ISLAM WITH A FEMALE FACE HOW WOMEN ARE CHANGING THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN TAJIKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN Anna Cieślewska ISLAM WITH A FEMALE FACE HOW WOMEN ARE CHANGING THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN TAJIKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN Kraków 2017 © Copyright by Anna Cieślewska, 2017 Reviewer Sultonbek Aksakolov, PhD Michał Łabenda, PhD Proofreading Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Artur Zwolski Cover Design Agnieszka Stachyra Author Anna Cieślewska, PhD, acieslewska@gmail. com Funding This project is funded by the National Science Center of Poland within the framework of the postdoctoral fellowship “Fuga 2”, decision number EC-2013/08/S/HS1/00205. 978-83-7638-767-3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. KSIĘGARNIA AKADEMICKA ul. św. Anny 6, 31 -008 Kraków tel. /faks: 12 431 27 43, 12 421 13 87 e-mail: akademicka@akademicka. pl Online bookstore: www. akademicka. pl In memory of Professor Stanisław Zapaśnik, my teacher andfriend Table of contents Acknowledgements................................................11 Introduction....................................................13 1. Starting point...........................................13 2. The region of research in the context of spiritual traditions.. 14 3. Female religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley..........17 4. The main themes and the structure of the book............21 5. Religious authority in Islam and female religious figures.... 23 6. The state of the art.....................................28 7. Notes on transliteration.................................30 Notes on fieldwork and methodology..............................31 1. Religious policies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the field study.......................................31 2. A personal perspective from the field....................32 3. Methodology..............................................38 Chapter I Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan..................................................41 1. 1. Preface..................................................41 1. 2. ‘Good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ - the problems with the terms and their interpretations........................43 1. 3. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet period.........................................53 7 Table of contents 1. 4. Contemporary religious discourses.....................63 1. 5. Islam in Kyrgyzstan................................... 68 1. 5. 1. ‘New and old Islam’ and its various manifestations... 68 1. 5. 2. ‘Piousness’versus‘Religiosity’................ 73 1. 5. 3. Radicalism as a topic of discussions.......... 75 1. 5. 4. Islamic education............................. 76 1. 5. 5. Summary....................................... 79 1. 6. Islam in Tajikistan................................... 80 1. 6. 1. Ending religious pluralism.................... 80 1. 6. 2. Making religion a political tool.............. 82 1. 6. 3. Summary....................................... 89 Chapter II Female religious professionals - an overview................. 91 2. 1. Historical context.................................... 91 2. 2. Transmitting religious knowledge...................... 94 2. 3. Becoming bibi-otun....................................104 2. 4. Between the mosque and the mazar....................110 2. 5. Conclusions...........................................117 Chapter III Female religious practices and rituals.......................119 3. 1. Preface...............................................119 3. 2. Spiritual celebrations, rituals, practices and their performance.............................................122 3. 3. Selected rituals and celebrations.....................126 3. 3. 1. Khatmi Quran..................................126 3. 3. 2. Laylatu 1-qadr................................127 3. 3. 3. Umra celebration and Mavlud Sharif............131 3. 3. 4. Khudoi........................................135 3. 3. 5. Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi-Seshanbe...............137 3. 4. Conclusions...........................................147 s Table of contents Chapter IV The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan..................................................149 4. 1. Perceptible and imperceptible conflict...............149 4. 1. 1. Religion as an alternative to reality........151 4. 2. The setting of fieldwork.............................153 4. 3. The madrasa network..................................158 4. 3. 1. Expelling an evil spirit in the male madrasa.159 4. 3. 2. Female madrasa...............................161 4. 3. 3. Madrasa teachers - the stories of Elmira and Amina.. 168 4. 3. 4. The female leaders of the madrasa as social figures.. 171 4. 4. Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha......................174 4. 4. 1. Teaching in a hujra..........................174 4. 4. 2. Gulsun otyncha and the tradition of female religious leaders ..........................................176 4. 5. Polygamy as a topic of discussion....................183 4. 6. Conclusions..........................................188 Chapter V Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan - between the state and the people....................................191 5. 1. Namaz with Rahmon’s portrait.........................191 5. 2. Khujand and its networks.............................195 5. 3. The rituals of Qalandar-khona........................200 5. 4. A story of Farida otun...............................204 5. 5. Good otun- bad otun..................................209 5. 6. Between politics and religion - the stories of Mualima and Mohniso............................................212 5. 7. Shuroi Bibi-otunho and its repercussions.............219 5. 8. Conclusions..........................................224 Concluding remarks..........................................227 Glossary....................................................243 9 Table of contents References....................................................249 Index of names................................................261 Index of places...............................................267 Index of etno-confessional terms..............................271 io Acknowledgements 1 would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Anna Kranowolska for accepting my project in the Department of Iranian Studies at the Jagiellonian University, as well as her substantive and mental support while I was writing this book. I would also like to thank to Michał Łabenda, PhD, and Sultanbek Aksakolov, PhD, for their comprehensive reviews of my work. Further acknowledgements go to Gosia Biczyk, Wojciech Górecki, Helena Patzer, PhD, Joanna Kusy and Artur Rodziewicz, PhD, for reading and commenting on the chapters of my book, and for their advice on the structure and content. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Agnieszka Makowska for her logistic help in organizing my field research in Kyrgyzstan, and her support during the process. My book would not have been so comprehensive without the help of my Tajik friends, Umma Bobojonova and Chamanoro Makharadze. I also render special thanks to Kibriehon Atayeva, PhD, from Khujand, for her support in my field research in Tajikistan. I am also thankful to Mutakalim NGO, expecially to the head of the Osh office, Jamila Japasheva, for helping me to establish contact with female religious leaders in Osh and in the neighbouring area. I also cannot omit Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska for giving me an idea regarding the title of my book, and for linguistic advice, and Professor Janusz Danecki for translating one of the prayers from Arabic to the Polish language. I also owe a large debt of gratitude to my numerous friends from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan whom I cannot name for security reasons, for their trust and help which allowed me to conduct research and finalize my work. Finally, I would also like to extend words of my deepest gratitude to a number of female religious Acknowledgements leaders who appear in the pages of this book, and who provided me with knowledge about the religion, local traditions and relationships which enabled me to better understand the cultures I study. Introduction i. Starting point I became interested in female religious figures and women’s religiosity in Central Asia during a number of stays in the region between 2006 and 2012, when I visited various holy places, and participated in many rituals at the invitation of my friends and co-workers. In 2010,1 began my research on the mahalla in Tajikistan.¹ Many communal gatherings and rituals organised by the mahalla community are presided over by religious leaders. Due to division into female and male groups, celebrations for men and women take place separately. Traditionally, in the women’s part, rituals are led by a female religious leader or another person who has some knowledge of religious rites. Since I participated in many ceremonies, I had the opportunity to interact with female spiritual figures, and I noticed that they were powerful individuals with a wide range of views on religion and social issues. They were important social actors dealing with the sphere of religion and tradition, and people respected them. On this basis, in 2012/2013 I wrote a project proposal for research on the social role of female religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley. The valley has always been a hub of various interfusing spiritual ¹ Mahalla can be briefly described as a community settled in a certain place, which is consolidated by territorial, professional, family and/or ethnic relationships. In traditional mahallas, spiritual and ritual interactions are the basis of all relationships; for more see Cieslewska (2015a). 13 Introduction traditions of Central Asia, and female religious leaders have been active there over the course of centuries. At the same time, it was suggested that I write a proposal for a project supporting mahalla committees, based on research conducted in 2010, and 2012 in Tajikistan. The project entitled “Supporting local communities in rural areas in Tajikistan” was planned to be implemented in southern Tajikistan, in the area of Kurgan-Tube, the centre of the Khatlon region, by the Polish Centre for International Aid and the Tajik NGO Mehrangez. We received the grant, and I went to Tajikistan to carry out the project. A few days before I left Warsaw, I received information that my project on the social role of female religious leaders successfully passed the first stage of the selection process, and that I was invited for an interview. I therefore travelled back to Poland. Shortly before my departure, my co-worker organised the ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho, conducted by a local female religious leader, in order to ensure the success of my interview.* ¹ ² A month later, I learnt that I received the grant. For me the fact that the ritual was performed to ensure my success, has a symbolic value. It became the starting point of my research project. 2. The region of research in the context of spiritual traditions This study addresses the female religious figures, the majority of whom belong to Uzbek and Tajik groups living in the Ferghana Valley in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.³ In some cases, I refer also to female ² For the analysis of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho ritual see Chapter III. ¹ The Ferghana Valley is a region within Central Asia; it covers an area of approximately 22,000 km² and lies between 350 and 1,000 m above the sea level, with mountain slopes rising up to 5,000 m. After the October Revolution, the Valley was divided between the Kyrgyz SRR, the Uzbek SSR and the Tajik SRR. Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Valley was incorporated into the territories of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The region is the 14 i. The region of research in the context of spiritual traditions religious figures of Kyrgyz origin. The first part of the research in 2014 was carried out during three months in the northern part of Tajikistan, in Khujand, which is the main city of the Sughd region, and Ghafurov rayon adjacent to Khujand. Some additional information was collected in the Isfara district, Dushanbe, and Vakhsh Valley. The second part of the research was conducted in Kyrgyzstan, in the city of Osh, and a district located closely to Osh, where I worked for about three months in 2015, and partly in Bishkek. In this book, I also refer to the various experiences of my previous visits in the region, or contacts with Tajiks in Warsaw. The Ferghana Valley, as well as the entire Central Asia, has always been penetrated by various religious and spiritual traditions. Since the 6th century (BCE) Zoroastrianism had spread throughout the region along with early pagan beliefs. Following the conquests of Alexander the Great in the 4th century (BCE) the Greek cults were absorbed into the local cultures. In the period of 1 st-4th centuries (CE) Buddhism became popular (with the centre in Termez). Besides, between 2nd-3rd centuries Manichaeism and Christianity - mainly Nestorianism - began to penetrate the region, contributing to religious diversity. Most nomads adhered to shamanistic beliefs, although some of them accepted other faiths (Labenda 2016: 481-484). The Muslim conquest of the region of Mawarannahr⁴ took place at the beginning of the 7th century, and its first wave absorbed the rural population of Iranian origin. A victory of the Caliphate troops over the Chinese army in the battle near Talas in 751 ensured the domination of the Arabs, the Turks and the Persian-speaking groups over the Chinese in this region. However, Islamisation was a long process by which Islam, though long rejected, was gradually accepted, slowly adapting to local conditions, absorbing the elements of other denominations. It most populated part of Central Asia. It is also a region which manifests ethnic diversity (Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya n.d.). ⁴ Transoxania (also Transoxiana), and after Islamisation - Mawarannahr (Arabic: Ma wara al-Nahr); the meaning of both terms can be understood as: “Land Beyond the River” [Amu-daria] and it traditionally refers to the territory of Central Asia located between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. 15 Introduction was only the Kara-Khanid dynasty, which ruled between the 1 Oth and 13th centuries, that introduced Islam as a state religion (Labenda 2016: 131-134; Zapasnik 2006: 21-22). Until the Soviet period, there was a significant difference between the sedentary and nomadic populations, due to their modes of life, as well as the dual system of administration. Theological centres were located mainly in the cities with the majority of sedentary population. The latter comprised artisans, traders, and farmers, as well as influential notables, including a vast part of the Islamic religious professionals. The two groups played different roles within the court structures of the duchies and khanates. Some nomads led a semi-nomadic way of life, and were linked to the ruling dynasties through ties of personal loyalty and military service. Others were mainly cattle breeders who lived in areas of higher elevation during the summer and who returned to lewdying pastures when the snow began to fall. Despite the considerable role of ethnic or national categories in the modem identity of the peoples of Central Asia, the traditional model of social relations still functions within the social structure. The process of the Islamization of nomads differed from that of the sedentary population, and took several centuries. It was largely carried out by the Sufi Brotherhoods and independent preachers from various parts of Asia. Nomads included groups corresponding with contemporary Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, some of Uzbeks, Turkmens as well as other ethne. In most cases, due to their nomadic mode of life, they did not establish mosques or other religious institutions. Religious education took place in their camps, and it was mostly irregular. Little is known about the religion that dominated among the nomads prior to Islamization; the main god was Tengri (but this name was also used in relation to other gods). After the spread of Islam, the word Tengri became synonymous with the word Kudai ([god], Persian: Khuda, Arabic: Allah). The other important deity was an ancient female goddess Umay, relics of her cult are still visible today in some maternity-related rituals; her figure was adapted to Islam as Fatima-Zuhra (Prophet Muhammad’s daughter). Despite the Islamization most nomads cultivated old practices intermingled with elements of Islam (Abramzon 1990: 292-356; Basilov, Karmysheva 1997: 37-39; Labenda 2016: 481-482). 16 3. Female religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley The Ferghana Valley has always been at the crossroads of various cultures and traditions, balancing between the two worlds: the nomadic and the settled one. The spiritual traditions of the sedentary population and nomads interpenetrated each other, creating a variety of religious expressions. Despite mutual influences, there have always been considerable differences between the two spiritual cultures, expressed in religious rituals, beliefs but also in the approach to the issue of spiritual leadership. 3. Female religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley Bibi-otuns are considered traditional religious figures for women of some Tajik and Uzbek-speaking groups of Central Asia which prior to the October Revolution manifested a sedentary way of life. Bibi-otuns function within the sphere of daily practices and traditions and are regarded as possessing spiritual knowledge that links them to God. They teach religion to children and women, and perform rituals and prayers for the female part of the community. There is a variety of terms which are used to describe the same social institution such as bibi otun/otin, bi--otin/otun, bu-otin, bibi khalifa/halfa/holpa, oy (u) bibi mullo, otyncha, otin-bucha, otin-hofiz and other terms (Peshkova 2006: 127,2014: 205; Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 333; Rakhimov 2007: 140; Gorshunova 2006: 255; Kramer 2006: 321-323; Fathi 1997: 28; Sultanova 2011: 125-126; field research 2014,2015). Bibi-otuns have never been present among the Kyrgyz or other nomadic groups, where bakhshy, kuuchu (shamans), bubu (wise woman) and other spiritual figures (both men and women), have performed spiritual services (Abramzon 1990: 328-331; Molchanova et al. 2017: 7). Until today, some of them are influential figures, and are held with high esteem by many people. Bakhshy and healers also operate among Tajiks and Uzbeks; some of their functions overlap with those of bibi-otuns. However, the latter’s role of teaching Islam to women makes them distinct from other spiritual professionals (see Chapter II). In Khujand and in the neighbouring area, the most popular term is bibi-otun, but also bi-otun, and khalifa among Tajiks or bibi-otin, otin- 17 Introduction bucha, otyncha among Uzbeks. In southern Kyrgyzstan, traditionally religious figures of Uzbek origin are termed otyncha. According to a person who comes from a Tajik family of religious leaders and who has taught religion to various female spiritual professionals for many years, the best term to describe this profession is bi(bibi)-otun/otin-oy (otun/otin - spiritual teacher, bibi - grandmother, oy-i - mother). It refers to a woman who is known for her sound knowledge of religion and tradition. The word otun/otin-oy indicates not only the ability to perform rituals but also the possession of higher spiritual knowledge. Consequently, it shows the social status of the person as a religious leader, whereas the term otyncha is attributed to religious professionals who do not have a high level of knowledge of Islam and Islamic ethics. They are considered religious leaders of lower status.⁵ In Kyrgyzstan, however, I noticed that the word otyncha is widely used in relation to various types of women who deal with religion but are not always traditional female religious professionals, as among Uzbeks and Tajiks. At present, some teachers of Islam of Kyrgyz origin are also called otyncha. It demonstrates that this term has been recently absorbed by new trends in Islam, expanding beyond its original meaning. I expressed my doubts on this matter to a person cooperating with the Mutakalim NGO which supports Muslim women. My interlocutor answered: Kyrgyz people have always had otyncha, Kurmanjan Datka was also otyncha!⁶ Kurmanjan Datka was a female political figure of the late nineteenth century. She was an influential and respected tribal authority but she was not a religious leader. In Central Asia, however, the authority of political leaders should always be legitimized by God. In this sense, political authority is associated with spiritual power. The political influences and personal charisma of Kurmanjan Datka made her a model of female leadership. By describing her as otyncha, my interlocutor referred to her spiritual attributes similar to those possessed by religious leaders. ⁵ Information obtained during an interview with a teacher of Islam, Khujand 2014. ⁶ On the basis of an interview conducted in August, Osh 2015. 18 j. Female religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley When the teacher of Islam from Tajikistan whom I mentioned above learnt that the Kyrgyz teachers of Islam were introduced as otynchas during the conference organized by the Mutakalim NGO in Bishkek,⁷ ⁸ she commented upon this as follows: Those Kyrgyz women have no reference to this tradition! Besides, theword ‘otyncha 'describes someone who is a religious professional of lower status? Since her grandmother was a famous otun-oy in Khujand, her perception of who should be regarded as otun oy or otyncha differs from the opinions of the Kyrgyz. As a matter of fact, the Kyrgyz "otyncha ’ is a rather new phenomenon associated with a contemporary revival of Islam (see Chapter I). ‘New otynchas ’ are female religious professionals who emerged during the post-Soviet transition. Fathi (2006: 309), and Kramer (2006: 321-322) divide female religious professionals into two basic groups. The first group consists of traditional otins (bibi-otuns) who come from religious families. They provide various religious services according to the spiritual tradition based on the worship of saints, cult of ancestors, beliefs in various supernatural spirits, and they teach Islam to women and children. Traditional bibi-otuns have a sound knowledge of spiritual practices, prayers and customs. Sometimes, they perform some forms of healing or remove charms. Within this category Fathi distinguishes a sub-group which includes ‘new bibi-otuns' - ‘non-reformist bibi--otun' who represent a relatively new phenomenon associated with the increasing presence of Islamic activities. They usually do not inherit their position within the family, learning religion from different sources. Due to the increasing demand for rituals among the people, they enjoy considerable popularity, conducting various traditional ceremonies and teaching religion. The second group consists of the Islamic reformists ⁷ The conference ‘Central Asian Forum of Muslim Women for Counteraction of Violent Extremism and Radicalization’ (Russian: Центральноазиатский форум женщин-лидеров мусульманок в противодействии насильственному экстремизму и радикализации) was organized on 20-2 Is' of August 2015 by the Mutakalim NGO with the support of an international NGO - the Search for Common Ground. ⁸ A personal conversation with this person, Bishkek, August 2015. 19 Introduction who emerged as a result of the contemporary transformation of Islam. They support modem ideas of religious reformation promoting various scriptural interpretations of religion. They often stay in opposition to traditional bibi-otuns, or other spiritual leaders, advocating in favour of purification of Islam from local practices and traditions. This category of female religious leaders functions among the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and other representatives of Central Asian ethne. In Kyrgyzstan, a teacher of religion is also termed ustod (also ustoz, teacher, educator) in Tajikistan ustod/ustoz and mualima (Tajik: she-teacher). This word refers to a teacher regardless of the topic of study; the word mudarrisa (Arabic: a female teacher) is also used in both countries, but it is rather a new phenomenon. Especially in rural areas, even ‘reformists’, despite a different approach to Islam and the role they play in the communities, are still termed otyncha, bibi-otun etc. It should be noted that some representatives of the ‘reformists’ are influenced by the traditional pattern of female religious leadership due to their early education in a house of traditional bibi-otun, which they continued in different contexts, such as private classes, madrasas, or courses, where their religious views were transformed. Consequently, some women reject old practices, others adapt them in a way which does not collide with their new thinking about Islam. Considering all of the above, in this book, I decided to use the term bibi otun for Tajikistan, and otyncha for Kyrgyzstan to describe traditional female religious figures, as well as those women who perform some forms of spiritual practices, but they do not have a religious family background. I use the term ‘new teacher’, ‘teacher of Islam’ or sometimes ‘reformist’ to refer to women who support various new Islamic trends, calling for the transformation of local practices, and traditions. I term all women who provide religious services: ‘female religious leaders’, ‘female religious professionals’ or ‘female religious figures’. It should be noted, however, that a religious leader in the communities of Central Asia is always a man (rnulla, imam), female figures are leaders only among the women. The term ‘female religious professionals’ is used to indicate their status as people who teach religion, and conduct rituals, in spite of the fact that many of them do not receive Islamic education in formal religious institutions. However, I acknowledge that in reality, 20 4. The main themes and the structure of the book all these categories overlap and cannot be fully separated, since they are linked to the social, spiritual, and imaginary nature of the phenomenon of female religious leadership. 4. The main themes and the structure of the book This ethnographic study focuses on the female religious authorities who function within various religious circles. Most of individuals mentioned in this study are Uzbeks and Tajiks, the majority of whom come from traditional religious networks, while some became bibi-otuns or teachers of Islam owing to personal spiritual pursuits. I also refer to the women of Kyrgyz origin, who became religious professionals after the years of studying Islam in modem religious institutions or during courses. Each of the religious figures presented here has her own individual approach to religious and life-related matters. They differ in their religious interpretations, their education, their way of transmitting religious knowledge, performing religious duties. Montgomery (2016:3) describes this process as a relationship between doing and knowing, between action and social navigation. Religious knowledge is based on religious education, life experience, recognition of moral values, and social interactions. While examining the contemporary role of female religious leaders in Central Asia, I analysed the distinct nature of the female religious sphere of influence, distinguishing it from the male sphere of influence. I sought answers to the following questions: how women form their congregation on the basis of formal institutions, and informal circles, how religious authority is exercised by women, what kinds of factors shape their relationships with their communities and male-dominated religious institutions. Finally, I analyze the way in which local communities react to female religious leaders, and the kind of activities they can undertake to be accepted by their circles. I also consider whether their social activities are limited to women issues only or, perhaps, can also include other fields, such as NGO work or politics. Another question which is considered here has to do with the influence of the revival of Islam, which started in the late Soviet period, 11 Introduction and continued after the USSR collapsed, on female religious leadership. In particular, the study looks at how the access to Islamic education, literature, as well as connections with foreign countries, have shaped female religious networks in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. I devote particular attention to the way in which the female religious individuals perceive their religiosity, and how this perception influence the changes in their thinking about religion, but also their religious practices, such as performing rituals and ceremonies, and teaching Islam, within both traditional religious networks of bibi otun/otynchas as well as within the ‘reformist’ groups. The final question of this study concerns the religious policies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and their impact on religious leaders and religious networks. I analyze the way the authorities attempt to shape female religious leadership within the framework of the state’s law and structures, and the reaction of different religious networks as well as individual female religious leaders to those policies. In the first part of the book, an introduction and notes on fieldwork and methodology are presented, which are followed by the second part consisting of five chapters, and concluding remarks. In Chapter I, I deal with contemporary transformational processes within Islam in the region, which contributed to changes within the religious traditions and practices of female religious leaders, with a special focus on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, the chapter discusses the religious policies of the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and their impact on Islam and religious leaders. In Chapter II, I present an overview of past and present activities of female religious figures. This chapter provides a basis for further discussions on the contemporary role of religious leaders and Islamic traditions in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Chapter III introduces the ethnographic material which I collected during the rituals and ceremonies performed by female religious figures. The main purpose of this part of the book is to present the ritual and spiritual dimension of the role of female religious leaders, as well as the nature of rituals and practices which consist of various traditions concerning the rich spirituality of Central Asia. Finally, Chapters IV and V present the networks of female religious leaders in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Chapter IV, 22 Religious authority in Islam and female religious figures I examine the religious groups connected to the Mutakalim NGO within the female madrasa of the Shahrak district, and a circle of independent religious figures - Gulsun otyncha. In Chapter V, I present the female religious leaders, including traditional bibi-otuns, and a holy place of the Qalandar-khona in Khujand, the religious teachers attached to the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP or IRPT; Tajik: Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston), and the state-managed structure - the Shuroi Bibi--otunho. This chapter also deals with the policy of the Tajik government in relation to female religious leaders, and other actors involved in the religious activities. 5. Religious authority in Islam and female religious figures According to the saying attributed to the prophet Muhammad: “Scholars are the heir of the prophets who have endowed them with knowledge of legacy. He who has chosen knowledge has taken generous share, and he who has taken a path towards the acquisition of knowledge, for him God will smooth a path to Paradise" (quotation in Gilliot et al. 2000: 801-805). In order to explain the social and spiritual roles of female religious leadership in the given context, first of all I intend to describe the phenomenon of the Islamic religious authority. It serves to make us understand how female religious leaders shape the social reality in their communities as well as in which way they exercise power over the female part of communities, despite the fact that their position (as religious leaders) is still lower than is the case of the male religious professionals. Yet, the problem with theoretical conceptualisation of religious authority led many scholars to analysing this concept by focusing on narratives, and the ways in which religious authority is exercised, rather than defining it according to strict rules. In my book I also decided to identify female religious authority and its function in the given context instead of focusing on theoretical issues, mainly because 13 Introduction the contemporary transformation of Islamic practices and traditions contributed to re-defining female religious leadership in Central Asia as well as in other places. Consequently, religious authority can be described as the ability to define proper conduct and faith (both ethical and liturgical), and to shape other people's views on religious issues, as well as to identify and criticize deviations from mainstream interpretations of a particular religion and their promoters. As far as the monotheistic religions are concerned, religious authority can create and promote canonical interpretations of liturgical texts (Kister 1994: 82; Krämer, Schmidtke 2006: 1-2). In Sunni Islam there is no official hierarchy among various spiritual and religious leaders. As a result, the rules, according to which religious leaders should be qualified, have never been determined. What was created at the early stage of the development of Islam is a class of religious semi-professionals and professionals (sg. alim, pl. ulama), (e.g.: Krämer, Schmidtke 2006: 5; Gilliot et al. 2000: 801-805). Nevertheless, in most parts of the Islamic world, “the ulama were not a distinct class, but a category of persons overlapping other classes and social divisions, permeating the whole of society” (Lapidus 1967 cited in Crews 2009: 100). They provide various services, such as leading the prayers, preaching, issuing fatwas,⁹ transmitting hadises, judging in court, shaping the Islamic scholarly tradition and so forth. Besides, various kinds of folk preachers, including Sufi masters, healers, and storytellers create their own religious networks, often overlapping or challenging the authority of formal scholars (Krämer, Schmidtke 2006: 5; Gilliot et al. 2000: 801-805). This diversity of the functions of religious authority in Islam calls for the examination of its nature according to male and female spiritual roles. First of all, as many authors indicate, gender separation in Islam resulted in the creation of different religious services and institutions exclusively for women in many parts of the Islamic world (e.g.: Kalmbach 2012; Kloos, Künkler 2016; Mahmood 2012). There are several examples of ⁹ Fatwa - a legal opinion which, according to sharia, is provided by a qualified Islamic theologian (mufti in Sunni Islam). 24 5. Religious authority in Islam and female religious figures female religious professionals within the Hanafi school of Islamic Law which is also a dominant school in Central Asia, where women have developed distinct religious and spiritual practices. Accordingly, there are informal and traditional female religious figures which in Bosnia are called bula (see Kijewska 2012; Raudvere 2012); ahong among the Chinese Muslims of the Hui minority who function within separate mosques only for women (qingzhen niisi), performing the roles of female preachers (see Jaschok 2012); as well as abystay among the Tatars in Russia, who are female spiritual figures possessing a sound knowledge of traditions, customs and rituals, and teach religion to women and children (see Micinski 2012). Female Sufi figures in India, Central Asia and other places are functioning within religious networks, and apart from performing rituals, provide various forms of healing (Pemberton 2005; Sultanova 2011; Gorshunova 2006). This broad spectrum of religious activities performed by women calls for an analysis of various aspects of female religious authority. A number of factors such as formal training, family background, charisma, participation in a particular family or social network, and the so-called ‘spiritual abilities’, contribute to whether a person can be considered a religious leader (Kloos, Kunkier 2016: 479-90). Since formal religious education has been still limited for women in many parts of the Islamic world, charismatic and spiritual authority is available to them to a greater extent. According to a Sufi concept, both male and female spiritual authority is based on baraka™ which is a transcendental and spiritual force given by Allah to a person who can pass it further on to others. In this case, the religious knowledge and abilities to perform ¹⁰ According to the Quran, the source of baraka is Allah who can grant it to the prophets. During the development of the Islamic doctrine the concept of baraka was influenced by Judaism and Christianity. As a result, there exists a belief that baraka can be emanated to the prophets who receive ‘enlightenment’ (wahi) and to ‘saints’ who are given ‘divine inspiration’ (ilham). Consequently, through these categories of people, baraka can be passed to others. ‘Holy people’ and the particular places they visited or lived in during their lifetimes, as well as their personal belongings and other such elements can all be a source of baraka (Rezvan 1991: 38). 15 Introduction rituals are considered as a spiritual experience. Even if a person does not receive formal Islamic education, he or she is still able to conduct religious rituals (Kalambach 2012: 10, 16). Female religious figures perform various roles within the different spiritual/mystical traditions - they conduct spiritual rituals, heal, and teach. Many of them function on the margin of religious structures, balancing between scriptural and local Islamic traditions. As it was mentioned, only some of them are assigned to formal religious institutions such as mosques or madrasas, others provide teaching services to informal groups. In Central Asia, traditional bibi-otuns as spiritual leaders perform rituals within their own female circles which are largely distinct from those of their male counterparts. This accepted separation from the male-dominated religious institutions, allow them a certain degree of spiritual and social independence. Nowadays, the new forms of social organisations, such as the political movements and NGOs, led to the development of new opportunities for female religious leaders. It was possible due to the rise in education and literacy levels, new communication technologies, and new trends in Islamic thought and practices. As a result, the social role of female religious figures was reshaped towards social involvement, and civic participation. It is related to the ability to pursue social change, and to present a person’s opinions and ideas to a wider public (Kloos, Kiinkler 2016: 479-490; Kalmbach 2012: 4). In my book, I provide the examples of the Mutakalim NGO in Kyrgyzstan, and the female religious and political activists of the IRPT. These groups created new opportunities for female religious leaders for advocating their ideas of social development according to religious values. Islam is a basis for all their activities, and all social changes should be introduced according to the rules of religion. Saba Mahmood (2012) in her book Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject on the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, acknowledges that practices of the movement (and other movements in general) is grounded in the belief that a divine plan of human life is embodied in the Quran, exegetical literature, and the moral codes which each participant is obliged to follow. “Each individual must interpret the moral codes, in accordance with traditional guidelines, 16 5- Religious authority in Islam and female religious figures in order to discover how she, as an individual, may best realize the divine plan for her life” (Mahmood 2012: 30-31). This movement seeks to realize the ideal of live set by Prophet Muhammad and his first followers. Religious authority should guide people and encourage the pursuit of religious principles. Especially female religious professionals are not expected to question the existing religious and social principles (Mahmood 2012: 30-31). Most female religious leaders with whom I interacted during my research perform a variety of activities such as teaching, performing rituals, healing or social activism. All of female religious leaders have the ability to influence their communities through passing various ideas and opinions, although they do not challenge (at least not directly) the social order. They can influence the process of decision-making in their communities but in most cases, they do not step out of a female circle, for example by approaching the religious sphere controlled by men. Yet, it is also reversed: teaching (with the exception of formal madras as), informal women’s gatherings and celebrations take place mostly beyond the control of men. Still, however, a woman may be considered a person who leads female rituals, transmits scriptural and esoteric knowledge or sometimes possesses baraka, but very rarely as an authority on Islam for all members of the community - even if she is established as a recognisable female religious leader in a certain place such as Gulsun otyncha whose figure I present in Chapter IV. Even though Gulsun otyncha is regarded as a respectful religious leader for women in her district, her activity does not cross the boundaries of the female world. Gulsun is recognized by imams, but she is not included in any discussions on religious matters within the male circle. If such a discussion takes place, it is always carried on only between her and a certain male religious authority. Nevertheless, female religious leaders are respected by the male part of the community, and their position in the social hierarchy is considerably high. The fact that they have no access to the male world is less significant because a mulla or an imam does not approach the female circle as well. In this context, the female religious figure in her circle has the autonomy equal to an imam, and their social roles are of similar status. 17 Introduction In the case of the IRPT, which was a political party in Tajikistan until 2015, it is still unclear to what extent female religious leaders went beyond what is considered the ‘female sphere of influence,’ which I explain using the examples of Mohniso and Mualim in Chapter V. The political activities of these women, and other female members, were associated with a mission which transcended religious activities, and created various opportunities. However, many female leaders functioned only within female groups, for which they organised various activities. The role of female religious leaders has been transformed not only in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan but also in other countries. It is a dynamic process shaped by many factors related to a particular religious circle, and its interpretation of Islam, and also an individual desire of a person to pursue her work outside of traditional spheres. 6. The state of the art In the recent years, several case studies devoted to female religious leaders in Central Asia were published. Each of them approaches the topic from a different perspective, contributing to enhancing the understanding on mechanisms of female religious leadership in the region. To begin with, the book by Nalivkin and Nalivkina (1886) Ocherk byta zhenshchin, osedlogo, tuzemnogo, naseleniia Fergany, which is the first comprehensive book regarding women in the Ferghana Valley, and was published at the end of the 19th century. The authors wrote about bibi-otuns as female religious teachers and leaders for women. The studies of Gorshunova 2001 Otyncha, and 2006 Uzbekskaia Zhenshchina, Socialnyi Status, Semia, Religia, present traditional female religious leaders in the context of their ritual and social functions in the female circle in Uzbekistan. In her 2011 book From Shamanism to Sufism: Women, Islam and culture in Central Asia, Sultanova describes female religious leaders as performers of religious rituals, celebrations and poetry in Uzbekistan. The author presents the rich musical tradition of the region, providing detailed ethnographic descriptions of religious rituals, poems and songs performed by women during various occasions, and analyses their social and cultural 28 6. The state of the art functions. In Koran i rozovoe plamia (Razmyshleniia ob Tadzhikskoi kulture) Rakhimov (2007) provides invaluable analysis of the rituals, celebrations performed by bibi-otuns in Tajikistan, demonstrating their significance for female religiosity and the lives of the communities. He writes about a spiritual division into the female and male worlds, and their origin, presenting bibi-otun as a priestess of female cults, a figure who protects the life-cycle rituals that function outside of canonical Islam belonging to a male sphere of influence. Kamp’s book (2006) The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism looks at women in Uzbekistan in the Soviet period, as well as the little known issue of female religious leaders analyzed from a historical perspective. Fathi (1997, 2006) and Kramer (2006) in their articles offer a glimpse into the practices of female religious leaders, including the influence of the contemporary changes within Islam on their performance. Kandiyoti and Azimova (2004) consider in their paper the role of female religious leaders in the participation in the life-cycle, religious, and propitiatory rituals in Uzbekistan during the USSR and in the post-Soviet period. Finally, Peshkova (2006) in her PhD dissertation Otinchalar in the Ferghana Valley: Islam, Gender and Power, and the book, Women, Islam, and Identity, Public Life in Private Spaces in Uzbekistan (2014) portrays the selected female religious leaders as personalities who function in a certain social context of the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. The stories of those women are presented in the context of contemporary social and political changes, and their impact on a person’s spiritual and mental development. Most studies on the female religious figures in the late Soviet period or after the collapse of the USSR focus on the Uzbek part of Ferghana Valley, and analyze on the Uzbek population (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004; Peshkova 2006, 2014; Sultanova 2011; Gorshunova 2001, 2006). Only Rakhimov (2007) describes spiritual practices of female religious figures in Tajikistan; he collected large part of ethnographic material among the Tajiks in the Zaravshan Valley. Due to the complexity of the topic and the dynamically changing post-Soviet religious landscape, each research brings a new insight into the sphere of influence of female spiritual leaders. 2-9 Introduction The perspective presented in this book focused on various interactions of bibi otuns, and other female teachers of Islam with their communities as well as formal institutions in the specific region. The study examines the relationship between the female religious figures and official organs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, providing new understanding of the religious policies, and their influences on female religious leadership. I also present the ways in which female figures develop strategies of negotiations of their religious roles with various institutions and organisations including NGOs, political parties, and state associations. Another issue considered here is the impact of the transformation of Islam on the networks of traditional leaders such as bibi otun/otyncha, as their status has been challenged by reformists. 7. Notes on transliteration Since this book uses terms from a variety of languages and alphabets, it employs simplified transcription for Asian languages, including Arabic, Tajik, Farsi, Uzbek and Kyrgyz, as well as Slavic languages, such as Russian and Polish. I decided to write only Polish surnames in their original form. Notes on fieldwork and methodology i. Religious policies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the field study In Tajikistan, due to increasing control over religious life, religious leaders and their activities are under constant pressure from the secret service and other governmental structures. As a result, people use a variety of strategies including peaceful resistance, passive acceptance, or cooperation with the state to cope with the situation. At the time of my research in 2014, a number of women were engaged in the work of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) until its dissolution towards the end of August 2015. Despite difficulties, it provided opportunities for female religious leaders to participate in politics. Consequently, they became more visible in the public space. Other female leaders with whom I interacted during my research work functioned in various ways; some of them were not involved in any activities outside the religious sphere, other cooperated with NGOs, few were members of mahalla committees.¹¹ A formal association of the Shuroi Bibi Otunho was established by the governmental structures in the Khujand city to control female religious leaders (see Chapters I and V). " A mahalla committee is a primary semi-official authority in a community/ village registered within a municipality. 31 Notes on fieldwork and methodology The religious situation differs considerably in Kyrgyzstan where relatively flexible religious policies facilitated cooperation of some spiritual professionals with the state organs. Besides the religious institutions, there are several NGOs which cooperate with religious leaders such as the Mutakalim NGO working with Muslim women according to Islamic values. Mutakalim created networks of female religious leaders in various parts ofKyrgyzstan which involve individuals who transmit religious knowledge to women in their communities. One of the branches of Mutakalim is located in Osh, in southern Kyrgyzstan, where it cooperates with female religious professionals of Uzbek and Kyrgyz origin. The ethnic conflict between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz which took place in 2010 in Osh and the surrounding area left behind a legacy of tension between those two groups. Mutual distrust and animosities are a part of the local reality. Consequently, cooperation with religious leaders involves a considerable number of challenges, especially that many religious groups and ideologies clash with each other, which, alongside the ethnic tensions, affects the situation in this region. Considering all of the above aspects, I decided not to disclose the name of the district in Kyrgyzstan where my research was based (hereby referred to as Shahrak), in order to protect the people, with whom I interacted during my field study. For the same reason the majority of names of the people in Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were changed, and they are not revealed in the text. As far as Taj ikistan is concerned, owing to persecution of the political opposition and religious leaders by the state authorities, I have tried to prevent the identification of the particular places in Khujand and the neighbouring area, as well as the situations I describe. In some cases, I decided to not reveal part of the collected information to protect my friends and their families. 2. A personal perspective from the field My research interests have always concentrated on the religion of ordinary people. What people believe in and practice and how they 32 i. A personal perspective from the field incorporate their beliefs into their lives. Why religion is important to them. Finally, what is the role of religious leaders, men and women in local communities. I have been interested in rituals, traditions, old songs, pilgrimages to holy places, and, to a lesser extent, the dogmatic aspects of religion or the religious policies of Central Asian states. Within my project, I planned to study the social realities of female religious figures who function in various communities in the Ferghana Valley, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While planning the project proposal I already knew that the discussion surrounding Islam in Tajikistan was tense, and that there was an ongoing political struggle between the IRPT and the President of Tajikistan - Emomali Rahmon - and his allies. However, I was still confident that the study of female rituals is less problematic than research regarding political issues. But as a provisional measure, I decided to conduct part of my field work in southern Kyrgyzstan. Besides, I also wanted to include this part of the valley in the research since this region is underexplored in the ethnographic literature regarding the topic of female religious figures. Paradoxically, however, in 2014, in spite of various problems which I describe in Chapters I and V, it was much easier to conduct research in Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan. In my opinion, it stemmed from the fact that in Tajikistan, some people, including religious leaders, either openly refused to obey the state, or did not support the government's policy in relation to religion. People who were not involved in any political activities (i.e.: supporting the political opposition - the IRPT), or even were not very religious, held the opinion that the situation of religion resembles the Soviet period. Hence, many of my friends, and co-workers were willing to help me, as they believed that drawing ethnographic data from rituals and ceremonies is valuable for their culture, and due to the political situation as well as changes within Islam, those practices have been gradually simplified or have vanished. Moreover, in Tajikistan, apart from research, I was involved in aid projects implemented by small Polish NGOs at the grassroots level. Hence, I had a wide network of personal contacts. In Kyrgyzstan, I also sporadically worked for NGOs, and as a long-term observer for The 33 Notes on fieldwork and methodology Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In 2006, I also conducted a short research project in the southern part of the country. Nevertheless, my knowledge of this country was less extensive than in the case of Tajikistan. Conducting research in Kyrgyzstan in 2015 turned out to be much more challenging for various reasons. First of all, despite a semblance of peace in Osh and the surrounding area, the situation is still uncertain. Besides, the increasing Islamisation of this region, and the presence of various Islamic groups, with some operating outside of the state structures, deepen the atmosphere of mutual distrust between various circles. The feeling of suspicion, as well as the ethnic division between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, influence the work of a researcher, and his/ her relationships with people. The suspicion of espionage and gossips regarding my person, which were being spread behind my back, became part of my reality during the research I conducted in south Kyrgyzstan. In general, this kind of accusations towards foreign researchers are not uncommon in Central Asia. They are a direct consequence of a long tradition of surveillance under the Soviet state which in some cases has continued until the present day. Moreover, many people are not familiar with the tasks of anthropologists or ethnographers, thus some of them think that the researcher is an agent of a secret service. Insinuations that I am a spy were also expressed several times during my previous work in the region, but never to such an extent as in Kyrgyzstan in 2015. Coming from Poland, I grew up in the so-called Eastern Bloc which collapsed in 1989, when I was a teenager. Due to my father’s family origin I have always been more related to ‘the East’ than ‘the West’ which I considered ‘far abroad’. However, Poland’s shift from the East to the West, which has gradually taken place since the late 1980s, has changed the perception of Poles in Central Asia. Moreover, the changing of the political situation on the USA-Russia axis has influenced the work of many people. A negative view of ‘the West’ and ‘Western researchers’ has considerably increased since the conflict in Ukraine started. Another factor which contributed to this situation had to do with the plans of the Kyrgyz government to introduce The Law 34 i. A personal perspective from the field “On Foreign Agents”¹² ¹³ aimed at limiting the activities of international organizations and foreign funding. Finally, I became ‘a suspected spy’ from a hostile country who did research on Islam to pass information to the mythical secret service. For me, it was a big shift as well as a surprise since during my previous years of work in the region, as a Pole who is a fluent speaker of the Russian language, I had always been very well received and even treated a bit as ‘one of us’ (Russian: наша), because I came from a ‘closer’, more ‘familiar Europe’ than someone from France or Germany. Moreover, working not only as a researcher but also in aid projects, I developed various relationships which allowed me to build trust as well as gave me access to information and people. However, in 2015 in Kyrgyzstan, it seemed that all those factors began to work against me. Suddenly, the fact that I speak Russian well became a confirmation that I was ‘trained’ in my country by the secret service. Another ‘obvious proof’ that I was a spy was that I gathered ethnographic data during the Ramadan. Why did you come to our district particularly in Ramadan? I heard from a nurse at whose house I stayed. Almost every day while conducting research in southern Kyrgyzstan I experienced unpleasant, sometimes ridiculous situations that affected the state of my mind, and to a certain extent, the way of conducting research. For example, besides the suspicion of espionage, I was accused of practising illegal da 'wa'¹ (because I attended religious gatherings for women, and classes of Islam). Another time, I was suspected of spreading illicit Islamic literature after someone observed that I gave The Book of Hadith to one of the otynchas during a gathering in her home (in fact, I bought this book in a shop near the central mosque in Osh). ¹² The Law “On Foreign Agents” (Russian: “Zakonoproekt ob Inostrannykh Agentakh”) it was a proposed amendment to the existing law “On Non-Profit Organizations” (Russian: “O Nekommercheskikh organizaciiakh”). ¹³ Da’wa (da'wah) is a form of preaching. It often involves reminding Muslims about their religion and obligation towards God or it can be an act of proselytizing. Da 'wa can be performed by a person or a group of the faithful (Quranreading. com 2015). 35 Notes on fieldwork and methodology Peshkova (2014) describes her experience with the Uzbek state while conducting research in Uzbekistan; her unwanted visits at the secret service’s office and the suspicion of spying which were directed against her, resulted in many difficulties and mental tensions. At the same time, it enabled her to see the nature of citizens’ surveillance in Uzbekistan, and the situation of Islam, and religious leaders, even those who were loyal to the state. Kaliszewska (2016: 23-45) who did research on the relationship between Islam and the state in Dagestan, writes about her numerous meetings with the secret service, as well as distrust towards her which was expressed by some of her interlocutors. Despite her emotional reactions and negative feelings, after some time, she began to perceive her conversations with the police as a source of information which enriched her study. My various experiences such as the meetings with the secret service, conversations with people, and the rumours that were spread regarding my person, were for me indications of the reality of life in southern Kyrgyzstan. All the situations I came across became part of the ethnographic material to analyse in my study of the relations between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz, as well as between various groups within Islam. I used the material to investigate the state policies, and the way in which they influence the activities of female religious figures. In the field, the boundary between private life and work is blurred. When a researcher lives wih the locals, in their houses, and interacts with them on a daily basis, she or he becomes part of the realities of the study. In extreme cases, when we are dealing with difficult matters, we are forced to confront our emotions, views as well as a moral dimension of our work. We touch upon what Leibing and McLean (2007: 15) term “Transmutation experience: approaching the reality of shadows”. In her essay Field-Workers’ Feelings. What We Feel, Who We Are, How We Analyze Kleinman (1991) describes the experience of her research in a holistic health centre. At the beginning she ignored her feelings of anger and disappointment since she believed that the researcher should be objective in order to understand the field (the setting). The author attempted to cope with her emotions by ignoring them. She thought that in this way, she was able to maintain friendly 2. A personal perspective from the field relationships with the people, simultaneously however, she noticed that through distancing herself she was not closely related to them. In the course of time, she realized that experiencing anger and disappointment in the field constitutes the process itself, and both feelings are a source of knowledge. She changed her approach and started to perceive the situation in the field from a different perspective, trying to understand what she observed, but at the same time accepting her feelings and emotions. In spite of the difficulties which I experienced in Kyrgyzstan, I was able to develop relationships that I could call friendly, and which allowed me to continue my research, especially with the people from Mutakalim organization network, madrasa in Shakhrak, Gulsun otyncha and other people. However, at some point the situation was tense, I was alone in the field for most of the time, always uncertain about my interactions with people, especially so because in the Uzbek and Tajik cultures and, to a certain extent, in the Kyrgyz culture, communication between people proceeds differently than in the Polish culture, where people speak their minds in quite a direct way. In contrast, in Central Asia, showing feelings or emotions is not regarded as desirable or polite behaviour, since a person to whom we direct our opinions could feel offended or even may lose his/her face. Hence, all our ideas and theories about what a particular person thinks about us, often have to be based on the fluidity of our intuition and feelings. It is extremely difficult and requires intense attention to detail, gestures and words, as well as a good knowledge of symbols and systems of meaning within a local cultural code. While conducting research I began to consider my emotions as a barometer, especially during conversations with people with completely different views than mine, for example those with quite a strict view regarding the Islamic creed or women rights. The emotional discussions which I held, often disagreeing with my interlocutors, became for me a source of knowledge regarding various social and religious issues. 37 Notes on fieldwork and methodology 3. Methodology Conducting research on Central Asian societies, I tried to avoid distorting local cultures in my description of them by not referring to any particular theory as well as by conducting research using methodological principles provided by anthropology. The methodology serves as a means to provide a final product of the research journey. Strategies of inquiry are constructed in a way to arrive at the research destination. It is a map which guides the researcher to the place where he or she intends to go and do necessary modification of methods during the process of the research (Wilson 2008: 39). Flexibility of research methods and their modification underparticular circumstances are important while working in Central Asia, where, as I described above, a researcher is frequently confronted with various challenges and constraints. The classical methods of inquiry based on fixed questionnaires, and recording interviews are often not practical. In many cases, people do not feel comfortable being recorded but it is not always the rule. In addition, many people prefer fairly free forms of conversation without of framing within a particular questionnaire. Therefore, a conversation has a spontaneous character, and at the same time the researcher can have control over its course. In my book, I deal with the religious traditions and practices of female circles led by female religious figures. My understanding of religious traditions and their realities is based on an ethnoepistemological approach and an indigenous research paradigm which are applied to the interpretation of knowledge from the point of view of personal, collective environmental and spiritual relationships in the context of a certain culture. It further enables the development of criteria for conducting research suitable for different realities. This idea is based on the assumption that: “reality is relationships or set of relationships. There is no one definite reality but rather different sets of relationships that make up an indigenous ontology. Therefore, reality is not an object but a process of relationships” (Wilson 2008: 73; see also Maffie n.d.). This approach is especially useful while confronting the changing social realities of Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, where practically all 38 3. Methodology relationships are defined by the religious tradition of Islam and its various interpretations. The main method of my research was participant observation and in-depth interviews. I conducted about 80 interviews. However, as was mentioned before, the course of an interview was often flexible without a fixed frame or length. Additionally, ethnographic material was collected during the religious classes for women and various rituals which I was able to observe, and to participate in. I attach particular importance to collecting ethnographic data from the rituals and celebrations, while realizing that some of them are disappearing and that it may be the last chance to study them. In this book, I present part of the collected ethnographic data. I participated in religious classes in the same way as other students who learn about Islam and read the Quran. I had the opportunity to observe the rituals by being invited by friends, and the female religious leaders with whom I established friendship. In most cases, people performing rituals knew that I was an anthropologist from Poland, however, in some ceremonies organised in holy places, and during other collective gatherings, I took on the role of a common participant or client (in the case of healing rituals). In the book I present a number of female religious figures. In most cases, I had contact with them on a daily basis, participating in their lives, getting to know their families and their social circles. I also conducted interviews with other female figures during various celebrations, and meetings. These people are not the main characters of this book, but I use quotations from conversations with them to present various issues. An additional source of information was provided by my friends from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who study Islam, or/and who come from families of religious leaders. Other interviews were conducted with various people such as local historians, enthusiasts of local cultures, intellectuals, religious professionals, NGO workers or other members of local communities. While interpreting the data, I was inspired by an interpretive anthropology which is based on the assumption that a researcher, even in the most accurate description, would not achieve an objective interpretation of the reality of another culture. He/she always produces 39 Notes on fieldwork and methodology some perceptions and an image of seemingly objective reality (see e.g.: Geertz: 1983). Therefore, while analyzing ethnographic material, I tried to present the opinions of persons or the ritual process, in a way which would give the broadest possible space for their interpretation. The female religious leaders among whom I worked, represented various independent approaches to religion, rituals, social and political matters. Thus, it is difficult to find one and fixed way to interpret their thoughts and opinions, especially that piety and its expressions were constantly negotiated and discussed by the parties involved. In addition, the role of female religious leaders, the nature of their activities, the way in which they interact with people and institutions have been constantly reformulated depending on the circumstances. Hence, while translating all those categories and presenting their logic, I had to consider their fluidity and dynamics. Simultaneously, a rather tense situation in the field as well as a lack of adequate sources of information on this topic, forced me to carefully verify, and select the ethnographic material that was collected to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, taking into account a diversity of ways in which my interlocutors construct their realities. Chapter I Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 1.1. Preface The main goal of this chapter is to examine the transformation of the Islamic practices in contemporary Central Asia related to the Islamic revival, with a focus on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. I understand ‘a revival of Islam’, which is also referred to as ‘Islamic renaissance’, ‘re-Islamisation’, or ‘rebirth’, ‘awakening’ (the term is derived from the Arabic word nahda) as an increasing presence of Islam in daily life and in the public sphere. This process is associated with a spontaneous intensification of various forms of religiosity, such as worshipping holy places, alternative forms of healing, lifecycle rituals, mass interest in Islamic education (including learning legal, philosophical, and theological texts, as well as poetry), developing religious institutions, increasing activities performed by spiritual leaders, including men and women, and so forth. However, I do not perceive this phenomenon as something that began only recently in the Muslim regions of the former USSR, which has been disconnected from pre-Soviet, and early Soviet periods, or only as a phenomenon that was imported to the region from the outside. In my opinion, the ‘revival’ is a very complex process influenced by various external and internal factors which are complementary to each other, and which have pushed the development of Islam onto a new track. There is also a difference between the period of the ‘revival’ which started prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the period after 1991. Those two periods of time are characterised 41 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... by dissimilar narratives and dynamics. The first period was marked by systematic atheisation and persecution of religion by the state. The second period has been more difficult to assess since the differences among the states in the region have deepened over the past 25 years, and each country has developed its own religious policy (Zapaśnik 2006: 65-67; McBrien 2008: 55-56; Kaliszewska 2016: 85-86; Montgomery 2016: 90-97). It should be noted that Muslims of Central Asia, prior to the October Revolution, had a sense of belonging to the Islamic world. In the aftermath of the revolution, they became part of the USSR (an atheistic state) with the cultural and political centre in Moscow, and a hub of Islamic life in Tashkent (at least from a formal point of view). Following the collapse of the USSR, the situation began to change, since new opportunities emerged, and new religious centres were established in every country. Tajikistan lost the connection with its traditional religious centres in Samarkand, Bukhara, and other places. This produced the need to create new relationships based on local, as well as foreign connections. Kyrgyzstan practically rebuilt its religious tradition based on local practices, but also on ideologies coming from the outside, forming a ‘new interpretation of Islam’. In addition, the division of the historically coherent territory of the Ferghana Valley, which has been a hub of Islamic life for a long time, contributed to the transformation of traditional religious networks. The new borders, rigidly defined after the dissolution of the USSR, prevented free movement of people and ideas, and consequently the transmission of the Islamic knowledge by independent teachers. All of the above-mentioned factors affected the process of revival of Islam in all countries of the region. This chapter considers the relationship between the changing social and political realities and Islam. It further analyzes the religious policies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and their impact on religious institutions and spiritual leaders, including female religious professionals. It also intends to examine how various religious interpretations influenced people’s perception of religion and their practices. Following Bowen (2013: 1-10) and Gabriele Marranci (2008: 13-29), I understand Islam as a system of interpretative resources and practices, similar to other religions. All Muslims living in various parts of the 41 i.i. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms... world participate in the formation of the Islamic tradition. People shape Islam through particular interpretations, narratives and the way in which they practice their religion. Seeking connections between various traditions and practices, and searching for their meaning, I adopted Penkala-Gawçcka’s (2006: 85) approach to the Islamic tradition of Central Asia: From a point of view of a researcher who applies anthropological perspective, it is important what is the interpretation of religion adopted by the people who consider themselves Muslims. What role does religion have in their lives, regardless of the extent to which it differs from the orthodox model. This way of looking at religion enables one to see the complexity of transformation of the Muslim practices in Central Asia, not only from the political or social perspective, but also from the point of view of religious involvement of people, how they see the recent changes within Islam and spiritual life. It also helps to see how the new interpretations of Islam influence the reformulation of the social institution of female religious leadership, and how it can potentially impact the transmission of religious knowledge to Muslim women. i.2. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms and their interpretations In this analysis I argue that Islam is the basis of all social relationships in Central Asia. Following Roi and Wainer (2009: 304), I recognize that “Islam in Central Asia is perceived not merely as an abstract component of collective and individual identity but as a key element, informing one’s habits and customs”. Even decades of Sovietization and atheisation did not significantly change it. Opening secular schools, universities, workplaces, hospitals etc. as well as promoting a secular worldview obviously influenced people’s perception of the world but did not affect a deeply-rooted basis of spiritual identity. Islam as a religious/cultural system has still influenced every aspect of human life: relationships within the family, between older and younger members of 43 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... the community, between men and women, between persons performing various professions; it also has determined the organization of houses and living space, a way of observance of celebrations and rituals, including some public events, even if the latter are of seemingly secular nature. It is very common to hear from people: My father/grandfather was a communist and a member of the Party but ofcourse he was always Muslim in his heart! In this context, Islam should be considered not only a religious but also a cultural and a social category. Being Muslim is seen as meta-identity of belonging not only to a religious group but also to a social/ethno-cultural formation. Therefore, the understanding of religiosity or the rejection of belief in any deities, as in the case of an atheistic approach, differs from the Western model, where secular and spiritual aspects of life have been separated, and where being an atheist is a widely accepted worldview. The term bedin functions in the Tajik language. It means ‘without faith’ and is understood in the similar context as kafir (unbeliever, or disbeliever) which is a derogatory word. There are also Tajik terms such as beimon (without belief in the principles of Islam) - and khudo be habar (without knowledge of God) which describe a person rej ecting the rules of religion, and committing immoral deeds of prostitution, drinking alcohol and so forth. Thus, the concept such as a ‘non-practicing Muslim’ or ‘Muslim-Atheist’, along the lines of a 'non-practicing Catholic’ in Poland - someone who was baptized but does not participate in any manifestations of religious life, does not exist in the collective consciousness of people. Certainly, individual people can have their own opinions on religious and spiritual matters, but a lack of any faith is perceived very negatively. People seldom openly admit to be holding or expressing such views. A person who is not very religious can be described in Tajik as dindari saht nest. Someone who follows religious rules such as praying, wearing the Muslim outfit etc. is called namaz khondan (performing prayers).¹⁴ ¹⁴ I use Taj ik/Persian terms to describe the above-mentioned religious phenomenon since they are used by various ethne of Central Asia, not only by Tajiks; nevertheless, various ethnolinguistic groups have also their own expressions of this kind in their languages. 44 .1. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms... The terms “atheist” and “atheism” are known from the Soviet period, but mostly people regard them as an abstract phenomenon, and many are not aware of their real meaning. These terms are sometimes used to describe a certain lifestyle or a person who behaves in a way seen as as secular in the local context. Even if someone describes himself/herself as ‘an atheist’, it does not mean that he or she does not believe in God or reject the existence of any supernatural beings (see McBrien, Pelkmans 2008: 87-88). Nevertheless, the institutional atheisation during the seven decades of the existence of the Soviet Union affected the way in which some people viewed the position of religion. It should be noted that in a broad sense, the Soviet system was influenced by ideas of post--Enlightenment which emphasized rationality as a way of explaining the world, attributing superiority to Western science. Sets of atheistic ideologies are based on similar terms to describe reality by using rational categories of knowledge. This approach influenced people through the Soviet education system. And despite the fact that a vast majority of them followed religious rites in their private lives, many of them accepted secularism as defining the relationship between public life and religion. There was a variety of individuals including some members of prominent religious families, party representatives, social activists, various professionals and others, who accepted the Soviet/ secular worldview; even though the majority of them did not support the Soviet policies in relation to religion. Even following the collapse of communism, which saw increased presence of various religious symbols in the public domain, many people still approach the manifestations of Islam and other denominations with a certain level of distrust. Although they are Muslims involved in religious practices within their social or family circle, they still prefer to follow the principles of secular rationality (associated with modernity) than any new interpretations of spirituality (Montgomery 2016: 91-92; McBrien, Pelkmans 2008: 87-88). The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan differs due to differences in the religious/spiritual cultures, but also dissimilar patterns of the state policies. However, in both countries there is a group of people who carefully approach all new religious trends, and prefer to distance themselves from open manifestations of Islam. 45 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... Hence, occasionally, in conversations with non-Muslims from the West, a person may present himself/herself as an atheist, or someone for whom religion is not important, because he/she thinks that people from the West perceive religious Muslims as those who do not support ‘secular’, ‘European’ values, and are possibly backward or even ‘radical’ in their worldview. Moreover, he or she could not support an increasing presence of Islam in the public life, and prefers to have a neutral position regarding religion. After some time, however, we learn that our interlocutor, despite previous declaration, is not an atheist in our ‘Western’ understanding of this term, and he or she follows some forms of spirituality and traditions. The intensification of religious life that followed the collapse of the USSR brought multiple perspectives on the position of religion in the social as well as state systems. Part of the population is afraid of the potential social changes that can take place as a result of the increasing presence of Islam which manifests itself with building new mosques, intensification of religious education, growing popularity of religious outfits in the streets and so forth. The fear of ‘Islamization’ of society, in a sense became an obsession in some circles. It is also widely used by all governments in Central Asia to control societies, and to undermine their political opponents’ position. Paradoxically, various antagonistic groups of Muslims also use ‘the Islamic factor’ to show rival groups in a bad light of ‘radicalization’. Threatening others with ‘Islamization’ is not only a method characteristic for the authorities of post-Soviet Central Asia, but is also common in the Russian Federation. In the following parts of this chapter I will deal with this topic in more detail. By and large, such policies do not improve security as well as do not prevent escalation of religious extremism (Kaliszewska 2016: 103-108; McBrien, Pelkmans 2008: 87-88). Especially some representatives of the local intelligentsia tend to describe the increasing presence of religion as a syndrome of backwardness or a sign of radicalization. In this context various stigmatizing terms are being used. These include: Wahabbi, Salafi etc. They are often used as synonyms without any reflection on their real meaning both in the official discourse as well as in informal conversations. Someone can be considered a radical because she is 46 i.2. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms... wearing a certain style of hijab'⁵ or niqab,¹⁵ ¹⁶ but in the same way the words Wahabbi and Salafi are used to discredit the activities of certain groups, regardless of their ideology. Specific terminology depends on the situation. For instance: in the south of Kyrgyzstan, locals sometimes use the word ‘Hizbu’ which refers to the outlawed organisation Hizb--ut-Tahrir. While talking about one of female religious leaders with her friend, who is also a local teacher of Islam, I was told: She is a bit radical, a bit Hizbu (Russian: Она немножко радикальная, немножко хизбу). In this way, my interlocutor wanted to emphasize that this person’s religious views are quite strict and she personally does not share such an approach to Islam. However, it did not mean that this woman was involved in violent activities. People are afraid of Islamists, especially that recently a number of citizens of Central Asia left to fight alongside ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). This anxiety has been fuelled by various local myths and spread of misleading information regarding the activities of extremist/ radical groups. In my opinion, these rumours are disseminated partly by the local secret services, but also through journalists and the media, and, possibly, rival Islamic groups. As a result, some people are afraid of any forms of religiosity (see e.g.: McBrien and Pelkmans 2008; Kaliszewska 2016; Montgomery 2016). One of my friends, Bamo, (aged 21) an Uzbek who is a student at the Theology Department of the Osh State University, became interested in religion at school, after a while she decided to wear the hijab. At first, Bamo's parents asked her not to cover herself and were against her choice of theology as a topic of study. They were both convinced that this was a prelude to her joining a terrorist group, and only after some time, they accepted her choice. Yet, many people in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan view religion as a point of reference for defining political as well as social relationships. Especially in Kyrgyzstan, where there is a relative religious freedom, ¹⁵ A veil covering the head, considered by the majority of the Islamic theologians as an obligatory outfit for Muslim women. ¹⁶ The face veil worn as a part of female Muslim garment; from a point of view of the Islamic orthodoxy it is optional for a woman to wear niqab, only some Islamic scholars believe that it is required. 47 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... people tend to seek religious enlightenment in different religious paradigms, using various sources of knowledge. Some of them go through many stages of religious development, as for example Nadira (Kyrgyz, aged 43), an economist and journalist who teaches Islam to female groups in Bishkek. Initially, she followed a traditional religious path of her Kyrgyz family, then she began to receive religious education in the madrasa. Nadira appeared on television speaking about Islam, she also used to be a political activist as well as a member of Jamaat al Tabligh.¹⁷ As in the case of a number of other religious figures, she talks about the diversity of religious views within the Islamic creed but also the needs of purification of Islam in Kyrgyzstan from local traditions.¹⁸ ¹⁹ The latter point leads to a question regarding the understanding of the ‘Islamic orthodoxy’ and what is considered ‘traditional Islam’, or ‘Islamic traditions’. On the whole, orthodoxy can be considered as adherence to the Quran and Sunna of Prophet Muhammad. However, due to multiple interpretations of the Quran and Sunna, this explanation does not provide a satisfactory answer. Asad (2009: 22) acknowledges that: “orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship - a relationship of power to truth. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy”. This theoretical framework is well complemented by an opinion of a person from the Islamic University in Bishkek whom I interviewed: Tradition and religion should be separated. However, if tradition does not contradict religion, it can be still kept.'⁹ An average follower of Islam from Central Asia, however, does not use the word orthodoxy (Russian: ортодоксальность) to describe the recent transformation of Islamic practices towards their regulation and modification. It is used by professional theologians, and intellectuals. They represent a small part of well-educated society but they may ¹⁷ Jamaat al Tabligh (Community for spreading faith) is a non-political Sunni organisation whose purpose is to spread Islamic creed. It originated in India and operates in many countries. On the basis my interview with Nadira, June 2015, Kyrgyzstan. ¹⁹ An interview with one of the employees of the Islamic University in Bishkek, June 2015. 4« .1. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms... influence the view of the people. Clearly, by describing practices as orthodox there is always a risk of too rigid determination of certain categories. Montgomery (2016: 37) explains that “Defining practice as orthodoxy creates the idea of both heterodoxy and preorthodoxy. But it is the case, after all, that most people do not find themselves part of a religious community wishing to be bad practitioners within that community”. Similarly, Asad (2009: 23) argues that orthodoxy and tradition should not be seen as opposing concepts, since tradition is not homogeneous, and heterogeneity of Muslim practices does not indicate an absence of Islamic tradition. Kaliszewska (2016:103-106), in her discussion of Islam in Dagestan, indicates that the terms ‘traditionalists’ or ‘neo-traditionalists’ refer to the members of the Sufi brotherhoods and those emphasizing the importance of preserving traditional forms of religiosity. However, the above-mentioned categories should be analysed in terms of their flexibility due to their transgressive meaning, depending on the context in which they are used. This situation is similar in Central Asia where according to Rasanayagam (2006: 224) the term ‘traditional’ is not value-neutral since it is frequently used as a weapon by governments of those countries, as well as by various competing groups in the ideological and theological battles to promote their own interpretations of the Islamic creed. Moreover, defining ‘traditional Islam’ becomes more complicated since some representatives of Sufism in Central Asia also criticize local traditions, just like those who are associated with groups of the Islamic reformists. Thus different perspectives triggered discussion on what is correct and incorrect from the point of view of the Islamic creed. New Islamic trends refer to more scriptural interpretations of Islam in explaining their views of religious matters requiring correction of local/ traditional practices. One of the religious leaders with whom I spoke in Kyrgyzstan said: A local version of Sufism is not this form of religion about which our great shaikhs taught our ancestors. Many of the local rituals are not included in Tasawwuf.²⁰ At present, various elements of :ü 7asawwH/is another term for Sufism; it is sometimes called the inner dimension of Islam. 49 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... Sufism are introduced by new groups in Kyrgyzstan such as for instance Jamaat al Tabligh or non-autochthonous ethnic groups: Chechens, Dagestanis and so forth. However, some local traditions are considered to be a part of the Hanafi school, and there is the need to modify them, and to adapt them to contemporary conditions. This is ‘the new creation ’ of Islam.²' Nevertheless, it does not mean that the opposition to Sufism versus some new religious trends do not exist within the complicated pattern of Islam in the region. While talking about the changes within Islam in Central Asia, it is important to look at the issue of radical ideologies. There is a common view that radical Islam is a marginal phenomenon in the region. It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to conduct research among members of radical and illegal group to gain knowledge of how they operate. Researchers and journalists have limited access to such groups due to the illegal status of the latter, and because the local secret services block information, mainly out of fear that people from the outside would acquire knowledge on linkages between the state organs and various illegal formations. I refer here to the case of Umar Faruk - an American journalist deported by the Kyrgyz in the spring of 2015, allegedly on charges of violation of social order, and spreading racial and ethnic hatred. He was detained by the Kyrgyz authorities, and accused of possessing illegal Islamic literature. The accusations were denied by the local human rights organizations which claimed that they were fabricated by the Kyrgyz secret service to discredit the journalist and then expel him from the country (Glushkova, Pomeon 2016: 19). In the summer of 2015 a local journalist in a personal conversation with me confirmed that evidence against Umar Faruk was falsified to enable him to obtain uncomfortable information regarding the Osh riots in 2010. Another factor is related to a lack of trust towards people from the outside such as foreign researchers, journalists, NGOs’ workers in a sensitive area such as southern Kyrgyzstan, where people prefer to keep the internal affairs within communities, since according ²¹ A quotation from the interview with a religious professional related to Naqshbandiyya, Bishkek, June 2015. SO i.2. 'Good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' - the problems with the terms... to popular opinion foreigners gather information for secret services of their countries. Moreover, the fact that radical groups are seen as a marginal phenomenon does not mean that they are unable to influence Islam in the region. This is especially because radicals of any formations reject the idea of integration of Islam into a secular state, preaching a fairly black and white understanding of religion, which leaves little room for any polemics on the Islamic doctrine. This kind of ideologies can easily get out of control. Those groups are ideologically heterogeneous, being at variance with one another. Each group accuses its opponents of having a mistaken understanding of Islam, calling them kafirs or misbelievers. Due to some influences of the Deobandi school from Pakistan, as well as Saudi Arabia’s policy aimed at undermining Iran’s position in the region, some people even present the followers of the Shia branch of Islam as kafirs (Zapaśnik 2006: 72; Kalishevskii 2015). At present, the view of Shia Islam is even less favourable than a few years ago. It results not only from the Iranian-Saudi antagonism, but also the anti-Shiite politics related to the political situation in Iraq and the war in Syria. Some of my interlocutors who supported purification of Islam expressed opinions that the Shia branch of Islam including Ismaili is an aberration (Russian: заблуждение). However, few people of the Salafi-like approach described the Shia as infidels. It should be noted that radical groups are frequently marginalized by the official religious discourse, however, it does not necessary mean that they are not popular among some members of society. I named them Salafi-like, or radical groups, due to a rather strict version of religion which they preach. I will elaborate on this topic in the subsequent parts of the book referring to specific cases. The question arises about the extent to which debates about Islam influence the religious awareness and identity of people, and how various Islamic trends shape people’s religious view, and their every--day practices. As mentioned above, labelling people as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’, ‘radical’, ‘fanatics’, ‘Wahhabi’, ‘Salafi’, ‘religious or not’ is constantly present in various discussions on religion in Central Asia, and used depending on the context. Working in the region for many years, I somehow got used 5i Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... to this type of categorisation which in fact does not always present someone’s opinion on religious/theological matters. It rather indicates that the person does not support a certain understanding of Islam which he or she considers as inappropriate. When my research on female religious leaders started, I was initially surprised to leam how much time some of my interlocutors devoted to explaining me what (in their opinion) the correct understanding of Islam was. For instance, how ‘we’ - representatives of the Hanafi school should pray, and how ‘Salafi’ or some other unknown groups perform namaz etc. (see Chapter V). Some people supported their arguments by using theological explanation. The terms such as shirk* ²² and hid'a²-are widely used to criticize local rituals: pilgrimage to holy places, or rituals of lifecycle, and others, as well as activities of some spiritual leaders. Later on in this chapter, I analyse this phenomenon, showing how those terms are incorporated into popular religious discussions. Considering the above even if a researcher attempts to avoid the debate on ‘traditional’ or ‘correct’, and ‘incorrect’ Islamic practices, some categorisations are necessary to describe the social and political reality, and its impact on Islam in Central Asia. In this book I do not intend to engage in a theoretical debate on the shaping of the Islamic creed in Central Asia. I rather make an attempt to describe how various religious categories are used by people, and in which way those ²² Shirk is a term of Quranic origin which means the presence at God’s side of other divinities or associates, which are understood as forms of worship that are additional to the faith placed in God. Shirk is the worst form of disbelief. The Quran emphasises in many verses that God is only one and does not have any other forms. Those who believe in the power of other spirits will be condemned during the Day of Judgment (Gimaret 1997: 484-86). ²² Bid'a - innovation regarding religious matters. A belief or practice which was not exercised in the times of Prophet Muhammad thus is in opposition to the Quran and Sunna. Bid'a does not always have a negative connotation, it can be good or bad (that which runs contrary to the Quran). Explanation is dependent on the circumstances as well as interpretation of various groups and scholars. Consequently bid'a raises various controversies and disputes. Bid'a should be distinguished from heresy as it is considered to arise from confusion rather than being contradictory to the teachings of the Prophet (Robson 1986: 1199). Si ij. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet... categories determine activities of female religious leaders, and their self-identification as religious figures. Hence, I use the word ‘traditional’ while describing some local practices and traditions because they are perceived by most of the local people with whom I interacted as ‘their traditional rites’, irrespective of the political discourses on this matter. 1.3. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet period Contemporary discussion on Islam dates back to the early Soviet period, and was marked by the activity of Shaikh Muhammad Sayyid Abd al-Wahid al-Asali al-Shami al-Tarabulsi (known as Shami Domulla; died 1940), a representative of the Shafiya mazhab from Syria. He claimed the Quran and Sunna were superior to local traditions and strongly criticized Hanafi mazhab and Sufi practices. Shami Domulla advocated of ‘socialistic Islam’, cooperating with the Soviet authorities. He is even considered as a precursor of modem Salafi thought in Central Asia; his educational activities led to the establishment of the group Ahl-i Hadis which influenced the religious view of many recognisable clerics of Soviet Uzbekistan before and after World War II.²⁴ The most significant personage of this group was Ziyauddin Babakhan serving as a mufti of SADUM until his death in 1982. SADUM (English: Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Russian: Духовное Управление Мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана) was established in 1943 as the official institution to supervise all Islamic activities in the Soviet Central Asia;²⁵ Babakhan and his colleagues ²'¹ Their main figures were: Jamal Khodzha Ishan (died 1937), Sayyid Abu Nasr Mubashshir at-Tarazi (died 1977), Mullah Yunus Khakimdjanov (died 1994), ‘Abd al-Kadir Muradov (died 1976), Ibrahim-qari Ishakov (Shaikhim qari), Shakh-lkram Shakh-Islamov, Mullah ‘Abd as-Samad (died 1937), Zain ad-din qari (died 1983), (Olcott 2007: 8-10). ²⁵ Apart from SADUM three other bodies were established in the USRR to supervise Islam such as the Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (Ufa), Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of Transcaucasia S3 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... influenced through their teaching and other activities the formal Islamic education and interpretations of Islam. They promoted Islam which would cater for the actual needs of the atheist state eliminating local practices such as traditional religious rituals and life-cycle events. These religious professionals were expected to create a religion that would be ideologically safe and eventually serve to reinforce the state’s control over Muslims of Central Asia. With time, however, contrary to the expectations of the Soviet apparatus, religious ideology promoted by SADUM turned in a different direction. In the 1920-30s another group named Ahl al-Quran was created, breaking from the Ahl-i hadis with Sabircha-domulla as the main leader. The Ahl al-Quran considered Ahl-i hadis to be excessively subordinate to the Soviet government, hence acting contrary to the rules of Islam. Both groups had also differed in the attitude to the religious creed. Although the Ahl-i hadis movement was the more influential of the two, the Ahl al-Quran managed to establish their own chain of spiritual figures who later influenced the development of the Islamic thought (Niyazi 1998: 42; Babajanov 2002; Muminov et al. 2010; Olcott 2007: 8-10). Yet, the purges carried out by the Soviets in the 1920-30s forced many leaders to emigrate which resulted in a significant drop in the number of people who could provide religious services. Despite persecution, however, part of the clergy was able to continue their activity informally in various places in Central Asia. Some spiritual figures survived, escaping to remote regions of Central Asia or finding hideouts among people in larger centres. For instance, some representatives of the clergy fled with their families and found shelter in isolated settlements of the Kyrgyz in exchange for teaching religion to local children. Elmira’s Father-in-law (a female religious leader presented in Chapter V) was a local imam from the Nookat district not far from Osh. He ran away in 1925 and until about 1945 lived among the Kyrgyz in a mountainous region teaching Islam. Subsequently he came back from exile, and continued informal religious activities until his death in 1974.* ²⁶ (Baku), Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Makhachkala, Daghestan). ²⁶ An interview with Elmira Edge, July 2015. 54 1.3. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet... Some religious figures came out of hiding at the beginning of the Khrushchev era, and a few of them decided to cooperate with local authorities within the framework of official religious institutions. Others preferred to stay out of the state’s control such as Sufi Ishans, unregistered mullas, Muslim intellectuals. They criticized SADUM for its conformist attitude towards the Soviet government as well as for its scriptural approach to the Islamic creed and Hanafi mazhab. For its part, SADUM attempted to undermine the authority of underground leaders through disregarding their interpretation of religion as backward and incompatible with the Islamic creed. Nevertheless, some people switched between formal and informal religious institutions, for instance by pursuing a legal religious training in The Mir Arab madrasa in Bukhara and basic education in informal schools.²⁷ * Yet, the official clergy (Imam-khatibs) employed in the formal mosques were not as highly respected as the unofficial religious leaders. Nevertheless, the relationship between the ‘legal’ Muslim world and the so-called ‘underground’ activities was always ambiguous, and the boundaries between them were blurred (see e.g.: Olimov, Olimova (n.d.); Niyazi 1998: 42-43; Muminov et al. 2010: 246-252). There were informal networks established on the basis of hujra²* or informal madrasa in many places, almost every mahalla or collective farm had a space to organise prayers. For instance, the Vorukh enclave of the then Tajik SSR (located within the Kyrgyz SSR) became a famous religious centre in the Ferghana Valley. Due to its secluded location many clerics escaped there from Kokand and other important centres of the Ferghana Valley; they and their descendants transmitted Islamic knowledge throughout the Soviet period under the protection ²⁷ The Mir Arab madrasa in Bukhara was opened in 1948 as the only legal institution of the Islamic education in the whole of the USSR. Only in 1971, a higher Islamic institute was opened also in Tashkent (Muminov et al. 2010). ²S Hujra - literally meaning a “cell” or a “classroom”. Hujras were a continuation of religious education which before the Soviet period was provided in maktab, madrasa and qari-khana; it began to be popular during the period of Russian Turkestan. In the Soviet period, hujras were especially widespread in the Ferghana Valley, and in the southern Tajikistan (Muminov et al. 2010). 55 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... of the authorities of the local collective farm. In the opinion of some people whom I interviewed in 2010, the activity of religious leaders significantly influenced the level of knowledge of Islam not only in Vorukh but also in the whole district of Isfara, within which the enclave is located, as well as some other parts of the Valley. In Chapter IV, I describe the case of a female religious leader named Mohniso living in the Isfara dictrict who comes from a chain of recognisable religious leaders linked to Vorukh. The informal Islamic education was also imparted in bigger centres such as Dushanbe, Kurgan Tube or Khujand in Tajikistan as well as in other regions. The Sufi networks conducted extensive activities, based on the loyalty of people, and their relations with Sufi shaikhs (Cieslewska 2015: 179-181; see also Olimov and Olimova (n.d.); Niyazi 1998: 41-42; Muminov et al. 2010: 246-252). As in the past, people continued pilgrimages to the holy places performing traditional rituals and celebrations. In the majority of communities, there was a person who served as an informal mulla providing religious services to people. Sometimes this role was played by a local healer, or other men who had some knowledge of Islam. Weddings, funerals and circumcisions were practised according to the rules of Islam even by the party officials (with some exceptions). Polygamy was continued on a small scale, and there were even cases of levirate marriages mainly among the Kyrgyz.²⁹ Bibi otuns were in almost every mahalla teaching religion, and traditions, and celebrating the life cycle rituals, sometimes performing healing. Young girls suitable for the profession of bibi-otun were even sent to other places to receive the relevant religious education as in the case of Gulsun otyncha presented in Chapters II, III and IV who used to study Islam in Margilan (Uzbek SSR of that time). More frequently, however, new adepts learned religion from local teachers passing various stages of education to finally become independent religious leaders (Muminov et al. 2010: 254). There was a representative of SADUM called muhtasib in every district whose task was to connect local communities and official religious institutions, and to control religious affairs, but his role was ²⁹ Information on levirate marriage was confirmed by Elmira, her previously mentioned father-in-law married a wife of his deceased brother. 56 i.j. Transforming the Islamic cradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet... minor. In reality, SADUM often cooperated with informal religious leaders, for example regarding the collection of zakat al-Fitr,™ and even sometimes the management of religious activities or holy places. Another task of SADUM focused on the organisation of pilgrimages to Mecca which were available only for a few people and were held irregularly, as well as exchanged delegations with Muslim countries. Moreover, religious professionals employed by SADUM issued fatwas whose purpose was to support the Soviet practices (Labenda 2016: 650--660; Olimov, Olimova (n.d.); Muminov et al. 2010: 246-252). The official religious leaders represented by SADUM and the promoters of the Soviet ideology had common interests in undermining the position of local spiritual representatives, and to diminishing the role of the local Islamic culture. Paradoxically, however, the goals of SADUM were not always consistent with the religious policies of the Soviet government. It should be noted that the knowledge about Islam and local traditions of the Soviet officials was predominantly poor. Deeply hostile to Islam, the authorities sought to erase any visible religious symbols to pursue atheisation. Apart from Muslim intellectuals and theologians, the effort was focused on removing the so-called ‘remnants of feudal traditions’ (Russian: feodalnyeperezhitki) whose visible manifestations were mazarsf pilgrimages, and other local practices. For instance, in 1958 the Central Committee issued a decree “On Stopping Pilgrimages to so-called Holy Places”. SADUM’s religious professionals issued the relevant fatwa to support the law but did not directly participate in closing mazars. At the same time the governmental battle against holy places ideally matched with SADUM’s desire to create a particular model of Islam. It was reflected in the use of the concepts of shirk and bid’a to determine what was considered by them as deviation from the Islamic orthodoxy. A fight against the so-called ‘innovations’ led by SADUM was supported by the arguments derived from the theology ³⁰ Zakat al-Fitr is charity in the form of food or money given by Muslims at the end of the Ramadan fast. ³¹ Mazar/mazor/ziyaratgah (also other terms) - a place of veneration such as a stone, tree, spring etc. or a tomb where people go on pilgrimage, performing various rituals. 57 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... of figures such as Ibn Taymiyyah (died 1328) as well as some modem theologians whose interpretations of Islam are now associated with the development of fundamentalism. In this way, SADUM encouraged transformation of Islam towards its purification, proposing quite a strict approach to the Islamic creed (Tasar 2007; Abashin 2002: 74). In the late 1960s and in the early 1970s, the situation of religion took on a new dynamics that triggered a new direction for further ideological developments. By this time the new chains of Islamic scholars emerged. One of the leading figures was the Islamic theologian, Muhammadjan Rustamov Hindustani (Domulla Hindustani, died in 1989) who established an underground network of Islamic learning, and trained many students, including a number of significant religious figures. Hindustani left many theological writings and commentaries which further served to form the Islamic thought in Central Asia. He and his followers supported the Islamic traditions of Hanafi mazhab, seeking a balance between sharia law and local practices. Hindustani was challenged by some Islamic intellectuals, including a few of his former students such as the prominent Mulla Hakimjon qori Margilani, and Rahmatullah ‘Allama ibn Rasulan (died in 1981), as well as Abduvali--qori Mirzaev, and Said Abdallah Nuri (later the head of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan [IRPT], died 2006), Hikmat-zade, a member of the IRPT of Tajikistan and others. This group of people supported reformation of Islam which already started in various parts of the Islamic world. The main thread of the dispute between those two groups was related to legitimacy (from the point of view of Islam) of the rituals based on the local adat (urf).ⁱ² Various issues were discussed such as pilgrimages to holy places, rituals associated with local forms of magic and tradition, for instance performance of Mavlud (the Prophet’s birthday), celebration of lifecycle rituals etc. (Babajanov et al. 2007: 33-54; Muminov 2007: 258-260; Olcott 2007: 11-17). Reformers advocated ‘purification of Islam’ from local practices. They named themselves Mujaddidiyar (Renewers) or Javononi Islomi (Islamic Youth) while their opponents called them Wahhabis. Each group ¹² Adat (urf) - a set of traditional institutions, rules and customs which were not included in the sharia law and which sometimes contradict it. 58 1.3. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet... defended its own position, and the discussion on religious issues became more harsh in different parts of present-day Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Muslims who represented the new approach believed that many of the traditional rituals are impermissible innovations - bid'a. They wanted to revise the established norms and practices of Islam in Central Asia, confronting them with what they considered ‘pure religion’. A great deal of the criticism was related to Sufism and rituals associated with this tradition. Besides a religious nature of their requests, the activities of the new reformers aimed at challenging the Soviet state and its oppressive religious policy (Babajanov et al. 2007: 33-54; Muminov 2007: 258-260; Olcott 2007: 11-17). It should be noted, however that contemporary discussion regarding shirk (understood as blasphemy), started only later, being influenced to a greater extent by foreign trends. It was a great shift in the thinking about Islam and tradition, and consequently exacerbated the antagonism between the various present--day groups of Muslims. The arguments of theologians who wished to modernize Islam were based on the assumption that due to the persecution of religion in the Soviet Union, there were low standards of knowledge of Islam. Religion survived mainly in the form of the life-cycle rituals and there were many inconsistencies that should have been modified. Another question raised by them was related to the relationship of Islam and politics, and the role of religion in challenging the state. They were inspired by works of theologians such as Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi - the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami (died 1979), Sayyid Qutb - an ideologist of the Muslim Brotherhood (died 1966), and others who were symbols of the Islamic struggles against colonial powers and regimes, but who also contributed to developing a fundamentalist approach to Islam. On the other hand, Hindustani and his followers believed that modifications of religion were not necessary, and that changes could be dangerous since they undermined the sanctioned tradition, and the integration of Islam itself. According to his view, the comprehensive nature of Islam allows for the adaptation of this religion to various conditions. Discussion on the nature of Islam took place in various places, mainly in the southern part of Tajikistan, and in the Ferghana Valley, and were organized informally by the religious networks (Olcott 2007: 15). 59 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... Zapaśnik (2006: 67) and Abashin (2002: 74) believe that the trend of purification of Islam promoted by local representatives of the intellectual elite was formed as a response to the atheisation of society. The influence of atheistic propaganda related to removing the ‘remnants of feudal traditions’ made local theologians believe that the ‘revival’ of Islam can be achieved through its modification. Islam was seen as a new tool of developing societies to fight against the Soviet state. The changes aimed at scrutinizing previously accepted doctrines and traditions to form a new basis for social development in line with the values of Islam, suitable for modem society. In a broader context, it represented general trends of religious reformation which started in many Muslim countries, challenging the ideas that were considered to be a product of colonialism and Western civilization, and hence unresponsive to the needs of Islamic societies. However, the Islamic thought in Central Asia had its own dynamics formed under the influence of the ideology of Communism which included the belief in the equality of social classes, in progress etc. Those peculiarities distinguished the ‘Soviet fundamentalism’ from other similar ideologies. The war in Afghanistan provoked by the Soviet Union, and the participation of Soviet Muslims in warfare became a spur for further expansion of various concepts regarding the place and role of Islam in Central Asian societies. Initially, many natives from Central Asia were sent to fight in Afghanistan. Some of them deserted and collaborated with the Afghans. Only later Asians were partly replaced by Slavs. Simultaneously, Muslim books and brochures were smuggled through the border and redistributed through various channels among the people (Akcali 1998: 274-275). Another factor which further triggered the discussion on the relationship between religion, state and society was the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It demonstrated that colonialism and Western ideas of development (including those promoted by both Capitalism as well as Communism) can be replaced by the state based on the principles of Islam, forming the ‘ideology of the third path’ -social development governed by the Islamic moral system (Abashin 2002: 72; Zapaśnik 2006: 67). The subsequent phase of Islam’s transformation in the USSR is associated with Gorbachev’s thaw (1985-1991). Since the 1980s 6o i.j. Transforming the Islamic tradition in the Soviet and early post-Soviet... Islamic activists from the Arab countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan started visiting the Ferghana Valley (Abashin 2002; Zapaśnik 2006; Łabenda 2016). In 1990 “The Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (Russian: O Svobode Sovesti i Religioznykh Organizaciiakh) was adopted by the Soviet authorities which fundamentally changed the relationship between the state and religion. The first period of changes was characterised by a spontaneous revival of various forms of local religiosity: ancestral rituals, healing and so forth. Mosques and religious organisations were registered in many places. Nevertheless, for the majority of Muslims in Central Asia as well as other parts of the USSR, public expression of religious affiliation was in some ways a novelty. Despite ongoing transformation, initially it was difficult to talk about common religious symbols for all ethnic groups of Muslims. Knowledge of religion was largely acquired locally and expressed in the life-cycle rituals; only a few people were aware of the new trends (Zapaśnik 2006: 63-67; Malashenko 2001 cited in Kaliszewska 2016: 88). In June 1990 the all-Union Islamic Renaissance Party (Russian: Islamskaia Partiia Vozrozhdeniia) was founded in Astrakhan (in present--day Russia). At the beginning the Party had three regional structures. The first branch was the Central Asian one, but its structures did not last a long time due to the animosity between the Uzbeks and Tajiks. The latter did not want to be dominated by Turkic-language groups. Consequently, Tajiks formed their own independent branch (Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, IRPT). It was founded in October 1990 during an underground assembly, but it was formally registered only in November 1991, just before the USSR was officially dissolved. As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, even though the party had a number of supporters in the Ferghana Valley, its legalization was never accepted by the independent Uzbekistan. The second branch was the North Caucasian one, consisting mainly of Daghestani, Chechen and Ingush people. The last one was the European regional branch of Muslims of Russia and Siberia (mainly Tatars). The all-Union IRP ceased to function at the beginning of the first Chechen war, when it was replaced by the Union of Muslims of Russia (Russian: Soiuz Musulman Rossii). After the assassination of its president, the Deputy of the State Duma, 6i Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... Nadirshah Khachilaev, the Union of Muslims practically ceased to exist (Akcali 1998: 269-273; Zapaśnik 2006: 78-79). The Party’s main goal was to bring about moral renewal through religion. It was based on the assumption that the Islam of USSR was formed in the conditions of the decay of the Islamic culture, which was a result of the years of tsarist colonialism, and then forced atheisation under the USSR. For this reason its transformation was necessary. Islam was promoted as a comprehensive worldview challenging its local ritual forms and manifestations. Another concept promoted by the Party was the umma as a community of believers (of all groups of Muslims). Islam seemed to be an adequate instrument which could be used to rebuild a collective identity of the Muslims of the USSR (Zapaśnik 2006: 78). The uncertain political and socio-economic situation before and after the collapse of the USSR, contributed to spreading various other groups which referred to Islam as a symbol of social and moral transformation. Some of those groups attempted to enter the public space through setting up their own order based on what they believed to be sharia law, and the principles of Islam. One of the first organizations was Tavba {'Repentance'), which was founded in the late 1980s in Namangan (in present-day Uzbekistan) aimed at establishing the Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley named FANO (an abbreviation derived from the first letters of the cities: Ferghana, Andijan, Namangan, Osh). The organization was accused of various offences, and was reputed to cooperate with other illegal groups. Another organization was Adolat (‘Justice ’), established in 1989 consolidating very different personalities including Juma Namangani and Tohir Yoldoshev. Adolat aimed to form a social order based on Islam, challenging corruption, prostitution, and crime. Initially tolerated by the President of Uzbekistan, Islom Karimov, it became increasingly aggressive in demanding to implement sharia law in the whole country. Finally, the group was outlawed and their members were persecuted in Uzbekistan. In 1998, Juma Namangani and Tohir Yoldoshev founded an Islamist terrorist group - the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ([IMU], Uzbek: Ozbekiston Islomiy Harakati). The creation of the IMU, and clashes between the latter and the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Batken district, 61 1.4- Contemporary religious discourses in 1999-2000, as well as the war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), contributed to increasing activities of politically oriented organizations. It further resulted in changing the perception of Islam which now began to be seen as a political ideology (Labenda 2016: 523-525; Zapasnik 2006: 79-80, 102-112). One of the reasons of the popularity of various ideologies stem from dissatisfaction with the reforms and disappointment with democracy as a political and social system in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The local regimes skilfully adopted attributes of democracy to their propaganda with a support of the West and the international institutions. It resulted in increasing frustration of people whose situation in the majority of cases has not improved after the USSR was dissolved. Instead, poverty and unemployment is rampant, public services largely deteriorated, and corruption limits the opportunities for businesses to develop. Most people do not benefit from the modernization and the systemic change, as do societies of the former Eastern Bloc: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, etc., where despite certain shortcomings the transition from Communism to Capitalism was much less abrupt than in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For many people from Central Asia, modernization and the ‘Western lifestyle’ is a dream they can come closer to only when they travel to the Russian Federation or other countries as labour migrants. Where, they are often treated as a worse category of people. It is hardly surprising that the situation makes for a sufficient basis for spreading various radical ideas. 1.4. Contemporary religious discourses As a result of the political transformation, SADUM was divided into separate Islamic boards or muftiyats, and all religious centres were established in the new countries. In this period, religion began to play a greater role in the politics of the governments of all the countries which promoted Islam as an inseparable part of their national, cultural and social identity. With time, the goals of religious policies were formed. However, they were later reformulated many times. Due to the new 63 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... borders, and an uncertain political situation, communication among the national Islamic centres was interrupted, which further contributed to their isolation. As a result, Islam in each country developed in a slightly different direction. The situation has changed over time, and gradually the Russian Federation has become a place where Muslims from Central Asia have had an opportunity to interact and exchange religious ideas. There was an increase of interest in Islam among people representing all social strata. Religious freedom resulted in the intensification of contacts with Muslims from other parts of world. It created opportunities for citizens of the new states to acquire education in the Islamic institutions located in Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, India, Turkey and other countries. Simultaneously, activists from abroad arrived in the region proselytizing different interpretations of Islam. At the same time, a number of religious institutions emerged, including previously informal mosques and madrasas which now were registered. Many mazars were newly renovated, and pilgrims crowded to visit them. Spiritual leaders such as imams, mullas, bibi-otuns, shamans and others came out of hiding. There was also an expansion of Islamic literature, records, videos and religious articles disseminated across the region (see e.g.: Khalid 2007; Louw 2007; Rasanayagam 2006). Religious polemics became even more intense than prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Proponents of a new approach to religion, and its purification from local traditions attempted to pursue their religious visions. Nevertheless, the local rituals that have not complied with the ideal of‘pure Islam’ emerged from the underground. Despite criticism expressed by modem theologians, women gathered in various places, celebrating the life-cycle rituals, adapting and enriching old practices with new elements. Due to standards of Islamic knowledge, information regarding religious rites was disseminated spontaneously, people learned how to practice religion on various occasions from their neighbours, family members or friends. It involved not only performing prayers or conducting rituals, but also dealing with moral dilemmas, practices related to food and clothing, social duties or interaction with people. Books with various stories and poems, previously available to a narrow circle, appeared on bazaars and other places now accessible to everyone. Local newspapers became filled with announcements of 64 1.4- Contemporary religious discourses clairvoyants, and healers, and such services were performed in many places. In addition, people of different ages and social status used the opportunity to attend various courses of religion (Zapaśnik 2006: 64-68). The changes were spontaneous and multidirectional, hence it is difficult to enclose them in a certain conceptual framework. Fathi (2006: 312) acknowledges three levels of changes within Islam in Central Asia: first, the level of formal Islamic higher education; second, the level of practices and the observance of Islamic rules; and third, the level of collective ceremonies and rituals. Many people seek their own spiritual path while redirecting their lives towards religion to live according to Islam (Peshkova 2014: 3-4). McBrien (2008: 51) referred to the representatives of this new religious trend as ‘the newly pious’ defining them as those who practice regular prayers, attend Islamic study groups and mosques, preach Islam, practice veiling, watch videos and listen to records on religious topics and so forth. A personal quest for religious enlightenment, however, is determined by a multiplicity of discourses. Increasing presence of various terms resulted in their popularization, but also devaluation of meanings. The main polemics regarding incorporating religious rules into the lives of people have continued. As mentioned above, the issue of the validity of local traditions from the point view of Islam triggered a vigorous debate in various circles. What is considered ‘Islamic’ or ‘un-Islamic’, what can and what cannot be performed within the religious practices. The terms bid’a and shirk became a kind of catch-phrases to indicate that a person/or a group does not follow the ‘real’, ‘true’ Islam. As it was mentioned in the first part of this chapter, these terms are used not only by the followers of ‘pure Islam’ but also by people who consider themselves ‘moderate’ or even ‘traditionalist’, including representatives of some Sufi groups who support the idea of modification of local traditions. Abashin (2006: 268) indicates that such differentiation is an answer to the demands generated by global trends, as well as local attempts to control and define Islam. However, in the course of time this division into reformers and traditionalists has become less obvious. Consequently, shirk and bid’a became elements not only of the official theological discourse but also everyday Islam, and are commonly Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... associated with an ‘incorrect’ understanding of religion. Those notions are used even by people who have a limited knowledge of the religion and the contents of the Quran. For instance, once while discussing female rituals with a nurse in whose house I lived in the south of Kyrgyzstan, I asked her: How do you understand the concept of shirk? She answered: shirk means that something is prohibited (Russian: ширк - это означает что-то, чего нельзя делать)?³ Many people have a similar understanding of this word. They believe that some traditional practices are forbidden by Islam but they do not know the theological basis of such opinions. They often repeat what was transmitted to them by religious professionals, and what they heard from their neighbours or family members. Gatling (2012) in his dissertation entitled Sufism in Post-Soviet Tajikistan demonstrates the way in which ‘the Islamic revival’ affects the Sufi tradition in Tajikistan. Some pirs (Sufi leaders) and their disciples previously associated with Tajik Sufi groups³,¹ argue that many practices of local Hanafi Islam need to be reformed since they are influenced by un-Islamic elements. For instance, disputes are conducted over the concept of shirk, and the sin of the excessive authority of a pir. They indicate that the traditional understanding of the master-student relationship, and devotion and love which the latter shows to a teacher is incorrect from the point of view of Islam because such admiration should be reserved for God (Gatling 2012: 79). Consequently, Sufism and its various interpretations are questioned also by its own representatives within the reformist camp. My research shows that some religious leaders including female representatives declare their adherence to the Sufi traditions but simultaneously follow quite a strict version of Islam. In Chapter II, I adduce the case of Dilfuza, a 45-year-old female teacher of Islam from southern Kyrgyzstan. She comes from a notable silsila (a line) ³³ ³³ A personal conversation with a nurse, June 2015, Kyrgyzstan. ³,¹ The main Sufi groups in Tajikistan are Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya. A small minority has also been affiliated with the Chistiya, Sohravardiya, Kubraviya, or Yasaviya (Gatling 2012: 28). 66 1.4- Contemporary religious discourses of Naqshbandiyya leaders whose tradition she refers in her teaching. Nevertheless, she criticizes many female rituals such as Bibi Seshanbe, Bibi Mushkil-Kusho which are believed to be part of Naqshbandiyya’s tradition. According to Dilfuza, many traditions were adapted to this tariqa, but there is no evidence that shaikh Baha-ud-Din Naqshband approved such modifications. She also criticizes pilgrimages to mazars. Dilfuza expressed the opinion that people are allowed to visit graves of their ancestors but celebration of various rituals is forbidden.³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ Moreover, the shaikh* who guard some holy places prohibit the performance of certain rites such as burning candles, the practice of tying pieces of cloth to a tree etc. which are considered pagan rites. I observed this phenomenon in various sacred places in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan. I say to a woman that burning candles is prohibited, that it is shirk but they are still doing itP¹ Many rituals associated with a female circle and zikrsw are a subject of criticism. Gatling (2012: 63) describes his conversation with shaikh of the mazar of Ya’qub Charkhi (a historical figure, an influential teacher of Naqshbandiyya) located in the suburbs of Dushanbe. The shaikh said that he would never allow Sufis to perform their rituals there because it is shirk. In 2010 I wanted to attend a ritual of Bibi Mushlil-Kusho in this mazar since I heard from my female friends at a student hostel that the ritual is organized there ever Wednesday. I went to the Ya’qub Charkhi mazar on this day, but I was there for the first time, and I did not know the rules of this place. I approached a man who looked like a shaikh and asked where Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is celebrated. But why do you ³⁵ An interview with Dilfuza, July 2015, the Shahrak district, Kyrgyzstan. ³⁶ Shaikh is a term associated with a Sufi master, but it can be also a person who guards a holy place. ³⁷ A conversation with shaikh of the mazar in 1st Pisor village, Tajikistan in 2014. ³⁸ Zikr is a kind of prayer in Islam associated with repetition of certain religious sequences to remember God; there are different types of zikrs associated with various Sufi groups although this prayer is not always performed only within Sufi circles. 67 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... want to go there? - the man said angrily. It is shirk! You should not do it! It is forbidden by the Quran! You would better pray, and perform ziyorat (pilgrimage) instead. I answered: I am sorry, I did not know about it. I will certainly follow your advice. Then I went to the main entrance of mazar and I asked a random woman who passed by where Bibi Mushkil-Kusho was performed. She showed me the right place without any hesitation and questions.³⁹ A discourse on what is correct or incorrect from the point of view of Islam is fuelled by various groups that usurp the right to judge what they believe is ‘good Islam’ or ‘bad Islam’. It is also part of into the official discussion about religion in every country. The official authorities declare a willingness to develop a model of Islam based on its ‘correct understanding’ which should supposedly correspond with ‘Uzbek’, ‘Tajik’, ‘Kyrgyz’ or ‘Kazakh’ cultures. Those national concepts of the so-called ‘traditional Islam’ are expected to be a compromise between ‘normative’ Islam and local religious practices. Those concepts should become an alternative to the illegal religious movements and/or the groups whose interpretation of Islam differs from the mainstream interpretation. In the subsequent parts of this chapter, I will discuss the course of those processes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan further. 1.5. Islam in Kyrgyzstan 1.5.1. 'New and old Islam' and its various manifestations The State Commission for Religious Affairs ([SCRA], Russian: Gosudarstvennaia Komissiia po delam Religiï) is the main institution regulating the religious affairs in Kyrgyzstan. SCRA cooperates with the semi-governmental organization, the Muslim Spiritual Board (Russian: Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musulman Kyrgyzstana - Muftiatf⁰ * ⁴⁰ ¹⁹ Personal experience, June 2010. In the end, I did not see the ritual on this day because it was over. However, this situation gave me an insight into the relationships in this place. ⁴⁰ Muftiat - religious administration. 68 i.5- Islam in Kyrgyzstan with branches (qaziats) in major cities. The main task of the muftiat is to control the Islamic affairs in the country and to formulate a religious policy which would be appropriate for the secular state with a majority of Muslim citizens. The muftiat forms the religious and educational institutions across Kyrgyzstan, sends students abroad, and organizes pilgrimages to Mecca (Isaeva, Tursunbekov, Chotaev 2015: 17-26). The so-called ‘national Islam’ or ‘traditional Islam’, is the ‘official’ version of Islam promoted by the state. It is based on a loose concept associated with the Hanafi mazhab, aqida maturidi f accepting some local traditions. As in other parts of Central Asia, many local practices are considered to be inconsistent with normative Hanafism, and are widely criticized by their opponents. The concept of ‘national Islam’ is based on the assumption that religion should be politically neutral, loyal to the state and opposed to various radical ideologies commonly referred to as 'takfirism'^ (Artman 2006: 3-7). It should be noted that various contemporary Kyrgyz Islamic authorities attempt to define what is acceptable within ‘national Islam’, seeking a theological explanation for the legitimacy of particular practices and traditions. Since consensus has not been achieved yet, there are no comprehensive definitions of ‘national Islam’. As a result, it only functions in the form of an abstract idea promoted by the state in the official discourse. However, the actual landscape of Islam, in Kyrgyzstan, is very complex, revealing a number of different theologies, interpretations within groups, and movements. One of the most significant fractions is Jamaat al-Tabligh which is promoting the Islamic message through da'wa groups, and activists called dawachis who are active in the whole country. Tabligh became popular as well as relatively influential, integrating itself even within the official religious structures; by some it is seen as a potential * * ⁴¹ Aqidah maturidi is based on the theology of Abu Mansur Al Maturidi Samarcandi (d. 940), the Islamic theologian and a follower of Abu Hanifa. ⁴² Takfiris are said to follow very strict religious rules rejecting any changes in the interpretations of Islam, and calling other Muslims kafirs (unbelievers). They preach a black-white version of the Islamic creed, which does not exclude violence against those who challenge their version of Islam, and the world order. 69 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... alternative to the ultra-religious Islamic groups. Others, however, perceive Tabligh teaching as alien to local traditions, accusing the movement of transmitting foreign ideas to the faithful of Kyrgyzstan (Balci 2012: 60-69). The activities of the organization are a topic of various discussions in Kyrgyzstan, which was also reflected in some interviews I conducted. The following is an excerpt from two of such interviews: Tabligh is not involved in politics and that is why it can officially function, even though it is banned in other countries of Central Asia. (...) The organisation carries out very intensive activities among people, and it is a counterweight to the Salafi groups.⁴ⁱ Tabligh has a big influence, including our muftiat and other religious and governmental institutions, our Mufti was a member oj this organization.⁴³ ⁴⁴ This person suggested that Tabligh has capacities to impact the course of action within the state structures, and even to make some ideological manipulation which further shapes religiosity in Kyrgyzstan. Both interviewers were representatives of Bishkek intelligentsia, and they were involved in public discussion about religion. Nonetheless, they differed in their views on the shape of Islam in Kyrgyzstan. Another influential movement is the Nurcu community of Fetullah Giilen linked to Turkey. The Fethullah Giilen movement in Kyrgyzstan which until recently has been represented by the Sebat International Education Institute (Sebat), is the founder of Turkish Schools which have operated not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in other countries of Central Asia excluding Turkmenistan (Murzaeva 2014: 48). The above-mentioned interlocutors expressed their opinions on Giilen as well: Giilens concept of religion is tolerant, the movement is committed to work for the education of young people according to moral values such as do not steal, do not tell lies etc. (...). They form an infrastructure oj education as a basis for spreading a certain worldview. It is no secret ⁴³ An excerpt from an interview with a local academic, specialising in Islam, June 2015, Bishkek. ‘H An excerpt from an interview with a representative of the Mutakalim, June 2015, Bishkek. 7° Islam in Kyrgyzstan that they purpose to educate a future elite, and a result of this work will be visible in 20, 30 years, when those people will come to power. Obviously, they also promote some ideas of Pan-Turkism.⁴⁵ ⁴⁶ Gülen is everywhere, conducting intensive promotion of their ideology through educational institutions. It works through various organizations that are formally independent but in fact are related to Giilen. Some other Turkish organizations conflict with the Gülen network as far as influences are concerned.^ The situation changed significantly since June 2016 when an alleged military coup was supposedly organized in Istanbul. The Turkish Authorities believe that the US-based Fethullah Giilen was behind the coup. It triggered a wave of persecution of the members of the Giilen network in Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish government requested to close the institutions related to Giilen in other countries. As far as Kyrgyzstan is concerned, the Giilen schools were not shut down but they are planned to be incorporated into the Ministry of Education (Azattyk 2017). As a part of a new religious and ideological configuration, there is also the famous but banned Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Hizb ut-Tahrir) seeking to establish the caliphate through a peaceful political process. It is also a pan-Islamic organisation banned in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), (excluding Ukraine and Georgia), and in most Arab countries, but still legal in the majority of EU countries, some countries of Africa as well as in a number of South Asian countries, including Australia. For some years the Kyrgyz government has been carrying out various actions designed to discredit the activities of this organization; nevertheless it has still a number of supporters. ⁴⁵ As above: an excerpt from an interview with a local academic, specializing in Islam, June 2015, Bishkek. Pan-Turkism is based on the idea of the cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples; the Pan-Turkic movement emerged in the 19th century; the movement failed to unify all Turkic nations, its concepts are featured until today in some Turkish policies, and ideologies of various organizations. ⁴⁶ As above: an excerpt from an interview with a representative of Mutakalim, June 2015, Bishkek. 7i Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... Hizb ut-Tahrir proposes a model based on a restricted version of Islam as an alternative to a dysfunctional state. The organization is known for providing assistance to its members in the form of loans granted according to the terms of sharia, and supporting people in various other ways. As far as women are concerned, there are female groups within the organization which conduct activities among the female part of the population (Marszewski 2011: 43-44). It should be noted that Hizb ut-Tahrir distanced itself from both revolutions (in 2005 and 2010)⁴⁷ * since, according to the organization, the existing political order contradicts the principles of ‘the religion of Allah’. Hizb ut-Tahrir also remained neutral during the riots in June 2010. There were cases of mixed Kyrgyz-Uzbek villages with a significant number of members of the organisation, where people organized sel--defence units against the militias involved in the conflict. Moreover, some activists and party members helped the representatives of other ethnic groups (Uzbek or Kyrgyz), to survive the riots (Marszewski 2011: 43-44). Hizb ut-Tahrir opposes the religious structures related to the state such as SCRA, and others criticizing them for betraying Islamic values by promoting ‘moderate Islam’ which, as the organization claims, is a product of the USA and the West to control Muslims. Besides, Hizb ut-Tahrir expresses its aversion to NGOs which are seen by the organization as a political tool of the USA to implement its agenda in Central Asia (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2016). It is difficult to assess to what extent the above opinion is a result of discussions regarding The Law “On Foreign Agents”, and to what extent it is a result of anti-Western ideology professed by the organization itself. Nevertheless, the view that the local and international NGOs are financed by America to promote Western values in order to discourage people from pursuing the Islamic lifestyle is popular among some people attached to religious ⁴⁷ In March 2005, President Askar Akayev was ousted as a result of a political coup and was replaced by Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev. The latter was seized in 2010, and replaced by the interim government headed by interim president, Roza Otunbayeva; in 2011, as a result of presidential elections, the position of the president was assumed by Almazbek Atambayev. 71 1.5. Islam in Kyrgyzstan circles.⁴⁸ Despite controversies related to the organisation, some of its concepts penetrate people’s perception of Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir has some good concepts regarding the understanding of the world such as organization of society, but its approach is too radical. It is uncertain what would come out of it. Communism also promised a perfect world. However, in the end we know what happened.™ Apart from the above-mentioned formations, there are Islamic circles which are not attached to any particular group, and which accept a variety of religious ideas. Many people still follow local traditions and practices despite the criticism of the supporters of more scriptural interpretations of Islam. There are also Salafi-like groups, which are heterogeneous, and difficult to study due to their isolated or even illegal nature. All of those movements and groups conduct more or less extensive activities by organizing meetings, publishing records, videos, distributing leaflets with theological explanations of their arguments and ideas referring to the Quran and the Sunna. Needless to say, almost all of them stand in opposition to the remaining ones, accusing their counterparts of distortion of the Islamic message, trying to win the largest possible number of supporters. The diversification of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan is visible in the public places such as mosques and namaz-khonas (a chapel where people pray) where various ways of performing namaz can be observed, including those outside the canon of the Hanafi mazhab. 1.5.2. 'Piousness' versus 'Religiosity' A story of Medina For the first time I met Medina (aged 38) during khatmi Quran* ⁵⁰ organized in one of the mahallas in the Shahrak district, which she led I based this statement on a number conversations with people which 1 held during my research regarding the harmful activity of NGOs on the local culture and Islam. An excerpt from an interview held with Nadira, a teacher of Islam, Bishkek, June 2015. ⁵⁰ Khatmi Quran - the reading of the entire Quran in stages or, in the case of Central Asia, the reading of the parts of the Quran during certain celebrations. 73 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... during the Ramadan of 2015 for a group of women (see Chapter III). Prior to our meeting I heard rumours that Medina’s ex-husband and mother-in-law travelled to Syria to fight for IS and were killed there. However, I did not pay attention to this story since accusations of this kind are not infrequent, and sometimes are disseminated to undermine the authority of a particular religious teacher. Medina is a good-looking and intelligent woman, in the past, she used to teach physics at school. At present, she helps her mother in her shop and teaches Islam to women in Shahrak, and Osh. She has a sound knowledge of the Russian language, which is not common among women in Shahrak. Medina seeks to increase her knowledge of Islam by learning from various sources, including classes in the Mutakalim office in Osh. However, her approach to Islam is quite strict, and she criticizes many local traditions and practices. Community disapproval of divorced women is still strong in places such as Shahrak. Thus, the fact that she teaches Islam helps her earn people's respect. After a few days of acquaintance she told me her own version of the story about her ex-husband and mother-in-law: At some point my husband became very religious. I would say that he was too pious. He told me to cover my face with a niqab in public, he wanted me to quit my job and to stop leaving the house. I was really fed up, we argued a lot. I was afraid of what would happen to me and our two sons, so I decided to move to my mother's house and then I filed for divorce. After some time I learned that he and his mother went to Syria and disappeared. People say that they were killed there but I am not sure what happened to them. I was thinking a lot about it: maybe he served God better than I did? Maybe my approach to religion is too compromised? But he killed people. Only God knows the truth. (...) I wonder, maybe I should get married again? But would I find someone goodfor me andfor my sons? A husband would limit me in many ways. At present people respect me because I am a teacher of Islam. I am free to decide what I am doing with my life.⁵¹ On another occasion, the nurse in whose house I lived in Shahrak, showed me some photos of Medina’s mother-in-law from a reception ⁵¹ An excerpt of my conversation with Medina, the Shahrak district, July 2015. 74 i.5. Islam in Kyrgyzstan held during the Soviet times. She used to work in public administration. I saw pictures of a young woman, dressed in European clothes, there were alcoholic drinks on the table, a typical European-style party. The question about what triggered such a radical change in her will remain unanswered forever. 1.5.3. Radicalism as a topic of discussions According to different sources, the number of Kyrgyz citizens associated with ISIS is about 200-500. However, it is very difficult to confirm the participation of Kyrgyz citizens in the fight alongside ISIS. The recruitment takes place via different channels: the Internet, family, friends’ networks, migrants in Russia, and so forth (Pikulicka-- Wilczewska 2015; Tucker 2015; Falkowski, Lang 2015: 37). Although the number of people who join extremist groups is not large, there is a scarcity of information about passive ‘sympathizers’ who are inclined towards various utopian ideologies, such as ISIS but also others. One of the reasons of the increased interest in various forms of religiosity, including its extreme manifestations, has to do with poor economic prospects, disappointment with government’s policy, and consequently growing social frustration. Islam, along with its many interpretations, is often perceived as an ideal of social order which can challenge the dysfunctional state. Islam addresses various challenges, such as alcoholism, divorces, discrimination of all sorts, proposing social transformation in line with the Islamic values. In the light of the lack of improvement of the social and economic situation in Kyrgyzstan, there are people who believe that introducing strict religious rules is the only way to tackle the problems. Some of those people perceive ISIS, and other radical groups, as a chance to set up a perfect social order. Simultaneously, the Kyrgyz state is unable to stop the spread of controversial ideologies, especially since there is only a vague definition of what kind of interpretations of Islam are harmful or radical. Galdini (2015) indicates that in this situation it is possible to accuse of extremism all groups which are not consistent with the semi-officially-sanctioned version of Islam. Accusations of this kind serve to discredit someone’s activity or group, and are spread by the Kyrgyz secret service, or/and by 75 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... representatives of particular religious groups to undermine the authority of their opponents. As a result, a spiral of mutual suspicions intensifies and reaches the community level, neighbours, or in some cases even the family. As might be expected, such a situation does not calm down social tensions or curb the activity of radical groups. In southern Kyrgyzstan rumours that a person is a terrorist or is involved in radical groups are spread on a daily basis. It is also confirmed by the fieldwork of McBrien who presents the example of Bazaar-Korgon located near Osh, where despite a low number of actual members of Islamist groups in the community, suspicion of Islamic extremism was high (McBrien, Pelkmans 2008: 92). In 2015, in the district Shahrak, various stories were spread for instance regarding ''salafi mahalla' whose residents were allegedly involved in radical activities. There were also rumours about individual people called ‘Hizbu’, ‘Salafi’, ‘Wahhabi’ and so forth. This particular mahalla had a reputation of being very religious, featuring a number of women who wore niqabs, and bearded men wearing ‘Islamic clothes’. The female hujra operated on a daily basis led by the above-mentioned Medina, whose approach to Islam was quite strict. Although she did not spread hatred or encouraged terrorism, her opponents claimed that she was ‘radical’, as her ex-husband had left for Syria. The fact that Medina left him with two children did not seem to matter to them at all. 1.5.4. Islamic education At present, it is very difficult to find a balance in life. Communism destroyed our faith. Religious education was banned in the USSR. People could not learn what is important in their lives. Alcohol was widespread, hence domestic violence increased. Finally, the system abruptly changed. It is difficult to find a right path at the present time, especially for women. Islam can guide a person in the right way. Religion can regulate the social relationships.⁵² ⁵² An excerpt from an interview with a female teacher of Islam from the Islamic University, June 2015, Bishkek. 76 1.5- Islam in Kyrgyzstan Many of the women with whom I spoke wanted to study Islam. Some of them were interested in basic education, such as reading the Quran, knowledge on how to meet religious obligations, etc. For others Islamic education was important because of prestige, since religious girls are considered to be better candidates for wives, and women who are familiar with even basic reading of the Quran gain respect of their communities. Others leam religion ‘for the sake of God’ (Russian: Ради Бога), to find out how to live according to Islam. Nowadays, women want to learn about Islam, sometimes even more than men.⁵ⁱ Doolotkeldieva (2017) points out that women attend religious classes to receive advice regarding the problems of everyday life such as how to get along with parents-in-law, how to resolve conflicts between spouses, etc. My various interlocutors emphasized that Islam is a comprehensive system covering all aspects of life, and the Islamic education consists of all necessary elements, not only those of religious nature. Allah shows us how we should live, what rules and regulations are the best for us.⁵³ ⁵⁴ Another issue considered by my interlocutors was the religious education and the role of religious leaders in the understanding of the Islamic creed. Kyrgyzstan needs Islamic scholars. People understand Islam in a very different way, many uncertain groups and sects are now formed. A proper Islamic education can bring a great deal of progress to society.⁵⁵ Women come to ask me various questions, some of them even ask about ‘Syria ’, and ISIS. Whether they should help there because it is an ‘Islamic state'. I always explain that this is not an ‘Islamic state ’, they are terrorists!⁵⁶ According to Isaeva, Tursunbekov and Chotaev (2015: 15), there are over 80 educational Islamic religious institutions in Kyrgyzstan including ⁵³ An excerpt from an interview with an official from the Islamic University, June 2015, Bishkek. ⁵⁴ An excerpt from an interview with Matluba, a female religious leader, the Shahrak district, July 2015. ⁵⁵ An interview with Nadira, a teacher of religion, Bishkek, June 2015. ⁵⁶ An excerpt from an interview with Dilfuza, a female religious leader, the Shahrak district, July 2015. 77 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... theological faculties at public universities. Besides formal and informal places such as the Islamic centres, madrasas, there are home-based hujras, or individual classes, that function in the whole country. Religious rebirth brought an increase of interest in the study of religion. Many people attend religious classes (taalim) to gain the basis of the Islamic teachings, as well as to find out how to live according to the Islamic values (Russian: жить правильно, жить no мусульмански, жить по шариату).⁵¹ However, according to the State Agency for Religious Affairs which conducted a survey among 59 imams, the level of religious education is not high, 70 percent of religious professionals lacked a formal religious training (Eurasianet.org 2015; Kurbanova 2014: 92-93). Since 2012, there has been a standardized curriculum for madrasas. The way of transferring knowledge, however, depends on the teacher’s view as well as the interpretation of religion accepted by a particular school’s board. The religious educational institutions are influenced by very different religious ideas from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and other countries, which practically preclude the development of one programme (Nasritdinov, Bekmurzaev 2015; Kurbanova 2014: 92-93). In October 2014, the muftiat requested all imams to pass a test on religious knowledge. The main goal of the test was to exclude religious leaders with a poor understanding of Islam (Eurasianet.org 2015). There are also official courses of religion for religious leaders organised by the Iman fund,⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ as well as other initiatives. In August 2015, the female hujra of Gulsun otyncha (see Chapter IV) which I attended, was visited by an employee of the Theology Department of the Osh University three times, who within the framework of a project implemented by a local NGO explained the religious policy of the government, the issues of terrorism and radicalism, the Hanafi mazhab and aqida maturidi, hadises, hijab, and other topics to a group of local women. In spite of the fact that it was a one-time initiative, ⁵⁷ Various quotations from interviews, and conversations conducted by me in the Russian language. ⁵⁸ Iman (Russian: Fond Razvitiia Dukhovnoi Kultury Iman) - the Foundation for the Development of Spiritual Culture was founded by the state in 2014 to implement its religious policies. 78 i.y. Islam in Kyrgyzstan the participants had the opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to leam about various religious groups, and interpretations of Islam. The Mutakalim NGO issues certificates (permissions) for female religious teachers who organize home-based hujras. Mutakalim issues documents for certain skills. For instance, if someone does not pass an exam of aqida,⁵⁹ he or she is only allowed to teach tajwid,⁶⁰ and to recite namaz. The ustod (teacher) decides whether a student can participate in the exam, during which the teacher is present.⁶¹ Such an official form of certification for female teachers, there are many informal hujras. There are also ‘self-appointed-teachers’ who organize informal education for small groups of students providing very basic knowledge of Islam. A few female teachers function within illegal groups. Despite recent changes, the tradition of the religious teaching based on an informal relationship between a teacher and a student has continued. Formal religious education does not necessarily mean that a person is a respected religious leader. Personal charisma, family origin and a relationship to a particular well-known teaching figure, are highly significant aspects. Some of those teachers do not want to be associated with any state institutions or organizations. For instance the previously mentioned Dilfuza, who is a respected teacher due to her knowledge of Islam and family background, has a number of students despite the fact that she has no certificate. 1.5.5. Summary Due to a low number of religious leaders, and traditional religious networks in the period prior to independence, the transformation of religiosity in Kyrgyzstan may be deeper than in the countries such ⁵⁹ Aqida - Islamic creed. There are various interpretations of aqida within the schools of Islamic theology. ⁶⁰ Tajwid- the rules of pronunciation during the recitation of the Quran; there are main seven schools of recitation of the Quran which were developed in various parts of the Islamic world. The rules of pronunciation and details regarding pauses are often marked in the Quranic text to enable the reader to read the text in an appropriate manner (Dziekan 2001: 343). ⁰¹ Information obtained from a person who works for Mutakalim, August 2015. 79 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... as Tajikistan, where chains of spiritual professionals were always well-established. In Kyrgyzstan, a new generation of Islamic leaders emerged, who were trained in foreign countries, and who created a new doctrinal basis in the new local institutions to develop Islamic thought. As far as the state and its policies are concerned, it does not control the direction in which the new Islamic religiosity develops. There are attempts to create a framework for the religious policy but it is still not precisely defined. A vague concept of ‘national Islam’ does not answer the needs of various ethnic groups and the diversity of the Islamic discourses. It is still not clear how to approach the multi-fractional model of Islam, and how it should be integrated into the secular state. Simultaneously, despite a threat of Islamic radicalism in the politically sensitive places such as the Ferghana Valley, but also others, the state is unable to implement a comprehensive religious education that would reduce the risk of spreading dangerous ideologies. 1.6. Islam in Tajikistan i.6.i. Ending religious pluralism The majority of the population of Taj ikistan are Sunni Muslims of Hanafi mazhab', the territory of the modem Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is inhabited by Pamiri groups whose representatives adhere to the Ismaili branch of Islam.⁶² For many centuries, the Shia branch of Islam has penetrated the region, influencing traditions and practices. There is a number of sacred places in Central Asia which are devoted to the Alids⁶³ or ⁶² Ismailism is one of the branches of Shia Islam recognizing seven Imams. Ismailism was developed as a result of disagreements after the death of the sixth Imam - Jafar as-Sadiq. Ismailis believe that the line of the Imamate ended with the son of Ja’far as-Sadiq - Ismail ibn Ja’far. The doctrine of Ismailism is influenced by neo-Platonic and Gnostic philosophies, and accepts a variety of elements considered to be heterodox (see Daftary 1998). ⁶³ The Alids are descended from Ali ibn Abi Talib, a relative and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, as well as a caliph. 8o i.6. Islam in Tajikistan the Shia theologians who were spreading the Islamic message in the territory of present-day Central Asia (Rakhimov 2014: 241-255). Due to intensification of contacts with Iran in the period after the civil war, the Twelver branch of Shia Islam again began to infiltrate the religious life of Tajikistan. Ismaili followers of Islam are active through the Aga Khan Development Network which implements various relief projects in Tajikistan. Despite a relatively peaceful relationship between the Sunni and the Shia in Tajikistan, the religious creed of the latter is criticized by some Sunni theologians as an erroneous understanding of Islam. The Ismailis are modest in presenting their views on religious topics to a wider public. The main organ to supervise the religious affairs in the country is the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), (Tajik: Kumitai Umuri Dini Tojikiston [Kumitai Dini]) which in its present form was established in 2010. It has branches in all districts as well as municipalities (jamoats). CRA supervises the Supreme Council of Ulama (Tajik: Shuroi Oli Ulamoi Dini Tojikiston [Shuroi Ulamo]), which replaced Tajikistan’s religious administration, muftiat, when it was dissolved in the late 1990s. The Shuroi Ulamo was registered in 1997; its administrative part, The Islamic Centre (Markazi Islomi), controls mosques, supervises imams, monitors sermons and Islamic literature. The Islamic Centre is also expected to provide a different sort of religious training and education to religious leaders. Shuroi Ulama issues fatwas according to sharia, and provides advisory services on all matters related to Islam (Epkenhans 2015: 51; Schmitz 2015: 16; Islamnews n.d.). One of the most important factors which influenced the formation of various Islamic tendencies in the Tajik society was the civil war (1992-97) between the opposition, with the leading role of the IRPT, and the governmental forces. Following the war, religious activists became an important force shaping the political situation in Tajikistan, and some of them supported the IPRT and helped to form its ideology. The influence of the IRPT increased and the organization began to play a significant role in shaping Islam in Tajikistan. Other religious professionals addressed social and theological issues in their sermons and during religious services. Discussions on the direction the religion were marked by increasing ideological differences between the religious 8i Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... leaders loyal to the state, and those departing from the governmental mainstream (Epkenhans, Nozimova 2013: 967; Epkenhans 2015: 69-75). Over time, however, the government began to undermine the position of the IRPT and its allies (including religious leaders) by launching a number of actions aimed at curbing the influence of opposition. Finally, at the end of August 2015, the IRPT was delegalized, and mass arrests of its members followed. Many people, including the head of the party, Muhiddin Kabiri, went into exile. Thirteen leaders of the IRPT were given long prison sentences, others received shorter ones or were forced to renounce their membership. At the end of September 2015, the Supreme Court classified the IRPT as a terrorist group, alleging that the party planned a coup. In addition, the property of the party members was confiscated, their families pressured and/or arrested. The trials were held behind closed doors to conceal procedural violations, and false accusations from the public (Perekrest 2016: 15-20). Apart from the political significance of the delegalization of the IRPT, which was the only serious political opposition in Tajikistan, it also had a symbolic dimension, as it marked the end of religious pluralism in Tajikistan. At present the country is dominated by a version of Islam which is ideologically and institutionally controlled by the state. Any attempts to challenge the official discourse are presented by the authorities as radical and terrorist activities. i.6.2. Making religion a political tool The closure of the Party was part of the political game of president Rahmon and his associates aimed at extending full control over all resources and the wealth of the country. For a few years the Tajik government has increasingly limited the civil rights of the citizens and their religious freedom. At the same time, the lack of reforms that would stop the economic and social decline resulted in social discontent which is partly translated into radical forms of religion. As in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the exact number of Tajik citizens in the ranks of the Islamic state is uncertain. Different sources quote a number between 1000 and 2000, and there are also people who are involved in radical 82 i.ó. Islam in Tajikistan groups in Afghanistan. One of the most prominent examples is Gulmurod Khalimov, who served as a high-ranking officer in Tajikistan’s OMON riot police, and who left to participate in the warfare in Syria where he achieved a high rank within ISIS structures (Falkowski, Lang 2015: 34-37; Eurasianet.org 2017). One of the main documents which contributed to tightening state control over religious life, was the amendment to the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, (Russian: Zakon Respubliki Tadzhikistan o Svobode Sovesti i Religioznykh Obedineniiakh), issued in 2009. According to the law, the Hanafi school of the Islamic jurisprudence was recognized to have a special role in the development of the national culture and spiritual life of the people of Tajikistan (Law 2009). In addition, the year 2009 was dedicated to Imam Abu Hanifa. Various specialists emphasize the controversial nature of this decision. In theory, the constitution protects religious freedom providing equal rights to all denominations. However, simultaneously, the Hanafi branch of Islam is considered to be the most numerous religious group in the country (Kalishevski; 2015; Schmitz 2015: 14). The 2009 law aims at regulating the mutual relationships between the religion, the state and the citizens. It also regulates the activities of religious leaders and religious institutions. Special attention is given to religious education which, according to the law, cannot be conducted by private teachers in private homes until the latter obtain a special certificate. All in all, religion should be taught at a registered place such as a mosque or a madrasa. In 2015 in the whole country, one madrasa was functioning, but it was closed in 2016. According to the authorities, other madrasas were not registered as they failed to fulfil relevant procedures required to open a religious school.⁶⁴ Until the end of June 2014, in the regional office of the IRPT in Khujand, located next to the premises of the Nuri Islom Mosque, public meetings aimed at discussing various important issues were held. The gatherings for women were organized on Tuesdays and Thursdays; different matters relating to Islam as well as state legislation and policies ⁶⁴ Information obtained during an interview with an official from the hukumat of Khujand in June 2014. 83 Chapter 1. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... were discussed there. Moreover, separate meetings for the members of the Party were taking place, including some educational activities. Similar activities were organized in other places in the country as well. It was the only official place in Khujand where some forms of religious and civic education were offered. At the end of June, the authorities closed the IRPT office, and the building was razed to the ground (Cieslewska 2015b: 139-140). One of the advantages of this place was that a person could acquire basic information regarding Islam and the Tajik law. It should be noted that the IRPT provided its own interpretation of Islam that rejected many local traditions. Female and male religious teachers who led the classes provided information on Islam according to their understanding of the Islamic creed. Some classes criticized the local traditions and expenditures for ceremonies. In addition, they emphasized the importance of the ‘Muslim lifestyle’. For example, modest Muslim female attire and the hijab were promoted. Thus the IRPT contributed to reshaping the perception of Islam and religiosity among women, challenging work of the traditional female religious leaders, bibi-otuns. Some people accepted this approach, others criticized the IRPT for bringing religious issues into politics. In Chapter V, I provide more details on this topic in the context of female religious leaders. There is an Islamic University in Dushanbe named in honour of Imomi Azam Abu Hanifa {Donishgohi Islomii Jumhurii Tochikiston ba nomi Imomi Azam Abu Hanifa), and a school for girls attached to this institution. In 2010, it had over 900 students, 10 percent of whom were women (Abramson 2010: 36-37). I tried to visit the school for girls in 2012 but it would have required going through various official procedures which I wanted to avoid. Finally I only managed to talk informally to one female student. In 2014, the situation in the field was already tense, and for that reason I did not make any attempts to visit this place. During my work and research in Tajikistan, I met a few female teachers of Islam (including bibi-otuns) who graduated from female madrasas in different parts of Tajikistan such as Istaravshan, Isfara, Khujand, and Kurgan Tube. The fact that they attended madrasas gave them an opportunity to increase their knowledge of religious matters. It also raised their prestige as religious leaders. Nevertheless, those who 84 .6. Islam in Tajikistan used to work in madrasas were unemployed since the Islamic schools had been closed. In most cases, however, the elementary religious education was provided by private teachers in their homes or during the courses. At present, private lessons are prohibited but some teachers impart knowledge unoficially to a small circle of people, like in the Soviet period (see Chapter V).⁶⁵ Schmitz (2015: 18) notes that pushing the religious education into the informal sphere exacerbates the general trend for decentralization of religious activities, which now are ever less transparent. According to my research, the attestation of mullas was continued in 2014; there were also plans to certify female religious professionals. However, no accurate mechanisms or clear procedures existed that would allow to properly examine their knowledge. Despite the officials’ claims that the main purpose of the attestation of religious professionals is to improve the quality of their teaching, this procedure mostly serves to exclude uncomfortable spiritual leaders. There are other legal measures that further limit religious education, such as “The Law on Parental Responsibility in the Upbringing and Education of Children” and the amendment to the Criminal Code against the organizers of ‘extremist religious’ education. Children under the age of 18 are prohibited to attend mosques and participate in religious activities outside of the family circle. In 2010, the president of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, requested Tajiks attending Islamic universities and madrasas abroad to return to the country to prevent them from being influenced by the ideologies of radical Islam. According to Abramson (2010: 36-37), before this decision there were more students of Islam from Tajikistan abroad than from any other country in Central Asia. They attended religious schools in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. Undoubtedly, there were people who studied in madrasas which spread radical ideas such as the Makki madrasa in Zahedan which is reputed to be linked to many terrorist organizations, including the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Some others learnt abroad different approaches ⁶⁵ For information on informal Islamic education in Tajikistan see also Stephan (2010). 85 Chapter [.Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... to Islam challenging the authority and knowledge of local religious leaders. Nevertheless, forbidding any form of religious education abroad for fear of radicalism will not solve the problem of radical religious leaders, especially that there have been no official alternative programmes to send students for religious education abroad. At present, people who want to acquire religious education in foreign countries should obtain a special permission of the state agencies, such as the CRA, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Tajik government introduced a ban on the activity of religious groups which have been classified as terrorist and extremist such as Jamaati Tabligh, the Salafiya groups, the Islamic Movement of Turkiestan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir and others without any effort to differentiate between the nature of their ideologies and activities (Corley 2011; Lemon 2010; USCIRF 2013). Recently the list has been complemented by the IRPT, and Group 24⁶⁶, despite the fact that the latter has rather loose connection to religion in its agenda. Another important act of legislation which refers to traditional practices and religion is “The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Re-ordering Traditions, Celebrations and Customs in the Republic of Tajikistan” (Zakon Respubliki Tadzhikistan ob Uporiadochenii Tradicii, Torzhestv I Obriadov v Respublike Tadzhikistan) popularly named the ‘Tanzim law’. The law was passed so as to regulate the expenditure for weddings and other ceremonies, and to deal with the negative consequences of the organization of big events on a family budget. The Tanzim law is implemented at the local level of the municipality (jamoat) through the introduction of a special committee and a person responsible for implementing the law, who is expected to monitor all events, as well as the mosques and imams within the territory of a particular municipality. Religious professionals, both male and female, are obliged to participate in the implementation of this law, and are expected by the jamoats authorities to cooperate on this matter. I will discuss this topic further in Chapter V (Law 2007/2008; Cieslewska 2015a: 89-91). ⁶⁶ Group 24 is a Tajik opposition movement which functioned in exile due to persecution in Tajikistan. 86 i.6. Islam in Tajikistan Apart from the above-mentioned acts, the Tajik government launched a number of actions against the religion, including, among other things, a ban on the hijab at schools and universities as well as in public administration buildings. There is also a campaign against people who have a ‘Muslim appearance’ such as women who wear hijabs or men with long beards who were reportedly stopped on the street and forcibly shaved at police stations in some places of Tajikistan (Sarkorova 2015; Najibullah, Recknagel 2016). Nevertheless, people continue to wear Muslim clothes, which in some places are considered to be a social norm. The campaign of ‘de-Islamization’ is supported by some representatives of the educated local intelligentsia. They are reluctant to the rise of religiosity, backing the policies of secularization. Some of them claim: Why wear those ‘Arabic clothes it is not our tradition, they came to us from Arabistan,⁶¹ referring to the hijab tightly wrapping the head and neck, and long and loose clothes. However, the traditional Tajik £z/rra (long dress), scarf and trousers can hardly be called ‘secular’. This kind of‘Tajik dress’ is promoted as ‘national’ or ‘traditional’. This fusion of ‘tradition’ and ‘Muslim things’ in female clothes became ‘a brand’ of the Rahmon State which is ill-disposed toward religion but at the same time unable to shape a religious policy that could be a respond to the needs of the Tajik society a with majority Muslim population (see Chapter V). Moreover, in September 2015, President Rahmon signed amendments to the criminal code to introduce more severe punishment for witchcraft and sorcery. People who are accused of being involved in magic can be sentenced for up to 7 years of imprisonment (Interfax-religion 2015). In Tajikistan as in the other parts of Central Asia, various forms of magic and healing are very common. Folk medicine is part of the cultural tradition based on plants, rituals, charms, prayers and so forth. Along with the collapse of public services and the deterioration of medical care, folk healing has become increasingly popular. Sometimes, people combine methods of folk medicine and conventional health care to ¹,⁷ Various opinions taken from interviews and conversations in Tajikistan. Arabistan is a colloquial term for the Arabic countries in Central Asia. 87 Chapter I. Contemporary changes within Islam in Tajikistan and... have ‘a double protection’; for example by linking fertility rituals and gynaecological examination in the case of problems with pregnancy. The services of local healers are also attractive due to their modest price compared to the amount of money charged by professional medical doctors. Folk medicine is available almost everywhere and is accessible for everyone (Tursunova et al. 2014; Latypov 2010). Officially, the purpose of the ban is to prevent illegal and harmful practices. In reality, however, it is aimed at curbing the influence of spiritual leaders, who are held in high esteem by the society and could potentially pass uncomfortable political messages. As during the period of the USSR, the official ‘clergy’ is not held in high regard by the population. By excluding religious and spiritual leaders from the public discourse, the government attempts to limit their influence to prevent the expression of immediate grievances on social issues to the Tajik society, which could become a source of potential unrest. The government wants to control Islam because it is the only force that can integrate the society against the existing relationships and the unfair social system.™ Kalishevski (2015) in his article Tadzhikistan: Pod seniu ‘gosudarstvennogo mazhaba' (Tajikistan: In the shadow of the ‘state mazhabj referred to the religious policy of Tajikistan as ‘radical secularism’. Religion and the faithful are under increasing pressure of the state. Information on detaining imams for alleged terrorist activities or other forms of intimidation of spiritual leaders resurface almost on a daily basis. Similarly to the governments of other countries of the region, Tajik state attempts to create ‘traditional Tajik Islam’ as a challenge to ‘radical, foreign’ Islamic ideologies. Nevertheless, there is no serious theological discussion on its fundamentals. Despite the declaration of religious tolerance, the official representatives of religious institutions try to frame religion through adjusting the local practices to what they consider the Islamic orthodoxy but it is not clear on what basis some of the religious concepts are developed. Moreover, neither government nor formal Islamic institutions attempt to encourage communication between different religious groups. Through ⁶B Various opinions derived from interviews and conversations in Tajikistan. 88 .6. Islam in Tajikistan limiting any forms of religious activity, including Islamic education, the Tajik state only fosters the spreading of xenophobic ideas. It makes the discussion about religious life nothing more than empty platitudes full of artificial statements and prohibitions. Under these circumstances no dialogue on religion and the nature of Islam is possible. 1.6.3. Summary In Tajikistan, religion and religious education are in regress due to the state’s policy which aims to control any manifestation of religiosity. There is informal education provided by religious leaders, both male and female, but at present it is difficult to make any assumptions on its future development. One of the consequences of the delegalization of the IRPT is the lack of a moderate approach to the Islamic thought other than the concepts officially promoted by the state. The Tajik government presents this organization as Islamist, and is blaming the West for supporting terrorism by accepting members of the IRPT as political refugees. It creates a very dangerous situation not only for Tajikistan but also for the whole region of CIS. The moderate forms of Islam are rejected, and removed from the public discourse on religion, which leaves a vacuum that might provoke the development ideologies that would challenge the existing order. Especially that migration to Russia as well as access to multimedia create opportunities to be connected to various religious networks. In the long run, it could also result in the development of an alternative centre of Islam for Tajik migrants in Russia, where germs of resistance against Rahmon’s government can be easily formed. The persecution of religious leaders prefigures the end of the concept of‘moderate Islam’ as a project for the renewal of Tajik society according to the Islamic values. In fact, the Tajik state decided to continue with the Soviet approach to Islam, adapting it to the new conditions. In this context, the activity of religious leaders, including women, is severely limited, and this has a negative influence upon the standards of Islamic education and religious knowledge of people. 89 Chapter II Female religious professionals -an overview This chapter provides general information on the history of female religious figures in the region of Central Asia. It analyzes the traditional way of transmitting Islamic knowledge and various spiritual and ritual aspects related to the process of becoming bibi-otun. Part of the chapter is devoted to the discussion on the participation of women and men in the religious life, including the mosque, the mazar, attending funeral ceremonies, and the cemetery. I demonstrate that the separation of female and male sacred spaces does not merely stem from the principles of Islam, but is rooted in a variety of spiritual traditions of Central Asia which influence female religiosity and the social institution of bibi-otun. The chapter reflects on works of other researchers as well as presents ethnographical material which I collected during research and work in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 2.1. Historical context It is difficult to trace the origin of bibi-otuns as religious leaders within female circles in Central Asia. Since the activities of bibiotuns were unregulated, and of informal character, information about them is scarce. Fathi traces them in Central Asia and in the present--day Xinjiang autonomous region (China) (1997: 31). According to Nadwi (2013: 271-272), in the past women called Muhaddithat were involved in the study of hadises and teaching in various Islamic centres, 9i Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview including Khorasan and Transoxania. Women have been also involved in the Sufi movements all over the Islamic world, including Central Asia, performing various rituals. According to different accounts, religious gatherings of women led by female religious leaders were organized since the 12lh century.⁶⁹ ⁷⁰ Troickaia describes a zikr ceremony which she observed in Tashkent at the beginning of the 20lh century; the ritual was led by the wife of a shaikh of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order - Ishan-bu (Ishon bibi) but the zikr was in the tariqa Qadiriyya style. Ishan-bu performed various rituals for women such as zikr, prayers, healing, she also provided advice on important matters. Ishan did not participate in zikrs for women. Ishan s wife was a member of the brotherhood, but she did not accept new adepts as well as did not give them blessing. It was done by an ishan. There were other independent female-ishans who had their own murids. The zikr in question was organized with the assistance of a halfa (a deputy of the master of ceremony), bibi-otun (sometimes referred to as hafiz - reading poetry and singing), and zokir who was performing using her voice. Zikr and other elements of sufi rituals can be observed to date in various rites (see below). The female halqas™ have still functioned in different parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Troickaia 1928; Sultanova 2009: 43-47; Gorshunova 2001: 135-136; Nizomov 2000: 150-153). A number of mazars devoted to female-saints can be found throughout the region. One of the most places of this kind is Kyz-Bibi khanaka not far from Bukhara, named after the female Sufi saint, Mastura-Khanim/ Aga-uy Buzurg, who belonged to the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order. According to the legend, both men and women were among her murids. Other examples of such popular places of pilgrimage include the Bibi Zudmurod mazar, where women recite nightly prayers, Bibi Arifa’s tomb, mother of Baha’ ad-Din Naqshband, Zurek-Momo in Fergana district of Uzbekistan, the mazar of Bibi Sawr and mazar of Chiltan, both not far from Vahdat town in Tajikistan, and many other places. ⁶⁹ Information obtained during an interview with Kumunjohon Atayeva, PhD, an employee of the State Museum in Khujand, May 2014. ⁷⁰ Halqa - literally a circle, a gathering of people seated in a circle, also a gathering of students/murids around the shaikh within Sufi movements. 9* l.i. Historical context Female saints are seen not only as patrons of women and children, but also as protectors (pins) of those who help women and children such as healers and traditional midwives (momo-doyas), whose assistance is still needed in some villages, especially in remote areas (see Chapter V). Female saints are believed to provide spiritual help to women who want to become pregnant, during labour, illness of a child, to maintain a good relationship within the family, and in many other cases (Nekrasova 2006: 233-235; Sultanova 2009: 43-47; Gorshunova 2012: 141-150; research 2014-2015). Various authors associate the bibi-otun with poetry and storytelling. One of the first famous poetesses was Hayat-atum (Bibi-atum) at the court of Abdullah Khan (1534-1598). Another well-known figure was the legendary Rabia Balkhi considered to be the first female poet in the history of Tajik-Persian literature (the dates of her birth and death are unknown). She was a contemporary of Rudaki (tenth century).⁷¹ There were also a number of poetesses in the nineteenth century who wrote poetry and were involved in various religious activities, including, among others such prominent names as Nodira-begim (who wrote under a pseudonym - Kamila, 1792-1842). She was the daughter of the governor of Andijan, and the wife of the Khan of Kokand, a famous poetess and mystic. Other important figures include Aimnisa (Nisa) whose poetry to this day is recited by some bibi-otuns of Fergana Valley, Uvaisiy (real name: Jahon-otin, 1780-1845), a famous poet, educator as well as a teacher and friend of Nodira. Uvaisiy lived in Kokand and was taught by her mother who was a bibi-otun, and her father who was a poet, both of whom were engaged in teaching activities. Another poetess was Anbar otin (Uzbek, 1870-1915), who was an otun-oy. In her poems, she criticized rich landowners, and social inequality, as well as Sufi leaders and taught at the school for girls. Anbar was a student of the famous Dilshod Otin of Kokand (1801-1905/1906) who was known as a very progressive woman, writing about social issues such as despotic government, exploitation of the poor, corruption, moral ⁷¹ Abu Abdollah Jafar ibn Mohammad Rudaki was a famous Persian poet (859--940/941), (Britannica n.d.). 93 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview decay of the rich and the like. Another important figure was Mushtariy (real name Saodat, 1810/1811-?), an Uzbek poet living in Kokand. She served as a secretary at the court of Khudayar Khan (reigned between 1845-75, with intervals); she was a poet and public activist. The poetesses represented a rich literary tradition of the region, writing in the Persian and Turkic languages (Kamp 2006: 78; Kramer 2006: 321-322; Sultanova 2011: 53-59; Nalivkin, Nalivkina 1886; Labenda 2016: 273-275). Bibi Soliha was another well-known historical figure in the Tajik city of Khujand, who apart from performing religious activity was a khodim¹¹ in her mahalla. Soliha was an initiator and organizer of women protests against the Royal decree dated June 25, 1916 on the mobilization of men to rear works during the First World War. The protests later escalated into an uprising against the Tsarist power in Khujand and other areas in the Russian Turkestan.⁷² ⁷³ Despite that poetesses were important figures in their communities, and some of them had the status of religious leaders, the knowledge on their lives and poetic works is still scarce. Through poems and stories they created, they transmitted a certain system of values and traditions which was passed from generation to generation. At present, some bibi--otuns also write poetry, singing or reciting it during various rituals. 2.2. Transmitting religious knowledge The bibi-otuns were also known for their activities related to the education of girls (schools of aium-bibi). The teachers were often the daughters or wives of religious authorities and people from prominent families. Bibi-otun provided education at homes and thus, they ⁷² Khodim/koybonu/dastarkhortchi also other names - the traditional organiser of celebrations and enterprises among women in mahallas,. They were respected people involved in many social matters. Today this social institution has slowly vanished. ⁷³ Information obtained during an interview with Kumunjohon Atayeva, PhD, an employee of the State Museum in Khujand, May 2014; Bibi-Soliha’s portrait is displayed at this Museum in Khujand. 94 2.1. Transmitting religious knowledge functioned informally, except in rare cases when they worked at official maktabs.™ At the end of the 19th century, first official maktabs for girls appeared. Madrasas and maktabs were registered and supported by the state and waqfsls, both in the khanate period and during the Russian colonization. Girls could study in maktabs with a domullo but they were rarely able to pursue further religious education in a madrasa, with some exceptions such as in the Bibi Oim madrasa in Konibodom (contemporary Tajikistan). It was founded in the 19lh century by Eshon Bobo, a religious figure from Kokand. According to some information he built the school for his daughter Oim who was also a religious teacher. Children started education in maktabs between the age of six and eight, and continued for about three years. Some girls could study further with an bibi-otun to become independent religious professionals in the future. The curriculum for girls was the same as for boys. They were taught prayers, recitation of the Quran, and classical poetry based on oral repetition of the text to memorize it, as well as adab norms (Tajik: tarbiya).¹⁶ Children started education by learning the Arabic alphabet, Haft-yak - a collection of short suras, with pronunciation marks, then Chor-Kitob, the book which includes religious texts* ⁷⁵ ⁷⁶ ⁷⁷, and the poetry ⁷J Maktab - in the Central Asian context, a school which provides basic Islamic education for children. ⁷⁵ Waqf/vaqf- Islamic religious land, property, etc., with a protected status used as an endowment fund. ⁷⁶ The Arabic term adab signifies a habit, hereditary norm of conduct, or a custom derived from one’s ancestors and other respected people who passed it on as a model of behaviour. ⁷⁷ Chor Kitob (Tajik: four books): I. Nami Haq, Sharaf Bukhari (the rules of ablution, the rules of daily prayers, the rules of fasting during Ramadan; II. Kulliyqt - Chahar fast - the Islamic terminology such as iman (faith), ahkam (the Islamic commandments) and arkan (pillars) of Islam. The book consists of four parts: 1) the principles of faith; 2) the influence of the stars on people and their deeds during unfortunate periods; 3) the principles of Sunni beliefs; 4) the genealogy of Prophet Muhammad and caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali; III. Muhimmat al-muslimin - four basic principles which are obligatory for every Muslim (tawhid - oneness [of God], fasting, prayer, and ablution); IV. Pandnamai Attar. The book was written by Sheikh Farididdinom Muhammad bin Abu Bakr Ibrahim Attar (d. 1230), a famous Sufi poet (Abdirashidov 2011: 66-67). 95 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview of Rumi, Hafiz,⁷⁸ Bedil⁷⁹ in Persian, Navoiy,⁸⁰ Baba Mansharab,⁸¹ Sufi Allayar⁸² and others in the Chagatai language. People learnt to read in their native language, and knew some poetry and basic suras. Bibi-otuns and domullos could teach both girls and boys, but it did not happen very often. The practice of girls receiving an education was not as frequent as in the case of boys, and was limited to a circle of relatively wealthy people. However, as Kamp indicates, the informal character of the education for girls resulted in a lack of the Russian records which could provide a basis for the opinion that girls were illiterate. Even well-known bibi-otuns did not have formal access to education which included such aspects as law, logic, and philosophy. This was provided in madrasas only to men. Nevertheless, due to a separation of educational and religious activities for women, bibi-otuns were able to form their own chain of transmission of knowledge as well as their own congregations, allowing them to create female religious authority (Kamp 2006: 76-80; Kramer 2006: 321-322; Khalid 1998: 27-28; Abdirashidov 2011: 66-67; Sultanova 2011: 48-53; Fathi 2006: 307-311).⁸³ This traditional system of Islamic education for girls began to change when the Jaddis schools using new teachings methods (Arabic: usul-I jaddid) were formed. The JaddidsM advocated the inclusion of elements of a European-style curriculum into Islamic education. At the beginning, the new curriculum was introduced in the Tatar schools. At the times, courses for female teachers also appeared. In Central Asia, at ⁷⁸ Hafiz/Hafez - one of the most famous Persian poets, bom in Shiraz (1325/1326--1389/1390), (literaturensvia n.d.). ⁷⁹ Bedil was a representative of Sufi poetry of the Indo-Persian tradition (1054--1133/1644-1721), (Iranicaonline n.d.). ⁸⁰ Navoy was a famous lS^-century poet from Herat (1441-1501), (ziyouz.uz n.d.). ⁸¹ Baba Masharab was a poet of the last period of the Chagatai language/culture, in the 17Ih and 18th centuries (Sultanova 2011). ⁸² Sufi Allayar from Samarkand was a dervish who wrote many poems in the 17th/18th century (Sultanova 2011). ⁸³ Information regarding the Bibi Oim madrasa in Konibodom was collected by me during a field study in 2014. ⁸³ The Jaddids were Muslim reformers who operated from the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Russian Tsarist Empire. 96 2.2. Transmitting religious knowledge the turn of the centuries, the Jaddid schools were available for boys, and some of them also for girls. In the Jaddid schools, a female teacher was termed mualima. Bibi-otuns' activities were considered to be backward and were the object of criticism of both the Tsarist administration and the Jaddids as not corresponding to the standards of a modem curriculum. The Jaddids, however, did not advocate for the reform of bibi-otuns' teaching. They condemned the bibi-otuns for preparing amulets and performing female rituals, believing that their activities are harmful. However, despite the Jaddid criticism, education in the bibi-otun style continued unchanged except for some modification in the manner of teaching the Arabic alphabet, and sometimes also basic writing. It should be noted that the policy of the Jaddids and the Tsarist government to separate the education system from the knowledge of ulama (theologians), and generally from religion, led to decreasing significance of the classical Muslim education. Consequently, this undermined the social status of those religious leaders who supported such knowledge, including bibi-otuns (Kamp 2006: 76-83; Kramer 2006: 321-322; Khalid 1998: 225-227; also see Muminov et al. 2010). At the beginning of the Soviet period until the 1920s, the Islamic schools continued to operate, including the traditional maktabs and Jaddid schools. In the first years after the October revolution, the Soviet authorities organized 3-6 month courses for literate women to train them as teachers for Soviet-type schools; a large part of them were former students of bibi-otuns’ or bibi-otuns themselves. In the mid-1920s, all religious subjects were banned from schools. Some bibi-otuns became teachers in the Soviet schools, and then abandoned the otun profession. All teachers were asked questions regarding their attitude to religion. However, most of the religious teachers did not become Soviet teachers, taking on other professions and teaching religion in secrecy within the family and various community’ networks on the basis of hujra (Kamp 2006: 91-92). Kamp (2006: 91-92) points out that pressure on religion forced many bibi-otuns to give up teaching, and limited their activities to performing rituals. Some female hujras operated and some girls were taught within the family circle (see Fathi 2006, 1997). During my research in 2014, the 76-year-old Saidniso explained to me how she started her Islamic 97 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview education: At the age of seven, I got sick and I was bedridden for seven months, during this time my father (who was a mulla) recited various suras of the Quran, to heal me. Finally I recovered, and slowly began to walk. I asked my father to teach me to read the Quran in Arabic. At the beginning, he did not want to agree, it was 1947, and Islam was under close scrutiny of the state. My father was afraid that I could say something at school or while playing with other children on the street, and there would be a problem for the whole family. When I was thirteen and more mature, my father started teaching me, but still I could not mention this to anybody.*⁵ From my research I know about the female hujras functioning in Khujand, as well as Isfara: Chorkhu, Vorukh, and other places. According to one of my interlocutors, her great grandmother was a recognizable bibi-otun who organized a home-based maktab for girls and boys, in the mahalla where she used to live in Khujand. Temurkhon oya was bom in 1881 in Khujand. She was from a family of religious leaders, and she got married to Osim eshon, a member of a family of eshons of Langar Ata mazar, and an imam.*⁶ All her kids died in early childhood and due to her childlessness, she got divorced and returned back to Khujand. Temurkhon oya got married once again to someone who was a widower with children, and who was imam of the mahalla. She adopted a daughter of her brother, who subsequently became a grandmother of my interlocutor.⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ ⁸⁵ On the basis of a conversation with Saidniso bibi-otun, Khujand 2014. ⁸⁶ Langar Ata mazar - the tomb of a famous theologian and clairvoyant, Abdu Rahmon Ata, who belonged to the Naqshbandiyya Sufi branch, is located in the village Langar, in the Spitamen district not far from Khujand. A few metres further away, there is another grave of a wise man, who according to a local legend was the companion of Khoja Ahmat Yassavi (the founder of one of the most important Central Asian Sufi brotherhoods, Yassaviya). A related group of eshons who are believed to derive their origin from Abdu Rahmon Ata live there to this day. The eshons of Langar Ata have a very high status in this particular region, and its members are involved in various activities related to business and politics (see Cieslewska 2015a: 76, 87). ⁸⁷ There is a practice in Central Asia that if a couple or a person cannot have children, their relatives can give away one of their children for the childless couple. 9« l.i. Transmitting religious knowledge Temurkhon oya taught a group of boys and girls (about twenty people) until she died in 1970. Apart from teaching, she was also a kinachi (a person who lifts spells), (see below). She was called to the KGB (Russian: Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, English: The Soviet Committee of State Security) office a few times, and was questioned about her activity. Moreover, the authorities took away half of her house, and gave it to the Russian family who kept pigs there. The Islamic tradition considers pigs as ritually unclean animals. Eating their meat and contact with them is strictly prohibited. Hence, giving half of the house to Russians was seen by the bibi-otun’s family as an act of humiliation. Apparently, Temurkhon cursed the man responsible for this decision, and he died suffering torments. The KGB visited the mahalla, three days after his death, investigating people and telling that they are going to arrest everyone who organizes illegal Islamic teaching. Someone reported to them that Temurkhon had a maktab in her house, but eventually no action was undertaken against her.⁸⁸ Anti-religious policies during the Soviet Union varied in different periods. Some temporary thaws allowed for the intensification of religious activities which were then suspended when pressure from the state increased again. Another person from Khujand who attended the hujra for girls in her childhood reported that under Andropov,⁸⁹ persecution increased and her teacher stopped teaching. The constant uncertainty and threat of investigation influenced the quality of religious education, which not infrequently became limited to knowledge of some basic Islamic rites. As was mentioned before, the topic of female hujra?, during the period of the USSR is underexplored and it remains in the shadows. The bibi-otun? were almost in every mahalla teaching Quran and prayers, and providing informal knowledge on ritual practices, traditions as well as the norms of behaviour (adab) for girls. To this day, in the traditional circles, girls who attend bibi-otun s classes are considered to be very well brought up, and are better candidates for wives. On the basis of an interview with a great-granddaughter of Temurkhon oya, Warsaw, February 2016. ⁸⁹ Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1982-1984. 99 Chapter IL Female religious professionals - an overview Female religious leaders helped to maintain the central Asian tradition and resisted atheisation and Russification in the USSR (Fathi 2006: 38). As one of my interlocutors indicated during the interview: A bibi-otun was always a respected and important person in a mahalla. She was usually an elderly woman, with life experience and knowledge on religion and tradition. Apart from performing female rituals, she taught girls and women to read namaz and basic religious duties.⁹⁰ It should be noted that in Central Asia, in most cases, men were involved in public life. Thus they were more exposed to secularization during the period of the USSR. Some of them were regular members of the Party, and showed their loyalty to the Soviet ideas, but at the same time they maintained an ‘Islamic way of life’ in their homes, whereas women tended to stay at home. They functioned in a hermetic circle of the family and mahalla/village. Thus, women’s perception of the world was often very different from the cultural pattern imposed by Soviétisation but also Européisation represented mainly but not only by the Russian culture. Despite many duties in the household and responsibility to raise children, women participated in gatherings organized on various occasions. They performed rituals, celebrations, sang songs, and told stories whose key figures were often female religious leaders. In this way, women created their own unique world, passing traditional knowledge to future generations, and maintaining the Islamic traditions (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 331; Sultanova 2011: 124-125). It is worth mentioning that women transmitted tradition and religious knowledge also in the cases of other religions such as Catholicism and the Orthodox faith in the USSR. Bukowiński (2006) looked into the Polish community in Kazakhstan, and noted that the Catholic tradition was usually kept alive by older women who remembered other times when religion was openly practised. They also stayed on the fringes of public and thus atheism influenced them to a lesser extent. At present hujras function in Kyrgyzstan, and their popularity increased during the 1990s (see Chapters I, IV). There are also ⁹⁰ On the basis of an interview with a husband of a Gulsun otyncha, the Shahrak district, Kyrgyzstan, June 2015. ioo L.i. Transmitting religious knowledge informal religious classes in Tajikistan. However, recent events in this country significantly undermined the position of Islamic leaders, and the Islamic education. Hujra has also various other names; in Khujand and its surroundings people usually say: darsi-dini (lesson of religion), or maktab-dini (a school of religion), maktab-dor (a person who has maktab), also dawra (circle), also other terms. Hujra networks maintained the traditions of the old confessional schools. In this way, the religious leaders managed to pass Islamic knowledge, norms, and tradition to the next generation. To this day, there is a practice of individual learning of religion in Central Asia. Sometimes, students even live in the house of an ustod (teacher) helping him/her with household duties or agricultural activities. Traditionally, the (ustod) transmits knowledge to the (shogird). This kind of educational process is based on the relationship between a Sufi master and his students related to spiritual learning which originated in the medieval times. It was also practised within artisans’ guilds and among musicians. The training process took many years, and involved a masterapprentice relationship (Sultanova 2011: 64-68; Babajanov 1999). The ustod-shogird relationship is characterized by deep emotional involvement but also subordination of the student to the teacher, whose authority is indisputable. It is said that a mother or a father cannot be ustod for their children because the latter can try to challenge them. A student should not even directly look at ustod’s eyes.⁴' Traditionally, a candidate for the female religious professional studies with an older bibi-otun, who enjoys the reputation of a good teacher. Sometimes one person has a number of teachers. From one teacher, she acquires knowledge related to religion, while another provides her with information on specific rituals. The process of learning and the length of study depends on a student’s ability and amount of time which the latter can devote to learning. Not everyone who goes through all the stages of religious education becomes a bibi-otun.ⁿ ⁹¹ ⁹² ⁹¹ A quotation from an interview with a teacher of religion from Khujand, May 2014. ⁹² On the basis of various interviews with ЫЫ-otuns, and teachers of Islam, May 2014. IOI Chapter ll. Female religious professionals - an overview Due to persecution of religion during the period of the Soviet Union, this way of transferring knowledge was re-formulated, and in some cases, male teachers transmitted the Islamic knowledge to women, who were members of their family or close associates. It was dictated by security reasons since teaching religion in a small circle was safer, but also by the fact that not many female religious leaders could provide the relevant Islamic knowledge. Hence, new adepts sought various alternatives to acquire better religious education as is demonstrated by the two cases below. As a result, the tradition was transformed, and at present the male theologians are sometimes ustods for women. Gulsun, an otyncha from the tura family⁹³ living in the Shahrak district, used to study Islam in Andijan (Uzbekistan) in the informal hujra of her cousin. Since her teacher was her distant relative, they always stayed in the two comers of the room without looking at each other during the classes in which the wife of the teacher also participated. Another female religious professional - Dilfuza, comes from a family of religious leaders on her mother’s side. Prior to the October Revolution, her great-grandfather and other relatives attended a madrasa in Bukhara. As a result of the religious persecution, part of her family fled to Afghanistan, others escaped to Kashgar in China, several people were arrested and exiled to Siberia. Despite difficulties, her greatgrandfather, and then grandfather maintained an underground hujra and taught religion. Both of them were also followers of Naqshbandiyya tariqa. The grandfather had a very large library of about 600 religious books, while her uncle was a director of the manuscript department of the National Library in Tashkent. She began her religious education at the age of seven, and her uncle was her first teacher of Islam. ⁹³ To put it succinctly, turas are believed to be descendants of Genghis Khan; khojas and sayyids are reputed to be the progeny of the Prophet Muhammad or his companions who brought Islam to Central Asia; the term khoja, however, is not always clearly defined; eshons (also ishons, ishans, etc.) and shaikhs are descendants of saints and Sufi masters. Although these categories can be merged with each other, and they vary from region to region, they constitute special groups that for centuries have been held in high esteem in the society and have exercised great authority in Central Asia. The high social standing is hereditary - the offspring enjoy the same respect as their ancestors (see Abashin 2001; Chapter V). IOl i.i. Transmitting religious knowledge Subsequently, another relative from her father’s family taught her to read the Quran. She wanted to continue her education in the Tashkent Islamic University but she got married and moved to Kyrgyzstan. Subsequently, she studied Islam with her brother, Abdu Rahim Qori, who taught Islam to many people in the area of his residence. Abdu Rahim Qori gave his sister permission to teach religion. She continued her religious education with a director of the male madrasa Sultan Ali in the Shahrak district in Kyrgyzstan where she lives (see Chapter V). Dilfuza considered herself to be his shogird. The whole process of learning with a director of a madrasa took place in a room divided by a curtain, so that they could not see each other. She did not speak loudly while talking to him since a woman’s voice is considered awra^ by some Islamic scholars. At present, she continues her religious studies with another teacher. If there are some uncomfortable issues about which she cannot directly ask her male teacher, such as those which relate to intimate matters, they talk by making allusions, and if something is still not clear, she can ask her teacher through his wife.* ⁹⁵ As the above cases demonstrate, both the male teacher and the female student should follow a certain etiquette. Especially, the reputation of a female student should not be disputed since she is expected to teach and provide moral advice to other women. Female religious professionals should serve as an example of good upbringing and behaviour. I return to this topic later on in this book. The ustod decides at which point the shogird can begin his/her independent activity. As in the case of other religious and spiritual leaders, the process of learning is finalized by the ustod talbon ritual which is arranged in various ways. A candidate for a religious leader usually invites his relatives and friends, and prepares a feast. In some cases, an event is accompanied by other life-cycle rituals such as a wedding, circumcision of a boy and so forth. A teacher can also invite some other religious professionals to watch the performance of the student. The candidate reads the suras of Quran in the presence M Awra - an intimate body part which should be covered. Some Islamic scholars considered a woman’s voice to be also her awra. ⁹⁵ On the basis of an interview with Dilfuza, July 2015, the Shahrak district, Kyrgyzstan. 103 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview of the teacher and guests, and answers their questions. This is a kind of an exam. At the end of the ritual, the ustod gives a fotiha which is understood as a blessing (a kind of permission) which entitles a person to act as an independent religious leader. The ustod gives a gift to the student: a piece of cloth, a headscarf etc. as a symbol of the end of the education, and the durability of their relationship. The student should also show gratitude to his or her teacher in the form of a present.⁹⁶ The traditional process of religious education would usually start with encompass learning the Arabic alphabet, correct pronunciation, and various suras, the already mentioned books with the Islamic principles and classical poetry, and finally the performance of rituals.⁹⁷ At present, however, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, various new possibilities emerged. People have the opportunity to learn religion and the Arabic language during courses and in madrasas. Individual teachers use different sources of knowledge and literature to enrich the curriculum. As I mentioned in the introduction, many new female teachers do not have a religious family background and do not follow the classical tradition of transmitting religious knowledge from an ustod to a shogird. They receive the formal certificates enabling them to teach Islam, or they graduate from various courses. Nevertheless, despite the fact that those the modem teachers often show reluctance towards the social institution of bibi-otuns, some of them replicate the pattern of female social authority, although in a modified way. I will present the particular cases in Chapters IV and V. 2.3. Becoming bibi-otun Kamila (aged 58), a bibi-otun, comes from a family of religious leaders who are sayyid. According to her words, her husband's ancestors were ⁹⁶ Information obtained during an interview with Kumunjohon Atayeva, PhD, an employee of the State Museum in Khujand, May 2014, as well as during various conversations with the traditional bibi-otuns. ⁹⁷ On the basis of research conducted in 2014 and 2015. 104 ij. Becoming bibi-ocun shaikhs of the Panshanbe mazar." She started reading the Quran at the age of twenty upon recommendation of her grandfather who was a mulla, but she quickly gave up. Kamila explains: I graduatedfrom a high school of economic specialization, after that I started working at a trading company and then in a district hukumat as an accountant. It was the Soviet era, I was always Muslim but I did not think that much about religion and the Quran. I was young and wanted to pursue my career. But gradually, something strange happened to me which forced me to change my previous plans. I miscarried 12 times. When I became pregnant with my son, I decided to live next to the premises of the Suhr Ota mazar in the 1st Pisor village", every day I visited the mazar, praying many hours, asking God to keep my child alive. Finally, I gave birth to a son, and a few years later to a daughter. At the age of 36, I began to have the dreams: elderly men with white beards, they kept saying that I should pursue religion, otherwise something bad would happen to me or my family. Sometimes, I also lost consciousness. My father-in-law was a mulla, his family guarded the above-mentioned mazar until 1985. Finally, he convinced me to read the Quran and learn the religion. I visited a local clairvoyant, she also confirmed that a religious path is my destiny, and I should accept it. There were other signs that Kamila should become a bibi-otun. Once, while she was buying milk from a woman who delivered it to her home, she noticed a book in the woman’s bag. I asked: “What is this? ”, and she answered: “it is Mushkil-Kusho, today we have Wednesday, a day of Mushkil-Kusho. I am a bibi-otun, someone invited me to perform a ritual”. At this very moment, Kamila decided to invite this bibi-otun to her house and organize this celebration. Simultaneously, she started having dreams about reciting Mushkil-Kusho on her own.* ⁹⁹ ¹⁰⁰ ’* The Panshanbe mosque located in the centre of Khujand, opposite the big bazar, is also part of a religious complex with the mazar of Shaikh Malihaddin Badeuddini Nuri, a religious figure from Khujand. ⁹⁹ This holy place is also named Nim-sar Ota mazar. ¹⁰⁰ On a basis of my conversations with Kamila bibi-otun, April, May 2014, Khujand. ioy Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview The story presents a case of a female religious professional who started practising as a result of a spiritual vocation that was preceded by an illness, a series of visions or unusual life events. Similarly to shamans (bakhshy), qasida-khon, azani-khon, polchi etc. (a category of healers, also exorcists), clairvoyants (folbin), kinachi (charm-removers), tabib (folk doctors), traditional midwives (momo-doya), refusing nasiba (a gift/vocation) can evoke a series of unpleasant events such as problems with childbirth, deaths of relatives, various ills such as losing consciousness, temporary coma or even paralysis. There is a belief that people performing tasks associated with the spiritual world are specially designated by the spirits of their ancestors. Nasiba is a gift, but also a destiny that must be fulfilled. A person must use the special gift he/ she received from God for the good of others. Kamila said: People in Tajikistan accept what God gives to them. We just need to pray to God and rely on his mercy. Everything depends on God. It is believed that nasiba is inherited from ancestors. In the case of female spiritual professionals the gift is passed through the female line of a family, just like in the case of female shamans (Azimova 2014; Gorshunova 2001, 2006; Rakhimov 2007; Snesarev 1969; Sukhareva 1975). According to tradition, special attention was given to the fact that religious leaders came from noble families, such as sayyid, tura, eshon, khoja. The bibi-otuns do not always have to undergo a strenuous transformation to become religious professionals. At present, there are also religious figures who do not have a noble origin, and perform religious services based on their knowledge of Islam, their charisma and sometimes a good network of personal contacts (see below). In northern Tajikistan, people still believe that a bibi-otun should possess muakkal. The meaning of this term is explained in various ways. In the Tajik language, it means a guardian/protector, also a confident/ trustee which corresponds with the Arabic word muwakkil (responsible, in charge of something). To sum up the conversations with a number of my interlocutors, muakkal is understood as a spiritual power/angel which protects a person (a guardian spirit). Muakkal also can be explained as a gift related to a subconscious feeling, also a premonition to see an event without conscious reasons. Muakkal is a kind subtle energy of a soul within the mind and thoughts that allows one to see or to feel in the 106 1.3- Becoming bibi-otun way which is not available to other people. Muakkal can be represented by white or black energy associated with good or evil. Bad people could use muakkal with evil intent against others. Everyone is connected to muakkal, but not everyone knows how to establish this connection. Murodov (1975: 94-117) mentions that muakkal is a category of spirit of a saint or ancestors. Those spirits can assume the form of Qalandars (dervishes) who help the shaman during the performance of rituals.¹⁰¹ In Central Asia, sacred practices are associated with the belief that illness can be caused by malevolent spirits whose identification is part of the healing process; these include jinns, albastyi (alvasti), pari, devs, and others. There are different experts including religious leaders such as mullas, ishans, qasida-khons etc. who challenge the spirits by using various techniques such as reading prayers, amulets, rituals as well as performing ziyorat (pilgrimage), (see Abashin 2015; Basilov, Kamysheva 1997; Gorshunova 2006; Penkala-Gawçcka 2006; Rakhimov 2007; Snesarev 1969; Sukhareva 1975; Tursunova et al. 2014). As in the case of other spiritual professionals, a bibi-otun can also integrate various skills such as the knowledge of the Quran and Islam, and the art of healing and magic. Snesarev (1969: 45) believes that the professions of a doctor, shaman or clairvoyant merged in the past, which can be proved by way of accepting a vocation. Some elements of shamanism were absorbed by Sufism; spiritual leaders can communicate with God through spirits in the matters of health, wealth, various family issues and so forth (Basilov, Kamysheva 1997: 72). Abashin (2015: 508) writes that in the village of Oshoba where he conducted research, bakhshys received a traditional blessing for practising their profession from the local bibi-otun. Murodov (1975: 94-117) gives an example of a female shaman from the Zaravshan Valley, who apart from healing and other typically shamanic activities, perfomed the rituals such as Bibi Mushkil-Kusho, and Bibi Seshanbe which traditionally are conducted by bibi-otuns. There are other examples of the connection between various spiritual professionals (Azimova 2014: 49; Gorshunova 2001: 136; see Tursunova et al. 2014). ¹⁰¹ The above description is a summary of various interviews which I conducted on this topic with religious leaders as well as other people in Tajikistan in 2014. 107 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview The healing process and removing kina in the Vakhsh Valley According to the local beliefs, the evil eye can be cast unintentionally, or by a person who has bad intentions towards someone. Kina could result in headaches, depression, various diseases as well as failures in life. I have not sorted out specifically in which way, according to my interlocutors, kina can be cast on a person. Sometimes, it is enough for a person to glance at something or someone, or even say something good for example: This girl is pretty. In other cases, spells are cast by performing the certain rituals; kina is negative but it is not a curse (Tajik: jodu) whose removal is more difficult, and requires very specific skills¹⁰² ¹⁰³ (see Abashin 2015: 439; Kikuta 2011: 72-73; Snesarev 1969: 35; Tursunova et al. 2014: 52-56). I met Dilbar (aged 53) while working on an NGO project in Vakhsh Valley. She helped us organize a group of women for seminars on health and hygiene. Dilbar works in a local school as a teacher; she is also a bibi-otun and kinachi in her village. Her family came from the Ferghana Valley to the Vakhsh Valley in the 1950s. She inherited the art of removing kina from her ancestors, together with the items which she uses during the ritual: her grandfather’s skull cap (Uzbek: du ’pa, Tajik: tuppi) and a knife. My friend, Kasia Szalbot and I, had the opportunity to observe the process of removing kina performed by Dilbar. Dilbar’s client was a young girl who lived in the neighborhood. The ritual began with dua, then the bibi-otun took the cap and knife and performed various movements around the girl. Dilbar also put beside three pieces of bread which she needed for the healing ritual. She touched the head and shoulders of her client (performing a kind of massage) while whispering different prayers as well as groaning, burping (she said that in this way the charm is removed). She directed her words to a spirit by uttering: Go away! Leave this person, please! Why are you here?! Who ordered you to be here?! The ritual ended with suf-kufm and dua. The bread was given to dogs to eat after the l⁰: Field research conducted in 2014-2015, various interviews, observations and participation as a patient in the process of removing kina. ¹⁰³ Suf-kuf'\s usually performed at the end of the ritual or a certain stage of ritual and it is associated with different sorts of healing techniques. It looks like blowing 108 i.j. Becoming bibi-ocun ritual since the charm was believed to be soaked in it. Dilbar said that nobody taught her to do it; she only observed the ritual when it was performed by her family’s members. Removing kina is a part of the healing process. It purifies the body and the soul from the effects of an evil spirit. It releases tensions, and calms the nerves.¹⁰⁴ I heard another story about female religious professionals being involved in healing from my co-worker whose mother-in-law was a bibi-otun as well as a healer. Dilorom bibi-otun was bom in 1945, her father was a famous mulla and a healer. A few years after he died, Dilorom had a dream in which her father told her that she should read the Quran and devote herself to religion. She started learning the Arabic alphabet from her neighbour. Subsequently, about the age of 40, she began to perform the rituals for a female circle. A few years passed, and the bibi-otun started to suffer from a periodic sleeping sickness, and sometimes had strange dreams. In 1987, she decided to undergo forty days of seclusion (chilla} in a small room in her house.¹⁰⁵ In isolation, she read the Quran and prayed a great deal. My friend and the bibi-otun’s son delivered food to her, which she consumed in very small quantities, fasting most of the time. She would leave the room only during the night. Nobody could see her apart from her youngest son. He delivered all things she asked for; the bibi-otun communicated with the people through short notes. Gradually, the spirits (pirs) started coming to her. Being in chilla gave her a feeling of spiritual purification, but she also realized that she had to leam a great deal to be able to cure people. According to her words, the pirs formed a circle around air with words suf-kuf, sometimes combined with whistles while reading the suras. People say: Suf-kuf makes the healing effect of a particular sura stronger. Suf is like a wind which blows into a sura to make it more therapeutic (various observations in the field). ¹⁽w The observation and interview conducted with Dilbar in October 2014, the Vakhsh Valley, Tajikistan. ¹⁰⁵ In this context, the chilla (forty) is a 40-day period of seclusion from the outside world. The chilla usually involves fasting, reading the Quran and mystical revelations, sometimes contact with spirits that indicate which mystical path is to be followed. Chilla also refers to a period of 40 days after the birth of a child who remains at home during this time. The period of 40 days after the death of a person is also called chilla (see Rakhimov 2007). 109 Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview her during, transferring her energy which she was going to use to heal people. She later repeated the forty-day ritual isolation several times, also for twenty days, one week, and three days. Performing chilla was recommended to her by her pirs. Then she became a healer, still conducting the female rituals. She organized a special room for healing, where patients could stay, sitting and lying on the floor. She had a very big knife (probably made of silver) which she brought upon the order of her pirs. She was stroking people with this knife, while reading the prayers at the same time. Patients came with various problems, even from remote places in Tajikistan. They also sacrificed animals, and prepared a ritual dish to consume. Despite the fact that Dilorom otun died in 2012, some people still come to visit her house. They say that even seeing her place can heal them. The bibi-otun also made medicines from potato flowers and propolis which helped to cure various digestive complaints.¹⁰⁶ According to the words of my co-worker, she learnt to prepare medicines from the books of Ibn Sino.¹⁰⁷ The knife was passed to one of her daughters in law, whom the bibi-otun taught how to prepare medicines. There are other religious leaders in her family too - a son of her brother is a qori,¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ healing people by reading from the Quran, someone else is a mulla.m 2.4. Between the mosque and the mazar According to the Central Asian tradition of the Hanafi school of Islamic Law, women do not visit the mosque, which is considered a male ¹⁰⁶ An interview with the daughter-in-law of the above-mentioned bibi-otun, Qurghonteppa 2013. ¹⁰⁷ Ibn Sino lived in the 10th century. He was known by Europeans as Avicenna; he was Iranian by origin, and is regarded as one of the most significant scholars and physicians of the Medieval Islamic world. ¹⁰⁸ Qori is a person who memorized the entire Quran. ¹⁰⁹ The story of Dilorom bibi-otun was written on the basis of two interviews conducted by me with her daughter-in-law who was my co-worker in the NGO project, in July 2013, and in June 2014. no 1.4. Between the mosque and the mazar space.¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹ Customarily, women can pray at home or visit mazars. There are multiple hadises from the Prophet Muhammad that advised men not to prohibit women from attending mosques. Nevertheless, the most popular hadis on this matter quoted in Central Asia says that: You should not forbid women to visit a mosque, although the best place for them is to pray in their own house. " On this basis, many Islamic scholars in the region support the division into male and female cult places. The most interesting explanation of this tradition is the one I heard from an imam - a member of the eshon family of Langar Ata mazar in the Spitamen district where I was living in 2012. According to his words, the ban for women to attend the mosque was introduced by Caliph Uthman¹¹² who once came across a couple in a mosque in an intimate situation. Since then, the Caliph decided that women should pray at home.¹¹³ Rakhimov (2009: 5-9, 15-18; 2007: 262-270) suggests that the separate places of worship for men and women in Central Asia are inextricably linked to social roles of both genders, and practices of everyday life reflected in the spirituality of the pre-Islamic tradition of Zoroastrianism or even further back. Moreover, he indicates that one of the reasons was ritual purity, since a woman who had her period was not allowed to approach the fire which was considered sacred in Zoroastrianism. All those factors had determined the development of separate sacred spaces for men and women, which was further accepted by Islam. The mosque has been a sphere of male influence, and it has always been a place where cult practices have been associated with a more dogmatic version of Islam. Women have their own practices and traditions, they also own a different sacred space which is not available ¹¹⁰ In many parts of the Islamic world, women are restricted to attend the mosque. In this study, however, I consider only the particular case of Central Asia. ¹¹¹ A hadis quoted by Aliautdinov (2008: 61), (the author’s translation from the Russian language). ¹¹² Caliph Uthman was the third of the Sunni Tradition of Caliphs, who are also known as “Rightly Guided Caliphs”. ¹¹² A personal conversation with an imam, kishlak Langar, Spitamen district, July 2012. Ill Chapter 11. Female religious professionals - an overview to men. It further influenced a different understanding of spirituality by both gender groups. I will return to this topic in Chapters III and V. During my research I asked my male interlocutors about the female rituals. Many of them recognized some practices performed by women, but they were rarely aware of the nature of those traditions. In most cases, female rituals and ceremonies are not accessible to men, and the latter do not show an interest in them. In general, men respect bibi-otuns as female religious leaders but they have no direct contact with them. There were a few men who criticized bibi-otuns as backward, promoting ‘impure Islamic practices’ or making profit on their activities. However, there are also women who expressed the same view. Even though men's spiritual leader is exclusively a mulla/imam/eshon, nobody challenges the status of a bibi-otun as a religious figure. Doubts concern mostly the level of knowledge of a particular person or her interpretation of the religious creed.¹¹⁴ Women have always visited mazars, where they have performed rituals which are very different from those that are observed in the mosque. Unlike a mosque, a mazar is a very specific place of worship representing a certain perception of spirituality. Due to the unofficial/ informal nature of female sacred tradition, it is much more diverse than the men’s rituals. Men also visit mazars, but they do not perform the same rites as women. There are rituals that could be performed by men and women together in mazars, such as those related to marriage and fertility rites. For example, to this day a couple who experiences difficulties to have children can perform a ritual together at a mazar, involving the sacrificing of an animal, and the recitation of various kinds of rites (Rakhimov 2009: 10-16; also Gorshunova 2001, 2006, 2012). I observed a very interesting ritual in 2014, in the Suhr Ota mazar in 1st Pisor village, performed by a young couple. They came with the grandmother and the mother of the young man because the girl could not get pregnant for a long period. Following a dua, the couple scattered ll‘l I conducted a number of conversations on this topic with men in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the years of 2010-2015. Ill î.4- Between the mosque and the mazar rice around the premises of a tomb, and after that they washed their faces and hands with water. All stages of the ritual were performed by the man and the woman together. As was mentioned above, there are places intended for women only which are in most cases related to female-saints, female religious leaders or even women who suffered for various reasons. While visiting the village of Yol, in the Shurabad district of Tajikistan in 2010,1 heard the following story about a local female saint: A long time ago, a woman was living in the village. She had a husband and children. Once, when her husband was away, she was doing laundry at her home. She was dressed in a traditional kurta and sharavars and since the woman thought that she was alone, she was sitting in a very relaxed and convenient posture. At this moment, her neighbour came to see her husband, but when he realized that the man was not present, he began making advances to her. Feeling deeply insulted by his behaviour, the woman ordered him to leave her house. In retaliation, the man accused her of flirting with him. The angry crowd beat her up severely. Covered with blood, she crawled slowly to reach a local holy place but she died on the way. In the time following her death, white flowers appeared in the places where drops of her blood fell upon the ground. Then, the residents of the village realised that she was innocent. To this day, there is a small grave of her surrounded by a clay wall with an entry, and local women come here asking the saint for help."⁵ Despite the fact that the mazar is associated with many female rituals, Rakhimov (2007: 262-264) comments that women are not allowed to perform chilla in chillkhona at mazars. They can follow chilla only at home. It is related to a lack of ritual purity during menstruation. According to a Central Asian tradition, women also should not visit a cemetery or participate in a funeral procession to a burial site. This taboo is extended to reading janoza namaz (an Islamic funeral prayer), which should be recited only by men. During religious classes which ¹¹⁵ This ethnography is written on the basis of a story which I heard in July 2010, in the village of Yol, Shurabad district of Tajikistan. ii3 Chapter II. Female religious professionals - an overview I attended in the traditional hujra of Gulsun the otyncha in the Shahrak district of Kyrgyzstan, this issue was explained in the same way.¹¹⁶ There is a belief that dark spirits are present at the ritually unclean places such as cemeteries. Especially women and children are sensitive to black energies (Tajik: siokhi'. blackness, darkness, also a ghoul, sometimes it is referred to as soya', shadow). According to Rakhimov (2007: 111-115), siokhi is the energy of a body of the dead, such as a spirit of the dead body. It can affect the people, who are mourning, or even objects which belonged to the deceased. While working in Central Asia, I was warned to be careful while visiting cemeteries during my research. Since I participated in many rituals organized mainly by elderly women, I was also told by a local healer not to stay too long in the company of widows who are believed to be influenced by siokhi. With regard to a mosque, it serves not only the purpose of religious rites but also as a place where community gatherings take place, including formal public meetings with various public figures. If there are some important matters to be discussed by the community, the elite of the village/mahalla gathers in the mosque to talk about the issue. Two or three times a year, the community organizes a majlis (assembly) in which representatives of each household are invited to participate. In most cases, during a majlis members of local administration are also present. Majlises are organized in the mosque or other public places such as schools premises etc.¹¹⁷ Since women do not enter the mosque, their participation in the public life of the community is limited. During the NGO project in which I was engaged, in the years 2013-2015, in the Khatlon region of Tajikistan, we organized various activities including focus groups and seminars. At the beginning, in most cases, we were invited to the mosques by the community leaders for the meetings in which women participated only in exceptional cases. We did not impose any rules on women’s involvement in our project, the communities decided freely who they wanted to invite for the seminar. Nonetheless, we wanted to encourage women to attend seminars and workshops. Thus, we asked the representatives of the mahalla to set up activities away from the ¹¹⁶ Personal observation, August 2015, Kyrgyzstan. ¹¹⁷ Field work in Tajikistan in the years of 2010-2015. 114 1.4- Between the mosque and the mazar area of the mosque. Within the framework of our project we also organized majlises to ensure that the goals and activities of our project are known to the whole community. In most places, according to the local tradition, the majority of the participants were men. In one village, however, a majlis was held in a mosque. Women came in considerable numbers but they went to a separate room and it was only through an open door that they could ask questions and discuss the issues. It should be noted, however, that the character of the meeting was secular, and also our presence (Tajik and Polish female NGO workers) could encourage women to participate (Cieslewska 2015a: 189-208). Nevertheless, most of the traditional female religious leaders with whom I conducted interviews did not support the idea of women attending the mosque. They considered home to be the best place for women to pray. Women and men should stay separately unless they are relatives. Good manners and the local savoir-vivre require the maintenance of an appropriate distance between men and women. The presence of the latter in the mosque can be perceived as a violation of social norms (Peshkova 2014: 108, 110). In 2012, while conducting research in the Spitamen district not far from Khujand, I asked a friend of mine, a female teacher, to show me a small village mosque. Previously, we went together for a pilgrimage to the Langar Ata mazar. She agreed, but when we approached the building, she refused to go inside, explaining that she was never seen inside any mosque, and that she felt uncomfortable to enter it. In 2015, while working in the district of Shahrak, I wanted to see a big mosque which was in the centre of the town. I asked Amina, who is a teacher of the English language at a local school, and a teacher of Arabic grammar in the female madrasa, to show me the mosque. She refused to go, explaining that according to local standards if she visits the mosque, it would be a humiliation for her husband and her sons. Nowadays, the fact that women cannot pray in the mosque triggers a lot of discussions, not only in Central Asia but also in other parts of the Islamic world where it is banned. In 2004, the Tajik Council of Ulama issued a fatwa prohibiting women from attending the mosque, as they claimed that the buildings lacked enough space to enable men and women to pray separately. However, some argued this was due ns Chapter 11, Female religious professionals - an overview to the concern of the government that women would participate in Islamic groups of a political character. In October 2014,1 conducted an interview with a person responsible for the implementation of the project targeting the bibi-otuns (see Chapter V). She expressed an opinion that in general women could pray in the mosque, but poor religious education contributes to the fact that people are more vulnerable to the influence of extremists. According to my interlocutor, the mosque is a potential source uncontrolled information on religion.¹¹⁸ Until 2014/2015, women could pray in Yaqub Charkhi’s mazar in Dushanbe. The mazar also fulfils the role of a Friday mosque. In front of the mazar, there is a small bazaar, where every Wednesday the ritual of Bibi Mushkil-kusho was performed by women (see Chapters I and III). There was a chapel in the Panjshanbe mosque in Khujand, where women could pray, however, few of them attended the daily prayers. This mosque is also part of a religious complex with the mazar of the famous Shaikh Malihaddin Badeuddini Nuri. In both places, no woman was allowed to enter the mosque during namaz al-jama 'a on Friday. Other mosques built on the territories of mazars can also be visited by women but never on Friday, which is a day for men. Nevertheless, women can attend mosques for healing purposes {ruqiya}. In this case, a mulla reads suras of the Quran to heal a person. I have seen such rituals many times in the Panjshanbe mosque in Khujand, and the central mosque in Bishkek, as well as in a male madrasa in the Shahrak district (see Chapter IV). In Kyrgyzstan, in the central mosque in Bishkek, there is a separate room for women to pray and also a place for ablution. Women are allowed to attend the mosque during the Friday khutba, and a considerable number of women come every Friday. A place for women is also organized in the mosque at the Medina bazaar but it is not a separate room; women can pray behind a curtain at the back of a main chapel; also, a small room for women was available in the central mosque in the town ofNaryn during my visit in 2011.¹¹⁹ ¹¹⁸ An interview conducted in October 2014. ¹¹⁹ Personal research in 2015; I visited the town ofNaryn in 2011. I also saw the above-mentioned places during my stay in Kyrgyzstan in 2011,2012, and 2015; there are other chapels which are available for women in Kyrgyzstan. Il6 2.J. Conclusions Nevertheless, women’s presence in the mosque is widely disputed. According to some reformists, women should be allowed to visit the mosque since the wives of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as his female associates, participated in the public prayers. According to sharia, men and women have equal religious rights and obligations, and only certain conditions should be fulfilled such as a separate place to pray for women. Due to the religious policy in Tajikistan, the discussion regarding women’s presence in the mosque has been impeded. In Kyrgyzstan, the situation differs significantly, as in large urban centres in the north of the country, women can visit selected mosques, which have become important centres of religious life. The south of Kyrgyzstan is still more traditional, thus the transformation of tradition is slower. It is a dynamic process and it depends on many factors also related to international trends and the religious policies of Central Asian governments. Undoubtedly, reformers of Islam seek to change not only this tradition but also many others. The fact that women attend worship services at mosques is also associated with the transformation of the whole ritual life, which can draw a strong response from the conservative circles of society. It may also facilitate women’s increasing participation in public life and influence the decision-making process. The question whether this social change will be widely accepted by Central Asian societies in the future remains open. 2.5. Conclusions Despite various social changes, bibi-otuns have always played the role of religious leaders for the female part of the commnunity. Due to the separation of female and male sacred life, they form their spheres of influence, leading female circles, teaching and participating in the lifecycle rituals. Even in the Soviet times, bibi-otuns were able to keep tradition alive and pass it onto other generations. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a wave of changes brought about a transformation of the perception of religion. New opportunities for acquiring religious knowledge appeared, which further contributed to the reformulation of the manner of its transmitting. At present, the new 117 Chapter ll. Female religious professionals - an overview group of female teachers of Islam challenge the local traditions and practices, demanding to purify Islam from what they believe are non-Islamic practices. Despite controversies, they undeniably gave a new impetus to the development of Islamic thought and the reconstruction of the role of female religious leaders. Chapter 111 Female religious practices and rituals 3.1. Preface The ethnographic material which is presented here was collected from a variety of rituals which I was able to observe, and is complemented by literature. Despite similarities between the rituals, the manner of their performance differs from region to region. Some rules are fixed, but other ones are subject to interpretation. Every female religious figure has her own individual way of conducting rituals, and presenting religious readings and/or poetry of various well-known, but also anonymous authors. Some women write their own poems or invent stories. The performance of rituals involves recitation of the Quran, elements of the Sufi tradition, religious stories such as hadises, rivayats'²⁰, elegies'²¹, epic parables¹²⁰ ¹²¹ ¹²² ¹²³, poetry (ghazals, masalas)'²², sometimes elements of healing and symbolic elements such as fire, flour etc. Through ¹²⁰ Rivoyat/Rivayat - one of the versions of hadis coming from different transmitters. However, my interlocutors referred to rivoyat as a religious story. ¹²¹ Elegies such as Arwah-noma (a book of ancestors), Musa-noma (a book devoted to Prophet Moses), Mavlud sharif, and others (Sultanova 2011: 150). ¹²² Epic parables are different stories describing holy people or events (Sultanova 2011: 150). ¹²³ Ghazal is a poetic genre, a lyric of plotless expressing various feelings; ghazals were popularized in the Islamic area of Asia and the Middle East as a form of mystical poetry related to Sufism (Sultanova 2011: 48-53); also other poetic forms such as murabba, muhammas (Sultanova 2011: 150), and other poems written by many authors (see Chapter I); masala are didactic stories connecting the Islamic knowledge and life (Peshkova 2006: 173-183; 2014: 138-183). 119 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals performing rituals, female religious leaders transmit a certain moral code rooted in Islam and local traditions, which are coherent with the local hierarchies and the traditional order. In essence, in a metaphorical way a ritual performance presents a system of values and proper behaviour (Sultanova 2011: 146-186; Rakhimov 2009: 3-19). Monica Wilson (1954 in Turner 2010: 46) points out that rituals reveal the core of a system of values. In a ritual people express their feelings at the deepest level. A ritual expresses the values of the whole group. For Turner (2010: 46-49), a ritual is a symbolic expression of a certain aspect of life presented in a performance based on religious beliefs. Each ritual is particularly designed to evoke spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental feelings. According to Wilson (2008: 69), “When ceremonies take place, everyone who is participating needs to be ready to step beyond the mundane and to accept a raised state of consciousness”. In Central Asia cultures, dreams, visions and prayers are part of people's experience and are often treated as a reality. People believe that a particular practice would help them solve their problems: curing infertility, finding a good wife or a husband, relieving the tensions of their lives and so forth. Intuition and emotions are an integral part of perception (Hart 2010: 3-4; Tursunova et al. 2014). The belief that mankind is connected to a spiritual realm and that the latter can influence people’s lives is expressed in the rituals performed for the ancestors’ spirits (ruh, plural: (e(a)rvah, arwohlar), (Snesarev 1969 266: 306; Basilov, Kamysheva 1997: 40-49). People believe that the departed are still related to the living, and they have the power to affect the events in this world. In all ritual gatherings, a ЫЫ-otun or other people read the dua for their ancestors (Tajik: Ahli bayti guzashtagon - for the ancestors of this house) who in certain situations are virtually present during the performance. According to the tradition, a person’s soul is strongly connected to this world forty days after death, then after one year it returns regularly, and then appears during ceremonies and rituals.¹²⁴ ¹²⁴ There is also a special ritual dedicated to the spirits of ancestors (Uzbek: chiqar, Tajik: Quran khondan - to read the Quran, or bakhshidan - to dedicate), which 120 j.i. Preface When people organize a ziyofat²ⁱ in commemoration of someone, spirits hold the celebration in their place. Through the rituals, spiritual leaders interact with the spirits who bring them closer to God. In this context, a spiritual figure is a go-between the people and Allah.* ¹²⁵ ¹²⁶ People’s understanding of their feelings and emotions shape their perception of the reality. Therefore, apart from the classical observance of rituals and describing their various phases, I attempted to focus on the emotions and feelings of the people participating in them. I also asked the people about their interpretations of the performed practices. I was particularly interested in their motivations to participate in a certain celebration, their intentions in which the ritual is held, as well as their feelings during the performance. I classify the rituals performed by female religious professionals into three groups: 1) Religious rites performed during Islamic celebrations such as those conducted during Ramadan, and Qurban hayyid (see below), the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, a pilgrimage to Mecca, Ashura. The majority of the Islamic rituals are performed by all female religious leaders - bibi-otuns - and new teachers, although they differ as far as the manner of their performance is concerned. Some promoters of the purification of Islam advocate the restriction of the Islamic celebrations to Ramadan practices, and Qurban hayyid. Most of them argue that religious rites should be limited to the reading of the passages of the Quran, amri maruf (the religious guidance/'Commanding Right’), or the recitation of other theological or religious texts. 2) Life-cycle rituals: birth, circumcision, marriage, mourning, and other gatherings of religious nature such as ehson organized on various occasions, other prayers. 3) Rituals of pre-Islamic origin such as Novruz, other specific celebrations related to various ‘saints’ such as Bibi Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi Seshanbe, etc., the cult of nature, and ancestors. involves reading prayers and sometimes cooking certain dishes every Thursday and Sunday evening. ¹²⁵ Ziyofat - a reception, a banquet, in this context a ritual gathering. ¹²⁶ On the basis of various interviews conducted by me in the years of 2010-2015 (see also Kikuta 2011). 121 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals Some rituals are entirely related to the Islamic tradition. Other customs morphed into Islam, and created a complex of practices as a whole. Various elements including Sufi practices, other spiritual forms and local legends intermingle with each other, and are expressed in the ritual life. In the subsequent part of this chapter, I describe the main practices in which female religious leaders participate, presenting some examples of rituals I observed. 3.2. Spiritual celebrations,, rituals, practices and their performance One of the most important Islamic events is Ramadan (Tajik/Uzbek: Ramazon), which is an obligatory month of fasting. Believers are expected to fast every day from dawn to sunset. There is a set of rituals and celebrations associated with this period. First of all, at the end of the Muslim daily fast, iftar (Tajik: iftor - the Ramadan supper) is organized after shorn namaz'²⁷ at sunset. This is the time of gathering, socialising and reading the Quran and religious parables. A female religious figure is often invited for iftars to lead religious ceremonies including tarawih (Arabic), (Tajik: tarobeh)™ which takes place in mosques for men after khuftan namaz.'²⁹ In the mahallas, women gather to pray together, usually in the house of a person who knows the Quran and prayers, but this woman not always has the status of a religious leader. Sometimes, women stay longer after iftar in the house of the host. The female religious figure does not lead prayers like an imam, standing in front of the faithful, but prays together with all the women in the first row. ¹²⁷ ¹²⁸ ¹²⁹ ¹²⁷ Shorn (Arabic: maghrib) - a prayer performed a moment after sunset; it is the fourth of the five obligatory daily prayers of Muslims. ¹²⁸ Tarawih prayers are performed by Sunni Muslims during Ramadan after the night prayer; according to the Hanafi tradition, they consists of at least 20 parts (rakats), conducted usually in a group. ¹²⁹ Khuftan (Arabic: isha) - a night prayer, it is the fifth of five obligatory daily prayers of Muslims. Ill 3.2. Spiritual celebrations, rituals, practices and their performance According to my observation, since women do not attend the mosque, tarawih is not considered compulsory for them. Nevertheless in the villages most women fast during Ramadan. In the Shahrak district where I conducted my research in 2015, participation in tarawih by women was more widespread since people in this place were very pious. Other activities led by female religious leaders during Ramadan include Laylatu l-qadr (Tajik/Persian: Shabi Qadr, Arabic: Laylat al--Qadr: the Night of Destiny). There is also a tradition of itikaf (Arabic) which is an Islamic practice associated with seeking retreat for a certain period in a mosque or another place, usually during Ramadan. It involves reading the Quran and performing religious rites during certain nights of Ramadan. This practice is not common among women who usually bear the burden of household responsibilities, and they cannot withdraw from life for a few days. The tradition of itikaf was not very widespread until recently. In 2014 I was told by the bibi-otun from the district of Isfara (Tajikistan) about itikaf organized in her house for her shogirds.v' In 2015, I observed a female itikaf \\e\A in the office of the Mutakallim NGO in Osh, in which, very young girls participated. They were students of the summer school of tajwid which was organized there. Bibi-otuns also supervised khatmi Quran (in this context, the reading of the entire Quran in stages)* ¹³¹, and performed various prayers during Ramazon Hayyid (Uzbek), (Tajik: Idi Ramazon, Arabic: Id-al--Fitr) at the end of the month of Ramadan. In 2010, I was invited several times for iftars in Isfara by female religious teachers; during that time I participated in tarawih prayers led by them. Khatmi Quran celebrations were also organized (which I attended only once during that time). In the same year, I was invited to ¹¹⁰ A conversation with this bibi-otun, June 2014, Tajikistan. ¹³¹ In Central Asia, khatmi Quran is also organized by Muslims not only to read the whole Quran in stages but as a ritual to show gratitude to God during different occasions such as a memorial service for the deceased ancestors, also during a wedding, circumcision ceremony and so forth. In this case, usually only some parts of the Quran are recited, and the reading is followed by a ceremonial meal (see Kikuta 2011). 14 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals attend Laylatu l-qadr by a friend of mine, which was planned to be held in an office of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan in Khujand, but in the last minute, the meeting was cancelled by the authorities of the city. In the following years, when I was working for NGOs in Tajikistan, I participated in some life-cycle rituals and pilgrimages to mazars upon invitation of friends but I did not attend the Ramadan celebrations in the bibi-otuns’ houses mainly for security reasons. In 2012 and 2013, the atmosphere concerning religion was already tense and, I did not want to jeopardize the implementation of the projects in which I participated. At present in Tajikistan, many ceremonies are organized in secret due to the state policy in relation to religion (see Chapter V). A significant Islamic event in which female religious professionals participated is Qurban Hayyid (Uzbek, Tajik: Idi Qurbon, Arabic: Eid al-Adha) which is referred to in English as the Sacrifice Feast. It is one of the most important Muslim celebrations. The Qurban Hayyid is related to the story of Abraham who was asked by God to sacrifice his son - Ismail. As a humble faithful man, Abraham wanted to fulfil the request of God, but finally the latter ordered that a ram should be killed instead of the boy. Another important celebration is the Day of Ashura held on the 10th day of the month of Muharram involving the performance of a ritual, reading prayers in a women’s circle. On this day, Husayn ibn Ali, and grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the third Shia imam was killed by the army of Yazid, an Umayyad Caliph during a battle near Karbala in 680 CE. Shia Muslims consider this day the time of mourning for Husayn and his companions. In Sunni tradition, it is commemorated as the Day of Atonement (derived from the Jewish tradition). There are also other celebrations related to Islamic evens such as Mavlud (the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), and Shabi Miraaj, a day devoted to the ascension of Prophet Muhammad to Heaven.¹¹² During the month of Ashr, bibi otuns read Ashr-kitob at religious ¹³² ¹³² For information on rituals performed by bibi-otuns see also Sukhareva 1960: 27-29; Sultanova 2011: 148-149; Kramer 2006: 321-322; Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 333-335; Gorshunova 2006: 258-261; Peshkova 2006: 166-175; Fathi 2006: 305-308; Rakhimov 2007: 140-185. 124 3-2. Spiritual celebrations, rituals, practices and their performance gatherings. Ashr-kitob is a rivoyat devoted to the life of the Prophet Nuh (Noah), (research conducted in 2014, 2015). Some religious traditions are cultivated only locally such as the the practice of khatmi-yozdahum (khatmi-eleven) which is a tradition devoted to Abd al-Qadir Gilani, a Hanbali jurist and a sufi, the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order. It is organized on the 11th day of every month, involving religious gatherings during which various religious texts are read. At present, this ceremony is considered one of the most important events among the women of Bukhara (Kramer 2006: 416). People invite bibi-otuns to recite the Quran during various parts of the wedding celebration such as when newlyweds come to the groom’s house, kelin salom (Tajik), yuzashti (Uzbek) which is a ritual of welcoming the new bride and others; also during funerals (morning rituals), sunna toy/nabera toy (circumcisions), gavora bandon (Tajik), beshik toy (Uzbek), (the cradle ceremony) organized 40 days after the birth of an infant involving the ceremonial placing of the baby in a cradle¹³³ and other life-cycle rituals. Bibi-otuns also participated in the celebration of Navruz (New Year) at all stages of the organization of this pre-Islamic practice. Another important activity for some bibi--otuns involves leading pilgrimages to mazars, which is associated with the organization of a thanksgiving ritual known as khudoyi (English: belonging to the God), as well as other rituals. In addition, there are specific practices only for women performed by bibi-otuns, such as Mushkil-Kusho or Bibi-Seshanbe rooted in pre-Islamic rituals. The other occasions are related to the organization of various religious gatherings. Sometimes people ask a bibi otun to come to their house to read the Quran, and to pray for success of various life events. In the following passage I will present the selected religious rituals performed by women in order to present a specific atmosphere built around their performance. ¹¹¹ It is also performed by a momo-doya. ns Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals 3.3. Selected rituals and celebrations 3.3.1. Khatmi Quran I attended khatmi Quran meetings a number of times in South Kyrgyzstan where they were organized regularly in the female hujras as well as in the office of the Mutakalim NGO in the summer of 2015. One of the hujras, organized a khatm in the house of Qalandar Apa, a retired gynaecologist, and because all her male relatives worked in Russia, the whole house was available only to women. The khatm was led by Medina who is a religious teacher, and whose history I described in Chapter I. The ceremony was organized in open air, in a bower. Over ten consecutive days 8-13 women of different ages came every day about 8 o’clock in the morning to read the whole Quran divided into stages; a certain number of suras were recited every day. The meetings were held until about 11-12 o’clock. The teacher always assigned a person to read a certain passage, and then a recitation was performed in the Arabic language. Medina commented during the whole recitation in Uzbek, to make the meaning understandable for all participants. Her comments included an interpretation of the Quran as well as explanation of various issues regarding religion and daily life such as the status women, the relationship between spouses, the stories of the Quranic figures, or events. Subsequently, the next person was selected to read the Holy Book. In this way, all participants recited some parts of the Quran every day. The reading of the last part of the Quran was organized in a very ceremonial way, in the afternoon before iftar. The meeting was attended by all participants of the khatm, every person brought some food products for iftar. One of the participants was a qori who was a young girl with an infant. She graduated from a madrasa in Osh. She taught tajwid in a small informal hujra organized in her home. Qori recited the last few suras and pronounced a long dua. She was crying at the end of the recitation of the Holy Book, as well and so did the other participants. The Quran should be always recited from the heart, that is why the qori cried, she did not pretend anything - if she did, it would produce harmful results for her. Qoris are always 126 3.3. Selected rituals and celebrations connected to the Quran in a special way.w Following the khatm, the participants recited asr namaz'-⁵ followed by shorn namaz after which iftar was held. In this warm summer evening, the participants were eating, chatting, and laughing, the qori from time to time fed her baby who calmly lied next to her. The atmosphere was very pleasant, and a feeling of spiritual purity, something sublime and delicate was palpable. The iftar ended, and all women left the house of Qalandar Apa. This khatmi Quran was organised by very religious group of women who reject all traditional practices of bibi-otuns. Medina as a reformist, does not accept ‘innovations’. Due to the obligatory fast of Ramadan, the khatmi Quran involves only religious rites, and apart from the iftar organised at the end of the reading, it is not associated with the usual common meal and socialising. For the participants, a collective reading of the Holy Book was a spiritual experience, which strengthened their bonds within the group. The khatm complements Ramadan which is a month of contemplation and ritual purity, but also a period of trial for every fasting Muslim, confirming his or her submission to God. 3.3.2. Laylatu I-qadr One of the most important celebrations during Ramadan is Laylatu l-qadr held in one of the odd nights of the last ten days of Ramadan. According to the Islamic tradition, during this night several ayats of sura al-Alaq (the 96th sura of the Quran) were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad as the first part of the Quran. Muslims believe that this night has a special meaning, the angels are very close to the earth, and our wishes and requests are more likely be accepted by God. On this night, the prayers are more powerful and our sins are forgiven. I was invited to Laylatu l-qadr by Gulsun otyncha to a house which belonged to her daughter. She also runs a guest-house and a place to ¹³⁴ A quotation from a conversation with Medina who led the above-mentioned khatmi Quran, Aravan, July 2015. ¹³⁵ Asr namaz is an afternoon prayer; it is the third of five obligatory daily prayers of Muslims. 117 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals rest there, where people can rent a platform (tapchan) in the open air to organize gatherings. The house is located in a beautiful area along the river, and the open air is divided into several sections separated by curtains to ensure the privacy of visitors. The ceremony was attended by about 30 women who came before iftar bringing bags, trays and pots full of various food products. They were students and relatives of the otyncha. Iftar was organized at the house of Gulsun’s daughter, after shorn namaz which was performed by all participants; during the supper various duas were recited, one of the participants sang a ghazal which was reportedly written by Khoja Ahmat Yassavi. At the end of the supper, khuftan namaz was performed, and then women performed a tarawih prayer and the witr namaz.'³⁶ Laylatu l-qadr began not long after the prayers. The participants occupied two platforms in the open air. The space was transformed into a temporary female sanctuary. Another section behind the curtain was occupied by a group of men who organized a social gathering. The voices of men merged with the prayers. Sometimes, they slipped furtively to our space, accepting a sacred taboo of the ritual, pretending to ignore our presence and the ritual as if it had not taken place. Laylatu l-qadr started from dua which was followed by sura Al--Qadr (97), sura Al-Sharh (94), a special dua Al-Qadr, all repeated one hundred times as a form of zikr.'³¹ The rumbling voices of women repeating prayers like a mantra echoed throughout the area, creating a mystical atmosphere. The whole process was broken by duas, and various stories told by Gulsun otyncha. The participants listened to the prayers with their palms open, holding them up at chest level. Here is an example of the dua: Oh Allah please accept our prayers! Muhammad is the best among prophets. Forgive our sins, please accept our prayers as you accepted ¹¹⁶ * * * * * ¹¹⁶ Witr namaz is a non-compulsory prayer which can be performed at night between khuftan namaz and bomdod namaz (a dawn prayer, Arabic: fajr). ¹,⁷ According to the Islamic tradition, during Laylatu l-qadr, people should perform one hundred rakats reciting sura Laylatu l-qadr. In the case of the ritual which which I observed, due to the older age of the participants, the latter sat on the platforms performing zikrs instead of rakats. 128 33- Selected rituals and celebrations prayers of the prophets. O Allah let us see Laylatu l-qadr in the following year. Please accept our prayers! May God be pleased with us!ⁱW As mentioned before, during the ritual, the otyncha told various religious parables. The examples of the stories are as follows: Story I It is easy to be a Muslim, but not a Mamin.™ Allah asks a man: - Who are you? The man: - I am a Muslim. God: - Yes, your ancestors were Muslims, but what kind of a Muslim are you? Say sincerely in your heart that you are a Muslim. The man: - La Illaha Illa lllah Muhammad Rasul lllah.¹³⁸ ¹³⁹ ¹⁴⁰ God: - You commit many sins such as drinking, lying, and others but if you sincerely regret all your mistakes, I will forgive you! Allah requests us: - You should be kind to each other! You should forgive each other! We came to this world, and only God knows when we will leave but until we are here, please Allah, protect our iman.¹⁴¹ We should be ready for another world! Story II Abdul Rahim (aged 37), my neighbour, was a very religious man. Once he fell ill with diabetes, but in spite of that he went on to perform da ’wa for 40 days, and upon his return, he died. He was only a simple man but people respected him. Many people came to attend his funeral, including his ustod who travelled from Andijan (Uzbekistan). A light (nur) emanated from the body of Abdu Rahmon because he devoted his life to God. And what are we doing with our lives? We are eating, sleeping, chatting, we are living only for ourselves. But what are we doing for God? (...) This man was a real saint! ¹³⁸ All of the quoted religious texts were recorded by me during the ritual, and then translated from Uzbek to the Russian language by a friend of mine. I translated all texts from Russian to English. ¹³⁹ The term mumin is used to describe a faithful Muslim, someone who is submitted to God. I⁴“ “There is no God but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God.” There are words of the shahada - the Islamic creed, one of the Five Pillars of Islam. By reciting the shahada, a Muslim confirms that there is only one God, and that Muhammad is God’s Prophet (http://www.answeringmuslims). ¹⁴¹ The term iman is understood as a commitment to Allah, practising Islam in all aspects of life, the authentic faith (Prozorov 1991: 100). 129 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals The otyncha was talking about the meaning of the holy night of Qadr, and about the importance of this ritual for Muslims. Alongside the prayers, short zikrs were recited, as well as the shahada which was repeated by the participants 101 times. The examples of zikr quoted during the ritual are as follows: Antal 'hadi-Antal-haqq Antal 'hadi-Lilahi, Hosni Rabbi Jallah Ma fi kalbi khayrullah Nuri Muhammad Salla-lah, la-ilaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, la-illaha-illa-la, Muhammad Rasul Allah. The meaning of this prayer may be rendered approximately in the following manner: You are the guide. You are the truth. You are the guide, my Lord My lord in his greatness There is nothing in my heart except Allah The light of Muhammad, God bless him There is no god but God, there is no god but God There is no god but God, there is no god but God There is no god but God, there is no god but God There is no god but God. Muhammad is the Messenger of God.¹⁴² N² I have two recordings of this zikr: 1) the first zikr was recorded by me in Qalandar-khona, in June 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan; 2) the second zikr was recorded by me during the ceremony of the Laylatu I-qadr, then it was written down upon my request by Gulsun otyncha in the Cyrillic alphabet; 3) subsequently, the translation of the zikr was consulted with Professor Janusz Danecki (a specialist in the Arabic language) who did a working translation of the zikr into the Polish language). Finally, I translated the zikr from Polish to English. BO j.j. Selected rituals and celebrations The ritual was continued until breakfast which was followed by bomdod namaz, then the participants recited salovat (praise) for Prophet Muhammad, short zikrs, and at the end ayat-al-Kursi.¹⁴³ The gathering ended with dua recited by an elderly woman and Gulsun otyncha. We went back home by taking a small minibus of one of the participants’ relatives. The women bid farewell, thanking God for this wonderful night which they could spend together, and for all the good things they received from Him. The Laylatu l-qadr has the special power of common prayers performed together and led by an otyncha. The suras and other religious passages repeated many times created a mystical atmosphere connecting participants with each other, and with God. Various parables and stories said by the otyncha referred to the cycle of human life, its fate and relationship with the surrounding world and Allah. They purposed to make the participants more aware of their obligations towards God and also each other. Prayers and zikrs released energy, giving hope for the wishes to come true and a better future. 3.3.3. Umra celebration and Mavlud Sharif One of the most important rituals is the Mavlud associated with the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. Traditionally, it is performed during the Twelfth Day of Rabi’ al-Awwal¹⁴⁴ in the lunar calendar, which is established as the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. However, in Central Asia it is continued over four successive months on different occasions (Tajik: Mohi Mavlud). This is one of the most important celebrations involving the recitation of the Quran, various prayers and other rituals. There is a special book Mavlud with the religious parables devoted to Prophet Muhammad (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 339-340; Sultanova 2011: 200-201). I observed Mavluds in Khujand and its surroundings in 2014, on different occasions such as the organization of khudoi (see below), family/neighbourly gatherings, N¹ Ayat al-Kursi is verse 255 of the second sura of the Quran. ¹⁴⁴ Rabi-al-awwal is the third month of the Islamic calendar. Bi Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals someone’s 63rd birthday¹⁴⁵ ¹⁴⁶, celebrations of the anniversary of the relatives’ passing, and so forth. As mentioned before, despite its Islamic roots, Mavlud performed by women in the Ferghana Valley consists of distinct elements of local traditions. In June 2014, I was invited by a friend of mine, Khaimiso, for the celebration of her father-in-law’s return from a pilgrimage to Mecca (urnra).'¹⁶1 came to her house in the late afternoon. Khaimiso’s father-in-law greeted the visitors at the gate of the house; after exchanging courtesies, I was invited to a room where about twenty women were sitting; two bibi-otuns, Farida and Rukhshona took the place at the head of a long dastarkhon. One of the bibi-otuns started reciting various suras of the Quran and duas and then she uttered the following phrase: Everyone who listens to the Mavlud of Muhammad by his/her heart and soul, in the day of judgement, will be rewarded by seeing the beauty of Muhammad. Each person who listens or talks about Mavlud [until the day of his/her death], will have his/her tomb illuminated by a bright light, and pure ‘nur’(light) will welcome him/her. Everyone who in his/ her heart and soul accepts Mavlud will be awarded the respect of the Prophet.¹⁴⁷ Subsequently, the bibi-otun recited various salovats for Prophet Muhammad, talking about his devotion to God, then she read various stories which are included in the book of Mavlud related to the life and deeds of Muhammad, and Islam. ¹⁴⁵ The celebration of one’s 63rd birthday is an important event in a person’s life--cycle in Central Asia, because Prophet Muhammad passed away at this age. For this reason, the celebration of one’s 63rd birthday often has a religious character, and many people invite religious leaders to perform prayers, read the Quran, and so on. In the case of the female circle, a bibi-otun is invited, at male gatherings a mullo is present (my own research). ¹⁴⁶ Umra is a pilgrimage to Mecca which could be performed by Muslims at any time of the year, opposite to the hajj whose time is exactly set up once a year; it takes place in the period of the 8 th-12lh/13d' days dhu al-Hijjah - the last month of the Islamic calendar organized according to the lunar cycle. ¹⁴⁷ All quoted religious texts were recorded by me during the ritual, and then translated from Uzbek to the Russian language by a friend of mine. I translated all texts from Russian to English. 3.j- Selected rituals and celebrations For example: During the night in which our Prophet Muhammad was born, his mother Amina was surrounded by female spirits who intended to help her in labour. At the beginning, she was afraid of them, but they explained to her: "Do not be afraid of us, we are your ancestors, we will assist you during this time’’. They were very beautiful women, and gave her a sweet (red) drink which she drunk. One of them said: "Congratulations on the birth of your first son! ” Thus, those female spirits already knew that Amina would have a son, that he would rule the world and preach the word of God. When the Prophet was born, he was wrapped by a cloud, and the female spirits took him to heaven. At first, Amina was a little scared, but the spirits told her that they wanted to show her son in the seven heavens, to bathe him in the river of Paradise, and to perform his circumcision. Finally, they brought Muhammad back to his mother.¹⁴⁸ ¹⁴⁹ ¹⁵⁰ The voice of a bibi-otun was heard across a large room. All participants listened to this story attentively. In the subsequent part of the celebration, the bibi-otun talked about the life of the Prophet, including his trip to heaven, and his meeting with God. Then the bibi-otun read various salovats to the Prophet and his family, suras, and some duas for the people who participated in Mavlud, and for their ancestors, finally, for a person who was on a pilgrimage and for his family who organized the celebration. An example of the dua is as follows: O Allah please bless hojji-bobo'^ for his pilgrimage. Thank God! O Allah please give to his children a long life, nobleness, happiness, make their children healthy! O Allah, please give the hostess of this house a nabera kelinⁱⁱⁿ and great-grandchildren. For her kindness, Allah please give her a grandson as kind as the owner of this house. Please, give us an opportunity to participate in the nabera toy [also sunna toy - circumcisions] in this house. Be rich! Be prosperous! Be ¹⁴⁸ Possibly, those spirits were traditional female spirits momoho (see below). ¹⁴⁹ Hojji/haji is a customary title for person who performed a hajj', bobo (grandfather, an elderly man). ¹⁵⁰ Nabera kelin, literally a wife of a grandson - she is a very important person in a household; a marriage of a grandson is a sign of status and prestige for the female head of the house. 133 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals healthy! (...) You should always respect your parents and receive from them a blessing and then you will also bless your children. Please, Allah give a blessing to us (the guests) who have come here to show respect for hojji-bobo. O Allah please fulfil our wishes in the two worlds. Please God - give us a healthy and long life. (...) after all those beautiful moments, please Allah, accept our duas and fulfil our dreams! In the meantime, the guests were served meat of a sacrificial ram. Then water from the Zamzam well brought from Mecca was given to us. Everyone drank a small bowl. Sharing water from the legendary well of Zamzam has a symbolic meaning. In this way, people who did not participate in the pilgrimage can feel the flavour of its sanctity. The natural spring water of Zamzam is brought in small plastic containers or in bottles by people who perform a pilgrimage. It is served to guests and sometimes given as a form of a gift. At the end of the ritual, a bowl of water with sugar was circulated among the people, the room was incensed by isyryk.'S] As in the case of other female rituals, there was also salt, sugar, and dry tea in the middle of the table (see below). The final prayers were recited collectively, together with duas, and salovats. The guests received small gifts. Since one of kelins of this family had given birth to a child a short time before the gathering, the hosts gave her a variety of clothes and other accessories for the baby. Both bibi-otuns received money and gifts for their services. People slowly started saying amin'ⁱ² and they began to leave the house. At present in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan such a way of performing Mavlud has come under harsh criticism from the state-backed clergy as well as from some other Muslims. They believe that this form of Mavlud contradicts what they consider ‘pure’ Islam. In their view the * * ¹⁵¹ Hazor ispand, isyryk (English: ruta) - a herb which is believed to cure all ailments, but also to protect from evil spirits. It is used to incense a room/house, for example after the birth of a child, or during rituals, as well as on other occasions; sometimes words the suf-kuf are uttered to reinforce the healing properties of isyryk (Kisliakov, Pisarchik 1970: 267-268). ¹⁵² Amin/omin is said in Central Asia during various occasions such as at the end of meetings, celebrations and so forth, it involves saying the word amin and gently running the hands over one’s/somebody’s face with open palms. 134 3-3- Selected rituals and celebrations anniversary of the birth of the Prophet should be celebrated only once a year. One of the Islamic teachers (I named her “Mualima”), said: If the Prophet was alive, he would not wish that people gathered so often and praise him, because every day a person should follow sunna through his/her actions, not just words,¹⁵³ Nevertheless, mohi Mavlud is very popular among women. Those months are a symbol of a certain cycle of the year in the spiritual calendar of the Ferghana Valley. The observed ceremony was devoted to the occasion of the end of umra. It was organized by the head of the house, who returned from a trip. He also financed the whole event apart from remuneration for the bibi-otuns which was paid by the women. The event illustrates the dualistic nature of the Islamic celebrations in the Ferghana Valley. Each of the groups, both men and women held a separate gathering. The male ceremony was led by a mulla, and it was much more modest than the female event. It was limited to reading the Quran, and consuming a meal. The ceremony for women was organized after a male ceremony was finished, and was led by two female religious leaders. The celebration included reading Mavlud, and the elements that go beyond the canon considered appropriate by the supporters of the new Islamic thinking. As the masters of the ceremony, bibi-otuns enjoyed full autonomy and freedom in the arrangement of the ritual. Despite differences, both the female and the male parts complemented each other harmoniously, giving the event a very solemn significance. 3.3.4. Khudoi Khudoi (an offering) is an offering ritual which is performed at mazars for various reasons. I had the opportunity to observe the biggest and most lavish performance of khudoi at the Mazar Sukhr Ota in the Istpisor village and another one at the Ovcha Kalacha Mazar (Sughd region, Tajikistan). Both rituals were organized at the beginning of spring in 2014. To the first gathering I was invited by Kamila bibi--otun whom I mentioned in Chapter II. We arrived at about 10 o’clock ¹⁵³ An excerpt from an interview with Mualima, a member of the IRPT, and a teacher of Islam, June 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan. 135 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals in the morning to the mazar where a large dastarkhon (a table with food) was already set up on the floor, in the open air, at the big aivan.¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁵ According to Kamila bibi-otun, khodoi at this mazar is organized once a year by women from the neighbouring mahalla. About 50-60 women collected money for the celebration and a sheep which was sacrificed at the beginning of the gathering, in the early morning. Upon our arrival, Kamila bibi-otun delivered a dua, we drank tea, and she recited various prayers. We ate a meal, and afterwards Mavlud began with the participation of three bibi-otuns. It took about one hour and a half, and was divided into stages. Kamila, who is a highly respected religious leader in the area, was the leading bibi-otun. In addition, a very short ritual Mushkil-Kusho was performed, since the celebration took place on Wednesday which is the day of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho (see below). On this day, female pilgrimages to mazars are often performed, and some people even say Chorshanbe-ro ziyoratash alotar ast! (A pilgrimage on Wednesday is better, more powerful). Following Mavlud, the shaikh of the mazar recited the azan (a call to prayer) for peshin namaz'⁵⁵, and almost all women performed namaz next to the dastarkhon. Elder women prayed sitting on mattresses. The bibi-otuns prayed in the first row; after namaz, the gathering finished with the duas recited by Kamila bibi-otun and other participants. While reciting the duas, women blessed the participants and their families, also their relatives who were labour migrants in Russia. At the end, they expressed many thanks to the presidents of Tajikistan and Russia. Then the women said goodbye to each other and slowly began to leave the mazar. This khudoi began a series of spring and summer pilgrimages of women to mazars where various rituals were performed depending on an annual cycle. The event coincided with the celebrations of Mohi Mavlud. The khudoi was a thanksgiving event organized by the persons living in the same mahalla, who wanted to assure a good harvest in that year, by making a sacrifice in the holy place. ¹⁵,¹ Aivan is a space, usually with a roof, walled on three sides, with the front side entirely open. ¹⁵⁵ Peshin namaz (Arabic: ztihr) - the second of five obligatory daily prayers of Muslims. 136 j.j. Selected rituals and celebrations 3.3.5. Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi-Seshanbe There is a legend about two female saints Bibi Seshanbe and Bibi Mushkil-Kusho who were aunts of Baha’ ad-Din Naqshband, or in the second version, his sister and aunt. Both of them were very powerful. They healed people and due to their prayers many wishes of the people came true. Thus, people crowded to visit the two female saints to ask for help. Slowly, the two women became so famous that people thought that they could pray to them instead of God. The saints felt very offended and decided to seek a retreat in the mountains. Some time later, people started telling legends about them and to perform rituals.¹⁵⁶ Bibi-Seshanbe Bibi Seshanbe (sometimes referred to as Oshi Bibi Seshanba) is a ritual organized on Tuesday, while Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is performed on Wednesday. Bibi Seshanbe precedes the Wednesday ritual since it is an introduction to the opening of the problems associated with Bibi Mushkil-Kusho. Bibi Seshanbe - Lady of Tuesday, is also a patroness of spinning and weaving. The ritual is based on a legend (Tajik: Kissai-i Bibi-Seshanbe) about a poor orphan (Tajik: Yatim dukhtar) pestered by her mother in law. Exhausted by her difficult situation, she met Bibi-Seshanbe sitting and praying together with a group of women in a cave in the mountains. Bibi-Seshanbe helped the poor girl to overcome difficulties, and the latter became the wife of a prince. The girl showed gratitude towards Bibi Seshanbe by organising thanksgiving rituals every Tuesday. In ethnographic literature, the ritual is sometimes called “the Central Asian version of Cinderella”, and involves reading the Quran, telling a story of Bibi Seshanbe, prayers and other rituals, as well as consuming a milk soup with omoch (small noodles). The main goal of performing this ritual is to provide a blessing in family matters, such as marriage, pregnancy, etc., or to give thanks (nazr) for wishes which were fulfilled. It also can reinforce healing rituals related to infertility. According to the belief, a person who performs the ritual with a pure ¹⁵⁶ A story collected from a religious woman living in the Shahrak district, Kyrgyzstan 2015. 137 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals heart and sincere intention will achieve her goal. The ritual is organised exclusively for women and no man is allowed to participate, even pregnant women are excluded, since foetus can develop into a man (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 341-342; Gorshunova 2007: 39; 2012: 146--149; Kramer 2003: 17; Rakhimov 2007: 143-151; Andreev 1927: 60--73; Louw 2007: 154-159; Basilov 1987: 171; research 2014-2015). The ritual of Bibi Seshanbe is led by a bibi-otun, sometimes also by a momo-doya (midwife). At present this celebration is rarely organized. I observed Bibi Seshanbe only once, in the mahalla located in the suburbs of Khujand performed by Farida otun in the house of her relatives. The ritual was ordered by an elderly woman who wanted to find kelin (a daughter-in-law) for her grandson. Together with Farida, we arrived about 7 o’clock in the morning to the house where the ritual was planned. At the time we arrived at the house, our host prepared omoch. The flour for omoch should be collected from seven neighbours. If it is not possible, flour can be bought, but in this case it should be put for a night in the four comers of the house. A woman who wants to collect some flour for the ritual should come to the house of her neighbour kneeling in silence in front of the gate, waiting until she receives some flour. The flour collected in this way is used also for other ritual dishes for instance to make a special bread, katurma, for the healing rituals, or to prepare borsoq (small fried pieces of pastry) for spell removing ritual.¹⁵⁷ ¹⁵⁸ Different kinds of bread such as katurma, chalpak (also known as chapati) and kuymoq were already prepared. In the meantime, five elderly women (widows) came to the house. According to Farida, in the ritual only an odd number of divorced or widowed women (5,7,9) can participate, and only one young girl should be present, to play the role of an orphan. However, sometimes other participants can also play this role. The widows who participate in the ritual are called momoho'-*, and they symbolize legendary women sitting and praying in the cave ¹⁵⁷ Field research 2014-2015. ¹⁵⁸ Momoho are female spirits, who are associated with childbirth. They are patrons of midwives (momo-doya) who called momoho to assist in labour by lighting nokcha (ritual candles). The number of momoho “participating” in childbirth differs depending on the region. In the past momoho also symbolized the spirits B8 3.3. Selected rituals and celebrations together with Bibi Seshanbe. A spiritual leader who leads the ritual should be also a widow/or divorced. Otherwise she should not sit at the table, but next to the table (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 341-342; Kramer 2003: 17; Rakhimov 2007: 143-151; Louw 2007: 154-159; Andreev 1927; Gorshunova 2012: 145-149; Basilov 1987: 171; research 2014). We started to prepare nokcha - set of candles made from willow sticks (Tajik: bed, Uzbek: to/);¹⁵⁹ raw cotton is wrapped over the sticks, which are then topped up with oil. There should be 41 candles (for the spirits of momoho). Additional two nokcha were prepared for the ancestors of this house - the souls of the husband and the daughter of our host. The organizer of the ritual set nokcha in a bowl filled with rice. Four nokcha were put aside and located in a different place. Subsequently, the women set up bread on a dastarkhon which was a white tablecloth (surfa/sufra) in the following order: kuymoq on the bottom, katurma in the middle, two pieces of chalpak on top. In this way seven sets of bread were made, each of them consisting of four pieces of bread. In addition, a teapot, small bowls for tea, and some candy were placed. Women put white headscarves over their heads. The ritual began with the lighting of candles and the putting omoch on the table. At the beginning of the ceremony, various duas, including the dua to Prophet Muhammad, Bibi Seshanbe and Bibi Mushkil-Kusho were recited, followed by a few suras of the Quran¹⁶⁰, then the bibi-otun took a break, drinking tea and chatting with other women. Women made a gesture of to ’zim (adoration, obeisance) over the fire of nokcha, which was repeated three times. The bibi-otun began to recite the story of Bibi Seshanbe. At the end of the celebration, the bibi-otun recited various of female ancestors. The meaning of the word momo is also “mother”, for instance mono Havo - mother Eva (Sukharieva 1975: 18-28). ¹⁵⁹ Nokcha are made for various female rituals. They are made of sprigs of willow, juniper or mulberry tree depending on the ritual and the region. In Khujand and the neighbouring area, nokcha for Bibi Seshanbe are made of willow sprigs. Willow bums very easily but also it is believed that it wards off evil spirits. Sprigs of willow are also used in some healing rituals, such us removing warts (research 2014-2015). ¹⁶⁰ In most cases, a bibi-otun recites a few last suras of the Quran because they are short, and many people know them. 139 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals suras, such as sura Al-fatiha (three times), then ayat Al-Kursi, and sura Yasin. As a separate sequence - sura Al-Ikhlas was repeated 10 times. According to Farida, the sura Al-Ikhlas should be repeated 100 times (as a form of zikr). However, because elderly and sick women are often among the participants, she usually recites this sura 90 times at home, and during the ritual, it is repeated only 10 times. The religious reading ended with salovats and duas. We ate the omoch, bread and candy were packed into white scarves; each participant received one portion. According to the custom, it should be given to seven orphans, but in reality it is sometimes passed to other people. For instance, a friend of mine, Khaimiso, who is a niece of Farida, once received a ritual bundle while her parents were looking for a husband for her. In this way, the blessing of the ritual table is passed to a person who needs it. At the end of the ritual, the white tablecloth was folded up, and our host (who played the role of the orphan in the ritual) put it on her head and moved out of the room three times as a symbol of visiting a wedding ceremony. Finally, the ritual was over and the guests moved to another room where the dastarkhon was furnished with osh'b} and various sorts of food. Bibi AAushkil-Kusho Ruzi Murod bakhsh! {Let it be the day of hope, the day of receiving benefit) - this is what a Tajik proverb says about Wednesday in which the ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is organized. Rahimov (2007: 140--160) believes that since Tuesday and Wednesday were considered to be unfortunate days, people organise rituals’ to overcome their perceived negative effects. The ritual is also called Bibi Mushkul-Kushod, Bibi Mushkel-Kushad, Bibi Mushkul-Kushad (the Lady of Solution, the Lady who opens a path), sometimes Bibi Chorshanbe (the Lady of Wednesday). Exceptionally, Bibi Mushkil-Kusho can be held on Tuesday afternoon or Saturday or Sunday, but in this case preparation for the ritual should start on Wednesday. Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is performed to ensure the fulfilment of someone’s wishes, to help him or her find a solution to their problems or just ‘to ¹⁶¹ A traditional dish, made of rice, carrots and meat. 140 33- Selected rituals and celebrations clear the path’ - to make life happier or to release tensions. Everyone can organize a celebration for a spirit of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho. There is a belief that to achieve a desirable result, the ritual should be performed seven times. Nevertheless, even the organization of a celebration once a year receives a blessing of Allah. Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is a female ritual, but there is no restriction for men to participate, they can sit and observe the course of the celebration. However, it does not happen very often (Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 341-342; Kramer 2003: 56; Rakhimov 2007: 151-161; Gorshunova 2012: 146-149; Basilov 1987: 171). The ritual is based on an old legend about Bibi Mushkil-Kusho, and it was originally written in the Chagatai language and in the Arabic script. At present, various versions of the legend are available and they are written in the Cyrillic alphabet. There are certain things which are needed for the performance of the ritual, such as two candles, milk and water, a special kind of bread, kishmish (a kind of raisins, always with little stems), cotton, a piece of white material, and isyryk. Traditionally, there should also be salt, flour, sugar, dry tea on the table. Sometimes, a special dish, halvetar (made of sugar and flour) or atala (made of milk, flour, and fat), is served.¹⁶² The ritual should be attended by seven widows but it is not always observed. It can be held at home within a close circle of friends and family, or in a mazar where the participants do not need to know each other. At the beginning of the ritual, bibi-otun delivers a dua for Bibi Mushkil-Kusho, the ancestors, the participants and their families, and so forth. Two candles are lighted for the ancestors and a bibi-otun starts reciting the Quran, and various salovats. The main part of the ritual is a story about Bibi Mushkil-Kusho. The story is as follows: Once upon a time, a very poor and old man known as Choi lived with his family. He earned his living by cutting branches and grass, and selling them at the bazaar. One day, he lost his sickle while he was working in a forest. Completely devastated, he wandered a long time among trees, praying to Godfor help. Finally, he saw a cave and heard the sound of a prayer coming from it. He went inside and saw an elderly woman who was sitting, her face turned towards Mecca. After a while "’² The food prepared for this ritual can differ depending on the region. 141 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals they started talking; he told her about his problems. Bibi Mushkil-Kusho (as it was her) advised the man to go back home and continue his life in a normal way. She ordered him to organize a thanksgiving ritual for her every Wednesday, buying foodfor 1 tenge (currency), and giving all meals to the poor. Choi followed this advice and soon after he became wealthy and powerful. He performed the ritual and organized a feast for the poor every week. Since he became famous, the shah of this country decided to visit his house to meet the person who became rich in such a short period of time. Upon arrival of the shah, Choi arranged a big party but he was so involved in its organization that he forgot that this day was Wednesday and he should organize the ritual. Shortly after this visit, the shah s daughter also wanted to see the house of the old man. She came with her servants, and after a while she decided to swim in a water reservoir (hauz) located near the old man s house. People tried to explain to her that the hauz is a holy place, and she should not swim there, but they did so in vain. The fussy princess went for a swim instead. She committed her clothes, and a scarf with gold jewellery to the care of a daughter of the host. Suddenly, the wind started blowing, and a big falcon flew up snatching the scarf with the jewellery, but nobody witnessed it except the daughter of the old man. The princess went out ofthe hauz, and learnt that her gold disappeared. She accused the daughter of Choi ofstealing her belongings, and he was thrown into a prison. Already in the cell, Choi recalled that he forgot to celebrate the ritual. The man decided to rectify his mistake. Thus, Choi called through a window of the cell to a man who passed by, then he gave him a coin, to buy all things for the ritual. This man was a chef at the court of the shah, and on this day he was very busy, because the daughter of the shah was getting married. Hence, he ignored the request of the old man. Shortly after, it turned out that there was not enough food for all guests who arrived for the wedding. The shah got very angry, and sent the chef to prison, accidentally to the same cell in which Choi was already located. At this moment, the chef realized his mistake of ignoring the request of the old man. Finally, both men asked someone who passed by to deliver everything and both of them celebrated the ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho. Then, a miracle happened - the falcon arrived with the shawl and jewellery, and simultaneously it turned out 142 3-3- Selected rituals and celebrations that there was plenty offood for all the guests. The shah released Choi and chef from prison, and as in most legends, all people lived happily ever after (see Kramer 2003: 56; Rakhimov 2007: 151-161; Gorshunova 2012: 146-149; Basilov 1987: 171).¹⁶³ While bibi-otun tells the story, women pick up the stems of kishmish, and put them on small pieces of cotton. In the meantime, a bowl of water with sugar and a bowl of milk is passed around for everyone to sip from and to pronounce niyat {intention). The ritual ends with a recitation of the Quran, and various duas and the room in which the ritual is celebrated is incensed with isyryk to purify it from evil energy. The bibi-otun or the head of the household in which the ritual is organized should throw the pieces of cotton with kishmish stems into a water channel, river or the water of a mill. By this gesture all problems are symbolically removed and the someone's path is purified. Many rituals, such as the above-mentioned Mushkil-Kusho or Bibi--Seshanbe, include elements that could have originated from ancient rites related to fecundity and fertility of the soil, combined with Islamic rites. Murodov (175: 99-104) gives an example of the shamanic song, sung by the Tajik female shaman, to call for her guardian spirits who, among others, included the figures of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi--Seshanbe. Despite the fact that both rituals are associated in the Ferghana Valley with the legendary female relatives of Baha’ ad-Din Naqshband and the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, it is probable that in the past both personages represented goddesses and were later adapted to Islam. The ritual objects such as the white scarves and dishes made of flour (bread, omoch) as well as salt, milk, and sugar are associated with the white colour which symbolizes purity and the leaving of darkness (Sukhareva 1960: 40; Andreev 1927; see Gorshunova 2007, 2012, 2006). In Tajikistan people believe that salt is something positive. Salt should be necessarily tested during the ritual, when salt is in the house, people should not argue or swear (...) There is a story that a thiefentered into someone's house. He noticed some bags, he looked into them and it ¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁵ While attending many rituals, I heard several versions of this story from various bibi-otuns for this reason. I decided to quote the most popular version. 143 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals was salt inside. He thought: "No, I am not going to rob this house, since there is salt in this place! ”.¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶ Milk is a symbol associated with life forces. A Tajik proverb says: Bakhti safedi shir borin (Your happiness should be as white as milk). The taste and colour of sugar is also a symbol of joy and pleasure. Sweet milk and water with sugar are commonly served during various rituals in Central Asia. These drinks are symbolically associated with the sweet rivers of Paradise. Both rituals also have a therapeutic value, helping people to release tensions during difficult life situations, regaining psychological balance. Likewise, the healing rituals, also Mushkil-Kusho or Bibi-Seshanbe can profoundly affect feelings, and thus lead to a change of the person’s attitude towards certain situations. A spiritual leader who leads the ritual passes a message from the people to Bibi Mushkil-Kusho or Bibi-Seshanbe, and finally to God. Symbolically, both ceremonies help open the path, remove blockages, and release energy to tackle difficulties through an attachment to a supernatural power, just like during shamanistic rituals (Gorshunova 2007: 45; Rakhimov 2007: 140-160).¹⁶⁵ It is believed that the stories of Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi Seshanbe refer in an allegoric way to fate, and a path of life. They teach people that difficulties can be overcome through faith in God, honesty, hard work and patience. The meaning of Mushkil-Kusho is that every person, if it is possible, should share with others, giving to the poor, and he or she will be rewarded by God. (...) no matter what kind of feast a person organizes inviting guests, no matter if she or he is rich or poor, we are all equal before God. Therefore, if we share with others, God will reward us.'⁶⁶ Those ideas are related to a certain code of moral values which make honesty and hard work a priority. They teach that a person should live his or her life in the best way, and that relationships among people are more important than wealth. ¹⁶⁴ A quotation from a conversation with Kumunjohon Atayeva, PhD an employee of the State Museum in Khujand, June 2014. ¹⁶⁵ Field research, various conversations with bibi-otuns and participants of the described rituals. ¹⁶⁶ Explanation of the meaning of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho by a local healer during a ritual organized in Khujand, in 2014. 144 3j. Selected rituals and celebrations Those rituals are also performed in other parts of Asia, including Iran and Afghanistan where they are observed by various religious groups, such as Ismaili Muslims (a ceremony named Ash-e Bibi Murad), and the followers of Zoroastrianism, (a ritual called Sofre-ye Bibi Seshanbe, Sofre-ye Moshkel gosha). In Iran Bibi Mushkel-gosha is associated with imam Ali, and Bibi Seshanbe with Fatima among the representatives of the Shia population¹⁶⁷ (Kramer 2003: 17, 56; Kandiyoti, Azimova 2004: 341-342; Niechciał 2014: 141; Mills 1982: 180-192; Rakhimov 2007: 151). Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is a very popular ritual, and it is organized not only in a private space but also in mazars. In Khujand, every Wednesday, women visit the Qalandar-khona - a holy place located in the centre of the city, where a collective version of this ritual is held (see Chapter V). Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is also organized every Wednesday, at the bazaar opposite to the Yaqub Charkhi’s mazar in Dushanbe. To perform this rite, a few bibi-otuns rent their own places at the courtyard of the bazaar, and from early morning until noon, simplified versions of the ritual are performed for groups of women. Likewise in the Qalandar--khona, people bring food and things needed for the ritual, as well as photos of family members who could not attend the session, such as migrant workers who are in Russia, sick members of the family and so forth. The place is very popular among women from Dushanbe, thus the fact that a Russian (i.e. myself) came to participate in the celebration, did not arouse any comments. The religious leader received me like any other ‘client’. In addition to performing the ritual, she provided fortune-telling, different kinds of healing techniques, charm removal, massages etc. She had a long rosary (tazbih) and razor blades which she used to cut, in a very gently way, temples of a person at the end of each individual session. Every bibi-otun had her own groups of women sitting in different places of the bazaar. The ritual was previously organized in the female part of the mosque located on the premises of the mazar where sometimes bibi-otuns performed but they were not very well received by the shaikh and his associates (see Chapter I). ¹⁶⁷ Information obtained from the bibi-otun who described herself as ‘Forsi’ and who comes from a family of Shia from Bukhara that had arrived from Iran; she also performed this ritual (Bukhara, June 2014). 145 Chapter III. Female religious practices and rituals For bigger groups of people, Bibi Mushkil-Kusho is sometimes celebrated in the houses of religious professionals. I participated in such a ritual in Osh in 2015. The Mushkil-Kusho was held at the local otyncha’s house and, as in the cases of previously mentioned celebrations, groups of a few women participated. The ritual was organized in a shortened form (about half an hour). At the end of the celebration saaqyt, a ritual dish, was served. It is a meal made of milk, mutton fat, water, and thin pieces of dough fried in deep fat (chalpak divided into pieces). According to tradition, saaqyt is also prepared as a symbolic dish which is served at the end of difficult life situations such as sickness, or to finalize important life matters such as exams, business transactions, and the like. Subsequently, in order to complete the Mushkil-Kusho, the otyncha held individual, short sessions of fortune-telling. She opened the Quran, reading some ayats, and on this basis talked about the problems of a client.¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹ In addition, people visited her to remove charms, and to receive tumors'⁶⁹ protecting them against various things. While waiting for my turn in a corridor of otyncha’s house, I met a Kyrgyz woman, who reported that she travels regularly with the goods to sell them at a bazaar in Khorog in Badakhshan (Tajikistan). For twenty years, she has been visiting this otyncha, who prepares tumors protecting her against troubles during the trip. If she has a talisman everything is going relatively well. She did not have the talisman a number of times for some reasons, and she experienced a great deal of trouble while crossing the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, including confiscation of her goods and paying a large amount of money for bribes. The activity of this otyncha was highly professionalized. The hours of admission were displayed in her waiting room, and a list of prices for her services was available to her clients. Traditionally the social institution of bibi-otun/otyncha was not present among the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, but this otyncha had clients among the Uzbeks, the Kyrgyz, also even sometimes local Tatars. ¹⁶⁸ For information on using the Quran for various sort of magic practices see Rezvan (2011). ¹⁶⁹ Tumor is a kind of a talisman; it is usually a piece of paper with suras of the Quran wrapped in a piece of material or inserted in a small container. 146 3 4- Conclusions These trends have led to simplification and commercialization of the rituals, which are now often planned superficially, with little attention paid to details. There are other places in the Ferghana Valley, where these rituals are performed, for instance, they used to be held at the tomb of mother Bibi Orifa near Bukhara but now their performance is banned. In Tajikistan the Bibi Mushkil-Kusho ritual was organized in a mazar located in a village known as Batosh, near the town of Shahrinaw, as well as at the Chiltani Pok mazar in the village of Simganj on the way to the town of Vahdat (Muzaffari, Kamol, Nabotzoda, 2007: 34; research 2014). Many women who attend the Mushkil-Kusho ritual in mazars cannot afford to have a ceremony at home. They belong to the poorest and most vulnerable parts of society. They believe that the rituals and intercessory prayers led by bibi-otuns can help solve their problems. As was mentioned in Chapter I, Bibi Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi Seshanbe are often criticised by various religious leaders. They express the opinion that there was no mention of those practices in the Quran. Some people completely reject those rituals. Others say that they can still be performed but without the elements which are considered by them to be ‘un-Islamic’, associated with bid’a and shirk, such as lighting the candles for the spirits of ancestors and telling stories about Bibi Mushkil-Kusho and Bibi Seshanbe. Thus, their performance should be limited to reading the Quran and asking God for help in a particular problem. There are reduced versions of the text of the rituals which could be bought in the different places in Tajikistan.¹⁷⁰ This transformation of female rituals indicates the changing tradition of Islam in Central Asia many elements and practices of which irrevocably disappear. 3.4. Conclusions Female rituals are important from the point of view of maintaining community ties and the protection of local traditions. Participating in the rituals gives women an opportunity to meet, and talk, to release ¹⁷⁽¹ A quotation from an interview with a female religious professional, Khujad 2014. 147 Chapter 111. Female religious practices and rituals tensions of everyday life. Rituals and various religious practices are embedded in a specific social reality. The mystical and religious aspects of the ritual or practice are linked to social, economic, and political dimensions of the realities that determine the course of a particular gathering, and the topics which are discussed. Religious leaders express their views on religious issues, interpreting the Quran, and religious parables in the context of everyday life. The stories of religious nature refer to the relationships in the family, the community, and the society, providing advice on how to solve a problem or difficulty, or how to follow a certain code of conduct. In this way, female religious leaders influence women shaping their value system, and forming opinions and views on various matters, including the interpretation of religion. Chapter IV The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan 4.1. Perceptible and imperceptible conflict Inter-ethnic fighting took place in June 2010, when Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks clashed in the area of Osh, and Jalalabad city in southern Kyrgyzstan. The events resulted in the loss of life and injuries of many people, the majority of whom were ethnic Uzbeks. Many thousands of other people were displaced. There were also incidents of rape, assault, and significant property damage. The old-standing unsettled animosities between the two ethic groups were catalysed in the form of riots, shortly after a shift of power in April of the same year, resulting in the weak rule of law. The unrest left the society divided, full of mutual grievances and traumas, affecting relationships not only between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz but also other ethne living in south of the country, (see e.g.: Matveeva 2011). The last time I was in Osh prior to 2015 was in 2012.1 was monitoring a development project of a Polish NGO. I spent several weeks in Osh and the neighbouring area. Two years after the conflict, the tensions were still perceptible, and many people were affected by the traumatic post-conflict memories. In 2015, five years after the Osh riots and despite optimistic views of some people from Europe with whom I spoke before my trip, my first impression was that the situation did not change significantly since my last visit. Just like in all the post-conflict areas where I had an opportunity to work, it seemed as if nothing had 149 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan happened. There were no open conflicts, everything seemed to have frozen to a halt and destructive emotions were deeply hidden. There might have been no violence in the sense of a physical threat, however, there was a mental violence which could be seen in the eyes, gestures, words of people, and during some interactions with them. One of the Kyrgyz scholars told me in Bishkek: After the conflict, Uzbeks became isolated even to larger extent than before 2010, they created their own closed networks and circles. The residents of Osh and nearby places, when asked about the relations between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz, answered: On the surface it is ‘yahshi/dzhakshy ’(Uzbek/Kyrgyz: good) but in fact the reality does not look so promising. After arriving in Osh, I went to Shahrak where I found a place in a house of the family of a local nurse. On the second day, while waiting for a taxi to Osh, I took some pictures of the main street in Shahrak, and I heard the following words uttered behind my back: An American spy! (Russian: Американская шпионка!). At that moment I thought that it was just a funny accident, just like as during the Soviet times, but soon other curious situations began to happen. The Uzbek drivers changed the Uzbek music into Kyrgyz songs while entering the areas with the majority of Kyrgyz residents in Osh. Another time a taxi driver of Kyrgyz origin shouted at me when he noticed that I was learning the Uzbek language: Why don't you learn the Kyrgyz language instead of the Uzbek language! Do you know that you are in Kyrgyzstan?! I also faced many other unpleasant situations. In 2015, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities were even more segregated than before the confl ict in2010.Mostof the state’s institutions, including the religious structures, were occupied by the Kyrgyz. Traditionally, Uzbeks still dominated in the small size businesses. However, many Uzbeks migrated during and after the conflict because they did not feel safe in Kyrgyzstan. They left for Russia and other countries. Certainly, many Uzbeks and Kyrgyz attempted to neutralize mutual animosities, to be able to live together again, but at least in 2015 the situation was still uncertain. As I mentioned in ‘Notes on fieldwork and methodology’, the atmosphere in Shahrak was tense, as due to my research on Islam, 150 4-i. Perceptible and imperceptible conflict I was constantly suspected of spying, but also spreading illegal, Islamic ideologies. Thus, in August I decided to move to Osh and rent a flat from Gulmira who was recommended to me by the Mutakalim network. 4.1.1. Religion as an alternative to reality Gulmira, a Kyrgyz woman (aged 47), is a nurse by profession. During the riots in 2010 her Uzbek husband was in Russia, she and their two children were in Osh, and their youngest son was in the hospital. Fortunately, the medical staff did all they could to protect the children from the consequences of the conflict. Finally, Gulmira managed to take her sons and she left for Russia. Shortly after the conflict ended, however, her Uzbek husband changed his mind. He did not want his Kyrgyz wife and mixed children any more. He pronounced the talaq (the Muslim divorce formula) and Gulmira was left alone. Soon, he took a new, young wife of Uzbek origin. At present, he also has ‘new’ children, and he forgot about ‘the old ones’, neither contacting them nor paying alimony. Gulmira worked at a bazaar in Russia, then she returned to Osh, bought a small flat, and started working at a pharmacy at the Karasu bazaar. Gulmira works every day from 8.00 a.m. till 9.00 p.m., practically without a day off. At present, due to unemployment and poverty there are many people in a similar situation in Kyrgyzstan. Gulmira is very religious, she wears the hijab, and follows the principles of Islam. Her faith helps her to cope with the difficulties of life. Moreover, religion and the Islamic outfit protect her against suspicions of not conforming to standards of morality which are often expressed in reference to divorced women. Islam is a factor that can reconnect the Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities because all nations are equal to Allah - I was told a few times in Osh. In June 2010, some religious figures visited conflict zones, attempting to mediate between two parties. In the aftermath of the conflict, they were invited to preach in mosques about unity, and tolerance (Nasritdinov, Bekmurzaev 2015: 21). There were also various attempts of NGOs such as The Foundation for Tolerance International (a Kyrgyz non-governmental organization) to work with the spiritual 151 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan professionals, including female religious teachers on conflict resolution. Mutakalim and its associates were included in the project, but not all religious leaders wanted to cooperate with the official structures.¹⁷¹ ¹⁷² In the chaotic realities of the post-conflict area, many women like Gulmira found support in religion, hoping that Islam would help them to overcome the difficulties of everyday life. For others, attending the religious ceremonies, or religious involvement is an opportunity to get out of the family circle, and participate in social life. It is often easier to get a permission from mother-in-law or husband to leave the house for religious lessons then for other activities. Others perceive religion as a form of self-realization, which gives them a feeling of satisfaction resulting from doing something that suits their interest. Female religious gatherings and religious classes led by female religious leaders have become increasingly popular, especially that women are not allowed to attend the mosques. There are formal and informal hujras, andmadrasas in each mahalla or ayil (Kyrgyz village). In fact, it is difficult to control them. Otynchas have a great influence on women. Sometimes they are modest, and low-profile figures, but hundreds of people attend religious gatherings to listen to them. The views of women are often shaped by female religious leaders. Nevertheless, numerous religious networks provide various interpretations of Islam (...). It is difficult for an average person to distinguish who gives correct information about Islam, and who spreads extremist ideologies.'¹² As I mentioned in Chapter I, the discussion regarding which interpretations of Islam are correct and which are dangerous has continued in various circles. The main issue of concern is the lack of clear criteria and a diversity of opinions. Less religious circles consider an increasing presence of Islam as a sign of backwardness (Russian: мракобесие). Others perceive religion as a means of social transformation. ¹⁷¹ An interview with the president of The Foundation for Tolerance International. ¹⁷² An excerpt from an interview with a representative of The Foundation for Tolerance International. 4-1. The setting of fieldwork In this chapter, I present the impact of various religious networks on female circles in the post-conflict area in a place such as Shahrak. I reflect on various aspects of religiosity by showing selected figures of female religious leaders associated with the Mutakalim branch in Osh, including independent religious teachers, and women who are attached to a female madrasa in Shahrak. I also refer to a number of interviews which I had an opportunity to conduct in Bishkek. One of the parts of the chapter demonstrates the phenomenon of polygamy in the context of discussion of various circles, and the impact of religious leaders on shaping religious views of people on this matter. 4.2. The setting of fieldwork The Shahrak district is a densely populated agricultural area bordering Uzbekistan, located about half an hour from the city of Osh. It is inhabited predominantly by Uzbeks (about 62%), the Kyrgyz (about 35%), and some other nationalities.¹⁷³ Despite the proximity of Osh, the region is provincial and marginalized. The riots of June 2010 only deepened the isolation of its Uzbek population. In spite of that, fights during the conflict were not intense in Shahrak, and most Uzbeks fled towards the border with Uzbekistan, to wait there for the outcome. The centre of Shahrak is constructed as many similar places in the post-Soviet Central Asia which are called regional centres (Russian: районный центр). Thus, there are various facilities such as the premises of local administration, schools, medical facilities, a club and a library, banks, offices, a bazaar and many small shops. The majority of residents are employed in the state sector such as education, local As was mentioned in the field notes, due to the sensitivity of the situation in the region, the real name of the district is not indicated. It should also be noted that as a result of the ethnic conflict in 2010, the ethnic composition of the area has changed. Many Uzbeks who previously lived in Osh, emigrated from Kyrgyzstan or moved to places with the majority of Uzbeks. Hence the ethnic composition provided is an estimate only, based on the information obtained in the field. 153 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan administration and health-care, are involved in agricultural activities, or work in the bazaar and other services. Many men are migrant-workers in Russia, while some people found employment in Osh. Prior to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, there were eighth kolkhozes in the district. After the systemic transition, the land was divided among the residents. Most of the people received a parcel for agriculture. Nearly everyone has a small garden where they grow fruit and vegetables for own consumption. Agriculture is the main occupation of the people, and during spring and summer whole families are involved in farming. There are two local NGOs and microfinance organizations in the district. Social projects are also implemented by NGOs from Osh and some international organizations. There is also the Drinking Water Users Committee which was established by a Polish NGO - the East European Democratic Centre, and a Kyrgyz NGO - Water Alliance - to deal with the issue of drinking water distribution and infrastructure. The Mutakalim NGO cooperates with female religious leaders in the district. The office of Mutakalim in Osh is directed by Jamila Japasheva, a social activist who cooperates with the governmental officials, and religious figures including the teachers of a female madrasa in the Shahrak district.¹⁷⁴ Two madrasas (male and female), and a central mosque are located in the centre of the district, but almost every mahalla has its own mosque. The mahalla plays an important role in integrating local communities, and many initiatives are undertaken through the mahalla mosque which traditionally is a centre of social and public life. Some hujras are located in the premises of the mosque to teach religion. Sometimes there are separate rooms for women’s classes. There is also a famous historical place with cave drawings located not far from the centre. Another important place is the tomb of a local saint (mazar). Both places are a traditional destination for pilgrimages of the local residents. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, many Uzbeks living in the Shahrak district travelled regularly to Uzbekistan to receive religious education from teachers leading the underground madrasas. Islam l⁷‘l Information collected during a field study in 2015. 154 4-2. The setting of fieldwork was also disseminated informally by local religious leaders (mullas and otynchas) through gap/mahalla networks.¹⁷⁵ People used to meet regularly with their gap, every time in a different house to study religion. There was one mosque in the district centre, where hutba was held every Friday. In addition, people gathered informally in private houses to pray, while major holidays such as the end of Ramadan, and others were celebrated in remote places, fields, orchards etc. Participation in the religious activities was closely monitored by the authorities. People who belonged to the Party and occupied state positions were not allowed to attend the religious ceremonies out of fear of being dismissed and excluded from this formation. After the independence, the situation changed and many new hujras emerged. Due to establishment of the border with Uzbekistan, travelling there became more difficult. Nevertheless, some people still had links with ustods and madrassas in the neighbouring country. After the incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) during 1999 and 2000, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, finally sealed the border, and the Shahrak district was cut off from previously well-accessible places in Uzbekistan. This strongly limits the opportunities of the residents to visit the religious centres in Andijan, Margilan and other parts of Fergana Valley, as well as the rest of Uzbekistan. Many people in Shahrak are involved in religious activities. A number of residents reportedly travel to IS in Syria; there are also groups which are related ideologically to Salafi-like ideologies and Hizb ut-Tahrir. As indicated previously in Chapter I, these groups are not homogeneous, and they are often at variance with each other. I came to the Shahrak district at the beginning of Ramadan, in June 2015. I visited this place previously only once in 2012. The EEDC had a history of a long-term cooperation with the Drinking Water Users Committee from the district, and I was introduced to the local people through this network. Hence, I was able to attend the meetings of the female religious groups relatively quickly. At the beginning ¹⁷⁵ Gap/gashtak (also other terms) - networks based on obligation and reciprocity principles, also gatherings. Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocyncbas in Southern Kyrgyzstan I participated in the khatmi Quran organized in various places, and other rituals. I also began to attend tajwid classes, and the religion classes at a hujra of Gulsun otyncha, and Uzbek language lessons. Thanks to the help of the Mutakalim NGO branch in Osh, I also established various links with female religious professionals. Shortly after my arrival, I noticed that the manifestation of piousness grew in comparison with the year 2012. Most of the women wore hijab, some of them niqab, and only some a more casual outfit with a traditional headscarf tied at the back of the head. Those who did not follow the Islamic dress code were often admonished that their clothes are unsuitable for Muslim women. Only a few decided to dress in the European style, mostly people working in the state institutions. Many people learnt religion and tajwid in the hujras led by teachers of very diverse views. Like elsewhere, a division into ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Islam, ‘New Muslims’ and ‘traditionalists’, ‘Wahabi’, ‘Hizbu’, ‘Salafi’ and those of moderate view on religion were an inseparable part of local religious discourses. Initially I thought that a particular person rejected the specific traditions or interpretations of Islam on the basis of her/his knowledge of religion. Over time, however, I noticed that some views expressed to me as ‘a correct understanding of Islam’, were based on the opinions of a religious circle or a leader with whom a particular person was associated. Kaliszewska (2016: 113) points out that borders between what is practised, what is believed, what is hidden, and what is said -especially to a researcher - are blurred depending on the situation as well as the level of trust in relation to an interlocutor. Attempts at classifying individual religious practices or views should be considered within a certain context in which those practices are performed. For instance, the nurse in whose house I lived was moderately religious. She prayed quite regularly, but neither attended the religious classes nor presented a special interest in religion. She did not wear the hijab, but a traditional headscarf tied at the back of the neck; she was professionally active and engaged in various activities. However, she and her associates condemned the traditional rituals including pilgrimages to mazars which were regarded by them as an aberration. In 2016, Sylwia Pietrowiak, a researcher from Poland conducted research on the mazar 156 4.1. The setting of fieldwork in Shahrak, and she lived in a house of the nurse’s friend. Once, both women went with Sylwia to this mazar, just to accompany her. Perhaps acting on impulse, perhaps for other reasons, despite previous criticism, they prayed, standing on a ritual stone located there.¹⁷⁶ ¹⁷⁷ Montgomery (2016: 36-37) notes that everyday practices are parallel with religion because the latter holds a recognizable interpretative framework. This results in a fluidity in what a person perceives as religion, and what he or she feels is appropriate within a certain religious and social framework. In this case, the mazar is the place of a collective sacrum. It functions as part of the cultural experience of a community related to various local practices such as the cult of ancestors, and other rituals. At present, the legitimacy of those traditions is undermined, which further affects people’s attitude towards this mazar. Some of them reject pilgrimages to mazars, some others try to find a compromise between old and new approaches to religious tradition. Nevertheless, both in Shahrak and elsewhere, influences of the new trends in Islam affected all life-cycle rituals. Many religious leaders present ‘old practices’ as inappropriate to be performed by Muslims. In some circles, weddings and other ceremonies are even limited to basic Islamic rites, thus no music, dancing and other rituals are allowed. For instance, the old tradition of walking round a fireplace performed by newlyweds is prohibited in Shahrak as a pagan practice. There are people who even criticize karnayi - long trumpets used during weddings in the Ferghana Valley. I was once asked by one of the Mutakalim activists: M: Why are you interested in these 'old, inappropriate’practices? AC: I conduct research on the role of female religious leaders, so I should study all aspects of Islam which I observe here - I answered. M: Okay, but in your book, you should emphasize that ‘we’do not follow those practices anymore because they are shirk)¹¹ ¹⁷⁶ / tersonal conversation with Sylwia Pietrowiak in Warsaw, February 2017. £ e is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of History, PhD Studies in History, History of Art and Archaeology, University of Gdańsk, Poland. ¹⁷⁷ An excerpt from a conversation with one of the Mutakalim activists, which I conducted in August 2015, in Osh. 157 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan McBrien (2008: 57) while conducting research on Bazaar-Korgon (the neighbouring area of Osh) acknowledges that while new concepts of religiosity challenge local traditions presenting them as ‘un--Islamic’, it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between them. There is a struggle between strict, scripture-oriented interpretations of Islam and local rituals, but various discourses are interwoven, which constitutes a religious space. In the following part of this chapter I will present this process on the example of networks of female religious leaders in Shahrak. 4.3. The madrasa network Sultan Ali There are two official madrasas in the Shahrak district. There is a large madrasa for boys, and a smaller madrasa for girls which is a branch of the male school. Just as all official Islamic schools in Kyrgyzstan, both of them are under supervision of the muftiat which sets up their curriculum. The director of both branches is Sultan Ali (aged about 40), who is an influential religious leader in the district. As a young person he studied Islam at an official madrasa in Andijan (Uzbekistan), then he continued his education in Kartegina (Tajikistan) at the hujra of a famous hazrat domullo Hikimatullo, a continuator of silsila of Shaikh Yaqub Charkhi of Naqshbandiyya. Subsequently, he carried on his study at the university in Syria. He returned from Syria in 2010, just one year before the war which began there in 2011. In addition, Sultan Ali attended a few hujras for short periods of time, seeking knowledge from various teachers. The experience acquired during the years of travel and study gave Sultan Ali the opportunity to learn Islam from various sources. At present, he is a well-known religious leader in Shahrak. He teaches a number of religious figures, including some women. Many people ask him to explain various theological matters. Sultan Ali is also invcl, ed in some social initiatives. Through educational and social activities, he contributes to the shaping of the religious policy in the district where he lives. He also influences the manner of teaching in the female madrasa. 158 4-3- The madrasa network. 4.3.1. Expelling an evil spirit in the male madrasa Despite the fact that madrasas for boys and girls function within the same institution, they are located in two separate places. Women do not have access to the main premises of the male madrasa where young men leam the principles of Islam. Men cannot visit the female madrasa as well. There is a place, however, which connects female and male ritual spaces. At the back of the male madrasa building there is an entrance through which women and men come to visit a mulla who recites the Quran for the purpose of healing. The mulla also has the ability to expel jinns, and other evil spirits. The entrance leads to a small room, which is divided by a curtain into two parts. A female patient sits near the curtain in the female part of the room, and the mulla is on the other side during the healing. Other women wait for their turn, sitting along the walls in the female part. Men who want to receive treatment sit in the same part of the room as the mulla does. Administering healing by means of the Quran is an old tradition called ruqiya. It has to do with the reading of particular suras and other religious sequences to a person for the purpose of healing; the reading can be also performed over food products or water. At the beginning of the whole process, the mulla asks a few questions such as: whether his client has nightmares, is she/he nervous, how does he function among people. Has his memory recently weakened? Then the mulla recites the appropriate suras. He also recommends various rituals to be conducted at home such as reciting selected suras (usually Al-Falaq, Surah An-Nas, Al-Ihlas, as well as others) a number of times, lubrication with olive oil which he previously sanctified, eating a specific amount of dates, and dissolving the pieces of paper with suras in water and drinking them at a certain time of the day. The whole healing process intends to purify the mind and soul of the patient, and it is based on the assumption that evil spirits harm the person. There are also more complicated rituals such as exorcisms (expulsion of a jinn), or removing the charms that mav iave been cast by bakhshy, usually on someone else’s order. According to Sultan Ali and the mulla, bakhshy’s activities are haram (forbidden by Allah), and people should not visit. However, the mulla deals with the negative effects of spells cast by bakhshy to help 159 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan people affected by them. In June 2015, I witnessed the expulsion of a jinn from a young girl who recently got married. She received an offer of marriage from three candidates, and her parents selected one of them. Shortly after the wedding, the girl became possessed by the evil spirit. Allegedly, one of the families of the rejected candidates asked a bakhshy to cast a spell on the girl. Soon after, she began to experience strange symptoms such as aggression and hysteria without any reason; the symptoms were intensified while she was performing namaz since the jinn did not want her to be connected to God. Finally, the couple was advised to see the mulla, which they did several times, to remove the malicious spirit.¹⁷⁸ The jinn was expelled by means of reciting Quranic suras by the mulla. It was invited to the girl’s body by bakhshy performing seemingly ‘un-Islamic’ rituals. It should be noted that the category of jinn can be very broadly understood. It can include other evil spirits which existed in the local legends such as devs, alabastis, and others.¹⁷⁹ A dev is considered a dangerous and powerful demon. It is a popular figure of many stories, and its origin is traced to the Avesta. Alabasti (alvasti) is a demon usually depicted as a woman who is especially dangerous to young women and children. Stories about devs and alabastis are popular not only in Central Asia but also in other places (Sukhareva 1975: 29-44). All those evil spirits can be removed through the reading of religious texts in a particular way by a person who is trained to do it, in this case the mulla from the male madrasa in Shahrak. The above-mentioned example is testimony to the fact that some local beliefs, despite their marginalization by the official religious discourse, are accepted within certain ritual and social situations.¹⁸⁰ ¹⁷⁸ The whole account is written on the basis of conversations held with the mulla, Sultan Ali, and my various observations, as well as my own experience of being healed by the mulla. However, more research is needed to explain this phenomenon. '⁷', On the basis of various conversations held with people in Central Asia, ir the years 2010-15. ¹⁸⁰ As far as official religious institutions are concerned, I observed the process of expelling the evil spirit, as well as different forms of healing such citing the suras over food products in the Central mosque in Bishkek, in November 2011, 160 4-3- The madrasa network Ruqiya, although popular, is also questioned by some Islamic theologians. In Central Asia, however, the legitimacy of this practice is sought in hadises and local religious literature, and on this basis ruqiya is continued until today (Babajanov, Kamilov 2006: 336-337). In this way people reformulate their relationship with the sacred, justifying various practices despite criticism of the followers of a more scriptural approach to Islam (Bowen 2010: 115-118). 4.3.2. Female madrasa The madrasa for girls was opened in January 2015, and it is a new institution in the district. The school is located in a side street, in a large villa hidden behind a wall. I visited the madrasa only twice. At the time of the first visit, I met the teachers and students, during the second visit I was asked to present an example of a traditional Polish dish to the students. At that time, myself and the girls prepared Polish dumplings with cheese and potatoes (Polish: pierogi ruskie). Despite my good relations and frequent meetings with the head of the madrasa, Elmira, and a teacher of the Arabic language, Amina, outside of the madrasa, I was not allowed to attend the classes or to get a permission to visit the school again. I was told that other people also cannot access the madrasa, and this decision was made by unknown ‘higher authorities’. All these factors influenced my impression that the female madrasa is an isolated place, and once again confirmed the uncertainty that was felt regarding religion in Shahrak. The house in which the madrasa was located, was offered by a religious family. In the period of the USSR, the building housed a public bath; during privatization, it was bought by the above-mentioned family, but it stayed empty for a long period. Finally, they decided to renovate the building and open a female madrasa. We wanted to do something good for women since the situation in our district is difficult. There is a lot ofpoverty, opportunities for young and June 2015. In other cases, I witnessed similar practices only in mazars, and private homes. However, since women in Central Asia have limited opportunities to visit mosques, 1 conducted my research there only occasionally. 161 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan people are limited. Girls should be educated, they should know Islam to be able to raise children well. Islam was concealed for 70 years, the religion survived thanks to our grandparents, now we should repay this debt of gratitude.'™ In 2015, thirty girls were enrolled in the madrasa for daily education. They lived in a dormitory which was located on the first floor of the building. All of the students finished a public school before entering the madrasa. According to the Kyrgyz law, children should complete at least 9 classes to be allowed to attend a madrasa. Additionally, 50 girls leamt religion in the afternoon after the regular school. All students learn tajwid, ibadaf ² elements offiqh,'™ and the Arabic language. The school so far did not have a permission to teach tafsir.'M Teaching of the tafsir in Kyrgyzstan is a subject of discussion due to the activity of a number of religious groups that provide various interpretations of Islam. Hence, the official religious authorities issue a special permission for teaching tafsir within a framework of a certain canon. In Islam, considerable value is attached to repeating the exact words of God which are preserved in the Quran. Muslims learn the scriptural, written text of the Quran in order to know how to pronounce it correctly so as not to distort God’s words. They learn not only to recite the holy book of Islam, but also to read it melodically, using certain rules of pronunciation which help people who do not know the Arabic language, in the memorization of the Quranic text (Bowen 2012: 18). Therefore, learning tajwid is one of the first stages of the Islamic education. According to Sultan Ali, tafsir is the advanced level of Islamic learning. First, students should know the pronunciation of the Quran, and the basic rules of Islam. The main purpose of tafsir is to explain the ¹¹¹¹ An interview with a woman who belongs to this family and is a manager of this madrasa. ls:! Ibada can be understood as obedience in fulfilling God’s commands and is reflected in the ritual duties and rules. IW Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. I⁸‘’ Tafsir is a Quranic exegesis. It refers to the interpretation and explanation of the meaning of the Quran. It provides a commentary to a particular issue or story. 162 4-3- The madrasa network content of the Quran as well as to provide complementary information about the suras. Tafsir express a wide range of views and opinions of the scholars on the Quranic text, hence it should be controlled to avoid misinterpretation of the word of Allah.¹⁸⁵ Despite such explanation I still had doubts as to how people could understand their religion without knowing the content of the most important source of religious knowledge which is the Quran. Peshkova (2006: 212) indicates that for a long time, tafsir was regarded to be part of more advanced, exclusively male education. It was considered to be far beyond the reach of the local women. Thus, otyncha s knowledge was often limited to the use of particular suras during ceremonies without any understanding of their meaning. Another reason which contributed to the low popularity of the study of tafsir is the poor level of Islamic knowledge, which is a result of the years of atheization during the Soviet period. Since people had limited access to various forms of religious education (including books, gatherings, lessons and so forth), religious knowledge was reserved only for a narrow circle of religious professionals who passed it to others. Female and male spiritual professionals taught Islam to people, who in the majority of cases were not able to verify someone’s religious knowledge. Not infrequently, a person who learnt a few suras was regarded as someone who knew Islam. And since knowledge of the Quran is considered a sacred thing, and given by God to people, the authority of religious leaders was rarely questioned. In terms of the female madrasa in Shahrak, the fact that girls do not leam tafsir, or even do not read translations of the Quran, can be explained by poor demand for advanced knowledge of Islam for women in a provincial place such as Shahrak. The goal of the madrasa is to provide basic religious education, and good upbringing; more sophisticated matters such as tafsir are not considered a first necessity. If a woman is particularly interested in religion, she can pursue further education, individually or within a relevant religious institution. In bigger urban centres, the level of the religious education is better than ¹⁸⁵ An interview with a director of a male madrasa, Sultan Ali, June 2015. 163 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan in rural areas, and people have higher expectations and ambitions. Besides, as I explained before, official religious institutions attempt to control the teaching of tafsir due to a fear of radicalization through the spreading of extreme interpretations of the Quran. Apart from teaching religion, the female madrasa provides courses in cooking and sewing. There are plans to open computer courses in the future. According to the head of the madrasa, Elmira edjef⁽' girls should be prepared for the role of wives, to respect their parents-in-law and husbands. The role of the madrasa is also to provide practical skills.¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷ Some of my ‘secular’ friends in Bishkek expressed a view that female madrasas are only ‘the schools for (future) wives’. They believe that the religious institutions reinforce the patriarchal structures of the society. Doolotkeldieva (2017) points out that the new forms of religiosity, (including religious education) are adapted into the patriarchal tradition of the local culture. Various local practices are only legitimized by a certain interpretation of Islam. Traditionally, being a good mother and wife is considered by the society in Kyrgyzstan to be an ideal of womanhood. In some social circles, women who follow the Islamic rules are perceived as the best candidates for the role of a wife. Islam clearly indicates that religiosity is the most desirable characteristic of a woman, and good upbringing is associated with the knowledge of religion. Therefore, some girls make great efforts, including wearing the Islamic outfit or attending religious classes to be considered by men and by their relatives as good candidates for Muslims wives. According to Elmira edje, in Shahrak, a number of girls are taken from school very early and married off despite the fact that marriage of a person under 18 years is prohibited by the law. Young couples are married in the Islamic way (nikah), and eventually the marriage is legalized only after the coming of age of both spouses. Girls are hardly prepared for life, they have neither secular nor religious knowledge. ¹⁸⁶ Edje (literally older sister), the term used in relation to women on the street, at work, among friends. ¹⁸⁷ On the basis of my conversation with Elmira, July 2015. 164 4 3 • The madrasa network often they even do not know how to run a house when they become wives.w Elmira and her associates are opposed to early marriages of girls, but they are aware that the financial situation of many families in Shahrak does not allow them to send their children to a university. Even if a family has some modest funds for further education of their children, it is more likely that their sons will be educated. Besides, chances for a job are limited in Shahrak, thus many people believe that higher education will not bring desirable benefits. The madrasa gives at least some opportunities for girls.¹⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁹ Commercio (2014) who conducted a survey of female students at religious and secular universities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, suggests that at present women who attend secular universities and those who study in religious schools tend to embrace traditional values such as family life, and religion as an alternative for being moved out of the work force. The author believes that this process should be viewed in the context of economic decay after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economic uncertainty contributes to retraditionalization. Women tend to adopt family life as a coping strategy for the scarcity of other opportunities. I believe that the failed transition accompanied by the increasing presence of Islam contributed to retraditionalization. This process, however, should be considered in the context of practices embedded in the local lifestyle. In Central Asia, early marriages and the traditional family system have always been a basis of the social order, and the Soviet Union did not change it significantly. In societies where individual choices are almost always filtrated through collective needs of a group, marriage and children are of a high value because they assert continuity and the well-being of an extended family. In the case of economic hardship and weak state structures, the extended family and/or local community such as ayil or mahalla guarantee at least a minimum of assistance. As a result of social and political changes, the traditional/ informal/religious structures came up on the surface replacing to ¹⁸⁸ An excerpt from an interview with Elmira, July 2015. ¹⁸⁹ My various conversations with Elmira edje and Amina (a teacher of the Arabic language). 165 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan some extent the order proposed by the secular state. At the same time, however, economic problems, unemployment, and migration influenced the transformation of the traditional mechanism of social regulation. Part of the society reacted to those changes by imposing rigid rules to prevent further moral and cultural disintegration and by promoting a lifestyle legitimised by Islam and local practices. One day, when I spoke to Amina from the female madrasa in Shahrak I asked her the following question: AC: What is, in your opinion, the biggest problem of women in Shahrak? Amina: I think that money is the biggest problem, life became hard in the times of the market economy ... women should stay at home and look after their children. AC: Okay but ...if they have to work? Amina: At present, all people are only working and working, thinking about money. They do not have enough time to spend with their children. In my opinion, men should work to earn money and women should look after the children. AC: But if a woman does not have a basic knowledge about life how can she raise children? They do not study, sometimes they even do not attend a school... Amina: After finishing school education, the majority of girls are married off, soon they have a few children. That is it! They do all the housework chores, and often they have to work in agriculture, or at the bazaar. They have no time to learn anything properly, to understand the matters, neither those related to religion nor other subjects. This is the life here!'⁹⁰ Amina advocates a traditional understanding of the roles of men and women. She believes that a man should work and maintain the family, and the current economic situation that forces women to work negatively influences the process of raising children, and so do education and development of women, including their knowledge of Islam. A similar opinion on gender roles was expressed by Nadira, a teacher of Islam in Bishkek. She blames the forced atheisation of the Soviet ¹⁹⁰ An excerpt from an interview with Amina, August 2015. 166 4-3 • The madrasa network period for demoralization of society. She admits, however, that a rapid transformation in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR deepened this process. Religion can contribute to a moral rebirth of society. Communism changed our tradition. Women were forced to work. It undermined their basic rights to stay at home and care for the family. People were told that women and men should be equal by performing similar tasks such as earning money. In my opinion, this led to demoralization of our society. Men started drinking alcohol, they did not need to maintain the family anymore. A part of a man's traditional responsibilities was placed on the shoulders of women. Hence, tensions increased between spouses, which resulted in growing domestic violence. Education provided by the formal institutions was only of secular nature. There was no religion in the public life, hence people did not acquire the knowledge regarding moral standards. Then, suddenly, communism was replaced with capitalism. People gained more freedom, and opportunities. We experienced a revival of religion, but many people lost their path. In this chaotic world, it is difficult to find a balance. Only Islam can explain the dynamically changing reality.¹⁹¹ Doolotkeldieva (2017) indicates that some people see Islam as a factor which encourages social change, or which even promotes a ‘feminist agenda’. Religion can challenge male domination. The promoters of this idea quote the verses and ajats of the Quran that, according to their interpretation, support women’s rights. In this way, they expressed criticism of the existing relations. They still, however, perceive marriage and family life as very important values of Islam, and local cultures. According to Jamila Japasheva who was mentioned above, a few years ago, Mutakalim organized a course for girls entitled ‘How to be a good wife in Islam’: Unfortunately, some graduates of the course experienced difficulty finding a good partner. There are only a few men who know Islam in Kyrgyzstan. Even those who attend a madrasa to learn the Quran, and some religious practices, know little about the ¹⁹¹ An excerpt from the interview with Nadira, a teacher of Islam and a journalist, Bishkek, June 2015. Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan nature of Islam and its principles.™¹ Such opinions, however, are still rare in Kyrgyzstan. Despite various attempts to reformulate the traditional gender roles within religion, many people prefer to preserve the existing hierarchies. In tradition-oriented places such as Shahrak, the social relationships are shaped by local adats, and sharia which dominate over the state law. Hence, any new ideas should be transmitted through Islam and local tradition. In the local madrasa, most girls learn religion in order to function within a traditional Uzbek community. Attending the religious school is considered to be prestigious, and learning some practical skills helps students to function as they approach adulthood. In addition, since the madrasa is connected to the Mutakalim network, girls have an opportunity to observe or perhaps even to participate in some social initiatives. 4.3.3. Madrasa teachers - the stories of Elmira and Amina Elmira One day Jamila edje invited me to a seminar organized by Mutakalim in a rayon adjacent to Shahrak. We got into the car of Elmira edje, the head of a female madrasa. She is the only Kyrgyz woman among the Uzbeks who works in this madrasa; she is also one of few women in this area who drives a car. The seminar was organized in a building of the local public administration. It was attended by a group of women living there. The seminar dealt with family law and domestic violence, and was one of a number of initiatives organized by Mutakalim. Various issues regarding women’s rights in accordance with the Kyrgyz law and Islam were presented to a female audience which potentially could face the risk of mistreatment. Elmira edje is a teacher of Islam, and a local activist, she integrates Islamic principles into her work with people. She cooperates with the Mutakalim and with the local administration, undertaking various ¹⁹² An excerpt from an interview with Jamila, the head of the Mutakalim branch in Osh, June 2015. 168 4-3- The madrasa network initiatives regarding women’s issues, and to prevent the spreading of radical ideas. Her career of a teacher of Islam started rather late. Elmira edje is a midwife by profession, but following her marriage she became a housewife, helping her mother-in-law. The family of her husband is very religious, her father-in-law was a religious leader (see the Chapter I). When Elmira came to her husband’s family, her father-in-law was already dead, but the religious tradition was still cultivated by her mother-in-law who prayed, and read from the Quran. Some time later Elmira’s mother passed away, and she began to seek consolation in religion. In 2011 her daughter attended a course of religion in Bishkek, and Elmira accompanied her. She seized this opportunity to take a course in Islam for adults, then she enrolled in a madrasa to advance her knowledge. Later she returned home and started teaching Islam. The beginning of teaching, however, was a challenging experience for her. I knew that there is a hadis: ‘One of the best Muslims are those who learn the Quran and pass this knowledge to others'. It helped me to make the decision to teach Islam. Initially she tried to teach women from the family of her husband, and their children but they were not willing to leam. ‘Do not bother us, we do not have time!’ - I was told many times by them. But now they are grateful that they know how to read the Quran (...). Due to the years of atheisation, it is very difficult to convince people that they should learn Islam andfollow the religious rules. Many of them make promises that they would attend the lessons of religion, or pray regularly, but they do not do it. The level of knowledge ofreligion is poor; ninety percent ofpeople consider themselves Muslims but they do not know the basic rules of lslam.m When Elmira edje started her spiritual search, she did not think that she could become a religious professional. She wanted to pursue the study of religion mainly for her personal development. As mentioned before, the social institution of otyncha never existed among the Kyrgyz population, and therefore Elmira did not refer to this tradition, she defined herself as a religious teacher. She also rejected the traditional ¹⁹³ An excerpt from an interview with Elmira, July 2015. 169 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan practices, such as visiting mazars, sacrificing animals within certain rituals and others. She considers those practices to be incompatible with Islam. Elmira edje follows the interpretation of religion which she acquired from her teachers in Bishkek. Elmira emphasizes the importance of her role as a teacher of Islam but she also admits: I teach Islam but I do not have a talent to attract people, to preach amri maruf or to perform during ehsons, toys, or persuade people to follow religion. Nevertheless, Elmira is respected by people, not only for teaching religion or because her father-in-law was a religious leader, but also due to her social activity. She is always busy, it is difficult to arrange an appointment with her. She always goes somewhere, does different things for the madrasa, the Mutakalim, and for other people. Elmira believes that educating people in accordance with the principles of the faith can contribute to changing the social relationships. The female madrasa should become an educational project of building a community based on Islam and religious social justice. Amina Amina (aged 47) is of Uzbek origin, she helps Elmira edje in the madrasa, and teaches Arabic grammar there. Amina is an English teacher at a primary school, and in the afternoons she works on the family farm. Amina is intelligent, curious of the world and open to different ideas even though she has never travelled far from the place where she lives. In her youth, she wanted to do a PhD but due to a family obligation, she abandoned her plans. Amina’s mother-in-law was a folk healer, she cured people performing various rituals; she also participated in many traditional ceremonies. According to Amina, her mother-in-law received fotiha from a local bakhshy. (...) But she was not bakhshy, just a healer - Amina underlined. She was a very respected person in her neighbourhood. Amina’s father is a qori, and during the period of the USSR, he used to teach Islam to men. Her mother taught the women from their social circle. In addition, Amina’s father heals people reciting Quranic verses, removes kina, and cures skin diseases. Amina has had contact with Islamic knowledge and various rituals since her childhood. Following her marriage, she slowly began to be interested in learning Islam but leading a busy life, she postponed 170 4-3- The madrasa network the study. Amina began to attend the classes of tajwid only when her mother-in-law died in 2005. Initially, she found a teacher of tajwid in her mahalla. At present, she is a student of Dilfuza (see Chapter I and II). Amina, with her linguistic qualifications, quickly learned the Arabic grammar, and recently she was offered a position of a lecturer at the female madrasa. She said: It was my dream to teach at the madrasa. Now my students say to me: ustoz, ustoz, it is so nice to hear it!'⁹⁴ Amina married off her son a few years ago, and now she has a kelin who helps her in the household, thus she has more time to devote to the study of Islam. She used to say: I am only a beginner, there is a long way ahead of me to acquire religious knowledge. Amina is modest and very religious, and despite being influenced by new Islamic ideas, she does not reject traditional rituals which not long ago were practised by the members of her family. Amina seeks her own path of religious development, exploring various sources of information and the available literature. Thereby she uses critical thinking to interpret religion. Together with Elmira and other teachers, Amina contributes to the development of the madrasa for girls. 4.3.4. The female leaders of the madrasa as social figures Through their activity and teaching, Elmira and Amina support female religious education and development. They have influenced the lives of the people and got involved in religious and educational activities. Elmira is the head of the female madrasa, and a social activist. Living in a rural area, in a traditional and religious place, she works at the grassroots level, interacting with women who have limited opportunities and choices in influencing their lives. Engaging with the community, she passes the ideas of reducing family violence, and women’s rights through linking secular education and Islam within the programs of the Mutakalim NGO, and some other initiatives. Shahrak is a difficult place to work and live: animosities between ethnic groups, radicalization of young people, corrupted state institutions, and the status of women which is lower than that of men are challenges ¹,⁴ An excerpt from an interview with Amina, August 2015. 171 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan that demand a great deal of energy, and self-determination. Elmira is at the beginning of her path as a religious and social leader. Not so long ago, she was a housewife who wanted only to pursue a study of Islam for her personal development. This rapid shift in her life brought a great deal of benefits but also challenges. It is difficult to make any assumption in terms of her future work in Shahrak. It is also uncertain what influences will prevail and what the political and economic situation in southern Kyrgyzstan will be. In 2015 her cooperation with the Mutakalim just started, and results can be achieved only through long-term work. Amina is not involved in the Mutakalim activities. However, she influences people through her teaching at the school and madrasa. Amina proves that a pious woman, even in a rural area can be an active member of society, contributing to the secular and religious education of young people. Ismah (2016) in her essay ‘Destabilising Male Domination: Building Community-based Authority among Indonesian Female Ulama’ presents the female religious leaders who, through their religious and social activities, challenge discrimination against women and the interpretation of Islam that reinforces gender inequality. At present, interestingly enough, the female ulama play the role of religious and institutional leaders, preachers, and teachers in Indonesia. In this way, they can influence their communities. Forming the authority of the female ulama depends on various factors, including male ulamas' attitudes to female preachers, as well as the community’s response to their actions. In this case, Islam can be used to introduce social changes that reconstruct the existing power relationships. All changes, however, should be accepted by people, and exercised within a certain social framework. In the case of Shahrak, and also other places in Kyrgyzstan, the fact that female religious leaders can work as ulama is unknown. Men are expected to posses a higher theological knowledge, and on this basis to guide the community as spiritual leaders. Certainly, female spiritual figures enjoy considerable authority among women, but they cannot challenge hierarchies within the religious structure. As was previously explained, strong otynchas may form their own congregations consisting mostly of female students, and female members of their families and communities. Nevertheless, they rarely approach the male 171 4 3- The madrasa network religious sphere. Yet, traditionally male religious professionals do not participate in female spiritual life either, and there are restrictions for them to attend some female rituals (see Chapter III). At present, the transformation within Islam, and the emerging group of new teachers of religion also triggers a reformulation of the position of female religious leaders. But, it is a long process, requiring transformation of the whole spiritual system. And it needs to be a compromise between the religious leaders and the communities. As far as the female madrasa and its leaders are concerned, the influence that they exert is very subtle. Obviously, Elmira and Amina can advocate certain issues, although their views and opinions should always refer to Islam and local traditions. As many other religious leaders, they perceive Islam as the means of introducing changes to reduce various social ills such as family violence, ethnic tensions, disintegrating social and/or family structures, consumption of alcohol, and even the ‘European’ dress style of women which is associated by them with ‘secularisation’. Islam is seen as a factor of social renewal, preventing all problems, including those that function within Islam itself, such as extreme interpretations of religion, and Islamic terrorism. Mahmood (2012: 70-71) indicates that female da'yats (preachers) in Egypt also do not question the fact that women are not allowed to be imams or preach during the Friday sermons (even for female groups). They accept their position within the local hierarchy which they believe is legitimized by Islam. Female preachers provide religious knowledge and teach social norms, thus sealing the existing relationships, and bringing the Islamic values into the lives of people. Kalmbach (2008) describes a case of a female Islamic religious authority in Damascus, who contributed to a great extent to spreading female religious education. Simultaneously she kept a conservative view on the role of women in society. As the mandate of female activists focuses on the Islamic ‘re-education’ of women, they would lose their authority as instructors if they embraced a lifestyle that is radically different from the social code of conservative religious society (Kalmbach 2008: 15). Elmira and Amina are teachers in the female madrasa, raising a new generation of Muslims in the spirit of religion according to the i73 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan established pattern of values and beliefs of their culture. For instance, as was mentioned in Chapter II, Amina refused to show me a mosque, because according to a local custom, women should not visit it, and breaking this rule would be uncomfortable for her male family members. Amina does not reject the idea of women praying in a mosque in general. She adopts, however, a social reality in which she functions without criticizing some of its aspects. The fact that women visit mosques in other countries is for her part of another reality to which she cannot or does not want to aspire. Both Elmira and Amina are teachers in the female madrasa which is a new institution in Shahrak, hence their position as religious figures has not been established yet. It might also be the reason why they remain modest in expressing opinions and pushing forward their ideas. In the following part of the chapter, I will present a person who is an independent female religious leader with a strong authority in Shahrak, and who freely presents various views, even if they do not represent some generally accepted concepts. 4.4. Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha 4.4.1. Teaching in a hujra Every Tuesday, for about two and a half months, I participated in the religious classes conducted by Gulsun otyncha. The classes were organized in the glazed aivan attached to the room at Gulsun’s home. From the morning until noon the students gathered there to learn Islam. On average there were about 10 women of all ages, most of whom were middle aged or elderly, there were also several young girls. We were sitting on mattresses on a traditional large platform (tapchan) with a long low table and a blackboard to write on. The room had an air of an improvised Asian-style classroom. At the beginning of each class, Gulsun otyncha checked the homework from the previous lesson which included, for example: obligatory rituals during funeral/wedding ceremonies, duties of Muslims during Ramadan etc. She picked students at random, asking the selected 174 4-4- Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha persons about a particular matter or a passage of the Quran. The main book used in the classroom is Ibada-i Islamiyya (worship, rules of religious rituals) written by Ahmedhadi Maksudi¹⁹⁵ concerning basic religious matters. Subsequently, in the second part of the lesson various religious issues were discussed. It was also the time for questions and doubts, and Gulsun otyncha talked about the social matters such as the relationship between the spouses, the upbringing of children, women’s professional development, education etc. The final part of each lesson involved the study of the Arabic alphabet and pronunciation (tajwid), usually led by an experienced student of Gulsun otyncha, and supervised by her. During the recitation of the Quran, the students pronounced the particular sounds based on the phonetic method. Every sound was explained according to its pronunciation taking into account the shape of the mouth and the position of the tongue and the throat. The Arabic letters were written down on the blackboard according to their three positions. The study of the Arabic letters was based on a book entitled: ‘ Azhariya - A textbook for the study of tajwid written by Ashur Ali Imran, which is widely used in Kyrgyzstan. Each person had her own copy of the Quran in the Arabic language, and a notebook to write down the new material, or to show their homework to the teacher. Gulsun otyncha's hujra is based on the principles of a gap network. The students know each other, and are related through family and neighbourly ties. Apart from the classes of religion, they meet on various occasions such as for example Laylatu l-qadr described in Chapter III. Sometimes after the class Mushkil-Kusho was performed for a student who ordered it. On other occasions, women helped each other or the teacher, preparing food for seasonal workers who worked in the field of Gulsun’s family etc. The students represented very different personalities and various ages, and their relations were friendly and open. During the classes they were concentrated and focused on learning, questions were asked at the ¹⁹⁵ Ahmedhadi Maksudi (1868-1941) was one of the most prominent intellectuals of the early 20th century of Tatar origin, a linguist, an educator, a Islamic scholar as well as a political activist (Gaffarova 2005: 189-196). 175 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan right time, and most of the women were concerned about the results of their education. Gulsun otyncha, however, did not put any pressure on her students. Sometimes she made remarks that one of the students did not come to the class or did not do her homework, but she was always polite while expressing disapproval of someone’s performance or behaviour. At first, the faith, conscience, and fear of God are the most important values. People absorb knowledge individually. It is their decision what they want to do with the knowledge I give them. I cannot influence people in this matter. Some people want to learn, they have a positive attitude to education. Some people do not want to learn. Everything depends on a person.¹⁹⁶ Apart from their educational role, the classes serve the purpose of a social circle where women can meet people other than their relatives or neighbours. Most women are busy with their daily duties, they have neither the opportunity, nor time to leam about religion. And since they cannot visit the mosque as men do, Gulsun otyncha is the only religious authority with whom they have an opportunity to interact. As a result, her view on social as well as religious matters shapes the opinions of her students who further pass this knowledge to family and friends. This informal way of transmitting knowledge is the main basic source of information on Islam in many places in Kyrgyzstan, as well as other parts of Central Asia. 4.4.2. Gulsun otyncha and the tradition of female religious leaders Gulsun otyncha is a traditional otun/otin-oy. She is the most famous otyncha in Shahrak. She is 56 years old, and comes from the tura family of religious leaders. Some members of her kin where also murids of Naqshbandiyya tariqa. She began to study Islam at the age of 12 with her grandfather, and at the age of 16, she taught some suras to her classmates. My grandmother wanted me to become an otyncha! - Gulsun said. As was explained in Chapter I she continued her education in Margilan ¹⁹⁶ An excerpt from an interview with Gulsun otyncha, August 2015. 176 4-4- Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha (Uzbekistan) with her relative, who was an imam, and a well-known teacher of Islam. She spent there three years. In addition to the religious education, in her youth Gulsun leamt the traditional embroidery and completed courses in dressmaking. In 1978 she married Pulunjon who was her cousin, and at the age of 22 she started teaching her female friends within a small group of students in the mahalla where she has lived ever since. When she was 36 years old, she began to perform female rituals during various celebrations such as Mushkil-Kusho, Bibi--Seshanbe and others. People named her otyncha as other teachers in Shahrak, but her religious knowledge as well as the family origin imply the status of otun-oy.m Gulsun has had many students. Twelve women of her circle became independent otynchas running their own hujras. Gulsun is a slim and humble person, apart from performing duties related to the religious services, she works on the family farm together with her husband and two sons; her three daughters have been married off and live in other places. Gulsun otyncha advises women of her community on a variety of family matters such as marital conflicts and disagreements between family members, sometimes acting as a mediator. She also provides religious counseling regarding polygamy, family relationships, raising children and so forth. Sometimes, Pulunjon helps Gulsun in mediation on family issues. Both of them are respected by their community, and people often ask them for advice on various matters. Pulunjon supports the religious activities of Gulsun. For him the fact that his wife is a religious leader is a source of pride. While talking to me, he praised his wife’s various accomplishments. Once, I asked Pulunjon if there are cases when the imam from their mahalla consults Gulsun on some issues e.g.: regarding family matters. No! - he answered. However, she has better knowledge of Islam than he has, so the imam would never do it in order not to undermine his authority, and because she is a woman. On another occasion, he said: I will tell you something: my wife even has better knowledge of ¹⁹⁷ On the basis of my conversation with Gulsun otyncha and her husband. She is a very modest person, only when I asked about the term otyncha, and the context of its use in the Shahrak district, she explained it to me, adding that for her it did not matter how she was called by people. 177 Chapter IV. The madrasa network, and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan Islam than Sultan Ali (the director of the madrasa), he is still relatively young!'* According to Gulsun’s words, she formulates her advice to people in the following way: First of all, I always try to answer according to the message of God, thinking about the fear of Allah. Secondly, I provide advice based the Quran and hadises. Thirdly, I consider what advice would be most suitable reflecting upon the character of a person and a given situation. (...). Sometimes I consult my husband. If I have any doubts of religious nature, I ask Sultan Ali. He is the only person in this district who can help me in religious matters.'* Gulsun plays the role of a counsellor, a spiritual leader, teacher of Islam as well as a friend to her followers. She often answers very pragmatic questions but she always seeks an explanation based on Islam. Her strong position as a religious leader gives her an opportunity to express freely various opinions, even if other religious leaders disagree with what she says. Religion for her has a very practical dimension, and is embedded in the local understanding of life-related matters, traditions, moral code, and social relationships. Gulsun as some other religious leaders uses various means to explain a particular matter, quoting rivoyats, life stories and legends which have an educational purpose (see Chapter III). Peshkowa (2014: 156-183) describes the pedagogy of storytelling focusing on - masalas (stories) narrated by the female religious leaders with whom she interacted in Uzbekistan. Thought telling stories, the otyncha help people to understand the challenges of daily life. These stories emphasize the relationship between the people and God and concern all aspects of people’s lives, linking the body, the mind, the feelings, and the consciousness of a person. I think that we (religious leaders) should always follow the will of God; being a religious leader means to be a servant of God - Gulsun said. ¹⁹⁸ A quotation from an interview with the husband of otyncha Gulsun, the Shahrak district, Kyrgyzstan, June 2015. ¹⁹⁹ An excerpt from an interview with Gulsun otyncha, August 2015. 178 4-4- Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha Gulsun as a religious leader is embedded in the local Islamic practices of Hanafi mazhab and Naqshbandiyya tariqa which is her family tradition. For her, Islam is something which is inherent to the everyday life and the spirituality of a human being. All views which she expresses to her students and community are always linked to God as the creator of the universal order. Gulsun emphasizes coherence of a person’s conduct with the principles of religion which naturally incorporates all dynamics of life, responding to the social and political changes. In her opinion, a rigid approach to religion or attempts to force people to believe in one ‘correct’ interpretation of religion is incompatible with the nature of Islam which was given by God to enable people to lead more integrated lives. Religion is every person’s individual way of understanding God. Obviously, each religion has a certain framework, but the relationship with God is our personal choice, irrespective of denomination, whether we are Muslims, Christians, or followers of another spiritual system. A person can acquire religious knowledge independently or through a religious professional (Odami Ilmi - a person of knowledge), who leads religious rituals, or explains the various religious matters. The main task of a religious leader is to transmit religious knowledge in the name of God. Under no circumstances can religion be a source of money or prestige.²⁰⁰ She was challenged a number of times by religious leaders of new Islamic thinking. Nevertheless, according to her words, she defended her point of view. Gulsun believes that the increasing influence of various Islamic groups which propose only ‘one correct’ understanding of the Islamic creed according to a black-and-white image of the world will lead to irreversible social changes, including the lowering of the status of women. Gulsun and her husband think that the fact that many young people are attracted by new trends is a sign of a conflict of generations. Young people reject the local Sufi traditions seeking their own religious path, opposing the religious practices of their ancestors. Some of them believe that Islam is a way to solve all their personal :o° An excerpt from an interview with Gulsun otyncha, July 2015. 179 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan and social problems, and several young people become radical in their approach to religion.²⁰¹ Borbieva (2009: 15-16) describes a Kyrgyz family whose daughter studied at a private high school belonging to Fetullah Gulen’s network, where she had an opportunity to leam about the Turkish-Gulen perspective on Islam that differs from the Kyrgyz spiritual tradition. The girl criticized the spiritual practices of her parents, urging them to change their way of worshiping God. She argued that the local traditions are incompatible with the Islamic creed. The differences in approach to religion triggered an ideological conflict between generations. The discussion provokes a reformulation of the relationships between age groups which in Central Asia have always been strictly defined. Even if a young person has a different opinion on a particular matter, she or he is not expected to challenge (at least openly) the view of their parents or grandparents. Many traditional religious leaders like Gulsun distance themselves from the new Islamic thinking, arguing that some new trends bring chaos and contribute to a split within Islam whose consequences are harmful for the society, and for Islam itself. There are, however, other factors that influence this transformation. As outlined in Chapter I, in the post-conflict reality of southern Kyrgyzstan, and other places, strict interpretations of religion are attractive because they give a clear distinction between ‘right and wrong, good and bad’. They highlight certain moral values associated with an order based on religious principles. Some people feel that under the current circumstances only uncompromising actions can bring about a spiritual transformation, and a moral awakening of society. They think that the traditional religious leaders are unable to guide people because their interpretation of Islam is affected by regressive influences of the Soviet period where religion was suppressed by the authorities. Moreover, according to some of my interlocutors, many old religious traditions are not consistent with today’s realities, and therefore they should be reformulated. They indicate that due to poor knowledge of Islam, some traditional religious leaders cannot challenge young teachers. The latter have an ²⁰¹ On the basis of my conversation with Gulsun and her husband, July 2015. 180 4-4- Hujra network of Gulsun otyncha opportunity to learn about Islam from a variety of sources which enrich their understanding of the religious matters. As a result, their teaching provides more comprehensive answers to life-related questions than the approach of traditional teachers.²⁰² Gulsun otyncha, however, seeks opportunities to acquire Islamic knowledge from literature, or through participation in various meetings, and talks with other religious professionals. In this way she adds to new elements to her teaching, modifying and changing it according to circumstances. She does not abandon the Islamic tradition which was passed to her by the teachers from her family, but at the same time she does not reject of the new approaches that bring value to her teaching. Gulsun always uses her own judgement regarding religious and life matters in which she deals within the framework her religious activity. Gulsun was invited to a seminar organized in Osh a few years ago, where she had an opportunity to talk about women’s employment with an imam who came from the USA. This imam supports a view that women should be professionally active, and that they play significant role in the society. He also recommended that society in Kyrgyzstan should not put limitations on women s professional development. I commented on her words: AC: First of all, I think that it is necessary to explain this issue to the men here. G: Yes, and sometimes we do it. AC: And what is the result? G: If I explain this matter, they accept it.²⁰³ Gulsun believes, however, that not only men’s opinion is an obstacle to women's professional involvement, but the trends promoted within some interpretations of Islamic teaching. According to her words, at present, many women want to learn about religion, but at the same time, they have scarce knowledge of the secular subjects. I am afraid that in the course of time, we will not have female professionals such as teachers, medical doctors and so forth. We have ²⁰² On the basis of my various conversations with religious leaders and Muslims in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the years of 2010-2015. ²⁰³ A conversation with Gulsun otyncha, August 2015. 181 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and ocynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan regressed as a society. Obviously, it is very good that women want to learn about Islam but they should also attend public schools and universities. I do not know what will happen to us in five, ten years if women are not educated. They say that they think about life after death, so that is why they are very religious, but unfortunately they forget about this life. I think that this is a misunderstanding of the word of God. Parents want their children to live according to Islam which obviously is very good. Thus, they send their children to religious schools or hujras but many of them do not represent a relevant level of religious teaching. Islam does not say that a woman has to be uneducated, quite the contrary, our religion encourages seeking religious and secular knowledge by both women and men. Thus, parents want their children to be religious but because of the low level of religious education, eventually children know neither about Islam, nor secular subjects. People do not think about the future. They claim ‘It is all God's will, if He wants, He will give us a good life ’. However, this way of thinking is incorrect. You need to work to achieve something in your life. Besides, after all you simply need to make a living. Some people isolated themselves from the society claiming that they live according to Islam, but this is a wrong understanding of religion. In my opinion, these people are afraid of difficulties, so they escape life to embrace religion. In fact, if you really want to study Islam and work then you have little time for yourself. People do not want to make such an effort. They want an easy life!™ Gulsun also thinks that a hijab is obligatory for a woman in Islam, but at the same time it should be always a personal choice of a person. No one has the right to interfere with this decision or impose a veil upon a woman. Gulsun’s daughters do not wear a hijab, all of them work, one is a medical doctor. Although Gulsun comes from the tura family of considerable social standing, she and her husband allowed their children to choose their spouses, even daughters could do it independently, and their husbands are not tura.™ ²⁰⁴ An excerpt from an interview with Gulsun otyncha. August 2015. ²⁰⁵ According to information acquired by me in Khujand and in the local area in Tajikistan in the years 2010-2014, noble families have still practised endogamy which is almost obligatory for daughters; male members of the noble families are allowed sometimes to choose a wife from other social groups (see 182 4 5- Polygamy as a topic of discussion Gulsun’s progressive ideas are met with criticism of more conservative circles. As a religious leader, she is constantly involved in discussions on many issues. In the following part of this chapter I present the view of Gulsun and others on one of the most controversial topics in Kyrgyzstan, namely polygamy. 4.5. Polygamy as a topic of discussion Once upon a time, several women came with questions to Imam Abu Hanifa: Why only men have the right to marry multiple women? Why women cannot take more than one husband?' Abu Hanifa thought for a moment and said: ‘It would be better if my daughter Hanifa explained this issue Hanifa did not to answer the question directly, instead she brought two small bowls, and poured one portion of milk from one mother to one bowl, and some milk from several mothers into another bowl. Then she asked the women: ‘Now tell me, please, which milk belongs to whom? ’In the case of the first bowl, the women had no doubt who was the owner of milk. In the case of the second bowl they said: ‘How can we recognise it if the milk is mixed?’ ‘Well... 'Hanifa said. ‘You have just answered the question about polygamy on your own. If we mix male semen how you would know who the father of your child was? ’ The women said: ‘Our doubts are dispelled, and now we understand why men can have several wives, but we are only allowed to have one husband’.* ²⁰⁶ At present, the topic of polygamy in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in Tajikistan provokes a great deal of controversy and discussions. The number of polygamous marriages in Central Asia is growing. As I mentioned in Chapter I, polygamy existed in the Soviet times even though the Soviet authorities tried to put an end to the practice. In Chapter V). Thus, Gulsun otyncha and her husband have a fairly modem view on this matter but it can be also an indicator of the reduction of the significance of noble origin in this particular place. ²⁰⁶ I heard this story from a religious woman in Shahrak, officially she was not a religious teacher, but she studied Islam on her own, and sometimes advised her female friends on various matters. 183 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a man can legally marry one woman, and a marriage is registered in ZAGS (Russian: Zapisi Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoianiia; Records of the Civil Status Act). However, some men maintain a second woman, and sometimes even more wives. They are only wedded by the Islamic marriage nikah, which is not legally recognized. In this case, an informal wife has no legal marital rights, if the marriage ends or if a partner dies. Some women are left with children without any financial support after their marriage had broken down. The issue of legalization of polygamy to control it (under certain conditions) was recently raised in Kyrgyzstan. Some religious leaders, politicians and social activists support this idea, others, however, oppose it, indicating that legal recognition polygamy would result in a great number of legal and social problems (Isakov 2015; Commercio, Cleuziou 2016). Some people believe that polygamy should be allowed because it is reflected in the Islamic message, and since it is widespread in Kyrgyzstan, its legalisation would regulate the situation of many families. Polygamy should be regulated but under certain conditions, for instance: an older man should not marry a very young girl. A polygamous marriage should be legalized in order to protect the rights ofthese women who have already been in an informal relationship regulated only by nikah and who, according to the Kyrgyz law, have no legal rights. The second wife should not be merely a source of pleasure for a man, who should be responsible for all his wives. Women in Kyrgyzstan should be more aware of their rights in Islam (...). A girl can get married in a young age, but she has to give her consent, nobody should be forced to get married. If women know their rights and how to advocate them, men will pay alimony and do other things for them. Besides, at present in Kyrgyzstan, we have poverty, unemployment and an increasing number of divorces. Many women are left with children after the divorce, and they have little chance of finding another husband, thus they often have lovers who also have wives. Taking into consideration the above circumstances, it would be better to legalize polygamy.²⁰¹ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁷ An excerpt from an interview with the head of the theology department in Osh, July 2015. 184 4-5- Polygamy as a topic of discussion As a matter of fact, many politicians, businessmen, religious leaders and even social workers have a second wife in Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Polygamy is also widespread among migrants in Russia. Some of them maintain two households in two countries. Moreover, the religious leaders are frequently involved in resolving family issues in the case of divorce and division of property of the informally wedded couples, even though it is illegal from the legal point of view. Thus a question arises about the existence of two parallel legal systems in Kyrgyzstan - the first which is exercised within the framework of the official state law, and the other based on sharia and local adats. For instance, the qazi of the city of Osh has two wives, who are said to be friendly with each other. He is also said to be involved in cases of informal marriage and divorce even though he is the head of the official religious institution, which should act in compliance with the state law.²⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the weak structures of the Kyrgyz state favour the formation of this kind of informal mechanisms of social regulations, especially that they are often discretely accepted by some high-ranking officials. The Kyrgyz society is not mature enough for polygamy. Few people know that a man may have more than one wife only under specific circumstances and conditions. If polygamy was legalized in Kyrgyzstan, there would be many violations. Men often take a second wife for the sake of prestige, to show their social position. People are not aware that, for example, in the Arab Emirates, only 1% of men have more than one wife. In my opinion, at present, in Kyrgyzstan there are two groups of women who decide to become second wives. The first group includes young, professionally active women who do not want to have any relations with the mans family, which due to our tradition, could be problematic, or they cannot find an adequate candidate for themselves. However, they want a baby. Thus, they decide to perform nikah without being concerned whether this relationship would last for long. The second group includes poor women for whom marriage is ²⁰,¹ On the basis of information collected during field research. 185 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and otynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan the only chance to improve their financial situation. This group is the most vulnerable to the consequences of informal marriage.²⁰⁹ ²¹⁰ Even though wives from informal relationships tend to be more often left by men than the first ‘legitimate’ wives, for a girl from a poor family, marriage with a man of higher social standing is a chance to raise her status. Even though the woman is only a second wife, the informal marriage is not only beneficial for her but also for all her relatives, since it is an opportunity to expand their network and establish new profitable relationships. Commercio and Cleuziou (2016) indicate that despite a risk of quick and uncompromising divorce, a polygamous marriage is a better solution for many women in Central Asia than to be single and childless. The majority of women who agree to become a second wife, are divorced, or widowed. They prefer to be informally married than to risk having a low status of an unmarried woman. Polygamy is advocated by some Islamic groups which argue that for a first wife, agreeing for her husband to take a second wife, or even helping him find a suitable candidate, is savob, something considered to be a good deed, deserving the favour of God. Nurmila (2009: 81) points out that in Indonesia, some first wives agree for the second marriage of their husbands mainly because they believe that Islam legitimizes polygamy. They think that accepting their husbands’ polygamous marriage is a sign of their religious devotion. Many of them, however, do not feel comfortable with such a choice. Such an approach creates many problems, a woman agrees for a second wife thinking that she acts in the name of religious values. Shortly after the wedding with another woman a conflict starts, the first wife is usually put aside, she becomes jealous of the second wife. Both women compete with each other, being constantly concerned about their relationship with the husband.²'⁰ The first wife, however, often does not know that she is not the only partner of her spouse. An informal marriage is secretly performed by ²⁰⁹ An excerpt from a conversation with a daughter of one of the leaders of Mutakalim; she is about 30 years old, graduated from a madrasa in Turkey, and is a Muslim fashion designer in Bishkek, July 2015. ²¹⁰ An excerpt from an interview with an employee of the local NGO. 186 4-5- Polygamy as a topic of discussion a mulla. A man visits his second wife, but usually he lives with the first wife. If the latter finds out about the secret relationship of her husband, she rarely decides to divorce, mostly due to financial reasons, but also out of the stigma attached to being a divorcee. She also does not want to lose the legal rights to property and inheritance in the case of her husband’s death (Commercio, Cleuziou 2016). Even if I did not ask about polygamy directly, this was frequently coming up in my conversations with religious leaders as well as other people. Most theologians and spiritual figures, both male and female, supported polygamy as being compatible with Islam. I think that if a woman agrees to become a second wife, polygamy is acceptable. If I did not have a husband, I would accept to be a second wife, but only of an Islamic theologian, to have an opportunity to learn about Islam from himP{ Gulsun otyncha, however, is opposed to polygamy; to support her opinion, she quoted a story from her experience: Once two men with their wives came to me with a question: ‘Does Islam allow Muslim men to have four wives?’ I think that they agreed to visit an otyncha due to the request of their wives, and because they thought that I would support the idea of their second marriage since it is permitted by Islam (...). I answered them in the following way: ‘It is true that our Prophet (peace be upon Him) had many wives, but you have to know that he had never taken a young woman for his pleasure. It was a very difficult time for the people, a number of men were killed during the hostilities, and many women and children were left without any support. Our Hazrat wanted to help these women, thus he married a number of them. However, you do not want to act like our Prophet! You came to me because you thought that I would justify that you want to take a young wife for your enjoyment. If you want to marry another woman, you should always respect the principle of equal treatment of all wives, even if you want to share a pinch of salt. Thus, rather than seeking another woman, you should take proper care of your present wife and children. You should give them adequate education. This is ¹¹ A quotation from my conversation with Dilfuza, a teacher of Islam, July 2015. 187 Chapter IV. The madrasa network and orynchas in Southern Kyrgyzstan the best way to equip them for the future’. Finally, they listened to my advice, and now they live happily. The discussion on polygamy demonstrates in how Islam shapes the social relationships in Kyrgyzstan, in parallel with the secular institutions. The boundaries between the informal religious rules and the state law have become fluid. Consequently, the Kyrgyz legal system may be reorganized to include elements of the sharia law in the near future, as in many countries with a Muslim majority. The changes will be dictated not only by the pressure from religious circles (as is commonly perceived by the opponents such solutions) but also taking into account practical considerations, as the debate on polygamy demonstrates. Both female and male religious leaders significantly contribute to shaping people’s opinion on this issue. Many religious professionals seek to legitimize polygamy in Islam by pointing to the practical implications of its legalization. Some others, like Gulsun otyncha, argue that nowadays polygamy is not justified and in the long run its legalization would be harmful for the society. Each of the parties gives their arguments referring to the socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan, and to the message of the Quran. 4.6. Conclusions Doorn-Harder (2006), in her book Women Shaping Islam. Reading the Quran in Indonesia discusses the issue of Islamic feminisms in the country and the position of female religious leaders as social figures who can introduce progressive changes within the religion. At the same time, however, she indicates that the religious and ideological framework for women s rights differ vastly from those in the West, the prevailing attitudes cannot be compared to western liberal feminist idea that stress individual agency (2006: 7). Despite relatively progressive views of the female figures presented in this chapter, their attitudes are determined by the social environment in which they function. Islam and religious knowledge legitimizes their actions which should be always consistent with religion, and the local culture. Each of the women, 188 4-6. Conclusions however, developed her own understanding of religious principles which is reflected in their teaching and opinions. Amina together with Elmira have shaped a female madrasa in order to raise a new generation of Muslim women in line with the rules of Islam. Their madrasa is also expected to become an alternative to the informal hujras and ustods spreading controversial ideologies. Nevertheless, the conservative environment of the Shahrak district determines the spirit of the school. It is also a place which ideologically supports the official religious policy. Religious education is under strict control of the state and follows a pre-determined curriculum. The authority of Amina and Elmira is therefore, to some extent, determined institutionally. Both teachers should follow very specific rules, for instance they cannot interpret the Quran and the religious rules independently. Gulsun otyncha s position is much more independent. She does not need to exercise her authority through institutional mechanisms; over the years of teaching she formed her own circle of influence which consists of her former and current students. The high reputation of Gulsun is based on her religious knowledge and a personal charisma but also on the social standing of her family. It gives her confidence to express various independent views even if they stand in opposition to the opinions of some male religious authorities. She understands the problems of her community, and can effectively act as a social leader, mediating and providing advice on various matters. All those female religious figures bring different values into the religious sphere and the female circle. The place where they live is marked by ethnic conflict and a very difficult social situation. Moreover, the moral standards and activities of the female religious leaders are constantly monitored by the members of their communities, including people who have a critical attitude toward the social and religious activity of women. The increasing popularity of a strict interpretation of the Islamic creed challenges the views of more moderate teachers, even if the latter follow the practices and traditions of Islam. 189 Chapter V Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan -between the state and the people 5.1. A/amazwith Rahmon's portrait A friend of mine is a Muslim from Europe. For the purpose of this book, I call her Aisha. She used to work in Tajikistan, for an international NGO as a consultant. In 2012 Aisha was in Dushanbe and was aware that women were not allowed to pray in mosques. Someone told her, however, that she could possibly perform namaz in the Central Mosque of Dushanbe, since there is a female madrasa. Aisha decided to go to the Central Mosque. Upon arrival she asked about the location of a chapel were women were allowed to pray. When she leamt that the chapel for women was closed, she went to the office of the authorities of the mosque, to ask where she can perform a prayer. According to her account, the imam explained that women in Tajikistan were not allowed to pray in the mosque, but since she was a guest, he offered her space to pray in his office. He gave Aisha a prayer rug and left the room leaving her in the assistance of a young girl. The girl showed Aisha the direction of Mecca. It was, however, coincidentally convergent with the wall where a portrait of president Rahmon was hanged. Aisha was confused. Aisha: Should I pray to Rahmon’s portrait? - she made a jocular remark about the situation. 191 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... Girl: Well, no... Aisha: So, could you take this picture off, please? Girl: No... but I can cover it up. Finally Rahmon’s portrait was covered by a piece of fabric, and Aisha performed her namaz. The girl watched her carefully, and when Aisha finished a prayer, the girl asked: Girl: Are you Salafi? Aisha: No. I am not Salafi... why do you think that I am Salafi? Girl: Because you pray like a Salafi, we... (Hanafi), pray differently. Aisha: So, how do you pray? The girl began to make the movements of the various stages of the Islamic prayer, Aisha followed to show her once again how she prays, realising the absurdity of the whole situation. She knew, however, that Salafiyya groups are banned in Tajikistan, and that she could end up at the police station if she was accused of beling Salafi. Finally, they came to the conclusion that Aisha prays in ‘a proper way’, and she was not Salafi. The atmosphere became more relaxed. The girl turned out to be a student of the female madrasa. She told Aisha that at present female students cannot officially pray at the school since the authorities closed a chapel where women could pray. In Tajikistan performing prayers is only allowed in the registered places of religious worship. However, women pray in secret, closing the door of a classroom. Sometimes, she and her classmates attended the IRPT centre in Dushanbe, where lectures on Islam were held, and until 2010 there was a chapel where women could pray.²¹² Aisha decided to visit the IRPT centre to talk about women’s access to mosques in Tajikistan. The girl agreed to be a guide. They went together with a marshrutka (minibus) to the IRPT place which was located quite far from the centre of Dushanbe. Upon arrival at the place, Aisha introduced herself, explaining the purpose of her visit to a man in ²¹² The country’s only mosque that officially allowed women to pray, which was also the IRPT Dushanbe cultural centre, was destroyed in a fire in October 2010. Shortly after the IRPT office lost the permission to perform any worship services. 192 y.i. /''Jamaz with Rahmon's portrait the office. He seemed to be reluctant to answer the questions of someone from abroad. Thus after 10 minutes both women left the place. Two years later, while conducing research in Khujand, I had an interview with a representative of the Department of Religious Affairs of this city. My interlocutor devoted part of our conversation to explaining to me the way in which ‘the Salafi’ pray and how to recognize them, taking into account their appearance and outfit. He showed me how to perform a full rakat of namaz, giving me detailed information on ‘how to trace a Salafi’. I visited Tajikistan a number of times in the years 2010-2014, working in various places. Since then, I have had the opportunity to observe the tightening control over religious life, which in some cases turned into ‘a witch-hunt’, as in the case of tracing ‘Salafi’ or other ‘extremists’ based on the example of Aisha, and my conversation with the official in Khujand. An accusation of ‘terrorism’ or ‘Salafism’ could have serious consequences, including incarceration, torture, and other forms of intimidation, not only for the accused but also for their family. It also happens that alleged terrorists leave prison after paying a bribe, which is usually no less than several thousand USD.²¹³ As I described in Chapter I, in spite the existence of a real threat of terrorism and radicalism in the region, the practices of regional governments fail to create adequate conditions to tackle these problems. Instead, they constrain individual freedoms and tighten the control over citizens and religious institutions. In 2014, however, at least at the beginning of my work, despite the circumstances, I thought that since my research was related to the study of spiritual life, traditions, religion and the role of female religious leaders, I was out of the political game. Besides, I did not intend to be involved in political debates on the relationship between religion and the state. However, in Tajikistan, no issue related to religion is seen as neutral. Religion and politics are inseparable, hence female religious ²¹³ This paragraph refers to the stories I heard in Tajikistan until the dissolution of the IRPT in 2015. At present, the situation has changed, and it may be more difficult to get out of a prison for those accused of terrorism. 193 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... leaders are also under the scrutiny of the state structures. Therefore, my work as a scholar became the subject of interest of various actors. In this chapter I present part of the material that I managed to collect in Tajikistan in 2014. Some findings come from my earlier work. The main goal of this part of the book is to show the dynamics of interactions among the various religious networks and female religious leaders, and their mutual influences, but also their reaction to the religious policy of the Tajik state. I discuss the mechanisms of power which impact the process of transformation of female religiosity. The majority of female religious figures presented here live in Khujand and the neighbouring area. One female figure comes from the Isfara district. Shortly after my arrival to Khujand I noticed that although many female leaders are active here, there is a strong but hidden pressure imposed on them. First of all, since religious education was banned by the state, private classes of Islam were held only unofficially at homes. Most people, however, knew only that they could not organize private classes, but they were not aware on what basis teaching of religion was banned. Only few people whom I interviewed knew that they should obtain a certificate but they had no information on the procedures required to get it. As I mentioned Chapter I, in the Nuri Islom Mosque, the gatherings for women were held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, where some religious matters were explained, but the authorities did not approve of women’s attendance in these meetings. Consequently, some people, including female religious figures, were afraid of any relations with the IRPT. I began my study without major obstacles; various contacts from my previous years of work allowed me to make some new friendships among female religious leaders as well as other people. In the course of my work, however, this has changed. At the beginning, it was more palpable than visible, some telephones did not answer, some old friends started avoiding me. Nevertheless, I continued my work in an increasingly nervous atmosphere. At first, I rented a small apartment in Khujand, and because the situation deteriorated, I was worried that someone might go through my belongings in my absence, or copy data from my computer. Finally, I decided to move to a mahalla located in the Ghafurov district, upon invitation of my Uzbek friend. I also 194 5.1. Khujand and its networks reduced the number of official meetings and visits to public places, such as mazars and mosques, and focused on direct contacts with female religious leaders and other people who were relevant to my research. In the end of June 2014, the office of the IRPT in Khujand was destroyed by the authorities. It happened just several days before the 17th anniversary of the peace agreement signed in Moscow on June 27, 1997, which ended the civil war. Around the same time, Alexander Sodiqov - a Tajik national and a researcher based in Canada - was arrested. The Taj ik authorities accused him of ‘subversion and espionage ’ (Trilling 2014). I conducted my last interviews and collected materials thinking that it was the last moment to do research on female religious leaders in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, the events of the following two years only confirmed my suspicions. 5.2. Khujand and its networks Khujand is the second largest city of Tajikistan and the capital of the Sughd Province situated in the northern part of the country. According to TAJSTAT (2014), 169,700 people lived there in 2013. This old and historical city is located in the south-western part of the Ferghana Valley, on the bank of the Syr Darya river. In the Soviet period, the city was named Leninabad (Tajik: Leninobod). As part of the Khanate of Kokand, Khujand came relatively early under the Russian influence (the city was captured by the Russian army in 1866). Perhaps this was one of the main reasons why the city elite was more prone to absorbing ideas imposed by the Soviet state, and subsequently played a leading role in the Tajik SSR. In the wake of the October Revolution, the city was industrialized and integrated into the Soviet system. Russians and other Europeans coming to the city influenced many spheres of the Khujand life. The Sughd Province, including Khujand, was less affected by the civil war after the independence than the southern part of the country. It made the Soviet structures more durable in comparison with the rest of Tajikistan. Despite the exodus of the European population after secession from the USSR, Khujand still partly retained the ‘Soviet spirit’ mixed with a style of an ‘Asian city’, and is a relatively well-developed 195 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... urban centre. Similarly to other parts of the country, as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, production dropped drastically, and the standard of living deteriorated. Slowly, some market mechanisms were introduced, and privatization took hold. Nevertheless, poverty is visible on the streets. There are no reliable statistics regarding unemployment rates and migration. However, as in the other parts of Tajikistan, a number of migrant workers living in Russia is substantial. Despite an ostensible acculturation during the Soviet period, the city as well as the whole province were exposed to a lesser extent to the changes in the social structure related to the resettlement of the population than the central and south Tajikistan (the Vakhsh Valley, Kuliabskaia oblast or Dushanbe). In the area of Leninabad, the irrigation system for planting cotton was constructed in the area of present-day Spitamen (the former Now) and Zafarobod districts. People were resettled from the Upper Matcha, Yaghnob Valley, the Ghonchi District and other places. Despite these changes, however, newcomers were integrated into the local structures. New relationships were established, but they did not dominate the old pattern. In the Vakhsh Valley and Dushanbe, the number of newcomers exceeded the number of the representatives of the indigenous population, and new networks were created. As a result, the social structure was more susceptible to transformation which consequently impacted tradition. In Khujand, regardless of Sovietization, part of the pre-revolutionary structure, including religious networks, remained. Flora J. Roberts (2016) in her PhD dissertation Old Elites under Communism: Soviet rule in Leninobod described the way in which the pre-revolutionary elite adapted to the new conditions after the October Revolution, navigating and transforming its form, at the same time maintaining the core of its structure, including social stratification, and hierarchies. She argues that despite unfavourable political and social conditions, especially during the period of Stalinism, the Leninabod elite was able to maintain their status and prestige. Roberts stresses the importance of the cultural capital and its transmission by the elite group into the Soviet system through participation in secular activities, including education, but also its purely religious nature. Despite persecution of religion, old traditions and practices were passed from generation to generation by 196 5-2. Khujand and its networks religious leaders with a strong participation of women. It resulted in the creation of cultural fusion in the USSR, period, when the traditional Khujand elite assumed power in the republic, strongly contributing to the formation of a ‘modem-Soviet elite’ of Tajikistan, but at the same time preserving tradition and Islam. To this day, there is a group called asilzodagon - ‘the well-bom’ - in Khujand, asserting their identity and status by means of family trees (shajara) written in shajaranoma,²'⁴ tracing their descent back to many generations (Roberts 2016: 44-45). Roberts refers to the asilzodagon as ‘white-boned’ (oq suyak in Uzbek), in opposition to the commoners, ‘the black ones’ (qoracha, qara suyak). Both terms are also used in other parts of Central Asia. According to a classification I prepared in 2014, in Khujand, there has been a strong division into two social strata (Tajik: tabaqa) - ‘aristocracy ’ ([referred to as asilzodagon, ashrafon, also khosa) stipulating a large group of oya which has a certain hierarchy. The most noble is tura, followed by khojas, sayyids, makhdums, eshons, mirzos, and all groups interwoven with one another (see Chapter II). A lower class (qara suyak) is called khalqiyat ([omma] - commonalty, people). The first category constituted a social group whose prestige and position has always been legitimized by presumptive or real religious origin, and not infrequently combined with considerable wealth, especially prior to the Russian conquests. Russians attempted to undermine the position of the high class, since they sought to establish their own order based on the loyal local groups. Paradoxically, after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks contributed to the restoration of the position of oq suyak in many places in Central Asia, since the local elite used the opportunity of a power shift to incorporate their own networks into new structures, and to regain their influences. As a result, almost all leading figures of new Central Asian republics were originally from the class of ‘white ²IJ Shajaranoma, which means ‘knowledge of genealogy’, ‘the genealogical book of a family’. Shajaranoma is carefully checked, especially by noble families before a decision is made concerning their children’s marriage or to legitimise someone’s rights to certain assets, positions, or in other cases (see Cieslewska 2015a: 42). Classical Islamic sources refer to this kind of relationship by the term nisba. 197 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... bone’, and even the repressions of the 1930s did not completely change this situation.²¹⁵ In Khujand the high class includes traditional religious leaders, academics, part of the ruling elite, intellectuals, and other people. At present, the boundaries between both groups are blurred to some extent, since the traditional pattern of relationships has also been affected by new capitalistic mechanisms. Following the independence, a group of wealthy ‘new Tajiks’ emerged, attempting to challenge the existing relationships. In the long run this can influence a transformation of the social structure. Differences between the groups are expressed in family terms which differ from each other, and through the marriage system - the aristocracy observes endogamy, searching for a spouse mostly within their own group. Preferably, a partner is selected from a close circle of a particular family network. At present, however, this aspect has seen gradual change, and there are cases of marriages with people from a lower class. However, girls are still married off within their own group, while men are sometimes allowed to take a wife from a different class.²¹⁶ Another distinction which is important in the context of Khujand, as well as the Ferghana Valley, is that there is a division into Tajik- and Uzbek-speaking groups, reflecting a complex phenomenon of ethnicity in the Ferghana Valley. Prior to the October Revolution, both groups were included into the category of sart. This term was associated with the Persian-Turkic-speaking sedentary population which inhabited cities and the valleys, and were included within a wide cathegory of the Chagatai culture.²¹⁷ This term became obsolete during the period of the USSR, and at present the ethnic division between the Uzbeks and Tajiks is more clearly defined than in the past. ²¹⁵ For more information on those categories see Abashin (2001 ). ²¹⁶ Information provided here was collected by me during the years 2010-2014. I attempted to identify the family terms of both groups. Nevertheless, further research has to be conducted in order to outline the social structure and the role of a particular layer and its transformation in Khujand and the neighbouring area. ²¹⁷ For an explanation of the term sart see Abashin (2007); Labenda (2016). 198 5.2. Khujand and its networks It should be noted, however, that in the Ferghana Valley, including Khujand and the neighbouring area, Uzbeks and Tajiks have lived side by side for centuries, and despite linguistic differences, both groups have similar social diversification, for instance, it has been always preferable to marry off a daughter from an eshon family of Tajiks to someone from an eshon family of Uzbeks rather than to a person who is Tajik of a khaukiya group. Ethnicity is considered important, but it is not the only way of defining social relationships. As far as religious networks are concerned, people of noble origin and good Islamic upbringing still enjoy social recognition. Nevertheless, even in the pre-revolutionary period, there were people who did not come from religious families, but gained religious education, and became the religious figures - Alims (theologians). There are religious leaders who do not have ‘a noble origin’ and are respected by people due to their knowledge of Islam. If someone becomes Alim (theologian), he is highly regarded by people irrespective of family background.¹'^ Referring to my previous argument, in the recent period of‘the Islamic revival’, an increasing number of people began to have access to religious education. Prior to 2010, there were opportunities to study religion abroad, and until recently in madrasas, and hujras in Tajikistan (see Chapter I). As indicated earlier, in the process of the transformation of Islam after the collapse of the USSR, traditions and practices performed by bibi-otuns became very popular, and they are adapted to new conditions. Practices which were previously performed clandestinely emerged from the underground. Organizing rituals and ceremonies in the presence of religious leaders became fashionable. As a result, the profession of bibi-otun became accessible to many people. In the past, a person became a bibi-otun only by inheriting this position from the female line of ancestors. At present, there are many bibi-otuns in every mahalla, and people who do not have noble origin can perform various religious services (See Chapters I and II). * ²¹⁸ A quotation from an interview with a female teacher of Islam of a noble origin, June 2014 Khujand. 199 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... However, nasiba (a spiritual gift) is still regarded as something that can be only inherited from one’s ancestors. The new teachers of Islam question the concept of nasiba, pointing to the importance of studying scriptural religious sources, and on this basis evaluating religious knowledge of a particular religious leader. Similarly, as earlier Jaddidis, new leaders undermine, but sometimes also absorb, the traditional networks which trigger their transformation. I elaborate on this subject in the following part of this chapter. 5.3. The rituals of Qalandar-khona There is a house in the centre of Khujand located in an old mahalla, hidden at the back of the buildings of the local hukumat (city administration). People named this place Qalandar-khona. According to a legend, it was founded about 100 years ago. Back then, a holy dervish arrived in Khujand. He was very poor (qalandar), and lived in a place which is now known as Qalandar-khona.²¹⁹ Soon after his arrival, people started visiting him, seeking help and advice; he cured them by citing the suras of the Quran. The place became famous, and many pilgrims began to visit him. He got married and had children. Since then, his descendants have looked after this place, performing various rituals and healing people.²²⁰ I was invited by friends of mine for the Bibi Mushkil-Kusho ritual to Qalandar-khona on Wednesday. When we arrived at about 7 o’clock many women were already there, waiting for the performance of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho and forming a considerable crowd, pushing each other at the entrance. One of the women performing the ritual was a distant relative of a friend of mine, thus we did not have to wait in the queue for ²¹⁹ According to my informants, despite the name ‘Qalandar-khona’, the dervish considered as a qalandar, he was not a member of the Qalandar order which before the October Revolution was a popular group of poor and travelling dervishes. ²²⁰ On the basis of stories about Qalandar-khona that I gathered in Khujand in 2014. zoo $.y The rituals of Qalandar-khona our turn. We entered the place where the ritual was held, took our seats and observed the situation. The ritual was organized in two separate rooms. Visitors brought food and other necessary things such as pieces of cotton, raisins, candles as well as water from a local well which was considered to be a sacred place. After the ritual people took all those things for their consumption. The ritual was performed by the female representatives of the shaikh's family who protects this holy place. Every half an hour, a new group of women came to celebrate Bibi Mushkil-Kusho. The celebration was conducted in a simplified manner. The leader recited various suras and zikrs but the story about the old man was not told. A big tray with candles was circulated around the room. In the end, the women who led the ritual blew the air with the words suf-kuf pronounced over the water and food products. Following the end of the ritual, the participants visited the shaikh, who was sitting in a separate room and recited suras for people over water. Men also queued up to see the shaikh. Although they were not directly involved in the ritual, they used the sacred influence of Wednesdays to ask for help on important matters, sometimes passing messages through female members of their families. At 12 p.m. the ritual was over, people left the Qalandar-khona, and the door of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho closed until the following week. The shaikh of Qalandar-khona (whose age was about 90) and the members of his family provided various sacred services. They belong to the sayyids group linked to various noble networks of Khujand. The shaikh has not always been religious. He was involved in the informal trade during the times of the USSR, and spent six years in prison in Kurgan Tube for ‘profiteering’ (Russian: спекуляция), then at the request of his parents, he started performing rituals. The shaikh said: I always fought the communists, I only fear Him (God)! People come to Qalandar-khona to sort out various matters. The shaikh recites prayers for the mentally ill, infertile couples and others. He also gives fotiha to momo-doyas who visit him to accept their nasiba. According to Sukhareva (1975: 197), in the past, the momo--doyas performed the role of traditional midwives. My study shows that at present in many cases their role is limited to performing rituals related 201 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... to pregnancy and new-born children, such as the practice of blessing women during certain stages of their pregnancy or gavora bandon (the cradle ceremony), and other life-cycle rituals. In some places, momo--doyas still assist during childbirth. This assistance, according to the Tajik law, should be performed exclusively by professional midwives. In the Tajik language, the word momo-doya is also used interchangeably with the Russian word akusherka (professional midwife). Sometimes professional midwives also perform rituals for women in the hospitals. The shaikh inherited his position from his mother, but his father was also a religious professional. Their photographs are displayed in the room where the shaikh receives his visitors. Moreover, people visit Qalandar-khona to perform special rituals of removing spells. Wednesday is a day for women because it is the day of Bibi Mushkil--Kusho and pilgrimages (see Chapter III). The shaikh s daughter-in-law learned to perform Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at his request, after the death of his mother, who was bibi-otun and the shaikh of this place. Until recently bibi-otuns performed zikrs there. People make a pilgrimage to Qalandar-khona to calm their minds, hoping to solve their problems. They believe that this place has a magic power, and prayers said there are spiritually more powerful. Rituals and prayers bring peace to your mind, and calm to your soul - said Ibrahim, the shaikh’s son - This place provides help to people (it is like an intermediary place). People come here but only God can make their wishes come true (Tajik: In dargoh sababchi orzu mukofotosh Khudo medihad).-¹¹ Qalandar-khona is strongly linked to the phenomenon which Rakhimov (2009: 9-13) defines as ‘female religiosity’ related to traditions and practices which function outside of mainstream Islam, such as various life-cycle rituals including fertility rites, and a cult of nature: water, fire and others. According to him, the worship of mazars, in contrast to the canonical interpretation of Islam (which is related to the Scripture and the mosque) represents religion of the path of spiritual learning and magic. In the mosque, which is inaccessible for women, people pray to an abstract God, by using abstract prayers. ²²¹ An excerpt from an interview with Ibrahim, the shaikh’s son, May 2014. 202 5-3- The rituals of Qalandar-khona In this case, God is a teacher and a judge to a person who performs prayers. In terms of pilgrimages to holy places, with an exception of restriction to enter particular tombs, there is no special prohibition for women. Man usually stay inside a central object of veneration which is a mausoleum, expressing prayers by selecting suitable Quranic texts. Women visit a shrine performing specific acts - they touch the walls of a tomb, the threshold, and light candles etc.; their prayers are an individual and spontaneous expression of sacred formulas which do not function within the main canon. In this way, they can connect directly with a spirit of a particular place, as a form of intermediary between them and the divine, expressing particular wishes. It brings God closer to people, the fear of God is transformed into hope. This ritual division into the men’s and women’s world demonstrates a dual nature of the human being - the female and male spiritual powers. The shaikh of this place is also a protector of momo-doyas who accept their vocation. The profession of momo-doya is related to feminine power associated with fertility and labour; it involves not only receiving deliveries but also performing rituals to protect the mother and her child. The shaikh inherited this position from his mother (bibi-otun), accepting in this way those elements of spirituality which constitute the domain of women, and a sphere of influence of female religious leaders - bibi-otuns and momo-doyas. Even though he is a man, the shaikh participates in the world reserved for women, therefore he goes beyond what is considered taboo for other men. He becomes an intermediary between a priest of Islam and the cults related to nature. The shaikh and his relatives were criticized by both the government circles and other supporters of purification of Islam for promoting ‘backward practices’, he was also accused of using the holy place as a source of income for him and his family. Qalandar-khona was not popular among people who wanted to pursue an advanced study of Islamic theology. This place was visited by common people who sought consolation, advice, and who believed that performing the rituals would help them overcome problems. 203 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... 5.4. A story of Farida otun An otun should show people an example of good deeds, and in which way they should follow the principles of religion and the Quran. This is something like the constitution, every country has its own constitution. If a person wants to behave like a Muslim, this is defined by a certain framework and rules that should be respected. A n otun should be religious, patient, and also forgiving. She should know what is morally good or wrong, what is sacred, and what is a sin. Obviously, some people listen, others do not listen. She should know many things, and be eloquent. If an otun reads a great deal of literature, knows hadises, rivoyats, she has always something interesting to say. She should not force people to do something, she can encourage them in a delicate (sensitive) way, not judging others. If a person speaks aggressively, people would be offended and consequently they can become disheartened to religion and the Quran. Farida (aged 65) is a bibi-otun, she lives in the Uzbek mahalla, not far from the centre of the town of Ghafurov. Referring back to Chapter III, Farida is an aunt of a friend of mine, Khaimiso, in whose house I used to live in 2014. Farida is a teacher by profession and in the past she taught Uzbek language and literature at school. She became a bibi-otun 20 years ago due to her own effort and choice even though nobody from her family was a religious leader. Her family used to live not far from the house of domullo, who taught the Arabic letters to young Farida. Then she continued her studies with another mulla. She later learnt female rituals from books with the help of the local bibi--otun. Farida’s profession of teacher and her knowledge of the Uzbek literature helped her to perform bibi-otun's tasks. While performing rituals, Farida tells stories, recites Uzbek proverbs and poems. People know me because I was a teacher, and for this reason they respect me. When I became a bibi-otun, they knew that they could commit their children to my care and that I would teach them religion and tradition in a proper manner.¹¹² ²²² An excerpt from an interview with Farida, May 2014. 204 5-4- A story of Farida otun Although she is not of noble origin, she is a well-known otun in her neighbourhood. She has a network of neighbours and relatives, some of whom are her former students. Farida is invited to recite the Quran at various celebrations such as weddings, circumcision celebrations, funerals, to perform Mushkil-kusho, Bibi-Seshanbe, and other rituals (see Chapter III). In her small and modest house, she plays with her numerous grandchildren, reads religious books, and receives women coming to visit her with questions regarding religion and life-related matters. F: People come to me with questions if they do not understand something about religious matters, they have family problems, or they quarrel and want to divorce. For instance, my former student visited me some time ago. There were problems in communication between her and her mother-in-law. I began to explain to her that she has to be patient, and everything will settle down. I visited her in-laws, and asked them to accept her, I talked with them a lot. Finally, the situation improved, and now they live together in harmony. I also taught her mother-in-law how to read the Quran. The kelin delivered another baby — a son; before she had a daughter. There are a lot of cases like that, and I help people to resolve them. AC: Thus, do you work as a kind of psychologist? F: I do not know. I give them advice according to my life experience and Islam, I also had difficult times in my life, so I know how it is (...). At present, there are a lot of conflicts between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. Tursunova Sadikova, an Uzbek female writer who based her stories on religious texts, writes: ‘‘The best woman is the best mother-in-law ". It means that if a person is a good mother-in-law, she is also a good woman. Being a mother-in-law is not an easy task. It is about establishing a proper relationship with a daughter from another family, and accepting her as her own daughter. In Tajikistan, as well as in other parts of Central Asia, the extended family is still the most desirable pattern of a family relationship. The extended family is usually part of a larger network of relatives. Frequently, 2-3 generations such as grandparents, parents, sons with wives, and their children live under the same roof, in some cases maintaining a common pot, or have separate kitchens, sharing only 205 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... some expenses and responsibilities. Gorshunova (2006: 140-141) indicates that such a family can provide economic security and support for the members of a group, especially in the time of hardship. On the other hand, however, within the extended family, collective rights of a group are more valued than individual rights. A specific hierarchy is maintained, regulating relationships within the family. It is based on the principle according to which younger people are subordinated to older family members, and women to men. The oldest woman has a leading position among female members. Officially, she is subordinated only to a male head of the house, but after his death, she often takes his place, and both men and women should follow her rules. Daughters-in-law, especially the youngest ones, have the lowest status within the family’s hierarchy. In the case of an open conflict, family members intervene to settle the issue which usually is solved in favour of the mother-in-law, since she has a higher position in the house. Zapasnik (n.d.) points out that in societies where there is a strict hierarchy according to which the lives of their members are organized, it is unquestionable that a younger person should obey his or her elders. Even if there was consent for expressing one’s own autonomy, a young person would never manifest it openly. Hence, a daughter-in-law may try to argue her case, but she should not express her anger or discontent openly by showing her negative emotions.²²¹ According to my interlocutors, one of the reasons of increasing family tensions is the large number of migrating young men. Young women are left with their husbands’ families, and problems between a mother-in-law and a kelin are more likely to be exacerbated. In the case when the conflict goes beyond the family, other members of the community, including religious leaders, can mediate to settle the issue. However, the changing social and economic situation has influenced the relationships within families. Young people advocate for relaxing rigid hierarchies, while older generations perceive the changes as a violation ²²³ ²²³ During my work in Central Asia, I had many conversations with my female friends about their relationships with mothers-in-law. Most of them believed that the best way to argue their case is to negotiate, and to seek a compromise. Sometimes passive resistance, silence, talks through their husbands bring desirable results; open confrontations were very rare. 20 6 5-4- A story of Farida ocun of the traditional social order. Kamila otun who is mentioned in Chapter II commented on this situation: Now kelins know their rights, and they are able to assert them (...). In the case of the conflict, I speak with both parties. However, I always give the following piece of advice to young wives: "You should be patient for 5-6 years, in the course of time your position in the family will change, you will have more opportunities, and your mother-in-law will look at you in another way ”.²²⁴ Such reasoning is based on the assumption that for the sake of harmony within the family, older members of the group should always have authority over the younger people, and the latter should subordinate. Traditional leaders intervene to end a dispute between two parties, but they usually attempt to bring about a compromise which would not disrupt the existing social order and hierarchies. The role of social leaders, including female religious leaders, is to protect tradition in order not to interfere with the accepted social norms whose violation may disrupt the relations. The latter are oriented towards sustainability which is much more important than individual choices or needs. On another occasion, I asked Farida what a woman should do in the case when her husband is dishonest to her, drinks alkohol, and beats her and their children, or if he sends her three talaqs in a text message from Russia. A few years ago, sending talaq via text message became popular among male Tajik migrants who wanted to end a relationship. In practice, it means divorce for a woman who receives such information, even if the marriage is still formally registered in the civil registry office. Most of the Islamic theologians do not support this way of dissolution of marriage, and it is banned by the official clergy (Najibullah 2009). According to the sharia law, a woman can re-marry her husband who divorced her three times only if she marries somebody else first and then divorces or if her second husband dies. AC: What a woman should do if a man does not respect her (...). Can she divorce him or not? F: You always have to be patient. Sabr (Arabic/Persian: patience) is obligatory for every Muslim. If they have children, a woman should be patient. ²²⁴ An excerpt from an interview with Kamila otun, June 2014, Khujand. 207 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... AC: But sometimes you cannot be patient. Look at the suicide rate among women in Tajikistan now (.. ,).²²⁵ F:A woman should be patient, and in this way, she can convince her husband to understand his mistakes better and to change his behaviour (...). According to my experience, the preservation of the family is the responsibility of a woman. AC: And a man is not responsible as well? Farida: Of course a man is also responsible. Men also make a lot of mistakes, often they do not behave properly. Anyway, a woman should do everything she can to preserve her family.²²⁶ Gorshunova (2006: 144-146) points out that the family is one of the most important social institutions in the Uzbek culture, hence divorce is seen as an extreme solution, and all parties do anything they can to find reconciliation. Divorce is not just an internal problem of a particular couple, but it involves all relatives who are responsible for the stability of the whole family. Divorce is accepted under specific circumstances such as infertility (this usually refers to a woman), violence, mental illness, adultery etc., and the whole family should agree on its conditions. At present, however, the number of cases of divorce has increased from 2.9 cases per 1000 people in 2005 to 6 per 1000 in 2010 in Tajikistan, which among others is a side effect of migration. Some migrants leave their wives and children in their country of origin without any support, and marry again in Russia or elsewhere (Poletaev 2013: 9). The female representatives of IRPT, to whom I talked about the issue of divorce, in Khujand in 2014, believed that a woman can arrange a divorce with her husband, if there is no other solution to resolve the conflict between spouses, but she loses the right for mahr (the dowry). Following my remark that mahr is paid very rarely, if not ²²⁵ For more information about the problem of suicide among women in Tajikistan see IWPR Central Asia (2016) Tajikistan: New Concerns Over Female Suicides, https://iwpr.net. According to my research, the people in Khujand named Syr--Darya - ‘a river of drowned women’ due to a high number of women who committed suicide by drowning there. Many of them could not bear their difficult situation, violence within the family, and/or economic difficulties. ²²⁶ An interview with Farida, May 2014. 20 8 5-5- Good ocun - bad ocun at all in Tajikistan, and kalym²²¹ is still given by the groom’s family to the family of the bride (which also influences the position of the wife), my interlocutors finally agreed that the Tajik law regulates the issue of divorce, and first of all, it should proceed in accordance with the relevant legislation. Regardless of a personal view on divorce and its conditions expressed by the religious leaders, they agreed that all measures should be undertaken to avoid a couple’s separation.²²⁷ ²²⁸ Religious figures are a source of moral authority for their communities guarding traditional values, including family matters. Farida is no exception, her negative attitude to divorces even in extreme cases stems from the assumption that the durability of the family is the basis of stability. As a teacher of Uzbek literature, Farida combines the role of a secular educator with a religious function. Farida forms her opinions in a very direct way using examples drawn from life, religion and local traditions. As in the case of Gulsun otyncha in Chapter IV, Farida is attached to her network as a community leader, and on this basis she has formed her authority. 5.5. Good otun - bad otun One afternoon in June 2014 I was invited by a friend of mine - Nigora (aged 45) to a meeting at the university which was attended by seven women (the age of the majority of them did not exceed 30 years). All of them lectured at the university, some were PhD students. We talked about Islam and the role and the position of bibi otun and other female religious leaders in society. ²²⁷ Kalym is a payment made by the groom’s family to the bride’s family in the form of cattle, fabrics, food, sometimes money. In the past, kalym was the main issue in marriage and it determined the course and the time of the marriage ceremony. ²²⁸ This assumption 1 made on the basis of many conversations as well as my work with community leaders. 209 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... All of my interlocutors expressed the opinion that bibi-otuns are mainly invited by the older generation. According to them, many bibi--otuns receive a great amount of money and goods, and those who behave in this way are not respected by people. Besides, the interviewed women believed that the traditional rituals performed by bibi-otuns, as well as pilgrimages to mazars are un-Islamic, and performing them is a sin. One of the women, Parviza (aged 27) graduated from a madrasa in Khujand. According to her opinion, the standards of education were not satisfactory there, although studying in the madrasa motivated her to study the Arabic language and the Quran. Other girls learned to recite prayers from their parents. Occasionally, they attended the gatherings organized in the IRPT office in Khujand. They believed that at present many young people know how to read the Quran, and various translations of the Holy Book and other sources of knowledge on the religion are available to the public. Thus, a person does not need any intermediaries such as bibi-otuns between her and God. They also criticized bibi-otuns for insufficient religious knowledge. Many of them do not understand the Quran, they only know how to read the Arabic letters. They added, however, that there are exceptions, and some bibi-otuns have sufficient religious knowledge. When we left the meeting, Nigora commented that she did not agree with those opinions. She learnt Islam from bibi-otuns for many years, and she believed that female religious leaders had a good influence on women, especially regarding the upbringing of girls. Nigora also added that those young women who attend bibi-otuns classes have better adab, were obedient to parents and well-behaved.²²⁹ Husain (aged 29), who works as a tanzim²--’ in the jamoat located at the outskirts of Khujand, comes from a tura Family. He received religious education and believes that bibi-otuns are important social actors: * ²¹⁰ ²²⁹ On the basis of my conversation with Nigora held in May 2014, Khujand. ²¹⁰ The Tanzim law is exercised at the local/jamoat level through the introduction of a special committee and a post for a person who is responsible for implementing the law. This role is referred to as Tanzim. He is employed in the jamoat and is expected to monitor all events, as well as the mosques and imams within the territory of a particular municipality (see Chapter I; Cieslewska 2015a: 86). 210 5-S- Good осип - bad осип Bibi otun is a woman who has great authority (...). Otuns are very popular in Central Asia, and they are very famous figures. They enjoy great respect, women listen to them as they have a similar status as mullas among men. Bibi otuns do not know the law understood as the state law, but they know life. They shape the opinions of women about various matters, not just religion. In the city, maybe women do not listen to them too much. I mean those women who work, and earn their own money, but in the villages, women respect bibi otuns. People send cars to take otun for rituals Mushkil-kusho, khudoi in mazars to recite the Quran there. That is why the role of otun is important.²³' Later, my friend Umeda (aged 61) who used to be a political activist as well as an employee of one of the international organizations, expressed an opposite opinion that the majority of bibi otuns represent low standards of religious knowledge, but women listen to them because they do not know Islam.²³¹ ²³² The following opinion was expressed by a local poet from the family of sayyids, and religious leaders: Bibi otun should have a very deep knowledge of Islam, as well as possess the relevant secular knowledge to teach people. She should be delicate and sensitive. At the moment 90 percent of otuns fail to represent these qualities: they seek only prestige and money. In this way, they slander religion. They want to be bibi otuns to gain authority, not because they want to preach the Truth of God and Islam.²³³ These contradictory opinions are part of a discussion I conducted with different people on the role of bibi otuns in Khujand, in 2014. One of the most controversial issues was the remuneration which bibi-otuns received for their services. Some women were said to receive even up to 100-150 USD and expensive presents for holding a single celebration. Others were satisfied with much more modest remuneration, receiving various gifts, such as cloths, scarves, other small presents and small amounts of money or food from the ritual table (sweets, bread etc.), or in rare cases - they worked without payment. Those religious leaders ²³¹ An excerpt from an interview, April 2014, Khujand. ²³² An excerpt from an interview, June 2014, Khujand. ²³³ An excerpt from an interview, June 2014, Khujand. hi Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... who demanded high amounts of money were not respected by people. They were treated more as performers of ghazals and poems rather than religious professionals. People criticized them for such conduct which is unworthy of a religious leader. Some bibi-otuns competed with each other about their popularity. Mutual animosities were sparked by disagreements regarding not only the rituals performed or remuneration received, but also various religious matters, the way of teaching tajwid, performing rituals. There are also accounts about female teachers who have requested significant amounts of money for their teaching, which has not been well received, since passing on religious knowledge should be provided free of charge or the remuneration should be discretionary. These requests can be explained by the deteriorating economic situation and unemployment. People seek various opportunities to earn money, and religious services are one of them. Nevertheless, this resulted in the commercialization of spirituality, triggering a dramatic expansion of commercial activities associated with rituals and ceremonies (Cieslewska 2015b: 137; 2016: 515-516; Koroteyeva, Makarova 1998: 593). In 2014, the discussion regarding female religious professionals engaged a variety of social circles such as representatives of local authorities, social workers, intellectuals, but also members of the IRPT. The latter, in a vast majority of cases, criticized traditional rituals and practices, as well as bibi-otuns’ performance, advocating for modernization of Islam and its adoption as a social-religious project. In the following sections of this chapter, I will present two figures of the female members of the IRPT, who taught religion, but also pursued political activity. 5.6. Between politics and religion - the stories of /Mt/a/zma and /VloAnzso Mualima I refer to this female leader as Mualima (teacher) because she used to be a teacher of the Russian language. I met her by chance while shopping at the bazaar. At the time when we met, she was 47, ran a small shop 212 <¡.6. Between politics and religion - the stories of Mualima and Mohniso and was involved in the work of the IRPT. Mualima started to study the Quran in the early 90s; she learnt the Arabic alphabet from her uncle, who graduated from the Institute for Oriental Studies. He was an officer of the KGB, and worked as an interpreter during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Subsequently, she complemented her knowledge during a three-month course. Some members of Mualima’s family were religious leaders. The uncle of her grandmother was an imam and healer, he studied in Bukhara before the Soviet period; her grandfather also attended the madrasa. Like many people from his generation, her father was a communist, and a member of the Party, but he followed the Islamic practices at his home. Mualima started teaching Islam to her students at school in the early 1990s, and then she continued her endeavour with the family and neighbours, at the same time reciting the Quran during various religious celebrations. In 2014, she recited the Quran at weddings, funerals, and circumcisions, explaining to the people the various religious and spiritual issues associated with the life-cycle, birth and death. She stopped teaching due to the state’s ban on religious education, and because the members of the IRPT were under surveillance of the state. Apart from her religious activity, Mualima advised people on various life-related matters in accordance with the principles of Islam. Mualima supported the renewal of Islam and purification of religion from the local traditions, and therefore she criticized the rituals performed by traditional bibi-otuns, pointing out their incompatibility with Islam. She backed women’s participation in religious, social and political life, stressing that women should attend religious and theological gatherings including khutba and prayers at the mosque. Just like the other IRPT activists she thought that the fatwa which prohibited women from visiting the mosque issued by Shuroi Ulamo is illegal. For her, attending the mosque by women was a question of human rights, and civic education. In this way, women can participate in the religious life, and challenge the state religious policies as equal citizens. From 2003, Mualima was actively engaged in the IRPT, conducting various activities for women. She was a candidate in the parliamentary elections in 2010. When we spoke for the last time, in the end of June 2014, Mualima planned to participate in the election in 2015, she IB Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... hesitated, however, as she was afraid that the political atmosphere was increasingly antagonistic and perhaps it was better to keep away from this political turmoil. Mohniso I met Mohniso (aged 51) for the first time in 2010, in one of the jamoats (municipality) of Isfara. We met through her brother-in-law's network during iftar and tarawih prayer which was organized in his house. A few days later I was invited by her to attend iftar that took place at her home. The supper was attended by around 60-70 women (men, including her husband and relatives, were not present). It was the biggest iftar organized at a private house that I have ever attended (Cieslewska 2016: 512). As a religious leader Mohniso was very influential in her jamoaf, many people brought their children to her house for religion classes. She was also an IRPT activist, but even people who did not support the party respected her not only as a religious professional, but also as a political and social leader. Mohniso comes from a family of religious leaders who passed religious knowledge from generation to generation even during the most dangerous period of the USSR. In 2010, while visiting the house of her brother-in-law, I saw the old pre-revolutionary books published in Kazan in Russia that were kept by the family throughout the Soviet period, and which were used in the teaching of religion and in the performance of rituals. Mohniso learnt the Quran from her grandfather and her aunt who was bibi-otun. The latter gave fotiha to Mohniso about 16-17 years ago and since that time she has acted as an independent religious leader. Mohniso preferred to speak about herself as bibi-mullo not bibi-otun to emphasize her status of a religious professional. As a political activist in her area, she stepped out of a female circle, approaching a sphere which is traditionally reserved for men. Simultaneously, however, she functioned in the conservative and religious society of Isfara, where the rules of separation of men and women are more strongly defined than in Khujand, or other places. Mohniso strictly followed the principles of the Islamic attire and social conventions while dealing with men and women. She was, however, a public figure in the place where she lived. 114 5-6. Between politics and religion - the stories of Mualima and Mohniso Mohniso believed that people should live according to sharia even under unfavourable conditions such as those created by the Tajik state. According to her, there were several obstacles for Muslims living in Tajikistan, including a ban on the hijab in public institutions. As a result, many religious women were excluded from formal education. Nevertheless, Mohniso refused to follow the official rules regarding female outfit, claiming that the state law cannot rule over the Islamic principles. She also strongly criticized all traditional female practices including making pilgrimages to mazars and organizing various life-cycle celebrations. Weddings, circumcisions and funerals should be limited to short religious ceremonies without music and lavish parties, as well as numerous additional events. According to her opinion, a funeral should be a one-time event to pay the last tribute to the deceased but all other celebrations such as those organized after seven (haft) and forty days (chilla) after death and an annual death ceremony (sol) are prohibited. People can only read dua for the departed. During Islamic celebrations people should only recite the Quran, and listen to amri maruf The reading of some religious ghazals is also acceptable. When I met her in 2014, Mohniso seemed to be very nervous because of pressures exerted on the members of the IRPT by state authorities and the secret service. She stopped teaching Islam at her home, limiting also her other activities such as the meetings of bibi-otuns, which previously took place once a week and involved discussions on various religious and social issues. The future of Mohniso and her family was uncertain in Tajikistan, and she thought about moving to another country. At the end of our meeting, she said: Our task (i.e. that of religious leaders) is to explain to people our customs, traditions and religion, if we do not do it, this world will become a wild place.²³⁴ Mualima and Mohniso combined religious leadership with political activity, showing one more dimension of female religious activists, and a possible sphere of influence for women. Both of them, as well as the other IRPT female members with whom I spoke, did not question, however, the hierarchy in the relationship between women and men, ²³⁴ An excerpt from an interview with Mohniso, May 2014. US Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... they only called for its modification according to their understanding of Islam. The social changes they proposed were always explained by religion. According to their view, Islam gives many rights for women, but they are not respected in the Tajik society, were the local traditions dominate in social relationships. Women made up 53 percent of the IRPT members in 2014 (Schmitz 2015: 20). According to Thibault, the party’s branch of the Sughd province was very dynamic also due to women’s involvement in the party’s activities (2014: 167). In 2014 the section of women consisted of 16 groups located in different districts of Sughd; each group had its own leaders who operated among women, organizing meetings on various topics such as the increasing political awareness of women, various issues related to Islam, including the rule of sharia (although within the framework of the Tajik law), and the role of women within the family, the labour market, and the political and social structures.²³⁵ Sattori (2002) in his essay Tajik Press about the Youth and Islam analyses excerpts from the Tajik press from the 1990s. It aptly presents the changes proposed by the IRPT regarding young people and women. The issue of women raised vigorous debates at that time. Most authors shared the view that Islam encourages women’s participation in the social and political life, at the same time, however, indicating that Islam has its own way of understanding the role of women and men. They expressed criticism towards the Western influences which, in their opinion, negatively affected the morality and conduct of people, which resulted in many social problems. In Tajik society, Islam is always filtered by the local traditions, and there is a complicated relationship between local cultural practices and Islamic conventions. Especially in rural communities (but not only there), the relationships between women and men follow a conservative pattern. It further influences personal views and aspirations of religious leaders, including those of the IRPT. For instance, in the conservative Isfara, there were cases that some female activists did not want to sit together with men during party meetings. It was only after they were ²³⁵ Information obtained during a personal conversation with four female party leaders, June 2014. 216 5.6. Between politics and religion - the stories of Mualima and Mohniso persuaded by other members that if they want to engage in political activity they had to take part in the meetings with men on equal terms that these women changed their opinion.²³⁶ In the years 2013-15,1 used to work with the Gharmi communities in the district of Qumsangir in the Vakhsh Valley within the framework of a NGO project.²³⁷ The Gharmis were traditionally associated with the political opposition during the civil war, and were supporters of the IRPT. We also worked on a project for women on hygiene and health. Our cooperation with male leaders of the Gharmi communities was satisfactory, generally speaking. However, approaching women there was much more difficult than in the case of villages populated by other Tajik groups. In many cases, men were reluctant to allow their wives and daughters to participate in the activities of the project, even if the latter were conducted by local female NGO workers. In the case of one of the villages we cooperated with a local bibi-otun (she was also a teacher) whose family originated from the Ferghana Valley,²³⁸ and her colleague, a woman of Kazakh origin, who had basic medical education (see Chapter II). Both women were respected by the community and created a link between us and the Gharmi women. Thanks to their help we managed to continue our work in a relatively satisfactory way (Cieslewska 2015a: 205-206). In this place, many women rarely moved outside their villages. Girls have often been married off before finishing education. A number of women bom between 1985 and 1992 are illiterate since they did not attend school which during the civil war and a few years after was difficult to access. A medical examination of women is still questioned. ²³⁶ Information obtained from Muhiddin Kabiri during an interview conducted by me in Warsaw, in April 2017. ²³⁷ In the 1930s and 1940s, in the Vakhsh Valley a huge irrigation system was constructed with the main purpose to plant cotton, and some other crops. As a result, thousands of people were brought to the valley to be settled in the newly established collective farms; among other groups also Tajiks from the Gharm region were relocated. ²³⁸ This bibi otun conducts religious rites primarily among the representatives of the Uzbek minority, only sometimes visiting the Tajiks. Nevertheless, she is respected by women. ii7 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... Sometimes, especially if a medical doctor is a man, a woman comes to visit him with a male relative who speaks on her behalf about the symptoms of her illness, and the examination does not take place at all or is very superficial. All those situations are presented as instances of proper ‘Islamic’ conduct, and are often legitimized by some members of the local clergy. I discussed this issue in Warsaw in 2017 with the female members of the IRPT, who argued that one of the goals of the female party activists was to change people’s approach to various social matters by means of adequate civic education, explaining women’s rights in Islam, and enforcing them in the modem Tajik society. Mohniso, and Mualima also supported modernization of the Islamic thought by introducing changes in the perception of the role of religion in the social development. Islam was seen as a factor of reforming society which after the years of Sovietization and atheisation was in regress. Hence, there was a need for moral renewal based on religious principles. Organizing the society according to the Islamic principles was presented as the best path for humanity, because only God’s laws can constitute an effective instrument in the fight against the aberrations caused by an imperfect human being, which resulted in the chaos in the contemporary world. The situation in the independent Tajikistan, caused by deteriorating living conditions, and the blocking of reforms due to predatory behaviour of the state, only confirmed this view. In 2016/17, while conducting interviews in Warsaw with the members of the IRPT who applied for refugee status in Poland, I tried to find out what happened to Mualima, and Mohniso and their families. However, no one was able to give me reliable information about this. Mualima was rumoured to have officially resigned from the party membership, which could have protected her from persecution. In terms of the fate of Mohniso I did not receive any information. I preferred not to contact her family or friends in Tajikistan, as I did not want to expose them to the surveillance of the Tajik secret service due to a phone call from a foreigner. 218 5-7. Shuroi Bibi-otunho and its repercussions 5.7. Shuroi Bi bi-otunho and its repercussions At the beginning of May 2014 I was invited to a very special event: a local Khujand TV station broadcast a TV show entitled Shuroi Bibi Otunho on khotiri chist ba? (English: What is the role of the Council of Bibi Otuns?). The main purpose of the programme was to promote Shuroi Bibi Otunho - an organization established by an initiative of the state authorities, as well as to present the role of female religious leaders in Tajik society. Half an hour before the programme, I sat together with some bibi--otuns talking about various aspects of this profession. One of the topics of our discussion was related to the female rituals such as Bibi Mushkil-Kusho - whether it is permissible to perform it, and if yes, which form of this ritual is acceptable within the Islamic tradition. The head of shuro expressed her opinion that the ritual should be modified: lighting candles is forbidden since it is a pagan tradition, and the story regarding of the old man should not be said (see Chapter III). Other topics included the remuneration of bibi-otuns for participation in the rituals. The head of shuro also spoke about the ‘fashion of the hijab’, which, according to her words it is not a ‘national Tajik outfit’ (see below). The conversation ended and we entered the studio where the programme was recorded. I was invited to participate as a foreign specialist on female Tajik traditions, but I preferred to observe the situation by standing aside. I chose such an approach especially because my participation in such an event could undermine the process of research since I could lose credibility in the eyes of independent religious leaders. When the recording of the programme was over, we took a picture of ourselves and all bibi-otuns wrote down their details for me to contact them for interviews. A few days later, I talked with the head of Shuroi Bibi Otunho. I was told that the organization was established by the hukumat of Khujand City (municipal administration) in 2011. According to the head of shuro and an official from the Religious Affairs Department in the hukumat of Khujand with whom I spoke, the main goal of this organ was to introduce the correct understanding of Islam among women through shaping 219 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... views on religion of female religious leaders. In the long run, the shuro should provide relevant training and education to raise the standards of knowledge of bibi-otuns. Female religious figures should observe the laws of the Tajik state, avoiding involvement in the radical political groups. Especially important is the law “On Re-ordering Traditions, Celebrations and Customs in the Republic of Tajikistan” (“Tanzim law”), and bibi-otuns are expected to help in its implementation. They should observe the course of celebrations in which they participate as well as talk to people about lowering the expenses and the number of guests invited (Cieslewska 2015a: 89-91; 2016: 520). Each jamoat (municipality) should prepare own list of female religious leaders, and women are invited to cooperate with the authorities on various communal matters such as mediation during family conflicts and observation of the above-mentioned “Tanzim law”. Every mahalla committee should also monitor the activities of bibi-otuns, and report to jamoat about those leaders whose religious or political views are a subject of controversy. For instance, in the Ghafurov district, there were 100 bibi-otuns on the list in 2014. The list included their address, phone numbers, and the area in which a particular female religious leader operates (mahallas, or villages). I received confirmation from different sources that bibi-otuns are invited to cooperate with the state institutions. In one of the jamoats in the Ghafurov district, the local government appointed the most loyal leader to the informal position of otun kalon (the head of the otuns). Such actions aim at selecting a religious figure willing to cooperate with the state. Nevertheless, some of them attempt to escape state control for various reasons, also due to the rumours about taxing the rituals performed by them. Others prefer to stay independent due to a low level of trust in the state policies. There are female religious professionals, however, who agree to cooperate with the shuro (Cieslewska 2016: 520-521). Until June 2014 the Shuroi Bibi Otunho managed to gather about fifty-three otuns in Khujand. The head of the shuro has conducted an extensive campaign to include as many bibi-otuns as possible, inviting them usually through the heads of mahallas. The shuro managed to organize some gatherings but they were not scheduled regularly. 220 5-7- Shuroi Bibi-otunho and its repercussions Moreover, the head of the shuro attempted to shape the opinions of female religious leaders by promoting a certain religious policy such as the aforementioned criticism of the hijab. Recently, the shuro introduced the outfit for bibi-otuns who are its members, a green costume which resembles ‘the traditional Tajik female outfit’. Nevertheless, a vast majority of religious leaders including bibi-otuns, do not challenge the obligatory nature of the Muslim outfit. Oddly enough, it is questioned by a female religious figure such as the head of the shuro associated with the state. Female rituals have also drawn the interest of the head of the shuro. When I participated in a Bibi Mushkil-Kusho performed by an older bibi-otun in a mahalla in Khujand, I was told that candles for ancestors should not be lighted since the head of the shuro does not allow it. The bibi-otun was very concerned about my connection with the shuro, and only after my solemn declaration that I had nothing in common with them she began to behave in a more relaxed way. The official Tajik institutions promote the interpretation of religion which combines the elements of Tajik traditions and a rather strict approach to Islam. Epkenhans (2015: 337-338) indicates that the Islamic Center and the Department for Religious Affairs promotes a traditional, conservative and regime-loyal version which almost resembles a Salafi approach, although it originates in the South Asian Deobandi movement. My conversation with one of the officials from the Department for Religious Affairs from the hukumat of the Khujand city, partly confirmed this opinion. According him, most of the female rituals are bid’a and shirk, and performing them is haram (forbidden). The official referred to “the Tanzim Law” quoting its Article 12 regarding the performance of certain rituals and Article 13 on the organization of the Mavlud ritual. Hitherto female rituals have escaped the official control. However, along with the politicization of the religious life in Tajikistan, their performance has drawn the attention of the state (Cieslewska 2016: 520). According to this official, the shuro as an organ of control over female religious leaders aims at transforming female religiosity according to an official version of Islam. To my question whether the head of shuro is 221 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... competent in the field of religion, he replied that she had completed some religious courses.²³⁹ However, in other circles her knowledge of Islam was questioned. There were also rumours that she takes a lot of money for teaching and performing the rituals. As far as my contacts with the shuro are concerned, I talked to the head of the shuro, and collected all telephone numbers to female religious leaders who participated in the TV programme. Subsequently, I attempted to phone some of them. In all cases, the women did not agree to see me. In one case, I managed to talk to the bibi-otun whom I met by chance during a religious gathering in the IRPT office, but the conversation was not very open, especially when I asked what they were doing within the framework of the shuro. It is a normal institution which aims to integrate bibi-otuns - she answered. In another case, a friend of mine arranged a meeting with a bibi-otun who was involved in cooperation with this body. The interview went relatively well. The bibi-otun was also the head of a small urban quarter (a part within a bigger mahalla)', her main concern was to fulfil the tasks of local administration, mediation in families’/neighbours’ conflicts as well as monitoring men who were called up for military service.²⁴⁰ Surprisingly, she invited me to attend a ritual led by her, but when I phoned her to arranged the time and date, she failed to respond to my phone-calls (Cieślewska 2015b: 144). The shuro is criticized by some religious professionals as well as other people in Khujand, mainly for an attempt to control female religious leaders. Nevertheless, some bibi-otuns agreed to participate in the shuro for various reasons. Many of them were afraid that if they do not agree for cooperation, the Tajik authorities would seek to constrain their activities for instance by refusing to issue a certificate for their religious activity. ²³⁹ Information obtained during an interview with an official from the hukumat of Khujand in June 2014. ²⁴⁰ The army has a very bad reputation in Tajikistan. Hence, most parents undertake various measures, including bribing officials, to protect their children from being drafted into the army. One of the main tasks of the local administration is to encourage young men to serve in the military. 212 5.7. Shuroi Bibi-otunho and its repercussions The shuro is connected to another state project aimed at formalizing the activities of female religious leaders. In 2013, the NGO Sustainable Development of People with the support of the branch of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Germany) in the Russian Federation and the Committee on Women and Family Affairs of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan implemented the project ‘Combatting violence against women and girls and the prevention of domestic violence through the involvement of female religious leaders (bibi otun) in Tajikistan’ (Russian: Противодействие насилии в отношении женщин и девочек, предупреждение домашнего насилия посредством привлечении религиозных деятели (бибиотун) в Таджикистане). The project was implemented in Dushanbe, the cities of Khujand and Vahdat, and partly in the Rudaki district. Two training modules for bibi otuns were designed within the project: a) ‘Reinforcing capacities of bibi otuns in improving gender equality, legal awareness, prevention of violence in the family in accordance with the principles of Islam’; b) ‘Legal and civic awareness and the responsibility of religious leaders (bibi otuns) towards the community’. In Dushanbe, Vahdat and in the Sughd province four training courses were conducted with the participation of female religious leaders. In addition, the project brochure ‘The responsibility of the bibi otun towards society’ was printed in the Tajik and Russian languages (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2014; Cieslewska 2016: 520-521). According to the person responsible for the implementation of this project, creating the shuro was her idea and was linked with the above initiative.²⁴¹ Attempts to supervise the female religious leaders are not only limited to Tajikistan. Similar steps have been undertaken by the authorities in Uzbekistan. Peshkova (2014: 230-233) analyzes the cases of the female religious figures and their involvement in the state-led activities in Uzbekistan. One of the religious figures became hokimyat otin (a main female religious figure in her area), winning an Islamic knowledge competition organized by the local administration. Those :JI Information about the project was obtained by me during an interview with the person responsible for the implementation of the project targeted at bibi-otuns, October 2014. 14 Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... female religious leaders were personally involved in promoting ideas considered by them to be a correct interpretation of religion, which does not interfere with the policy of the state, and also stands in opposition to what they believed was a radical version of Islam. The shuro of Khujand is an attempt to establish an official structure for female religious leaders. It is possible that in the future, it can evolve in the same direction as the Uzbek structure, where official representatives of bibi otuns are elected. At least in 2014, however, the shuro was still a weak organization and its leader was not recognized by people as a female religious authority, but rather a person closely related to the state institutions. 5.8. Conclusions Kaliszewska (2016: 81-83) writes about the ‘magical dimension of the state’referring to peoples’ individual experiences with the Russian state in Dagestan. She describes the way in which the state manipulates people’s lives in the context of religion, and how people re-interpret those actions depending on the circumstances. Comparably, in Tajikistan, the state uses the growing danger of terrorism as an excuse for developing an apparatus of surveillance of religious institutions, and religious leaders. It intensified after delegalization of the IRPT, and it manifests itself through tightening control over all spheres of religious life, including the performance of rituals and celebrations. In the case of female religious leaders, the Shuroi Bibi Otunho was established to formalize previously informal activities of bibi otuns in order to shape the political and religious view of women, and to control their actions. In 2014, the activity of the Shuroi Bibi Otunho was questioned, since some bibi otuns did not wish their activities to be formalized, and supervised from the top. Other actions of the state such as creating lists of female religious leaders in the municipalities, or organizing formal gathering were also treated with distrust. Some women accepted this situation, some others attempted to avoid the close relationship with the authorities. In 2014, Farida was not included on a list of otuns in her jamoat yet, and she still enjoyed relative freedom. As many bibi otuns, she 224 5-8. Conclusions was not interested in politics. However, she and her circle were aware of the worsening economic and political situation in the country which resulted from dishonest actions of the ruling elite. Moreover, the state interrupted her religious activities by introducing a ban on teaching and performance of some rituals. At least in 2014, Farida and some other religious leaders sought to adapt to the situation while avoiding open confrontation. Just like back in the USSR, people preferred to rely on the informal relationships conducting religious activities among a certain circle of people. They know that they have no other choice, and are in a losing position in relation to the state, thus they prefer to bypass some rules. It should be noted, however, that despite the reservations and doubts about the religious policy, many people believed that the actions of the state were partly justified. They held a view that the state had a right to protect people from terrorism and other evils, and in this way, was able to assert stability (which is the state’s official propaganda). For instance, Farida supported Rahmon during the presidential election, encouraging people to vote for him during the female gatherings where she performed the rituals. According to her words, I told the people that they should be patient anyway; if a person is patient it will be always better. There were long queues even for a piece of bread during the civil war, and now we have enough food. The most important thing is the peace and stability in the country!¹⁴² The IRPT leaders, Mohniso and Mualima had a different vision of the situation in the country. For them Rahmon and his people persecuted Islam and the faithful, just as the Soviets did during the period of the USSR. The IRPT’s experience with the state was clearly negative, and their actions aimed at changing the state’s policy on religion, and defending the rights of religious people. As I mentioned in Chapter I, the IRPT actively participated in the shaping of the Islamic thought in Tajikistan. Various theological disputes regarding the ritual life and doctrinal issues conducted by ²⁴² An excerpt from an interview with Farida, June 2014. It should be noted that the opinions that “stability is better than war” were expressed by many people who did not openly support Rahmon, but did not see any alternative to his rule. Chapter V. Female religious leaders in northern Tajikistan... theologians had started in the late Soviet period, and continued after its dissolution, until the party was banned. The IRPT raised the question of ritual normativity within the Hanafi Sunni Islam, combining it with the teachings of the theologians elaborating on the role of religion in the social and political life. It further impacted the nature of religious leadership including female religious and political activists. In spite of the fact that the role of the IRPT as political opposition was significant, its interpretation of Islam was questioned by many people who were neither supporters of Rahmon nor officially promoted interpretation of Islam. They disagreed with strict modifications of local practices that they considered part of their tradition, and which were criticized by both the IRPT leaders, and the Rahmon-backed theologians. They worried that the proposed dogmatic changes would have a negative impact on the spiritual expression of Islam featured in old legends, stories, and practices cultivated by their ancestors for generations in places such as Qalandar-khona, and passed through bibi otuns and other spiritual leaders. 226 Concluding remarks My European friends, students, or people participating in my public lectures, often asked: Are female religious leaders in Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan feminists, or are they conservative ‘Islamists ’? The first group has a romantic vision of female religious leaders being feminists defending the rights of women, and gender equality, asserted by Islam, and the Quran. The opposite opinion is equally extreme. It suggests that female religious leaders are custodians of the conservative Islamic tradition which is responsible for violating women’s rights. However, situation on the ground is much more complex. As I said in the previous chapters, in Central Asia, just like in other Muslim societies, the central figure and religious leader is always the imam, who leads prayers in the mosque - he is the spiritual leader of the whole community. There are other spiritual figures of high social standing, including women, distinct for each ethnic/national group. Traditionally respected female religious figures such as Gulsun or Mohniso belong to a class of Odami Ilmi - the people of knowledge, and they are respected by both women and men. Nevertheless, female figures have limited access to spiritual male space such as the mosque, and other male gatherings. They have, however, their own sphere of influence within a female circle based on the teaching of Islam and tradition, and (in the case of traditional bibi otuns), on the performance of specific rituals, and pilgrimages to mazars. With some exceptions such as healing, and the funeral, the female spiritual sphere cannot be approached by an imam/mulla. The latter holds a higher position in ‘the official-spiritual hierarchy’, but in fact the roles of female and male religious leaders are complementary. Concluding remarks Despite the changes within Islam, and the increasing role of Islamic education, the female religious figures with whom I interacted do not question local religious hierarchies of which they are part. They do not think that a woman can be qadi, imam or mufti such as Mukhlisa Bubi, who was the first woman elected for the position of a qadi to the Central Spiritual Administration in Russia, in 1917, just a few months before the October Revolution (Garipova 2017: 136). When I talked about Amina Wadud, who is an Islamic scholar, as well as a female imam preaching for mixed congregations, local female religious leaders - with some exceptions - criticized her conduct as incompatible with Islam, and the tradition of a ritual gender segregation. According to their view, the position of the imam is also reserved for men only. This does not mean, however, that female religious leaders do not address the issue of women’s rights. Some of them take part in social initiatives aimed at improving the situation of women, or the standards of Islamic education such as Mutakalim, the madrasa network, and the IRPT leaders. A person of considerable religious authority such as Gulsun otyncha speaks on a variety of topics, challenging some opinions of male religious leaders on polygamy, women’s professional activities etc., but she always justifies her view with the rules of Islam. For her, as well as other women, Islam is a point of reference of all opinions, including gender roles. Hutson (2005: 104-105) proposes the term ‘alternative modernity’, to describe the social activity of the Sufi women of the Kano Tijaniyya order from Nigeria. Female spiritual figures of this order help shape the modernization process in the Islamic African society, although its nature differs from a secular model of woman’s liberation proposed by the British education system. Correspondingly, the female religious activists whom I contacted during my research do not reject woman’s empowerment, but their perception of social development differs from a secular Soviet model or the current trends brought from Europe, USA or Russia. Those female religious figures encourage women’s involvement in the public life, their right to education, and so forth. At the same time, however, they believe that all social changes should be introduced in compliance with the Islamic values, which are not always consistent with the secular model. 228 Concluding remarks For instance, the female leaders of the IRPT, and Mutakalim openly criticized the low level of attachment to religious principles of Muslims who follow a secular model associated with the European/ Western lifestyle. All female religious leaders to whom I spoke believe that Islam provides a comprehensive approach to life that covers all its aspects. Islam was given by God to people, thus man-made laws, and ideologies cannot be more significant than Allah’s laws. It does not mean, however, that they demand to remove a secular state, and impose the sharia law. They only perceive Islam as a perfect system of moral and religious renewal of societies. Women have a great role to play because they bring up children (future generations). Therefore, they should be educated and have the relevant religious knowledge. The family is seen as the most important value in Islam, and in this context women’s role is to preserve the family, which was explained on the example of Farida in Chapter V. Despite the fact that she is, she is a teacher of Uzbek literature, supporting women’s education, and their professional development, she strongly opposes divorce irrespective of circumstances. It is a rather conservative view on women rights, and many female religious figures do not agree with this opinion, just like for instance the members of IRPT to whom I spoke. Various female leaders have their own views on social and religious issues, and on this basis they shape the opinions of their followers. There are also female religious figures such as Amina, who does not perceive her role as someone who should participate in the social or political discussions while teaching Islam. She is a teacher of the Arabic language in the madrasa, and she studies Islam for personal and spiritual development. I am Muslim, and 1 want to live according to the Islamic way and I would like to know what God wants from us. I learn Islam for Him andfor this reason I want to teach religion to others.²⁴¹ Amina teaches Islam and educates people in the spirit of religion because for her spiritual development is a value by virtue of its nature. Another issue which impacts relationships within religious networks, including women, is related to a doctrinal change within Islam. Research on the Islamic theology is beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, ²⁴¹ An interview with Amina, August 2015. Concluding remarks my assumptions are based only on observation of rituals, celebrations, conversations, and interviews. In my opinion, however, modification of rituals towards their purification will influence in the long term the whole sphere of female religiosity, transforming female religious authority. Bibi otuns have always had their own sphere of activity, performing specific rituals only for women, and leading pilgrimages to mazars. They have created their own congregations separated from the male religious sphere. Traditionally, the mazar is a place of their influence, expressed for instance through a celebration of the ‘female’ day of pilgrimages such as Wednesday in contrast to the ‘male’ Friday, and a sermon performed in the mosque for men. Some rituals, as for example Bibi Mushkil-Kusho or Bibi Seshanbe, are organized exclusively for women, and in the case of the latter, no man is even allowed to see the performance. Bibi otun is a high priestess of the ceremony, and a master of celebration, acting as an intermediary between the people and God. In my opinion, various Islamic trends have influenced the whole pattern of ritual performance, reshaping the nature of female gatherings which now in some circles are limited only to the reading of the Quran and religious texts without poetry, songs, or some ritual dishes. Certainly, this process is not homogeneous, and new female teachers replicate some social functions of bibi-otuns. Ehsons are organized with the leadership of a person who knows how to read the Quran, and women gather to pray together. Nevertheless, old traditions are less frequently cultivated, which affects the ritual functions of female religious leaders. Those women who are connected to an official Islamic institution are supervised by a male religious circle such as the female madrasa in Shahrak which is a branch of a male madrasa. In this context, the female teachers are deprived of a certain kind of freedom in forming opinions, or interpreting the ritual life, and religion. They function within hierarchies of the local clergy and their position is much lower than that of male theologians, and imams. Certainly there are far fewer women attached to the formal religious education than men. However, as I mentioned above, the position of women has not been even negotiated, or its change reconsidered, irrespective of the theological knowledge of a given person. 230 Concluding remarks On the other hand, the emergence of a social organization such as Mutakalim created opportunities for female religious leaders to be involved in the social sphere. The Mutakalim promotes the Islamic lifestyle and education for women within the ideological framework which (despite some controversies) corresponds with the religious policy of the Kyrgyz state. In this way, the organisation contributes to reconstituting the role of female religious leaders, who can now engage in public affairs, while still operating according to the rules of Islam. In this context, Mutakalim creates a new type of otyncha linking this old social institution of Uzbeks and Tajiks with reformists irrerespective of the ethnic group. Through social or educational activities, Mutakalim contributes to the shaping of the religious policy of Kyrgyzstan. In the long run, it could lead to an increase of the authority of these female religious figures who participate in social and educational initiatives such as Elmira. The situation differs significantly in Tajikistan. President Rahmon legitimizes his actions against religious leaders by the necessity of bringing order, and fighting extremism. In fact, however, it is an attempt to limit the influences of religious networks, and religious leaders, since they have a capacity to consolidate people, and potentially challenge the authority of Rahmon, and his allies. This policy aims at undermining the position of various families of noble (religious) origin, especially those who do not want to subordinate to the president’s group. Apart from formal religious leaders, also Sufi teachers, tabibs, folbins, bibi otuns and others, are a potential threat to the authoritarian regime. For the first time, bibi-otuns are said to be officially supervised, and even incorporated into semi-formal organization namely Shuroi Bibi Otunho. The ban on the IRPT excluded the previously emerging alternative sphere of influence for female religious teachers within the area of politics. The activities within the IRPT were important from the point of view of participation of the female figures in public life, and could contribute to the changing of the situation of women through increasing their civic awareness, and the standards of Islamic education, especially in conservative areas of the country. At present, even if Rahmon does not destroy the religious networks, he at least weakens their influences. Nevertheless, people still organize 131 Concluding remarks religious gatherings which are hidden from the sight of outsiders, just like during the Soviet times. Many others migrate to Russia, and other countries, where they have an opportunity to participate in various forms of Islamic education, unavailable in Tajikistan. This seriously undermines the position of religious leaders, including women. It also creates a vacuum into which various trends can be absorbed, including those of radical ideologies. The concept of female religious leadership has changed in the last few years in both countries. Certainly many female religious figures have adapted their religious views according to various new interpretations of Islam. Others have still followed the traditional pattern rooted in the local culture, and their understanding of religion and religious values. Some women have the opportunity to go abroad, and function in ethnically and ideologically diverse groups, which also changes their perception of religion, and possibly the view on the role of female religious leadership. 1. The ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at Qalandar-khona 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 2. The ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at Qalandar-khona 2014, Khujand. Tajikistan 133 3. The ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at Qalandar-khona 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 4. Khudoi (an offering) at the Ovcha Kalacha Mazar 2014, Sughd region, Tajikistan 134 5. A TV show entitled Shuroi Bibi Otunho on khotiri chist ba? (English: What is the role of the Council of Bibi Otuns?) 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 6. Women’s chapel at the mosque of Shaikh Malihaddin Badeuddini Nuri 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 7. A portrait of a bibi otun, a grandmother of a friend of mine from Khujand 2014, Tajikistan 8. The Bibi Oim madrasa in Konibodom, Tajikistan 236 9. The mazar Sukhr Ota in the Istpisor village 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 10. Spilling rice at the mazar Sukhr Ota 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 2-37 11. The ritual of 5z’W Seshanbe 2014, Khujand, Tajikistan 12. A dua at Surkh mazar near the Isfara town 2014, Tajikistan 138 13. Healing ritual during a pilgrimage at Surkh mazar near the Isfara town 2014, Tajikistan 14. The ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at the bazaar near the Yaqub Charkhi mazar in Dushanbe 2014, Tajikistan *39 15. The photos of relatives who live in Russia brought by women for the ritual of Bibi Mushkil-Kusho at the bazaar near the Yaqub Charkhi mazar in Dushanbe 2014, Tajikistan 16. Khatmi Quran during Ramadan near Osh 2015, Kyrgyzstan 240 17. Quran classes at the Mutakalim office, Osh 2015, Kyrgyzstan 18. A mother with her child at a mazar near Osh 2015, Kyrgyzstan 241 19. Making chalpak (a ritual bread) during a pilgrimage at a mazar near Osh 2015, Kyrgyzstan 20. Yuzashti (Tajik: Kelin Salom), the ritual of welcoming a new bride, near Osh 2015 Kyrgyzstan All photos by Anna Cieslewska 142 Glossary This glossary does not include all of the terms and phrases of foreign origin found within the text. Only selected terms have been listed here. In the case of the majority of other terms, their meanings have been explained within the text itself. adab/tarbiya - traditional norms and customs adat (urf) - customary law, custom alabasti (albastyi, alvasti) - a demon, usually presented as a woman who is especially dangerous to young women and children Alids - descendants of Ali ibn Abi Talib amri maruf/amr ba maruf- religious guidance/'the Commanding Right’ aqida - the Islamic creed Ashura - commemoration of Husayn ibn Ali who was killed in a battle near Karbala in 680 CE asilzodagon/ashrafon - a high-bom, noble awra - an intimate part of the body which should be covered ayil - a Kyrgyz village bakhshy - shaman, healer (also an oral epic performer) baraka - a blessing attributed to a special kind of people closely related to God Bibi Mushkil-Kusho (Lady of Solution) - a female ritual Bibi Seshanbe (Lady of Tuesday) - a female ritual bid'a - innovation regarding religious matters bibi-otun (there are also other terms) - a female religious figure U3 Glossary chilla - a 40-day period of seclusion from the outside world; a 40-day period of isolation of a baby after birth; a 40-day period after the demise of a person (there are also other meanings of this term) dastarkhon - a table with food da ’wa (daawa or daawah) - a form of preaching to remind Muslims about Islam; proselytizing dev - a dangerous and a big demon domullo (also mullo) - a Muslim religious functionary dua - a prayer, an act of supplication edje (Kyrgyz) - literal meaning: an older sister ehson - a religious gathering, offering eshon (also ishan/ishon) - a respected religious leader, usually within a Sufi group; their descendants inherit this title from their ancestors fatwa - a legal opinion based on sharia law fatiha (there are also other terms) - a customary blessing given to a candidate for a spiritual leader fiqh - Islamic jurisprudence folbin - clairvoyant gavora bandon (Tajik); (Uzbek; beshik toy) - a cradle ceremony ghazal - a poetic genre hadis (es) - various stories associated with the life and actions of prophet Muhammad halqa - a gathering of murids around a shaikh in Sufi movements, a ritual circle hajj - an obligatory Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca hijab - a veil covering the head, neck and a part of the chest, also understood as modest, Islamic dress hujra (cell, classroom) - a group where Islam is taught hukumat - a district and regional government in Tajikistan Ibada - ritual duties and commands iftar (iftor) - a supper during the month of Ramadan imam - male religious professional iman - faith, commitment to Allah, practising Islam 244 Glossary Ismailism - one of the branches of Shia Islam recognizing seven Imams isyryk (hazor ispand, ruta) - a herb used for ritual incensing itikaf- a practice of seeking retreat for a certain period jamoat- an administrative unit, a municipality in Tajikistan janoza namaz - the Islamic funeral prayer jinn - a spirit in the Arabic and Islamic beliefs kalym - a payment made by the groom’s family to the bride’s family in the form of various goods kelin - a daughter-in-law kelin salom (Tajik); (Uzbek: yuzashti) - a ritual of welcoming a new bride khalqiyat ([omma]) - (commonalty, people), here: a lower class (Tajikistan) khatmi Quran - the reading of the entire Quran in stages or, in the case of Central Asia, the reading of parts of the Quran during certain celebrations khodim (there are also other terms) - a traditional organizer of celebrations and enterprises among women khoja - the reputable progeny of the Prophet Muhammad or his companions who brought Islam to Central Asia (there are also other meanings) khosa - upper class (Tajikistan) khudoyi - thanksgiving ritual kinachi - a person who lifts spells kina - casting a spell laylatu l-qadr (the Night of Destiny; there are also other terms) - held on the 27th day of Ramadan mahalla - community neighbourhood within the city, village or part of a village mahr - dowry mazar/ziyorat gah (there are also other terms) - a place of veneration, such as a stone, tree, spring etc. or a tomb which is a destination of a pilgrimage madrasa - an Islamic school maktab - in the Central Asian context, a school of basic Islamic education Mavlud - a celebration in commemoration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday momodoya - a traditional midwife momo (ho) - female spirits associated with childbirth MS Glossary mulla (also domullo) - a Muslim religious functionary murid - a disciple of a Sufi master muakkal - a subconscious feeling guiding a person namaz-khona - a chapel where prayers were held namaz (Arabic: salat) - Muslim prayer Naqshbandiyya - a Sufi branch nasiba - a gift/vocation Navruz - an ancient tradition of the New Year niqab - a face veil niyat - intention nokcha - candles made from willow sticks with raw cotton wrapped around them pari - a spirit present in various legends and beliefs pir - a Sufi leader Qadiriyya - a Sufi branch qasida-khon (there are also other terms) - a category of healers/shamans, also an exorcist qori (Arabic: hafiz) - a person who memorized the whole Quran Qurban hayyid (there are also other terms) - a sacrificial feast, one of the two most important Muslim holidays Ramadan (Tajik/Uzbek: Ramazan/Ramazori) - a month of fasting Ramazon-hayyid (there are also other terms) - a celebration at the end of the month of Ramadan, one of the two most important Muslim holidays ruh (plural: e[a]rvah, arwohlar) - a soul, being, ghost, or essence sayyid- the alleged progeny of Prophet Muhammad or his close associates salovat - praising Prophets/God sart - a sedentary group of the Persian-Turkic-speaking population, widely recognized before the October Revolution Shabi Miraaj - a day devoted to the ascension of Prophet Muhammad to Heaven shaikh - a Sufi master/descendant of saints, also a person who guards a holy place shirk - the presence at God’s side of other divinities or associates 246 Glossary shajaranoma - ‘knowledge of genealogy’, ‘genealogical book of a family’ sharia law - Muslim code of law shogird - a student shura/shuro - a council suf-kuf- a certain way of blowing associated with healing sunna toy/nabera toy - circumcision ceremony tabaqa - social layer (Tajikistan) tabib - a folk doctor tafsir - Quranic exegesis tajwid - a set of rules for the pronunciation of the Quran talaq - divorce tanzim - an official event and religious specialist in Tajikistan tariqa - a Sufi path of spiritual learning tasawwuf- another term for Sufism tarawih (Tajik: tarobeh) - a set of prayers performed during Ramadan after a night prayer tazbih - a Muslim rosary tumor - a talisman tura - reputable descendants of Genghis Khan umra - a small pilgrimage to Mecca ustod (also ustoz) - a teacher waqf/vaqf- Islamic religious land, property zakat al-Fitr - a charity given by Muslims before the end of Ramadan zikr - a prayer/repetition of certain religious sequences to remember God ziyofat - religious gathering ziyorat - pilgrimage 147 References Abashin, S.N. 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M. 16-17 Abu Bakr, Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate 95 Abu Mansur Al Maturidi Samarcandi 69 Abu Nasr Mubashshir at-Tarazi Sayyid 53 Abul Ala Maududi Sayyid 59 Ad-Din Naqshband Baha’ 92, 137, 143 Ad-din qari Zain 53 Ahmat Yassavi Khoja 98, 128 Aimnisa (Nisa), poetesses 93 Aisha (an altered name) 191-193 Akayev Askar 72 Akcali Pinar 60, 62 Al-Qadir Gilani Abd 125 Alexander the Great, king of Macedon 15 Ali Imran Ashur 175 Ali Sultan 103, 158-160, 162-163, 178 Ali, caliph 95 Ali, imam 145 Aliautdinov S.lll Allama ibn Rasulan Rahmatullah 58 Allayar Sufi 96 Amina, social activist 115, 161, 165--166, 170-174, 189 Amina, Muhammad’s mother 133 Andreev M. S. 138-139, 143 Andropov Iuri Vladimirovich 99 Arifa Bidi 92 Artman Vincent M. 69 As-Sadiq Ja’far 80 Asad Talal 48-49 Ata Abdu Rahmon 98 Atambayev Almazbek 72 Atayeva Kumunjohon 11, 92, 94, 104, 144 Avicenna, scholar 110 Azam Abu Hanifa Imomi 69, 83-84, 183 161 Index of names Azattyk 71 Azimova Nadira 17, 29, 100, 106--107, 124, 131, 138-139, 141, 145 Azizova Lobar 88, 107-108, 120 Azizova Nodira 88, 107-108, 120 Babajanov Bakhtiyar 54, 58-59, 101, 161 Bakiyev Kurmanbek Saliyevich 72 Balci Bayram 70 Balkhi Rabia 93 Bano Masooda 25 Bamo, student 47 Basilov Vladimir Nikolaevich 16, 107, 120, 138-139, 141, 143 Bearman Peri 23-24 Bedil, poet 96 Bekmurzaev N. 78, 151 Bianquis Thierry 23-24 Borbieva Noor O’Neil 180 Bosworth Clifford Edmund 23-24 Bowen John R. 72, 161-162 Bukowiński Władysław 100 Buzurg Aga-uy 92 Charkhi Ya’qub 67, 116, 145, 158, 239-240 Chotaev Z. D. 69, 77 Cieślewska Anna 13, 56, 84, 86, 98, 115, 197,210,212,214,217, 220--223, 242 Cleuziou J. 184, 186-187 Commercio Michele M. 165, 184, 186-187 Corley Felix 86 Crews Robert D. 24 Daftary Farhad 80 Danecki Janusz 11, 130 Datka Kurmanjan 18 Dilbar, teacher 108-109 Dilfuza, teacher 66-67, 77, 79, 102- -103, 171, 187 Dilorom, bibi-otun 109-110 Domulla Shami (Shaikh Muhammad Sayyid Abd al-Wahid al-Asali al- -Shami al-Tarabulsi) 53 Donzel Emeri Van 23-24 Doolotkeldieva A. 77, 164, 167 Doom-Harder Pietemella Van 188 DundesAlan 145 Dziekan Marek M. 79 Edge Elmira 54 Elnazarov Hakim 81 Epkenhans Tim 81-82, 221 Falkowski Maciej 75, 83 Farida, bibi-otun 132, 138, 140, 204- -205, 207-209, 224-225, 229 Farididdinom Muhammad bin Abu Bakr Ibrahim Attar Sheikh 95 Faruk Umar 50 Fathi Habiba 17, 19, 29, 65, 91, 96- -97, 100, 124 Fatima-Zuhra, Muhammad’s daughter 16 Gaffarova F. 175 Gafurov Uigun 54-57, 97 Galdini Franco 75 Gari Ishakov Ibrahim (Shaikhim qari) 53 Garipova Rozaliya 228 Gatling Benjamin Clark 66-67 Geertz Clifford 40 Gilliot Claude 23-24 Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeyevich 60 262 Index of names Gorshunova O. S. 17, 25, 28-29, 92--93, 106-107, 112, 124, 138-139, 141, 143-144, 206, 208 Gulmira, nurse 151-152 Gulsun, otyncha 23, 27, 37, 56, 78, 100, 102, 114, 127-128, 130-131, 156, 174-183, 187-189, 209, 227--228 Hafez see Hafiz, poet Hafiz, poet 96 Hakimjon qori Margilani Mulla 58 Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb 52 Hart Michael Anthony 120 Hayat-atum (Bibi-atum) 93 Heinrichs Wolfhart P. 23-24 Hooker M. B. 23-24 Hunwick John Owen 23-24 Hutson Alaine S. 228 Ibn Abi Talib Ali 80 Ibn Ali Husayn 124 Ibn Ja’far Ismail 80 Ibn Sino see Avicenna Ibn Taymiyyah 58 Ikram Shakh-Islamov Shakh 53 Isaeva G. K. 69, 77 Isakov I. 184 Ismah Nor 172 Ismail, biblical 124 Japasheva Jamila 11, 154, 167 Jaschok Maria 25 Kabiri Muhiddin 82, 217 Kalishevskii Mikhail 51 Kaliszewska Iwona 36,42,46-47,49, 61, 156, 224 Kalmbach Hilary 24, 26, 173 Kamila, bibi-otun 104-106, 135-136, 207 KamilovM. M. 161 Kamol Hamza 147 Kamp Marianne 29, 94, 96-97 Kandiyoti Deniz 17, 29, 100, 124, 131, 138-139, 141, 145 Kara-Khanid, dynasty 16 Karmysheva J. H. 16, 107, 120 Kemper Michael 54-57, 97 Khachilaev Nadirshah 62 Khaimiso 132, 140, 204 Khalid Adeeb 64, 96-97 Khalimov Gulmurod 83 Kharitonova V. I. 93, 139, 141, 143 Khodzha Ishan Jamal 53 Khrushchev Nikita Sergeyevich 55 Kijewska Anna 25 Kikuta Haruka 108, 121, 123 KisliakovN. K. 134 Kister Meir Jacob 24 Kloos David 24-26 Koroteyeva Victoria 212 Kramer A. 17, 19, 29, 94, 96-97, 124- -125, 138-139, 141, 143, 145 Krämer Gudrun 24 Kramers Johannes Hendrik 52 Kügelgen Anke von 58-59 Künkler Mirjam 24-26 Kurbanova Nazira 78 Lang Jozef 75, 83 Larina E. I. 106-107 Latypov Alisher 88 Lecomte Gerard 52 Leibing Annette 36 Lemon Edward 86 Levi-Provencal Evariste 52 Lin Chang-Kuan 23-24 Louw Maria Elisabeth 64, 138-139 263 Index of names Łabenda Michał 11, 15-16, 57, 61, 63, 94, 198 Mahmood Saba 24, 26-27, 173 Makarova Ekaterina 212 Makowska Agnieszka 11, 72 Maksudi Ahmedhadil75 Malashenko Aleksei 54, 61 Mansharab Baba 96 Marranci Gabriele 42 Marszewski Mariusz 72 Matluba, religious leader 77 Matveeva Anna 149 McBrien Julie 42, 45-47, 65, 76, 158 McLean Athena 36 Micinski Nick R. 25 Mills Margaret A. 145 Miloslavskii G. V. 25, 129 Mohniso, religious leader 28, 56, 214-215,218,225,227 Montgomery David 21, 42, 45, 47, 49, 157 Motika Raoul 54-57, 97 Mualima (altered name), teacher of Russian 135, 212-213, 215, 218, 225 Muhammad, the prophet 16, 23, 27, 48,52, 80, 95, 102, 111, 117, 121, 124, 127-133, 139 Muminov Ashirbek 54-59, 97 Murodov O. 107, 143 Murzaeva Dinara 70 Mushtariy (real name: Saodat), poetess 94 Muzaffari Muhammadali 147 Nabotzoda Zainuddin 147 Nadira, economist, journalist 48, 73, 77, 166-167 Nadwi Mohammad Akram 91 Najibullah Farangis 87, 207 Nalivkin V. P. 28, 94 Nalivkina M. V. 28, 94 Namangani Juma 62 Nasritdinov E. 78, 151 Navoiy, poet 96 Nekrasova E. G. 93 Niechciał Paulina 145 Nigora, university teacher 209-210 Niyazi Aziz 54-56 Nizami Khaliq Ahmed 23-24 Nodira-begim (pseud. Kamila), poetesses 93 Nozimova Shanhnoza 82 Nuri Shaikh Malihaddin Badeuddini 105, 116, 235 Nurmila Nina 186 Olcott Martha Brill 53-54, 58-59 Olimov M. 55-57 Olimova Saodat 55-57 Orifa Bibi 147 Otin Anbar, poetess 93 Otin Dilshod 93 Otunbayeva Roza 72 Pelkmans Mathijs 45-47, 76 Pemberton Kelly 25 Penkala-Gawęcka Danuta 43, 107 Perekrest Lea 82 Peshkova Svetlana 17, 29, 36, 65, 115, 119, 124, 163,223 Petrosian I. A. 25, 129 Pietrowiak Sylwia 156-157 Pikulicka-Wilczewska Agnieszka 11, 75 Pisarchik A. K. 134 Poletaev D. 208 264 Index of names Pomeon A. 50 Prozorov Stanislav 17, 19, 25, 29, 81, 93-94, 96-97, 124-125, 129, 138- -139, 141, 143, 145, 161 Qori Abdu Rahim 103 Qori Mirzaev Abduvali 58 Qutb Sayyid 59 Rahmon Emomali 33, 82, 85, 87, 89, 191-192,225-226, 231 Rakhimov R. 17, 29, 81, 106-107, 109, 111-114, 120, 124, 138-139, 141, 143-145,202 Rasanayagam Johan 49, 64 Raudvere Catharina 25 Recknagel Charles 87 Reichmuth Stefan 54-57, 97 Repp Richard Cooper 23-24 Rezvan M. E. 25, 146 Roberts Flora Julia 196-197 Roi Yaacov 43 Rumi, poet 96 Rustamov Hindustani Muhammadjan (Domulla Hindustani) 58 Saidniso, bibi-otun 97-98 Sarkorova A. 87 Sattori Kiemiddin 216 Schacht Joseph 52 Schmidtke Sabine 24 Schmitz Andrea 81, 83, 85, 216 Shaffir William B. 36 Shigabdinov Rinat 54-57, 97 Snesarev Gleb Pavlovich 106-108, 120, 124, 143, 160, 201 Sodiqov Alexander 195 Soliha Bibi 94 Stebbins Rober A. 36 Stephan Manja 85 Stewart Pamela J. 25, 228 Strathem Andrew 25, 228 Sukhareva Olga A. 106-107, 124, 143, 160, 201 Sultanova Razia 17, 25, 28-29, 92-94, 96, 100-101, 119-120, 124, 131 Szalbot Katarzyna 108 Tasar Eren Murat 58 Temurkhon oya 98-99 Thibault Hélène 216 Tomohiko Uyama 58-59 Trilling David 195 Troickaia Anna Leonidovna 92 Tucker Noah 75 Turner Victor 120 Tursunbekov Z. A. 69, 77 Tursunova Zulfiya 88, 107-108, 120 Umar, Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate 95 Umeda, political activist 211 Uthman, Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate 95, 111 Uvaisiy (real name: Jahon-otin), poetess 93 Wadud Amina 228 Wainer Alon 43 Widy-Behiesse Marta 25 Wilson Monica 38, 120 Yoldoshev Tohir 62 Zapaśnik Stanisław 16,42, 51,60-63, 65, 206 Index of places Afghanistan 60-61, 83, 102, 145, 213 Afghans, people 60 Amu-Daria, river 15 Andijan, city 62, 93, 102, 129, 155, 158 Arab Emirates 185 Asia, Asians 30, 60, 119, 145, 174, 195 Astrakhan, city 61 Batken, district 62 Bishkek, city 15, 19, 48, 50, 70-71, 73, 76-77, 116, 150, 153, 160, 164, 166-167, 169-170, 186 Bosnia 25 Bukhara, city 42, 55, 92, 102, 125, 145, 147,213 Canada 195 Caucasus, region 54, 92 Central Asia 13-18, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 33-34, 37-38, 41-44, 46-54, 58--61, 63-65, 69-70, 72-73, 80-81, 85, 87, 91-92, 95-96, 98, 100-102, 107, 110-111, 113-115, 117, 120, 123, 131-132, 134, 137, 144, 147, 153, 160-161, 165, 176, 180, 183, 186, 197, 205-206,211,227 Chechens, people 50, 61 China, Chinese, people 15, 25, 91, 102 Christianity, Christians, rel. 15, 25, 179 Czech Republic 63 Dagestan (Republic of Dagestan), a federal subject of Russia, Dagestanis, people 36, 49, 224 Dagestanis, people 50 Dushanbe, city 15, 56, 67, 84, 116, 145, 191-192, 196, 223,239-240 East, region 34 Eastern Bloc 34, 63 Egypt 26, 64,78, 85, 173 Europe, Europeans 35,46, 53, 61,75, 96, 110, 149, 156, 173, 191, 195, 227-229 Farsi, language 30 Fergana, district 28, 92 Ferghana Valley 93, 155 France 35 Georgia 71 Germany 35, 223 267 Index of places Ghafurov, district 15, 194, 204, 220 Gharm, region 217 Ghonchi District 196 Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, region 80, 146 Greeks, people 15 Hui, people 25 Hungary 63 India 25, 48, 64 Indonesia 172, 186 Iran, Iranians 15, 51, 60, 81, 85, 93, 110, 145 Isfara District 15, 56, 84, 98, 123, 194,214,216, 238-239 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 47, 75, 77, 83 Istpisor, village 135, 237 Jalalabad, city 149 Jordan 78 Karbala, city 124 Kazakhs, people 16, 68, 146, 217 Kazakhstan 100 Kazan, city 214 Khatlon, region 14, 114 Khorog, city 146 Khujand, city 11, 15, 17-19, 23, 31--32, 56, 83-84, 92, 94, 98-99, 101, 104-105, 115-116, 124, 130-131, 135, 138-139, 144-145, 182, 193--201,207-208,210-211,214,219--224, 233-238 Kokand, city 55, 93-95 Kokand Khanate of 93, 195 Konibodom, city 95-96, 236 Kurgan Tube 14,56, 84, 201 Kuwait 78 Kyrgyzs, Kyrgyzstani, people 15-21, 30, 32, 34, 36-37, 48, 50, 54, 56, 68-69, 71-72, 75, 146, 149-154, 162, 168-169, 180, 184-185, 188, 231 Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic 14, 55 Kyrgyzstan 11, 14-15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32-39, 41-42, 45, 47-50, 62, 66-71, 73, 75-77, 79-80, 82, 91, 100, 103, 112, 114, 116-117, 126, 134, 137, 149-151, 153, 158, 162, 164-165, 167-168, 172, 175--176, 178, 180-181, 183-185, 188, 227, 231,240-242 Leninabad (Leninobod) see Khujand Margilan, city 56, 155, 176 Mawarannahr, region 15 Mecca, city 57, 69, 121, 132, 134, 141, 191 Medina, city 116 Middle East, region 119 Moscow, city 42, 195 Namangan, city 62 Naryn, town 116 Nigeria 228 Now see Spitamen, district Osh, city 11, 15, 18, 32, 34-35, 50, 54,62, 74, 76, 123, 126, 146, 149--151, 153-154, 156-158, 168, 181, 184-185,240-242 Pakistan 51,61, 64, 78, 85 Pamiri, people 80 Persia see Iran 168 Index of places Persians, people, language 15-16, 44, 93-94, 96, 123, 198, 207 Poland 14, 34, 39, 44, 63, 156-157, 218 Polish, (Poles), people, language 11, 30,33-35,37, 100, 115, 130, 149, 154, 161 Rudaki, district 93, 223 Russia, Russian Federation 25, 34, 46, 53, 55, 61, 63-64, 75, 89, 94--96, 126, 136, 145, 150-151, 154, 185, 195-197, 207-208, 214, 223--224, 228, 232, 240 Russian, people, language 19, 30, 35, 47-48, 51, 53, 57, 61, 66, 68, 74, 77-78, 83, 96, 99-100, 111, 129, 132, 145, 150, 152-153, 184, 195, 197, 201-202,212, 223 Samarkand, city 42, 96 Saudi Arabia 51, 64, 78, 85 Shahrak (altered name), district 23, 32, 67, 73-74, 76-77, 100, 102--103, 114-116, 123, 137, 150, 153-155, 157-158, 160-161, 163--166, 168, 171-172, 174, 176-178, 183, 189, 230 Shahrinaw, town 147 Shurabad, district 113 Siberia, region 53, 61, 102 Simganj, village 147 Slavs, people 60 Slovakia 63 South Asia 71, 221 Spitamen, district 98, 111, 115, 196 Sughd, region 15, 135, 195, 216, 223, 234 Syr-Darya, river 15, 195, 208 Syria 47, 51, 53, 74, 76-77, 83, 155, 158 Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 14, 55 Tajik (Tajiks), people, language 11, 14-15, 17-18, 20-21, 23, 29-30, 37, 44, 61, 66, 68, 81-82, 84-89, 93-95, 108, 114-115, 120, 122--125, 131, 137, 139-140, 143-144, 195, 197-199, 202, 207, 209, 216--219, 221-223,231,242 Tajikistan 11, 13-15, 19-20, 22-23, 28-34, 38-39, 41-42, 45, 47, 55--56, 58-59, 61, 63, 66-68, 80-89, 91-92, 95, 101, 106-107, 109--110, 112-114, 117, 123-124, 130, 134-136, 143, 146-147, 158, 165, 181-185, 191-197, 199, 202, 205, 208-209, 215, 218, 220-225, 227, 231-240 Tashkent, city 42, 55, 92, 102 Tatars, people 25, 61, 146 Termez, city 15 Turkey 64, 70-71,78, 186 Turkestan, region 55, 86, 94 Turkmenistan 70 Turkmens, people 16 Turks (Turkish) Turkic language, people 15,61,71,94, 180, 198 Ukraine 34, 71 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) 14, 16, 19, 21-22, 29, 33-34, 41-43, 45-46, 53-55, 57, 59-64, 66, 75-76, 85, 88-89, 97, 99-100, 102, 104-105, 117, 150, 154, 161, 163, 165-167, 170, 180, 183, 195-199, 201,213--214,218,225-226, 228,232 Index of places United States of America (USA) 34, 72, 181,228 Upper Matcha 196 Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 14, 53, 56 Uzbeks, people, language 14, 16-18, 20-21, 29-30, 32, 34, 36-37, 47, 61-62, 68, 72, 93-94, 108, 120, 122-126, 129, 132, 139, 146, 149--151, 153-154, 156, 168, 170, 194, 197-199, 204-205, 208-209, 217, 224, 229, 231 Uzbekistan 14, 28-29, 36, 59, 61-62, 67, 85, 92, 102, 129, 153-155, 158, 177-178,223 Vahdat, town 92, 147, 223 Vakhsh Valley 15, 108-109, 196, 217 Warsaw, city 14-15, 99, 157, 217- -218 West, region 34, 44-46, 60, 63, 72, 89, 188,216, 229 Yaghnob Valley 196 Yol, village 113 Zafarobod, district 196 Zahedan, city 85 Zaravshan Valley 29, 107 270 Index of etno-confessional terms Abystay 25 Adab (Tarbiya) 95, 99, 210, 243 Adat (Urf) 58, 168, 185,243 Ahkam 95 Ahi al-Quran 54 Ahl-i Hadis 53-54 Ahong 25 Aivan 136, 174 Ajat 167 Alabasti (Albastyi, Alvasti) 107, 160, 243 Alids 81,243 Amin (Omin) 134 Amri maruf (Amr ba maruf) 121, 215,243 Aqida 79, 243 Aqida Maturidi 69, 78 Arkan 95 Arwah-noma 119 Ash-e Bibi Murad 145 Ashr-kitob 125 Ashura 121, 124, 243 Asilzodagon (Ashrafon) 197, 243 Asr namaz 127 Afala 141 Atum-bibi 94 Awra 103, 243 Ayil 152, 165, 243 Azan 136 Azani-khon 106 Bakhshy 17, 106-107, 159-160, 170, 243 Baraka 25, 27, 243 Bibi Mushkil-Kusho (Bibi Chorshan-be, Bibi Mushkel-Kusho, Bibi Mushkul-Kushad, Mushkel-Ku-shad, Mushkil-Kusho, Mushkul--Kusho, Mushkul-Kushod) 14, 67--68, 105-106, 108, 116, 121, 125, 136-137, 139-141, 143-147, 175, 177,200-202, 205,211,219, 221, 230, 233, 236, 239-240, 243 Bibi otun (Bibi-otin, Bi-otun, Bi-otin, Bu-otin, Bibi khalifa, Bibi halfa, Bibi holpa, Bibi-mullo, Otin--bucha, Otin-hofiz, Otun) 17-22, 26-30, 35, 37, 56, 64, 78, 84, 91--102, 104-112, 114, 116, 118, 120-121, 123-125, 127-136, 138--141, 143-147, 163, 169, 172, 187-189, 199-200, 202-204, 207, 209-215, 217, 219-224, 226-227, 230-231,236, 243 Bibi Seshanbe (Oshi Bibi Seshanba) 67, 108, 121, 125, 137-140, 143- 171 Index of etno-confessional terms -144, 147, 177, 205, 230, 238, 243 Bid'a 58-59, 65-66, 147, 221,243 Bomdod namaz (Fajr) 128, 130 Borsoq 138 Bubu 17 Bula 25 Chalpak (Chapati) 138-139, 146, 242 Chilla 109-110, 114,215,244 Chillkhona 114 Chor-Kitob 95 Da’yat 173 Dastarkhon 94, 132, 136, 139-140, 244 Da’wa (Da’wah, Daawa, Daawah) 35, 69, 244 Dawachis 69 Domullo see: Mulla Dua 108-109, 112, 120, 126, 128, 131-134, 136, 139-141, 143,215,238,244 Edje 164-165, 168-170, 244 Ehson 121, 170, 244 Fatwaif 57, 81, 116,213,244 Fiqh 162, 244 Folbin 106, 231,244 Fotiha 104, 170,201,214, 244 Gap (Gashtak) 155, 175 Gawora bandon (tj.) (Beshik toy) (uzb.) 125,202, 244 Ghazal 119, 128,212,215, 244 Hadis 24, 35, 78, 91, 111, 119, 161, 244 Hafiz 92 Haft 215 Haft-yak 95 Hajj 132-133, 135,244 Haifa 92 Halqa 92, 244 Halve tar 141 Hazrat domullo 158 Hijab 46-47, 78, 84, 87, 151, 156, 182,215,219, 221,244 Hojji (Haji) 133 Hojji-bobo 134 Hujra (Darsi-dini, Maktab-dini, Mak-tab-dor, Dawra) 55, 78-79, 97-99, 101-102, 114, 126, 152, 154, 156, 158, 174, 177, 189, 199, 244 Hut ba 155 Ibada-i Islamiyya (Ibada) 162, 175, 244 Iftar (Iftor) 122-123, 126-128, 214, 244 Ilham 25, 122 Imam 20, 27, 54, 64, 81, 88, 98, 111--112, 122, 173, 181, 191, 213, 227-228, 230, 244 Iman 95, 129, 244 Ishan (Ishon, eshon) 55, 92, 98, 102, 107, 112, 183, 197, 199, 244 Ishan-bu (Ishon-bibi) 92 Isyryk(Hazor ispand, Ruta) 134, 143, 245 Itikaf 123, 245 Jaddids 96-97 Jamoat 81,86-87,210,214,220,224, 245 Janoza namaz 114, 245 Jinn 107, 159-160, 245 171 Index of etno-confessional terms Kafir 44, 51,69 Kalym 209, 245 Karnayi 157 Katurma 138-139 Kelin 134, 138, 171, 205-207, 245 Kelin salom (tj.) (Yuzashti) (uzb.) 125, 242,245 Khalqiyat 197, 245 Khatmi Quran! f 123, 126-127, 156, 240, 245 Khatmi-yozdahum 125 Khodim (Koybonu, Dastarkhonchi) 94, 245 Khoja 102, 106, 183, 197, 245 Khosa 197, 245 Khudoi (Khudoyi) 125, 131, 135-136, 235, 245 Khuftan (Khuftan namaz, Isha) 122, 128 Khutba 117,213 Kina 108-109, 170, 245 Kinachi 99, 106, 108, 245 Kishlak 111 Kishmish 141, 143 Kissai-i Bibi-Seshanbe 137 Kulliyqt - Chahar fast 95 Kurt a 87 Kuuchu 17 Kuymoq 138-139 Kyz-Bibi 92 Laylatu l-qadr (Shabi qadr, Laylat al-Qadr) 123-124, 127-128, 130-131, 175,245 Madrasa 20, 23, 26-27, 37, 48, 55, 64, 78, 83-86, 95-96, 102-104, 116, 126, 149, 152-155, 158-166, 168-174, 186, 189, 191-192, 199, 210,213,228-230, 245 Mahalla 13-14, 31, 55-56, 73, 76, 94, 98-100, 114-115, 122, 136, 138, 152, 154, 165, 171, 177-178, 195, 200, 204, 220-222, 245 Mahr 208, 245 Majlis 114-115 Makhdum 197 Maktab 55, 58, 95, 97-99, 245 Masala 119, 178 Mavlud (Mavludsharif) 58, 119, 124, 131-136, 221, 245 Mazar (Mazor, Ziyaratgah) 57, 67--68,91-93,98, 105, 111-116, 124--125, 135-136, 141, 145, 147, 154, 156-157, 161, 169, 195,202, 210, 215, 227, 230, 234, 237-240, 242, 245 Mazhab 55, 69, 80, 179 Mohi Mavlud 131, 136 Momo-doya 93, 106, 125, 138, 201- -203, 245 Momo(ho) 138-139, 245 Muakkal 106-107, 246 Mualima 20, 28, 97, 135, 212-213, 215,218, 225 Mudarrisa 20 Mufti 24, 228 Muftiat 63, 68-70, 78, 81, 158 Muhaddithat 91 Muhammad (the prophet) 16, 23, 27, 48,52,81,95, 102, 111, 117, 119, 121, 123-124, 127-133, 139, 260 Muhimmat al-muslimin 95 Muhtasib 57 Mulla (Mullo, Domullo) 20, 27, 55--56, 64, 85, 95-96, 105, 107, 109, 111-112, 116, 132, 135, 155, 159--160, 187, 204, 211, 227, 244, 246 173 Index of etno-confessional terms Mumin 129 Murabba 119 Murid 92, 177, 244, 246 Musa-noma 119 Muwakkil 106 Nabera kelin 133 Namaz-khona 73, 79, 246 Namaz al-jama 'a 116 Nami Haq 95 Nasiba 106, 200-201, 246 Nazr 137 Nikah 164, 184-185 Niqab 47, 74, 76, 156, 246 Nisba 197 Niyat 143, 246 Nokcha (Bed) (tj.) (7o/) (uzb.) 138--139, 246 Navruz (Novruz) 121, 246 Odami ilmi 179, 227 Omoch 137-140, 143 Oq suyak 197 Osh 140 Otun kalon 220 Otun-oy (Otin-oy) 93, 176-177 Otyncha 17-20, 22-23, 27-28, 30, 35, 37, 56, 78, 100, 102, 114, 127--131, 146, 149, 152, 155-156, 163, 169, 172, 174-179, 181-183, 187-189, 209, 228,231 Oya 197 Pandnamai Attar 95 Pari 107, 246 Peshin namaz (Zuhr) 136 Pir66, 93, 110, 246 Polchi 106 Qadi (Qazi) 185.228 Qadr 130 Qalandar-khona 23, 145, 200, 202--203, 226, 233-234 Qari-khana 55 Qasida-khon 106-107, 246 Qaziat 69 Qingzhen ntisi 25 Qoracha (Qara suyak) 197 Qori 110, 127, 170, 246 Quran khondan (Bakhshidan) (tj.) (Chiqar) (uzb.) 120 Qurban hayyid (Idi Qurbon, Eid al--Adha) 121, 124, 246 Rakat 128, 193 Ramadan (Ramazan, Ramazon) 35, 122-123, 127, 155, 175,240, 246 Ramazon-havyid (Idi Ramazon, Id--al-Fitr) \23, 246 Rivoyat (Rivayat) 119, 121, 125, 178 Ruh (E[a]rvah, Arwohlar) 120, 246 Ruqiya 116, 159, 161 Saaqyt 146 Salovat 130, 132-134, 140-141,246 Sort 197, 246 Savob 186 Sayyid 102, 105-106, 183, 197, 211, 246 Shabi miraaj 124, 246 Shahada 129-130 Shaikh 56,67, 92, 102, 105, 136, 145, 158,201-203,244, 247 Shajara 197 Shajaranoma 197, 247 Sharia 24, 58, 62, 72, 81, 116, 168, 185, 188,207,215-216, 229, 247 Shirk 57, 59, 65-67, 147, 221, 247 Shogird 101, 103-104, 123, 247 Shorn (Shorn namaz, Maghrib) 122, 127 Silsila 66, 158 174 Index of etno-confessional terms Siokhi 114 Sofre-ye Bibi Seshanbe {Sofre-ye Moshkel gosha) 145 Sol 215 Soya 114 Suf-kuf 109, 134, 201,247 Sunna toy {Nabera toy) 125 Sura 96, 104, 116, 126-127, 131-132, 139-140, 146, 159-160, 163, 177, 200-201 Surfa {Sufra) 139 Taalim 78 Tabaqa 197, 247 Tabib 106, 231,247 Tafsir 162-164, 247 Tajwid 79, 123, 126, 156, 162, 171, 175,212, 247 Takfirism 69 Talaq 151,207, 247 Tanzim 210, 247 Tapchan 174 Tarasvih {Tarobeh) 122-123, 128,214, 247 Tariqa 67, 247 Tawhid 95 Ta’zim 139 Tazbih 145, 247 Tengri (Kudai, Khuda) 16 Tumor 146, 247 Tuppi (tj.) {Du 'pa) (uzb.) 108 Tura 102, 106, 183, 197, 210, 247 Ulama {Alim) 24, 97, 116, 172, 199 Umay 16 Umra 131-132, 135,247 Ustod {Ustoz) 20, 79, 101-104, 155, 171, 189, 247 Ustod talbon 103 Wahi 25 Waqf {Vakf) 95, 247 Witr namaz 128 Zakat al-Fitr 57, 247 Zikr 67, 92, 128, 130-131, 140, 201- -202 Ziyofat 121,247 Ziyorat 107, 247 Zokir 92