

THE POWER OF IDEAS BEHIND TERRORISM: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

Dawid Kamil Wieczorek

Jagiellonian University in Krakow
dawid.wieczorek@uj.edu.pl

Orbis Idearum (ISSN: 2353-3900), Vol. 3, Issue 2 (2015), pp. 103–126

INTRODUCTION¹

The concept of power has been the subject of variously disciplined studies.² The common point in discourse on power is the noticeable use of force and violence symbolically, physically, or verbally. Throughout the centuries, power has been displayed in a variety of forms, from economic domination to flat-out terror. There have been states exalting violence against civilians to obtain political or ideological goals, e.g., in ancient times under the regime of Nero and Caligula, during the period of the French Revolution, or in the times of Bolshevik Russia.³ Brutality and the fulfillment of political and ideological aims using violence against civilians is reminiscent of terrorism. Its contemporary developments appear to be even more visible than ever because of terrorists' massive engagement in the media, treated by them as recruitment area, and a battlefield. Each epoch has its own definition of terrorism, and the reality following 9/11 redefined terrorism as it was known

1 This article contains results of research conducted between July and December of 2014 at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. It is also English version of a part of PhD dissertation.

2 See, e.g., M. Foucault: *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, transl. by C. Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books 1980; P. Morris: *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1987; G. Deluze: *Foucault*, New York: Continuum 2006; P. Bourdieu: *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. by G. Raymond, Harvard: Harvard University Press 1991; J. Nye: *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs 2004; *Id.: The Future of Power*, New York: PublicAffairs 2011; I. Berlin: *Die Macht der Ideen*. Berlin Verlag: Berlin 2006; U. Dierse: „Die ‚Macht der Ideen‘ im deutschen Vormärz“. [In:] M. Kowalewicz (ed.): *Formen der Ideengeschichte*. mentis: Münster 2014, p. 17-30; Savoie: *Power: Where Is It?* Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2010; S. R. Barrett/S. Stokholm/J. Burke: "The Idea of Power and the Power of Ideas: A Review Essay." [In:] *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 103, Issue 2, online publishing 2008, p. 468-480.

3 Compare for example the biography of Felix Dzerzhynski, who claimed that terror is necessary during revolution: B. Bromage: *Man of Terror, Dzerzhynski*, London: Peter Owen 1933.

from the past. This does not mean that we have forgotten the broad typologies of terrorism or the smaller organizations that still act today. After 9/11, Westerners do not think of “terrorism” so much as left- or right-wing extremist organizations, but rather envisage brutal acts in Africa, the Middle East, and on the borders of Syria and Iraq. They imagine that in these places, a powerful voice condemns infidels and the West in general, and there is a physical clash of powers. This voice is amplified by the development of new media that are handily utilized. Just as the Vietnam war was more visible and triggered more social contests because of more media coverage than in previous wars, a similar situation is occurring with terrorism nowadays. Additionally, the amount of terrorist acts committed for religious reasons (the Matsumoto incident, the Madrid train bombing, and the London, Istanbul, and New Delhi bombings) show the characteristics of the most recent shape of terrorism. What is important for this study are the distinct ideas that can be identified behind terrorism. Therefore, the aim of this article is (1) the identification of ideas standing behind major terrorist organizations that show the relationship between terrorism and power, and (2) terrorism’s reference to the mechanisms of seizing power, giving ideas specific, contextual meaning. The main methods used here are case studies and the critical analysis composed of some organizations’ statements, manifestos, media coverage, and references to religious texts. The aim is to answer the following questions: Do the ideas selected below really drive terrorist groups in the Middle East? How does look the process of enacting the ideas work? What are the (global) consequences of such terrorist activity? There is also an ontological issue that might arise: are ideas “transmitters” of power and values, i.e., do they have a specific meaning attached? Or do they just trigger some mindset and behavior by specific nature and use in context? Most revolutions, wars, and other conflicts have been grounded in some ideology. Not only is the manifestation of power crucial in the case of conflicts, but also in the ideas that stand behind the conflicts and form ideologies. We have already faced different ideas throughout history, e.g. *Übermensch*, the proletarian nation, and collectivism during the rise of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and communism in Soviet Russia. We will try to prove that such an affection for ideas is also visible nowadays in the case of a popular flag and other examples of terrorism.⁴

4 Here we mean Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). In this article we focus mostly on ISIS as probably the most powerful exemplary case, but many other organizations are meant here that are similar ideologically, structurally, or are more or less connected with ISIS, such as the Al-Qaeda Network (especially with Al-Nusra Front), Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Ansar al-Sharia, and Fatah Al-Islam.

THE MEANING OF TERROR AND TERRORISM

The meaning of terrorism has varied a lot throughout the ages; until the twentieth century, it was difficult for scholars to define its modern meaning univocally. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we have witnessed the constant redefinition of terrorism.⁵ International agendas are still defining the next types of terrorism in international conventions,⁶ although there is no univocal definition devoted only to terrorism and accepted by affiliated states. The regulations are dispersed in documents regarding fields of activity such as air traffic or financing of terrorist organizations. Combining this with the variety of forms of terrorism that violent organizations and movements can be organized in, it seems necessary to be as precise as possible in this definition without getting stuck in tricky details. Violent political movements, for example, can transform very rapidly⁷ and act as terrorists at one moment, and as a completely legal party in the next.

According to one of the major works of the history of ideas, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, terror and terrorism appear in at least four different meanings: biblical-theological, psychological-aesthetical, political, and legal.⁸ Generally, terror refers to fear, for example the fear of God, authorities, or the government; it can be individual or mass-oriented. During the French Revolution in 1789, terror peaked in use, and was used for describing a particular historical period, namely the turn in the Revolution after Thermidor 9th (July 27, 1794), a day called “*époque de la terreur*.” Social changes occurring after this period connected with the process of forming nation states brought another perspective. The development of leftist socialist and anarchist thought which distinguished and admired the working class, as well as the need for revolution, effected in national, political, ideological, and governmental forms of terror, among other things. This was visible during the Bolshevik revolution and after the Second World War in Stalin’s Soviet Russia. Also, right-wing policy resorted to terror, e.g., National Socialism in Germany. Apparently, the extremist and most radical versions of any ideology that allowed violence tended to sow fear through terror. While the use of the concept of *terror* has de-

5 W. Dietl/K. Hirschmann/R. Tophoven (eds.): *Terrorism*. PWN: Warsaw 2011, originally published as *Das Terrorismus-Lexikon. Täter, Opfer, Hintergründe*. Eichborn AG: Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 29.

6 Currently, there are over 200 definitions of terrorism. They are formulated in many legal acts, mostly in the Tokyo Convention (1963), the general resolutions of the United Nations (which are still being updated), and the *Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism* from 1998.

7 See K. Grisham: *Transforming Violent Political Movements: Rebels today, what tomorrow?* London/New York: Routledge 2014.

8 O. Brunner/W. Conze/R. Koselleck (eds.): *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 6. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1972-1997, p. 325.

creased since early modern times and has been replaced with *terrorism*, a significant rise in this word usage dates from the early nineteenth century up until today.⁹

After broadening the scope of terror through the French Revolution, none other than a Frenchman attempted to deconstruct it. Jacques Derrida, interviewed by Giovanna Borradori after 9/11, the breakthrough point in history for understanding contemporary terrorism, analyzed this example to describe the most recent facet of terrorism exhaustively, using “terror,” “international terrorism,” and other phrases, and at the same time referring to political, ideological, and social contexts on the local and global scale. He makes the following points: the lack of dialogue between the West and Islam was induced by the lack of Enlightenment, colonialism, or imperialism in Africa or the Middle East; the result of this lack of dialogue is that people are taking up arms and the distinction between civilians, police and the military is vanishing. This makes the terrorism of 9/11 appear “wealthy, hypersophisticated, telecommunicative, anonymous, and without an assignable state.”¹⁰ Derrida points out another factor that is essential for today’s (global) terrorism: the development of technology. Terrorism is aimed at the imagination and a sense of security. It is both symbolic and mental, and aims to provoke reactions more or less intentionally. In times of sophisticated information technology and nanotechnologies, it is no longer always necessary to use open violence but rather to attack information systems, computers, databases, etc. The use of contemporary technologies also includes media that are very important for both sides of conflict: terrorists use them so that their actions can be as transparent as possible, and anti-terrorists need them to justify their measures for fighting terrorism. But the use of technology does not mean the end of open violence. Derrida notes in his essay “Faith and Knowledge” that people tend to use extreme violence in the name of religion, including torture, beheadings, or rape, to declare “revenge” (similar to the French Revolution) and rage against informatization. Numerous examples of cotemporary wars can be mentioned here, such as those in Rwanda, Pakistan, Yemen, and many others.¹¹

The terminology is unclear after that point. The dichotomy of freedom fighter/terrorist no longer exists. The definition of terror changes according to the current situation and international agendas are not able—or do not want—to work out a consistent definition. Among other things, the reason for this is to enable anti-terrorist intervention wars, allowing veterans from these military conflicts to be paid. Moreover, contemporary terrorists do not need territory as much as in

9 Exemplary analysis based on *Google books Ngram viewer* for words *terror* and *terrorism* appearing in books published in English between 1500 and 2008.

10 G. Borradori: *Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago: Chicago University Press 2003. [Polish translation: *Filozofia w czasach terroru. Rozmowy z Jürgenem Habermasem i Jacques'em Derridą*, ed. by B. Żółtowska, transl. by A. Karalus/M. Kilanowski/B. Orlewski. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne 2008].

11 *Ibid.* p. 190.

the past; now, their actions are aimed at boosting technocratic power or political control which is also determined geopolitically.¹²

At some point, the semantic difference between terror and terrorism is noticeable. For Western civilization, terror has primarily referred to the reign of dictators, Caesars, and emperors and described the forms and methods of their governance. According to Tom O'Connor, we have been able to use the term terrorism in a more modern sense since the French Revolution. For example, Edmund Burke uses this term to describe the governance of the Jacobins, including their means and methods.¹³ The difference between the prerevolutionary and post-revolutionary meanings of terror/terrorism is not so obvious. From today's perspective, terror is related to a state or government's activity. Here we can mention the well-known totalitarian regimes of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. According to Boaz Ganor, terrorism, the more modern term, refers to different extremist groups, organizations, and individuals who aim to harm or threaten non-combatants (using violence) and have a particular political aim (meaning it could also be ideological or religious).¹⁴ Mikkel Thorup makes another distinction. According to his *Intellectual History of Terror*, terror refers to state-related violent activities, while terrorism is separate from the state. It remains a kind of anti-state power and is connected to individual acts and organizations opposing the state (however, he has a different category for anarchists and nihilists).¹⁵ Usually, terrorists are not part of an authorized or legal (internationally acknowledged) power, but they might gain power as the Jacobins did in the past and significant terrorist organizations still do today.

CONTEXT OF IDEOLOGY

Behind each struggle stand special motifs, world views, and contextual conditions. The act of seizing power usually comes from and serves the purposes stated by ideas, ideologies, a sense of identity, or other socially unifying phenomena. Power is seldom seized, and terrorism is seldom enacted, just for the sake of its own. These actions belong more to the realm of anarchists. Having a look at what is happening in the Middle East at the borders of Syria and Iraq especially, one might think about the dark past of Nazi Germany. The current situation stemmed from the destabilization of the territory of Iraq and Syria. This destabilization was caused by the military interventions of the United States, the United Nations, and the

12 *Ibid.* Part two.

13 T. O'Connor, *The Criminology of Terrorism: History, Law, Definitions, Typologies*, in: cultsandterror.org [08-19-2014].

14 B. Ganor: "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another's Man Freedom Fighter?" [In:] *Police Practice and Research*, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304

15 M. Thorup: *An Intellectual History of Terror. War, Violence and the State*. Routledge: London/New York 2012, pp. 102-135.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the Syrian Civil War as a consequence of the Arab Spring. Smaller paramilitary fractions, guerillas, and terrorist groups first fought among themselves, and then many of them joined together under one flag to fight against the forces allied in the war on terrorism. These people need to pay taxes that appear to be closer to extortion just to have the basic necessities of water and electricity. Even more significantly, UN reports state that kidnappings usually demand the payment of ransom.¹⁶ The conditions of economic and political crisis opened the gates for extremisms such as the extensive use of violence and harsh laws. Among the main aims of local terrorist organizations is the proclamation of the caliphate. This was completed in 2014¹⁷ and aimed at a world caliphate. We find references to literal, very conservative interpretations of the Quran and Sharia law, referring especially to Wahhabi/Salafi movements demanding the return to the roots of the religion, i.e., a pivotal understanding of the Quran. We especially see some references to the teaching of Wahhabism by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a former of orthodox Sunni Islam. Alastair Crooke, a British diplomat and a former of *Conflicts Forum*,¹⁸ conducted a historical analysis of Wahhabism and suggested some interesting comparisons. He writes:

Abd al-Wahhab demanded conformity -- a conformity that was to be demonstrated in physical and tangible ways. He argued that all Muslims must individually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. The list of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim denominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all.

[...]

Their [wahhabists'] strategy -- like that of ISIS today -- was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear.¹⁹

Human Rights Watch reports on the discrimination of religions other than Wahhabi/Salafi-Islam, and severe punishments for not obeying specific rules. Historical periods of turbulence, especially the years of the formation of the Saudi State dur-

16 See "Explained: Who's funding Islamic State?" in Grisham: *ibidem*.

17 See "Iraq conflict: ISIS declares a 'caliphate,' calls for Muslims to pledge allegiance" in: www.abc.net.au. Information acquired by Agence France-Presse (AFP), APTN, Reuters, AAP, CNN, and the BBC World Service [02-08-2015].

18 *Conflicts Forum* is a think-tank dealing with military and political conflicts, especially in the Middle East, co-participating in the Western and Islamic spheres.

19 A. Crooke: "You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia." [In:] <conflictsforum.org> [02-15-2015]. See also S. Coll: *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, London: Penguin Books 2004.

ing 1741-1818, led to the current situation in the Middle East. Now, we can observe the increasing popularity of violent solutions, because of which

Wahhabism was forcefully changed from a movement of revolutionary jihad and theological takfiri purification, to a movement of conservative social, political, theological, and religious da'wa (Islamic call) and to justifying the institution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and the King's absolute power.²⁰

Therefore, this religious movement is currently connected mostly with extremism and jihad. Natana J. DeLong-Bas, author of books on Islam and jihadism, notices that contemporary interpretations of Wahhabi's writings do not fully reflect their contents. In her book, which pioneers English translations of Wahhabi's texts from Arabic, she proposes some interesting perspectives on the issue. We read that

Wahhabism in the contemporary era is largely portrayed as misogynist, denying women their human rights, insisting on strict gender segregation, forbidding women access to public space, and subjugating them by considering them inferior to men. [...] but the term Wahhabism is rarely defined. Many of the regimes and movements labelled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militarism, extremism, or a strict literal interpretation of the Quran.²¹

Confirmation of this statement can be complemented with the text of another author who writes about Wahhabi and Saudi Arabia, David Commins: "To judge the issue fairly, Ibn Azzuz [Tunisian Sheikh] looked over some Wahhabi writings and concluded that their beliefs were sound. His letter [to Mahmud al-Alusi] gives a sense of how elastic the meaning of 'Wahhabi' had become."²²

The understanding of Wahhabism as the most comprehensive (including religion, politics, and law) and influential movement depicts its importance and explains most of its ideological weight. It still remains a way of interpreting bigger idea: the idea of God.

20 *Ibidem.*

21 N. J. DeLong-Bas: *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, London: I.B. Tauris 2007, p. 123sq.

22 D. Commins: *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, London: I.B. Tauris 2006, p. 134.

IDEAS

God and Faith

A strong attachment to God and faith seems to be one of the most important elements for the face of terrorism today. Wahhabi-rooted terrorists openly manifest their faith and find religious texts as justification for their activity, even though the vast majority of the interpreters of Islam reject such a narrative. Moreover, within Wahhabism there are arguments about the use of violence and punishment for apostates and infidels. Just after the world witnessed violence in France at the beginning of 2015, the national Muslim leagues in many countries condemned it for having nothing in common with Islam. Even controversial fragments from the Quran about Jihad are not interpreted literally today by most Muslims but rather are exploited and violated for the purpose of undertaking illegal military actions. But can one not also find violence in other religious texts like the Bible or Torah? Yes; however, the organizations that are the most transparent and dangerous for international safety are organizations exploiting the Quran as their argument for violence.

An integral part of the idea of God is faith (*iman*) in Islam. The belief in six articles of Islam is the reason why terrorists believe that non-believers should be executed regardless of is in Hadith, the collection of Muhammad's sayings: "none of you believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself," a line which resembles the golden rule. Besides the importance of God, this indicates their selectiveness in their choice and interpretation of religious texts.

(Religious) Law

The special place of religion among contemporary terrorists points to the rules of religious law. As was stated earlier, today's terrorism is largely linked with extreme interpretations of Islam, even though they are rejected by the majority of believers. The basic form of social and political organization is, for example, a caliphate²³ based upon Sharia law. Such a "state" has already appeared at the borders of Syria and Iraq. Sharia regulates both religious behavior and everyday activities. There is no such thing as the separation of religion and state that has been important for the Western world since the Enlightenment. All possible fields of human activity are subjugated to religion through the law. This issue is strongly connected to the

23 The self-proclaimed caliphates of today are mostly in Syria (proclaimed by ISIS) and in some territories in Africa: mostly Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon (proclaimed by Boko Haram).

dichotomy of morals and ethics. According to Graham Hughes, the author of the entry about *law* in the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*:

In primitive societies legal rules are often not sharply distinguished from religious prescriptions and the dictates of social morality or convention. It is only with the emergence of law as a distinct and organized form of social control in a relatively advanced civilization that the problems mentioned above become apparent. The Greek Sophists raised such questions in the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. They distinguished between nature (*physis*) and convention or law (*nomos*) and regarded law as an artificial, man-made scheme of regulation which encroached upon natural freedoms.

[...]

The sharp separation between law and morals which has characterized the positivist position becomes difficult to defend when the close similarities between legal and moral reasoning are pointed out. In this way contemporary studies of legal reasoning hold out some promise of bridging the ancient division between positivist and natural law traditions.

Such an opinion helps explain the need for Sharia law. In these circumstances, ethics are almost equated with morals, so there is no separation between the power of the state and the power of religion. This set of rules, because of its contradictions in logic and its ambiguities, is the outcome of several hundred years' worth of interpretations of the Quran. However, it is very useful for terrorists who can implement it to control people. Such sociopolitical organization helps in seizing and holding power, especially while rejecting international laws and taking part in extreme violence.

However, along with the development of civilization and the strengthening of international bonds between countries in the economic, political, and cultural spheres (called globalization or *mondialisation*), the extreme conservative and violent versions of Islamic terrorism may be doomed to isolation and condemnation. This can be seen in the interventions of democratic states in these areas. The reasons for this inevitable decline are mostly connected with the terrorists' disrespect of basic laws: their violation of human rights in various manners (homicides, genocides), and the act of threatening and terrorizing world governments. According to some, e.g., Neil Smelser, post 9/11 terrorism is not anything new, especially with regard to globalization. This is because nothing is new about ideologies or proceedings. Others, such as Gemma Edwards,²⁴ claim globalization is a phenomenon without a particular influence—other than cultural—on the spread of terrorism. Either way, terrorists can have more attention placed on their activity through transnational networks and global access to media, and they attempt to recruit new members this way. The most recent cases of terrorist groups indicate

24 G. Edwards: *Social Movements and Protest*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 109sq.

the formation of a strong cultural opposition to the globalized, liberal economic models rooted in Western culture. It is certain that modern technologies and social processes occurring worldwide have allowed different groups to be more visible than ever.

Power and Protest

The visibility or transparency of social movements can often be distorted. Images delivered by global networks are not only often selective, but particular labels can be put on social phenomena. The revolution of 2010 and 2011 in Middle Eastern and North African countries was a huge destabilizing factor conducive to the emergence of radical movements. Dissatisfaction caused by a lowered status of living, e.g., by high food prices, and oppressive authoritarian regimes provoked the outbreak of violent and nonviolent actions. Such an environment, a conglomerate of disadvantageous factors connected to economy, politics, and culture, is a favorable milieu for triggering uncontrollable power stemming from the social organization. Strong fundamentalist-driven ideology that accompanied terrorist organizations in the Middle East took a chance and had a strong backing from protest movements that arose during the Arab Spring and Winter. According to Jean Jacques Waardenburg, we can distinguish three kinds of religious movements that have the characteristics of a protest. The first kind is related to groups struggling with Western domination and economic models; the second refers to moral decline and reformative movements; and the third involves indirect forms of protest within Islam referring to law and mysticism.²⁵ Nevertheless, the author tends to describe religion as a vehicle for socio-political and economic factors, as well. Contemporary Middle Eastern terrorism can be classified as the first kind of religious movements with the characteristics of a protest because of Sunni religious leaders, violence, and open protest against Western domination. In 1978, Adel Faouzi wrote about four types of protest movements. One of them is considered to be the establishment of an Islamic state, has a militant-political character, and involves extreme actions. Another is considered to have an ideological character including discrimination and injustice, resist the influence of other cultures, and aim at the expansion of Islam to become a normative and ideological pattern.²⁶ Nowadays, in addition to the classic "Louis-Auguste Blanqui [who] preached revolution for revolution's sake, with only the vaguest suggestion of the social and political justice

25 J. J. Waardenburg: *Islam: Historical, Social, and Political Perspectives*, Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter 2002, pp. 368-375.

26 A. Faouzi: "Islam, réformisme et nationalisme dans la résistance à la colonisation française en Algérie (1830-1930)." [In:] *Revue internationale des Etudes socio-religieuses, Social Compass* n° 34, 1978, Université Louvain La Neuve (Belgique).

that would ensue,”²⁷ we also need to bear in mind that protests and revolutionary movements are highly contextualized. According to Peter N. Stears, author of the *protest movements* entry in the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*,²⁸

[...] a successful protest ideology leads to quite diverse protest movements in different regions, among different social groups, even among different personality types. Socialism among stubborn but practical miners, to use one example, was never the same as socialism among more visionary textile workers.

It implies that the understanding of more factors is necessary to grasp the characteristics of terrorist, revolutionary, or protest groups. In the Middle East, it was possible to transform the protest movements into one very active, open-militant, and wealthy organization²⁹ due to a specific conglomeration of ideological, religious, and economic factors: the Islamic religion, extremist interpretations and ideologies, frustration caused by the military destabilization of the region, external funding, and oilfields.

The very special context for the unification of insurgents and terrorists can then be characterized by a complex manipulative strategy (due to social media skills and propaganda), engagement in insurgent movements and civil wars, and the extensive use of violence and strong fundamentalism. Quoting Stears, “The future of the study of ideas and protest lies in the admittedly difficult examination of the actual contacts between ideas and those who use them.”³⁰ In doing so, one notices the importance of who uses ideas like freedom or liberation. People who first fought for freedom and later became engaged in the wave of the anti-dictatorship movement soon became fighters for the caliphate that claims to be a “state.”

Statehood and Totality

The Frankfurt School thoroughly examined the phenomenon of totalitarianism after the twentieth century’s traumatic experience of totalitarian states. The School of Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Max Horkheimer, among others, attributed it to the development of mass media. Even though the characteristics of

27 P. Stears: *Protest Movements*. [In:] P. Wiener (ed.): *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas* (1905-1992). Online version based on 1974 print edition in: <http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu>, [02-08-2015], p. 671.

28 *Ibidem*, p. 676.

29 For the mechanism and the process of such transformations see: S. Adnan/A. Reese: *Middle East Security Report 24. Beyond the Islamic State: Iraqi Sunni Insurgency*. [In:] *Institute for the Study of War* website <understandingwar.org> 2014, as well as St. Wicken/J. Lewis: *From Protest Movement to Armed Resistance: 2013 Iraq Update #24*. [In:] *ibid.*, June 15, 2013.

30 *Ibid.*

the media in the 1940s and 60s was very different than the contemporary one, one might find some interesting similarities. The momentum for *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944)³¹ was immediately important to the growth of media, such as radio and television, which was exploited heavily by totalitarian regimes. A similar rapid growth took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century when the Internet became the primary tool for banking, communication, entertainment, and other, less obvious purposes: data gathering and processing, the monitoring of networks and real-life activity, and criminal activity. Terrorists know how to use social media to attract people, especially youth. However, the placement of media in the non-mainstream understanding of a state is challenging and demands additional training. What is the understanding of a state in reference to caliphates?

One might mention here the vast variety of understandings of what a state is, from that of Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli to Marx, Weber, and Jessop. Therefore, we will refer to the basic documents concerning this issue. According to them, “the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”³² Until now, the population of terrorist-controlled areas was constantly changing and consisted of many nations, mostly from the conquered Syrian and Iraqi citizens that still formally have their citizenship, in contrast to the terrorists who were supposed to lose it. Their territory is not defined clearly and is still being developed. This is also because of terrorists’ expansive ambitions; according to *Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium*, the governmental structures of today’s caliphate in Syria, Iraq, and the Levant are still developing but are already functional, providing basic necessities such as food, gas, water, and electricity to people; on the other hand, they also decide who is to be beheaded.³³ In reference to the last point (d), their constant threatening and violations of the international conventions make it impossible to have a dialogue with them. Thus, according to *Montevideo Convention*, today’s caliphates cannot be considered states—not even as religious states, as some North-European countries have claimed. The difference between the state religions of today is that most of them respect international law and are acknowledged and respected by international society as states.

31 Max Horkheimer/Theodor Adorno: *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente*, New York: Social Studies Association, Inc. 1944; Polish translation by M. Łukasiewicz with the afterword of M. Siemek: *Dialektyka oświecenia. Fragmenty filozoficzne*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej 2010.

32 *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States Convention on rights and duties of states adopted by the seventh International Conference of American States adopted at the seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, Uruguay, and signed on December 26, 1933, Washington D.C. 1934*, Article 1.

33 See the TRAC website: <<http://www.trackingterrorism.org/>> [02-16-2015].

In the discussion of the statehood of currently proclaimed caliphates, we should also mention their form of governance. Let us take the example of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. Behind the organization stands one person with the highest power (the caliph/commander in chief), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (*nom de guerre*), whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarrai;³⁴ he is the leader of the ultraconservative movement of Sunni Islam. Under his power we can distinguish two deputies: Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, the deputy of Iraq, and Abu Ali al-Anbari, the deputy of Syria. They are the “brains” of the organization’s ideology. Under each deputy are twelve governors for Iraq and twelve for Syria: financial, leadership, military, legal, fighters’ assistance, security, intelligence, and media councils. There is also an executive branch, which is a cabinet with Baghdadi’s advisers that is superior to the Shura council that regulates religious and military affairs. This structure might be reminiscent of the organization of a state, but there are factors that make it more like a totalitarian regime. Michael Curtis writes about the totalitarian concept:³⁵

The totalitarian concept has been a useful term to typify a particular genre of contemporary regime in an age of mass democracy in which the population can be controlled by a variety of means, especially terror. Dictatorships, despotisms, and autocratic regimes are akin to totalitarian ones in their elitist rule, arbitrary use of political power, minimization of private individual rights, and in their ordered and hierarchical institutions. [...] Totalitarian systems embody not only strong and arbitrary power but also the insistence on conformity of the whole society, mass mobilization, the subjugation of all classes to a dominant political group and attacks on the “enemies” of the system and on their ideology. Resting on mass support and mass movements rather than on the economic and social groups that formed the elite in earlier systems and maintained by a combination of force, indoctrination, and propaganda, the totalitarian regime is tutelary in nature, purporting to incarnate the true and necessary values to give meaning to the lives of its citizens.

In the case of terrorist-governed caliphates, it is hard to speak of any sort of democracy. The “state” is rather control through terror. It is not an authoritarian state where pluralism, freedom to enter the economic market, and freedom of expression are given to the citizens. Authoritarian countries usually do not have an official ideology, while totalitarian regimes do. Curtis continues:³⁶

The distinctiveness of totalitarianism arises, as Orwell argued, in the effort to control thoughts and emotions as well as actions. Its novelty is in the more ef-

34 See BBC News website from Middle East article – *Profile: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi*.

35 M. Curtis: *Totalitarianism*. Transaction: New Brunswick, New Jersey 1987, p. 2-5.

36 *Ibidem*, p. 5sq.

efficient technological devices, the mass media, the skilled personnel, and the mass support available for coercion, manipulation, and indoctrination of whole populations to implement the perceived truth or objectives and to bring about the desired changes in thought and action.

Just to give an example of how skillfully an individual or group can be manipulated, controlled, and surrendered to somebody else's power, see the case of *Al-Khanssaa Brigade*, the female terrorist group. In their last manifesto, we can see that their thoughts, emotions, and behavior are totally controlled by an outside force. The document was translated and released on the website of the Quilliam Foundation, a counter-extremism think-tank, in February 2015. According to Charlie Winter, the translator, it was not released in English for Western audiences because of its complete disregard of Western values. First, in this document we find a huge critique of Western science, lifestyles, aesthetics, and many other areas of life. The most important, and perhaps the only, arguments against West are its atheism, materialism, and "distraction from the fundamental purpose of humanity – to worship God". Frankfurt School representatives write about the subject who desires to kill and who has always seen the (potential) oppressor in his victim. Unbearable danger demands illusory self-defense, as when terrorists respond to the economic, cultural, and military "campaign" of the West by encouraging people around the world to take up arms against it and discredit the culture *en bloc*. In *Dialectic...* this is called "rationalization."³⁷ In this case, the logic of religion is applied heavily. The destruction takes no hostages, and the will to kill and destroy is total.³⁸ It becomes especially dangerous for international peace when moral or ethical justifications are applied. Such driven terrorists do not display universalistic thoughts; rather, they tend to think totally, or in a totalitarian manner, by subjugating others to their worldview with the extensive use of global media. Second, we can read about the failure of the "Western program for women," by which feminism is meant, and the emasculation of men as a consequence of blurring the lines between the roles of each sex. Third, the issue of women's education and life-organization is undertaken by the author. Women's function should be "sedentary." They should have responsibilities connected "first and foremost" with the home. Marriage is very important and a female-child can enter it at the age of nine. Woman can only leave the house in a few cases: "a) if she is going to study theology, b) if she is a doctor or a teacher, [and] c) if she has been ruled by fatwa that she must fight, engage in jihad because the situation of the *ummah* has become desperate [...]"³⁹ In further verses, we can read about the periods of a woman's life

37 Adorno/Horkheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 115.

39 *Women of the Islamic State. A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa* (trans. by Ch. Winter), Brigade, Quilliam online publishing 2015, pp. 7-10.

during which certain values should be taught, and the ideal models for Muslim women. In most cases, there are references to the past Shiite government as a bad one, depriving people of healthcare, ability to run small business, education, and basic necessities such as electricity, waste disposal, or elderly care.⁴⁰ The very last verses might even be exhorting Muslims to fight against the West:⁴¹

To [...] the enemies of chastity and purity, the secularists and liberals from among our own people, women have been returned to their Rightful jilbabs and sedentary lifestyle. Throw the sputum of your culture, your civilisation and your thinking into the sea. God fights you and you are not of us and we are not of you.

The way that text is written insinuates that a Muslim woman's life is joyful, and the organization of life under the governance of the caliph is fitting for them. And maybe this is so. Adorno and Horkheimer, probably inspired by Freudian theories, wrote about women's affection for paranoid, unmoved men who use and manipulate them. Fear of one's own conscience can be quieted by a lack of it in others.⁴² Such an understanding explains the aforementioned opposition of feminist movements in the West. However, further analysis triggers some concerns about the honesty and credibility of the manifesto. It is reminiscent of skillful recruitment propaganda rather than an outline of facts. The overall character of the manifesto insinuates that everything about the West is wrong and the only acceptable way of realizing oneself is by worshipping God according to the very specific rules given there. The language is also very emotional. There are few facts, but many opinions. It aims to be personal and triggers worries about one's own life or health. The use of such a document fits into the first three criteria of totalitarianism as outlined by Curtis.⁴³

40 *Ibidem*, p. 24-33.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

42 Adorno/Horkheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

43 "1. An official and exclusive ideology or set of convictions to which the society is to be committed and which will be the basis for a new type of political and social order and for a new type of man. 2. Monopoly control, not only over political, economic, social, and cultural behavior, but also over private life and personal thought, to produce total conformity of the whole society. 3. The use of terror, concentration camps, and a political police force to help produce that conformity and to pose a permanent threat against the individual. 4. A hierarchically organized one-party system or movement regime, from which pluralism on Western democratic lines is absent. 5. The subordination of private interests to and on behalf of the public or collective interest through which the reality of the individual is affirmed. 6. As a corollary, a stress on centralization of power, unity, and integration, with opposition or even dissent regarded as an offence. 7. The removal of legal limits on the wielders of power. 8. Monopoly control of the media of communication and the educational and the cultural process, in order to mobilize the society. 9. The absence of meaningful free elections. 10. Monopoly control over weapons and force. 11. Denial of the right of citizens to travel abroad, and sometimes internally, at will. 12. A centrally planned economy in which production is stressed and consumption

Generally speaking, social media channels and fundamentalist terrorist writings look similar. There are similar actors—good and bad ones, winners and losers—in addition to analogous scenarios and comparable slogans. The message is put forth at every possible occasion. There is also a strong bond between religion and the use of force, manifesting power. We constantly hear religious shouts interrupted by gunshots and explosions. Most of the men are carrying arms, their faces are covered, and they behave like paramilitary troops.⁴⁴ In addition, there is a regular army standing in complete opposition to them that openly bears arms and respects international conventions on basic human rights and proceedings during warfare.

We might suppose that such endeavors are aimed at controlling the social order and providing a foundation for a new type of man. When somebody disobeys the rules, he or she might be threatened by the use of terror. Therefore, we watch and read about “nonbelievers,” homosexuals, and executions of unfaithful women. According to the United Nations and Amnesty International reports, women in some Islamic terrorist-controlled areas are also the victims of rape, slavery, and assassination.⁴⁵ In addition, these organizations commit various violent acts like beheadings, lapidating, the defenestration of homosexuals, burning people alive, the abuse women and children, and organ trafficking.⁴⁶ The brutality in the Middle East is continuing to escalate,⁴⁷ although it has even been condemned by the infamous Al-Qaeda.⁴⁸ When terrorists intentionally threaten people subjected to the force of terror with violence, it makes them feel more powerful. Needless to say, threats are still a form of violence. Besides the fact that this organization is militarily oriented, in the process of gaining power they also educate people, or in this case we would rather say that they indoctrinate or manipulate people.⁴⁹

controlled to provide accumulation of capital for investment purposes. 13. The preeminence of an individual ruler whose personal dictatorship may be the key factor in the nature of the regime.” [In:] Curtis, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9.

44 Based on a broad variety of visual (journalist and source) material found on CNN, BBC, AlJazeera, and Youtube when using a standard browser and searching for “ISIS,” “terrorism,” “caliphate,” “Boko Haram,” and related keywords.

45 See for example *Escape from Hell. Torture and Sexual Slavery In Islamic State Captivity in Iraq*, Amnesty International’s report. London: Amnesty International, International Secretariat 2014.

46 *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria*. United Nations, Distr.: General, 14 November 2014.

47 See the Dailymail news listing [In:] J. Hall/J. Robinson/T. Wyke/S. Cockcroft/D. Williams: accessed at www.dailymail.co.uk [03-23-2015]. Unfortunately, by the time this article is released, the list of brutal acts will get longer. Almost every day, media such as Jihadi Watch have new information about them.

48 D. Gayle: “Even Al-Qaeda condemn murder of Jordanian pilot as ‘deviant’... and leading Muslim cleric calls for ISIS militants to be killed, crucified and have limbs ‘chopped.’” [In:] *ibidem*.

49 Some call the use of facts for seizing power “soft power:” see L. L. Roslycky: *The soft side of dark power : a study in soft power, national security and the political-criminal nexus: with a special focus on the post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea*, NetzoDruk: Groningen 2011. In the case of ISIS, one cannot speak strictly of

IDEAS TURNED INTO POWER – THE ROLE OF EDUCATION

Malcolm Coaxall mentions nepotism, coercion, bribery, intimidation, terrorism, and education as the primary tools of social control.⁵⁰ The means of education can be powerful tools and, when used in a skillful way, they can attract new followers to ideas, ideology, and religion. In this case, we witness a very organized structure of recruitment and brainwashing through the use of religion (actually, exploiting people's faith) and media. There are easily-accessible terrorist-ideological newspapers,⁵¹ videos, and TV-programs on the Internet that are disseminated through popular social media both officially by organizations and unofficially by their members on personal accounts. They are hashtag-hijacking, i.e., infiltrating tweets and online conversations and creating "bots" (infiltrated networks of computers) in order to conduct anonymous activity. The fact that terrorist organizations have a structure where some cells are devoted strictly to media development leads us to two conclusions: first, media are of great importance because they have the ability to control, manipulate, and indoctrinate current members; second, media are a basic tool that can be used for recruiting new members, not excluding women, and boost the power of the organization.⁵² Targeting the youngest audience gives the organization a greater possibility to enlarge the number of its faithful and members who follow it blindly. The process of selectively creating images for the media, as we mentioned during the discussion of interpretations of religious texts, is another form of manipulation. As social media are accessible almost worldwide, the process of seizing social power does not demand anything more than access to the Internet and some basic electronic devices.

In 1959, John French and Bertram Raven published an article in *The Psychological Review* describing the theory of social power.⁵³ They identified five sources of power: legitimate, reward, coercive, expert, and referent (a sixth, informational, was added later). Terrorists' efforts may be analyzed through these sources. The base for (social) power is the relationship between person A and person B. This relationship can be shaped in different ways, according to the sources mentioned above. The first source is connected with the internalization of specific "oughtness," which can be based, for example, upon values transmitted by parents to

education. Because of the particular ideology involved, it is highly manipulative and does not include many facts or objectivism.

50 M. Coaxall: *Human Manipulation – A Handbook* (e-book), Cornelio Books 2013.

51 "Dabiq" online magazine is released regularly and is accessible online in the form of a pdf file.

52 For detailed methods of recruitment see: C. Hoyle/A. Bradford/R. Frenett: *Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2015.

53 J. French/B. Raven: "The bases of social power." [In:] *The Psychological Review* 63, 1956, p. 181-194. For more mathematical and analytical analysis, see N. E. Friedkin: "A Formal Theory of Social Power." [In:] *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 12 (2), Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc. 1986, p. 103-126.

children (this is the educative aspect).⁵⁴ It is also compared with the Freudian *super-ego*. Cultural values are first mentioned here as a base for legitimate power.⁵⁵

These bases, which Weber (41) has called the authority of the “eternal yesterday,” include such things as age, intelligence, caste, and physical characteristics. In some cultures, the aged are granted the right to prescribe behavior for others in practically all behavior areas. In most cultures, there are certain areas of behavior in which a person of one sex is granted the right to prescribe behavior for the other sex.

Combining this with the acceptance of social structures and their agents forms two more bases for this source of power. In the case of today’s caliphates, people who belong to them have to accept the (self proclaimed) religious state organization which is founded upon Sharia law. The head of the state who executes law and order through the structured administration is the caliph. He also acknowledges decisions on lower levels by giving power to these structures. Cultural values are very important here because the law is based on religion and a strong tradition connected with the Quran. Therefore, affirmation for this type of power can be very strong.

The second source, called *reward power*,⁵⁶

is defined as power whose basis is the ability to reward. The strength of the reward power of [person] O / [person] P increases with the magnitude of the rewards which P perceives that O can mediate for him. Reward power depends on O’s ability to administer positive valences and to remove or decrease negative valences. The strength of reward power also depends upon the probability that O can mediate the reward, as perceived by P.

The most important reward for terrorist fighters is probably the promise of getting into heaven after a courageous and heroic death on the battlefield, which is strongly connected with the previously-mentioned source of power. Just as the religious aspect is important for them, the locality is also essential. In the manifesto of the *Al-Khanssaa Brigade* mentioned in this paper, the place of residence is family-friendly and prosperous. This amalgam seems even more complex and influential when mentioning the coercive source. The threat of being punished is characteristic of it.⁵⁷

54 *Id.*: “The Bases of Social Power.” [In:] D. Catwright: *Studies in Social Power*. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research 1959, p. 264.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 265.

56 *Ibid.*

57 *Ibid.*

Coercive power is similar to reward power in that it also involves O's ability to manipulate the attainment of valences. Coercive power of O / P stems from the expectation on the part of P that he will be punished by O if he fails to conform to the influence attempt.

The number of cases of punishment is rather large and the vast majority of activities in everyday life are strictly controlled. Thus, these types or sources of power are also significant. Moreover, the authoritarian organizational structure and huge accumulation of power in the hands of a small group poses the threat of malpractice and manipulation. These can be introduced when referent and expert power occurs.⁵⁸

The referent power of O/ P has its basis in the identification of P with O. By identification, we mean a feeling of oneness of P with O, or a desire for such an identity. If O is a person toward whom P is highly attracted, P will have a desire to become closely associated with O. If O is an attractive group, P will have a feeling of membership or a desire to join. If P is already closely associated with O he will want to maintain this relationship (40). P's identification with O can be established or maintained if P behaves, believes, and perceives as O does. Accordingly O has the ability to influence P, even though P may be unaware of this referent power.

The strong bond and sense of identity creates a feedback loop which strengthens power. An additional and important source of it is the expert knowledge of some members of the group. The wiser they are, the more attractive they become to others. The crucial is that knowledge possessed by one person should be held to a consistent standard.⁵⁹ In the case of hierarchically organized groups such as the one analyzed in this paper, the use of knowledge as power is easy to observe because of the positions held by the knowledgeable. Again, the founding figures or teachers of extremist religion (*imams*) who are terrorists are both authorities and transmitters of knowledge. Imams are leaders, and leadership is mentioned by Fred Lunenburg as being connected with power:⁶⁰

The concepts of power and leadership are closely linked. Leaders use power as a means of attaining group goals. By learning how power operates in organizations, you will be better able to use that knowledge to become a more effective leader. In its simplest terms, power is the ability to influence someone else (Nelson & Quick, 2012).

58 *Ibid.*, p. 266.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 267.

60 F. C. Lunenburg: "Power and Leadership: An Influence Process." [In:] *International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration* 15 (1), 2012, p. 2.

Leaders usually have access to information that is important to others. Information can also be manipulated and prepared or presented in a contextually adjusted form. This constitutes the last type or source of power: information power. According to Ken Petress, "Information power comes as a result of possessing knowledge that others need or want."⁶¹ But instead of redistributing power by using empowerment strategies or providing source-based and verified information, the governors of today's caliphates would rather convey it selectively and cleverly. There are even structures responsible for this, and due to the great possibilities of the Internet and networking media, this is even possible through post targeting or data scrutiny.

The set-up of the organization fits perfectly into the contemporary Middle-Eastern context and is the scaffolding for the promotion and dissemination of the particular ideas that drive it. There appears to be a feedback loop where ideas drive the terrorists as well. Such a conglomerate attracts new members, allows for fluent cooperation, and, consequently, allows terrorists to realize their goals.

SUMMARY: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Some remarks need to be made at this point in order to sum up the above sections. Because simplicity is not stupidity, the simpler the idea, the more influential it can become. Jihadists reach for the most fundamental ideas, such as that of God. The great affection for such an idea can provoke people to commit crimes in the name of the idea. The expansive character of the activity of terrorist states displays an element of imperialism: they require constant expansion to new territories and to possess new members for "feeding" the conquered territories and recruits. The more expansive the state wants to be, the more unified it must become; the leaders must have great potency or power. For this purpose, exploiting basic ideas seems to be the most efficient solution.

Since the 1950s, we've learned how to measure the power of an idea, even in a mathematical way. Having applied it, we can conclude that the most visible and influential among recent terrorist organizations are the Jihadist extremists groups. Some of them aspire to form states by proclaiming caliphates, e.g., in Syria, Iraq, and some African territories. They are visible in social media, and their expansiveness forces allied states to run military campaigns against them. From a political perspective, the caliphates cannot be described as states. They are rather conglomerates of smaller groups, such as insurgents, rebels, and terrorists fighting for different reasons under the leadership of an influential organization⁶² driven by a particular ideology that is focused on religion. The caliphates use skilled methods for seizing power, including the extensive use of violence. While aiming at

⁶¹ Accessed at uthscsa.edu [03-28-2015].

⁶² Mostly ISIS in the Middle East and Boko Haram in Africa.

civilians,⁶³ they can be called a new kind of terrorist group. Today's facet of global terrorism can be characterized by nation-state ambitions and cultural wars. It remains hostile to the Western world and violates international law in a variety of brutal forms, with a global reach via social media and information technology. The terrorism we see today also has a totalitarian nature. Its statehood is limited to the rule of a small group with a leader who does not provide verified information or freedom to people, but rather threatens and controls them. The most prone to influence here are children who are indoctrinated and manipulated, even abroad in Western countries.

The ideas accompanying these groups include God, law, state, education, totalitarianism, terror(ism) through violence, protest, and usually patriarchy (based on the position of women in the society). In general, they are understood in a peculiar way, without fitting into global standards, definitions, and regulations. All of this makes today's terrorism a specific type of terrorism. Maybe such a form is nothing new in the history of terrorism in general, but it is definitely different to pre-9/11 terrorism. It also demands further research and analysis using the latest technologies, which are still in development. Even this form of terrorism's lack of dialogue and foreign affairs, in addition to its human rights violations, has not turned the world's attention to its obvious need for expansion and power. This mechanism was explained through reference to the theory of French and Raven, among other things.

Both ideas and history are prone to be violent. The social and economic consequences of extremist understanding and the implementation of them may induce the worldwide escalation of violence, economic destabilization, and the rise of the

63 The argument against this is given by Osama Bin Laden himself: "You may . . . dispute that [the various accusations and grievances just stated do] not justify aggression against civilians, for crimes they did not commit Civilian Immunity and Liability 233 and offenses in which they did not partake: This argument contradicts your continuous repetition that America is the land of freedom... Therefore, the American people are the ones who choose their government by way of their own free will; a choice which stems from their agreement to its policies. Thus the American people have chosen, consented to, and affirmed their support for the Israeli oppression of the Palestinians, the occupation and usurpation of their land, and its continuous killing, torture, punishment and expulsion of Palestinians. The American people have the ability and the choice to refuse the policies of the Government and even to change it if they want. The American people are the ones who pay the taxes which fund the planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy our homes in Palestine, the armies which occupy our lands in the Arabian Gulf, and the fleets which ensure the blockade of Iraq. These tax dollars are given to Israel for it to continue to attack us and penetrate our lands. So the American people are the ones who fund the attacks against us, and they are the ones who oversee the expenditure of these monies in the way they wish, through their elected candidates." [In:] <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver>>. J. McMahan comments: "The translation is attributed to 'Islamists in Britain' and is ungrammatical in potentially misleading ways in various places. [In:] *Id. Killing in War*. Clarendon: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 233.

number of armed conflicts. As an answer to the last question stated in the introduction, we might conclude that the strategies adopted by terrorist leaders nowadays created this specific form of terrorism. Now, power and ideas are manifested loudly. There is strong sense of identity and a tendency to antagonize the West with Islam and alternative interpretations of common ideas. The well-known differentiation between the Orient and Occident in the globalized world has now become a cultural struggle, too. This situation is even stranger when cultures intermingle and clash: today's jihadi terrorist barely reads the Quran by himself, shoots a Russian rifle, and wears American jeans.⁶⁴ The distinction is not as clear it used to be centuries ago, and this fact places attention on well-tempered education, free from indoctrination and destructive ideology. Maybe the Occident, the land of *occidens* (sunset), can provide these things on a decent level globally, as it attempted to during the Enlightenment and in modern times, instead of focusing on military solutions. The combination of state aspirations known by the Europeans since the nineteenth century is now combined with modern warfare, religion, and global terrorism. This inspires fear in Western citizens, but among scientists, it suggests the necessity of reconsidering the meanings of concepts; among politicians, it brings about the need to create new methods of communication. Information technology, a great tool for disseminating ideas on both sides, brought everyone to the global level at the same time. This situation reveals not only the importance of ideas and their special constellations in case of terrorism, but also power that comes with having the proper tools to disseminate and propagate these ideas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adnan S./Reese A. 2014. *Middle East Security Report 24. Beyond the Islamic State: Iraqi Sunni Insurgency* in Institute for the Study of War website <understandingwar.org>.
- Barber B. 1996. *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*, Ballantine Books: New York.
- Barrett S. R./Stokholm S./Burke J. 2008. "The Idea of Power and the Power of Ideas: A Review Essay." in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 103, Issue 2, online publishing 2008, p. 468-480.
- Berlin I. 2006. *Die Macht der Ideen*. Berlin: Berlin Verlag.
- Borradori G. 2003. *Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*. Chicago University Press: Chicago.
- Bourdieu P. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. by G. Raymond. Harvard University Press: Harvard.

⁶⁴ Comp. B. Barber: *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World*, New York: Ballantine Books 1996.

- Bromage B. 1933. *Man of Terror, Dzherzhynski*, : Peter Owen: London.
- Brunner O./Conze W./Koselleck R. (eds.) 1972-1997. *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 6. Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart.
- Catwright D. 1959. *Studies in Social Power*. Institute for Social Research: Ann Arbor.
- Coaxall M. 2013. *Human Manipulation – A Handbook* (e-book), Cornelio Books.
- Coll S. 2004. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. Penguin Books: London 2004.
- Commins D. 2006. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. I.B. Tauris: London 2006.
- Curtis M. 1987. *Totalitarianism*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction.
- DeLong-Bas N. J. 2007. *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. I.B. Tauris: London.
- Deluze G. 2006. *Foucault*. Continuum: New York.
- Dietl W./Hirschmann K./Tophoven R. (eds.) (2006)2011. *Terroryzm*. PWN: Warsaw 2011. Originally published as *Das Terrorismus-Lexikon. Täter, Opfer, Hintergründe*. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn AG.
- Edwards G. 2014. *Social Movements and Protest*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014.
- Escape from Hell. Torture and Sexual Slavery In Islamic State Captivity in Iraq*. Amnesty International's report. London: Amnesty International, International Secretariat.
- Faouzi A. 1978. "Islam, réformisme et nationalisme dans la résistance à la colonisation française en Algérie (1830-1930)." in *Revue internationale des Etudes socio-religieuses, Social Compass* n° 34. Université Louvain La Neuve (Belgique).
- Foucault M. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, transl. by C. Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books.
- French J./Raven B. 1956. "The bases of social power." in *The Psychological Review* 63, p. 181-194.
- Friedkin N. E. 1986. "A Formal Theory of Social Power." in *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 12 (2), Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.
- Ganor B. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another's Man Freedom Fighter?" in *Police Practice and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287-304.
- Grisham K. 2014. *Transforming Violent Political Movements: Rebels today, what tomorrow?* London/New York: Routledge.
- Horkheimer M./Adorno T. 1944. *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente*, New York: Social Studies Association, Inc.
- Hoyle C./Bradford A./Frenett R. 2015. *Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
- Kowalewicz M. (ed.). 2014. *Formen der Ideengeschichte*. Münster: mentis.
- Lunenburg F. C. 2012. "Power and Leadership: An Influence Process." in *International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration* 15 (1).
- McMahan J. 2009. *Killing in War*. Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
- Morriess P. 1987. *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Nye J. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs.
- _____. 2012. *The Future of Power*, New York: PublicAffairs.
- O'Connor T. 2014. *The Criminology of Terrorism: History, Law, Definitions, Typologies* in: <cultureandterror.org>.
- Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria*. United Nations, Distr.: General, 14 November 2014.

- Roslycky L. L. 2011. *The soft side of dark power : a study in soft power, national security and the political-criminal nexus: with a special focus on the post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea*, Groningen: NetzoDruk.
- Savoie D. 2010. *Power: Where Is It?* Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Stears P. *Protest Movements*. in Wiener P. (ed.) *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas* (1905-1992). Online version based on 1974 print edition in <<http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu>>. [02-08-2015].
- Thorup M. 2012. *An Intellectual History of Terror. War, Violence and the State*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Waardenburg J. J. 2002. *Islam: Historical, Social, and Political Perspectives*, Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter.
- Wicken St./Lewis J. 2013. *From Protest Movement to Armed Resistance: 2013 Iraq Update #24*, June 15.
- Women of the Islamic State. A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa* (trans. by C. Winter), Brigade, Quillam online publishing 2015.