some and not by others.

In view of the fact that the persuasion process is elusive and persuasion itself should be treated as a prototypical category rather than a classical one, it comes as no surprise that at present no single theoretical perspective upon which all scholars would agree can be identified. There is a multitude of theories, some accounting for a great number of persuasive phenomena, some applying only to a very limited and specific contexts or situations.

In the 1980s two models that are somehow complementary and move away from the attitude-behaviour issue, central to the persuasion

research earlier on, were proposed. One is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), the other the Heuristic Model (HMP). The ELM, elaborated by Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986, 1990) focuses on how messages are received. The authors argue that there are two "modes," or two distinct routes to persuasion: the central route and the peripheral route. The central route means careful examination of persuasive messages, the effect of which is dependent on both the content of the message and the elaboration of the content. The peripheral route means practically no elaboration of the message but reliance on various heuristics and the "peripheral" cues in message evaluations.

The model stipulates that message elaboration varies along the "elaboration likelihood continuum." One end of this continuum is a cognitive involvement characterised by active processing. The other is a cognitive inactivity, where processing is performed almost without or with very little cognitive effort. From this perspective specifying conditions for the occurrence of both modes of processing becomes the central issue. Petty and Cacioppo acknowledge that there are a variety of factors that may determine whether the central or peripheral route is followed; three factors, however, are especially decisive: motivation, cognitive ability, and need for cognition. A message is likely to motivate the message recipient to cognitively process it if the message content is of high relevance for him. Cognitive ability, just as the need for cognition, means not only idiosyncratic characteristics of the message recipient but also external factors such as, for example, distraction.

Some of the theoretical and practical limitations of this model gave an impulse for postulating the Heuristic Model (HMP). Chaiken (1987) suggested also two modes of message elaboration: systematic processing and heuristic processing. The concept of systematic processing is similar to Petty and Cacioppo's central route; heuristic processing is slightly different from peripheral processing:

Peripheral processing reflects a variety of psychological motivations emphasizing the association of the speaker's position with rewarding or unrewarding persuasive cues. Conversely, heuristic processing reflects a single motivation, that is, evaluation of the message recommendation with minimal cognitive effort.

(Stiff 1994: 192)

The ELM model is an either-or model, so it cannot explain the instances where both peripheral and central processing co-occur; the HMP model, on the other hand, accounts for parallel processing without difficulties.

Without going into detail on the ELM and putting aside some reservations, irrelevant in the case of press advertising, that have been put forward since the model was presented for the first time, it may be assumed that in press ads, especially in headlines, slogans and catchphrases, the essential way of creating a persuasive potential is using elements whose powers of persuasion consist first of all in activating the peripheral route. The addressee is to accept the message reflexively and intuitively. Or, at least such acceptance has to be the first step leading to further elaboration based on rational argumentation. In other words, peripheral elaboration may be a necessary stage creating a favourable attitude on the part of the addressee that may, but does not have to, be followed by activating the central route. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that a great number of advertisements are based on activating solely the peripheral route, which is not a preliminary stage leading to further analysis but an aim in itself.

I have focused here on the ELM because it is *the* model that reflects best the communicative situation in most press advertisement. The analysis of this situation leads to the conclusion that most advertisements in the press (in particular, slogans, headlines, catchphrases) are messages in which all constituent elements, the verbal layer included, are subject to one governing principle: the message has to be composed in such a way that its basic functions may be performed on the assumption that the receiver does not get involved in the decoding process and the process itself is short-lived. Simplifying things a bit, one can say that it means that the message should be simple, clear, acceptable, familiar, natural, and attractive.

Three Levels of Rhetorical Effects

The cognitive perspective on language emphasizes on the one hand the role of the speaker in the process of coding messages, and the role of the addressee in the process of decoding on the other. Seen from this

perspective, any act of communication has some rhetorical potential that is realised through particular coding governed by the aims and intentions of the speaker. Rhetorical effects to be achieved are usually of three distinct kinds. First-level effects result from the overall organisation of the text, second-level effects are a matter of lexical choices and word patterns, and third-level effects are rhetorical aspects of the mental construction of meaning (conceptualisations). The clear boundaries between the levels are not to be accurately delineated, since rhetorical effects are rather "holistic"; they refer to the overall persuasive import of a message.

It is sometimes especially difficult to differentiate between the second- and the third-level effects. Let us take an example to point out to the three levels and to signal the difficulties involved in distinguishing between them.

- (1) How do you conquer the highest mountain? The same way you accomplish any task. One step at a time. The gutsy part is setting the goal in the first place. Fairchild Aerospace is determined to set the pace in the global market for 30- to 95-seat jet airliners and large-cabin business jets. And we're doing it one aircraft at a time. Starting with our revolutionary 328JET and moving forward with the all new 428JET, 528JET, 728JET, and 928JET. Eventually we'll have an entire family of aircraft that fits the market. All designed for long-haul comfort. Maximum economy. And peak performance.

As for the first-level rhetorical effects, that is the effects resulting from the overall organisation of the text, we can distinguish here four constitutive parts of the advertising text that conform to a more general persuasive scheme. Such schemes, recurrent rhetorical patterns reflecting our general mental preferences and motivations in persuasive processes, find numerous applications. At the beginning of his book about rhetoric, Nash (1989) analyses the seduction of Eve as presented in the Book of Genesis and points out a pattern that is repeated in numerous persuasive messages that appeared later on in various persuasive "genres." Here is the scheme and particular sentences from the Book of Genesis (cf. Gen. 3,1-4) that mark off consecutive segments of the scheme:

1. The Teasing Question: "Did God really say, 'You must not eat from any tree in the garden?'"

2. The Robust Assurance: “You will not surely die”
3. The Authority: “For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened . . .”
4. The Guarantee: “. . . you will be like God, knowing good and evil”

Here is how Nash comments on the scheme:

The biblical example presents two aspects of the rhetorical act. On the one hand, we see in it a kind of programme, a set of steps upon which the design is constructed; and on the other, an aesthetic form or genre, here taking shape round the designated markers of the argument; and yet it would be perfectly possible for the same construction to be incorporated in a different genre. That is to say, we might take the suggested model – Teasing Question, Robust Assurance, Authority, Guarantee – and build it into a different sort of story; into a dialogue set in a supermarket; into a newspaper editorial on commercial ethics; into a sonnet on love or democracy or malt whisky.

(Nash 1989: 4)

The same pattern may be applied to the advertisement in question:

1. The Teasing Question: How do you conquer the highest mountain?
2. The Robust Assurance: The same way you accomplish any task. One step at a time. The gutsy part is setting the goal in the first place.
3. The Authority: Fairchild Aerospace is determined to set the pace in the global market for 30 to 95-seat jet airliners and large-cabin business jets.
4. The Guarantee: And we're doing it one aircraft at a time. Starting with our revolutionary 328JET and moving forward with the all new 428JET, 528JET, 728JET, and 928JET. Eventually we'll have an entire family of aircraft that fits the market. All designed for long-haul comfort. Maximum economy. And peak performance.

As a consequence, we could say that the overall organisation of the advertisement follows a certain pattern, quite commonly used, that is motivated by, and results from, the psychology of composition. The composition and the first-level rhetorical effects are the results of rhetorical procedures that classical rhetoric called *heuresis*, *taxis*, and *lexis*. That

is to say, the first-level effects are achieved through a composition of the text that is based on a very general knowledge of the addressee, the world, and the language.

Lexis, “the dressing of the topic in appropriately expressive and persuasive language,” is a rhetorical procedure from which the second-level rhetorical effects arise. The procedure consists in a variety of choices ranging from such trivial decisions as using words with strong positive valuations and avoiding ones with negative valuations to more complex patterns that classical rhetoric called *tropes* and *figures*. A detailed analysis of such patterns goes beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like to stress the fact that the second-level rhetorical effects are based on the general linguistic competence on the one hand, and on the general “aesthetic sensitivity” on the other. For example, various “repetitive” patterns (in the analysed ad *one step at a time*, echoed later on in *one aircraft at a time*) might be just “pleasant” for the addressee, and increase the acceptability of the text, which in turn has an impact on the text’s persuasiveness.

The lexical choices in persuasive texts do not function persuasively only because they appeal to the addressee’s aesthetic sensitivity. The phrase *one aircraft at a time* might have a persuasive potential because in combination with the previous phrase (*one step at a time*) it appeals to the reader’s sensitivity. This is, however, only a part of the job this phrase has to do. It serves also as one of the cues, allowing the addressee to conceptualise the advertised activity (producing planes) in terms of another activity (moving upward to the top of a mountain). The text becomes persuasive because of the “perspective” it imposes. The world that the advertisement offers is a world under a certain description and the focal activity is linguistically encoded in such a way that the addressee perceives the manufacturing process as a journey upward. This perspective results from the mental processes that bring about the third-level rhetorical effects.

It is important to notice that while the first-level rhetorical effects are a matter of the overall organisation of the text seen as a whole, and the second-level effects result from particular combinations or patterns of words, phrases, sentences and other units, the third-level rhetorical effects are markedly different because they are anchored in universal mental processes that the text triggers (the DOING SOMETHING IS MOVING FOR-

WARD conceptual metaphor), and are only indirectly connected with particular words or phrases. Classical rhetoric has been almost exclusively involved in investigating the first- and the second-level effects. Disregarding, for the most part, the underlying cognitive aspects of text processing, it has not only put into the background one category of rhetorical effects, but has also given rise to a lot of misconceptions about the very nature of the first- and second-level rhetorical effects (cf. for example what Turner (1987: 16ff) calls "Aristotle's metaphor").

The cognitive approach provides a good perspective that gives justice to the third-level effects. It allows to judge the rhetorical value of persuasive messages on the basis of mental processes that are contingent on the text, its context, the addressee, and the communicative situation. In saying so, I do not want, however, to undermine the value of classical rhetoric as a tool for the analysis of the persuasiveness of texts; in turning to the cognitive approach, I do no more than just shift the centre of gravity. Classical rhetoric thrived in times when the paradigm of a persuasive text was an elaborated speech. The speech was prepared on the assumption of its conscious evaluation on the part of the listeners; hence the reliance on the first- and second-level rhetorical effects, logical argumentation and "ornamentation" with various tropes or figures. Nowadays, in the times when the paradigm of a persuasive message is a salesman's pitch or a commercial, with their pseudo-logic and reliance on slogans, the second- and third-level rhetorical effects come into prominence. This is not to say that the overall organisation of the text does not play a role any more; example 1 shows clearly that it is not the case; even centuries-old persuasive schemes are still operative in modern advertisements.

The shift in the emphasis on how the increase in the acceptability, and consequently, the persuasiveness of texts is achieved is also reflected in such models as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the Heuristic Model. Broadly speaking, they postulate that a great majority of persuasive messages (advertising texts in newspapers included) are subject to "peripheral processing" that relies on a set of heuristics, and that the outcomes of many persuasive practices are the result of subconscious responses to the text rather than conscious "logical" analysis. The dichotomy between central and peripheral processing is not equal to that between rational and irrational processing. If anything, it is the

dichotomy between the conscious and the subconscious; between the mental processes that are easily monitored and those that easily “pass unnoticed” because they are based on well-entrenched cognitive routines. The metaphorical rendering of the company’s activities (producing planes) in terms of another activity (going upward to the top of a mountain) in example 1 is possible because there is a fairly universally shared mental pattern of conceptualising an activity in terms of moving forward.

The so-called “cognitivist perspective” covers too broad a research area to be summarised in a couple of paragraphs. In what follows, I would like to focus only on some basic aspects of the linguistic perspective that has come to be called cognitive linguistics. In particular, I will focus on those aspects that have a bearing on the explanation of how the third-level rhetorical effects are created through the linguistic coding.

The basic tenet of cognitive linguistics is that linguistic competence results from the human being’s constant interaction with, and natural development in, the environment in which all of us have to live. This interaction gives rise to, on the one hand, a set of conceptual primitives, or kinaesthetic image-schemas (or schemata), and, on the other hand, to structured models reflecting reality, which Lakoff calls idealised cognitive models (ICMs).

Kinaesthetic image-schemas are pre-conceptual structured patterns that emerge through bodily, physical experience of reality that we all share. Johnson says that

in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. *A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities.* These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions. (Johnson 1987: 29)

The schemas exist at a very high level of abstraction and generality, which allows them to function as recurrent patterns for structuring a large number of experiences. They are also dynamic – as Johnson says – in two distinct respects:

They are a primary means by which we *construct* or *constitute* order and are not mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured. Unlike templates, schemata are flexible in that they can take on any number of specific instantiations in varying contexts. It is somewhat misleading to say that an image schema gets “filled in” by concrete perceptual details; rather, it must be relatively malleable, so that it can be modified to fit many similar, but different, situations that manifest a recurring underlying structure.

(Johnson 1987: 30)

To the best of my knowledge there has never been made an attempt to systematically classify all image schemas that emerge in human cognition, but the most commonly mentioned (and most important for organisation and ordering of experience) are the CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, LINK, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, SCALE, and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schemas. For the sake of illustration, I will focus exclusively on the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema.

The ELM stipulates that in view of inherent limitations (lack of motivation to get involved on the part of the addressee, no need for cognition, a very short duration) an advertising slogan will be persuasive if the linguistic coding opens up conceptualisations that are universally valid, natural and immediately acceptable. Since the advertising slogan basically refers to what an institution does or offers or what the addressee may do if s/he decides to buy a product or use a service, the basic conceptualisation involved is often the DOING SOMETHING IS MOVING FORWARD metaphor based on the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema.

Particular conceptualisations may stress various aspects of the underlying metaphor or the schema. They may be a manifestation of the general concept a journey:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| (2) Let the journey begin | (US Navy) |
| (3) Click, zip, fast round trip | (Internal Revenue Service / IRS e-file) |
| (4) Follow us, we know the way | (Bank Handlowy) |
| (5) Where do you want to go today? | (Microsoft) |
| (6) For the journey ahead | (BP) |

They may shift the emphasis on the starting point of the journey (SOURCE):

(7) The adventure begins with Pamper (Pampers)

(8) There from the start (Adidas)

Or else the destination (GOAL) may be foregrounded:

(9) Ray-Ban till the end (Ray-Ban)

(10) We're getting there (British Rail)

(11) Across the street from the ordinary (Best Western International)

(12) If you've been waiting for video, it's arrived (Video 2000, Philips)

The linguistic coding may also make both the starting point and the destination prominent:

(13) From thought to finish (Ernst & Young)

as well as some aspects of the journey (further, ahead on the path, faster):

(14) With us you can go so much further (Stanbic Bank)

(15) IMD has taken us one big step further in the way we do our jobs (IMD)

(16) Step ahead (Nikon)

(17) Ahead of current thinking (National Power)

(18) We go a long way to make you happy (Airtours)

(19) The fast way to a better job (JobSite)

Sometimes the "travellers" become prominent:

(20) The legend rolls on (Harley Davidson)

(21) Where nature meets science (Vitabotics)

(22) Go with the pros instead of the cons (Service 911.com)

or the "driving force" causing the movement along the path:

- (23) Managing perceptions that drive performance (Burson-Marsteller)
- (24) We drive the future (Siemens)
- (25) Grasp the forces driving the change (Stanford University)

Sometimes the path itself becomes the central element:

- (26) Right up your street for value (Woolworth's)

In the examples presented so far I have just pointed to certain aspects of the underlying conceptual structures, although the persuasive potential is not infrequently more complex and richer. However, since my aim here is just to show how the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL schema and the DOING SOMETHING IS MOVING FORWARD metaphor are used in short persuasive messages in advertising, I will only try to point out how this basic conceptual pattern may be elaborated, focusing on just one constituent element, namely the PATH.

A simple elaboration may consist in coding more than one PATH suggestive of a number of possible activities that may be undertaken:

- (27) Many paths lead to capital growth. We get you there safe and sound (KfW)
- (28) Many paths, one destination (INSEAD)

The kind of conceptualisation presented above is quite easy to “detect,” since the lexical signals that tie the real-life events to pre-conceptual schemas are fairly conventional. I think nonetheless that analogical or similar rhetorical mechanisms underlie quite a lot of persuasively effective metaphors, for which the descriptions or explanations that traditional rhetoric may give either impoverish the picture or sidetrack important, or even the most important, aspects of a persuasive message. Here is another example, a metaphorical message in which the TIME magazine advertises itself:

- (29) Understanding comes with TIME

A trivial explanation of the effectiveness of this metaphor may be that it is a kind of pun in which the word denoting the concept of “time”

in a fairly popular saying has been replaced with the proper name of a magazine. "Trivial" does not mean here "unimportant," for the readers will, surely, appreciate the intellectual game in which they are involved. This "appreciation" can easily translate into intellectual satisfaction or acceptance, a necessary condition for persuasive effects to occur. If one chose to stop at that point, one does not exhaust the whole persuasive potential of the advertisement. The addressee is typographically cued (*TIME*) to construe the press domain. A piece of commonplace knowledge in this domain is that reading the press is an important source of information and understanding of the world. The word *understanding*, on the other hand, elicits the domain of mental processes, in which "understanding" is viewed as the final outcome (GOAL) of complex mental operations. Finally, it turns out that it is not merely a play on words in which the word "time" is crucial, but also a "play on concepts" in which the same concept, namely "understanding," is derived from two distinct domains. On the one hand, "understanding" is the GOAL of mental activities (in general); on the other hand, supposedly the same GOAL is the result of reading the magazine. What is more, the internal logic of the basic schema is reversed, since it is not the "traveller" that moves towards the GOAL but the GOAL moves towards the static addressee. In other words, the addressee of the message becomes the GOAL for the *TIME Magazine* and *understanding* moving towards him along the path that is delineated through consecutive stages of acquiring knowledge.

The persuasive force of the metaphor lies basically in foregrounding the two domains. The domain of mental activities evokes complex processes that to a large extent are beyond our understanding, and connotes mental effort. The press domain foregrounds the act of reading, fairly easy and pleasant, in which "understanding" is a natural outcome. The reader is "manipulated" in being offered two domains, or two perspectives within which the concept of understanding is construed, and in being invited to replace one with the other.

It is important to realise that it is reliance on, and evoking of, basic conceptual schemas, and then foregrounding or questioning the basic logic of conceptual configuration, that creates a novel perspective, that offers the addressee "a world under a certain perspective." A cognitive pattern that is normally "transparent" because it is the only way of conceptualising a particular configuration is "made prominent." In this way

the pattern becomes rhetorically effective. Normally, such patterns are entirely unconscious. "We have in fact no practical need to analyse them. Biologically, they must be *unproblematic*, making them seem intellectually boring. But they become intellectually interesting the moment we lack them" (Turner 1996: 14). And it is neither the organisation of the text nor particular word patterns that are the source of rhetorical effects. They are neither first- nor the second-level effects. They are third-level rhetorical effects that are brought about via pre-verbal conceptual configurations coded into language in a particular way to produce persuasive effects. Only with such a broadly defined metaphorical locus can we account for third-level rhetorical effects that reside in the cognitive area, and they can be achieved on the assumption of the sender/addressee's actively constructing reality, rather than just passively mapping it (in the sense in which Grace (1987) uses the term).

The final example is meant to show that the pre-conceptual schemas may also contribute to the persuasive potential of a short advertising message when the linguistic coding induces various configurations of the basic pattern, seemingly violating the internal logic of the schema.

(30) Where do you need to be?

How will you get there?

Does it matter?

Yes, it matters.

The journey is the destination.

(Singapore Airlines)

At first glance it may seem that the internal logic of the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL schema is violated. We simply "know" that it cannot be the case that GOAL = MOTION / PATH. While the conceptualisation in which an agent assumes the role of PATH does not violate the internal structure and logic of the schema, the conceptualisation of GOAL and PATH fused into one is impossible, since it violates basic constraints imposed by the schema. Johnson put it in the following way:

To say that image schemata "constrain" our meaning and understanding and that metaphorical systems "constrain" our reasoning is to say that they establish a range of possible patterns of understanding and reasoning. They are like channels in which something can move with a certain limited, rela-

tive freedom. Some movements (inferences) are not possible at all. They are ruled out by the image schemata and metaphors. (Johnson 1987: 137)

How, then, does the addressee go about processing the advertisement? I think that the processing involves a number of factors. The combination of the knowledge of the world, the relevance principle and/or the Maxim of Quantity makes him reconsider the statement *journey is the destination* once again. There are two possibilities, or, in fact, two inferences, a basic one and an extended one, resulting from the same assumptions. If it is not possible that GOAL is PATH and the statement *journey is the destination* is relevant, there must be some reasons for juxtaposing the two concepts and treating them as “equal.” One of the inferences (contextual effects) that might be arrived at – at the cost of additional processing effort – is that the “equality” is the “equality” of, say, valuations associated with both concepts. The destination, or GOAL, as the *raison d’être* of any journey, or the SOURCE–PATH–GOAL schema, has the strongest positive valuations inherent in it (cf. for example Krzeszowski 1997). Thus, the valuations may be transferred onto the journey or PATH / MOVEMENT.

There is another, or complementary, conceptualisation derived from the same starting point. PATH cannot be GOAL if one thinks about a pre-conceptual schema “applied” to a particular event. But, faced with the incongruity PATH = GOAL, the addressee conceives of the real-life event referred to in the advertisement as an event that is linguistically coded through two distinct kinaesthetic schemas. Both are of the same kind, but the linguistic form reveals only the PATH of one event and the GOAL of the other event. In other words, the traveller’s journey is the airlines’ goal. Rhetorically speaking, this conceptualisation is a way of making “present” quite a unique configuration in which the inherent strong positive valuations of GOAL are not just transferred into PATH; they *are* valuations of the PATH, because the reader is forced to see the PATH of the schema underlying one event (the journey) as the GOAL of the schema underlying the other event (airlines’ activities).

Conclusions

Persuasion is first of all action aiming at modelling people's behaviour. Language is one of possible forms of action that may be undertaken in order to achieve intended results. Theoretical models of persuasion provide a general analytic framework that is geared towards particular types of persuasive attempts and as such may give some cues as to what a linguist should pay attention to in differing contexts. In the case of advertising slogans, for example, the natural constraints inherent in the type of communicative events in which slogans are used (no motivation or need to elaborate the message, short duration) make it necessary for the sender to rely on the "peripheral route" to persuasion. It means, among other things, that slogans may be effective if the linguistic coding induces basic relevant metaphorical conceptualisations (the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema and the DOING SOMETHING IS MOVING FORWARD metaphor) that may either make some elements prominent or impose novel configurations of the basic pattern.

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