Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowe

2016
journal article
article
dc.abstract.enThe aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to defend my position against charges levelled by Tadeusz Ciecierski, and second, to venture into the possibility of an irrealist position concerning propositional attitudes. Regarding the first aim, I argue that the distinction proposed by Holton, between theories of truth and theories of truth-aptitude remains relevant, and allows for the joint acceptance of deflationary account of truth and a selective realist approach to truth-aptitude. As for the second aim, I consider several possible motivations for denying that sentences about propositional attitudes cannot be true, which do not rely on any substantial theory of truth. I also argue that even if we reject the strong form of irrealism about propositional attitudes, there is still space left for a moderate version of anti-realism concerning this domain. Such a position does not deny that propositions ascribing propositional attitudes might be described as true or false, but they are still not to be treated in a strongly realist manner. The anti-realistic element of this approach consists either in denying that the propositional attitudes are causally relevant or in claiming that they do not form natural kinds.pl
dc.affiliationWydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofiipl
dc.contributor.authorPosłajko, Krzysztof - 114410 pl
dc.date.accession2019-08-05pl
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.available2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.issued2016pl
dc.date.openaccess0
dc.description.accesstimew momencie opublikowania
dc.description.number2 (94)pl
dc.description.physical133-144pl
dc.description.points15pl
dc.description.publication1,8pl
dc.description.versionostateczna wersja wydawcy
dc.description.volume24pl
dc.identifier.issn1230-6894pl
dc.identifier.project2014/15/D/HS1/02722pl
dc.identifier.projectROD UJ / Ppl
dc.identifier.urihttp://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/32658
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/821/626pl
dc.languagepolpl
dc.language.containerpolpl
dc.rightsUdzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowa*
dc.rights.licenceOTHER
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode.pl*
dc.share.typeotwarte czasopismo
dc.subject.enirrealismpl
dc.subject.enpropositional attitudespl
dc.subject.endeflationismpl
dc.subject.enrealismpl
dc.subject.plirrealizmpl
dc.subject.plnastawienia sądzeniowepl
dc.subject.pldeflacjonizmpl
dc.subject.plrealizmpl
dc.subtypeArticlepl
dc.titleIrrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowepl
dc.title.alternativeIrrealism and propositional attitudespl
dc.title.journalFilozofia Naukipl
dc.typeJournalArticlepl
dspace.entity.typePublication
dc.abstract.enpl
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to defend my position against charges levelled by Tadeusz Ciecierski, and second, to venture into the possibility of an irrealist position concerning propositional attitudes. Regarding the first aim, I argue that the distinction proposed by Holton, between theories of truth and theories of truth-aptitude remains relevant, and allows for the joint acceptance of deflationary account of truth and a selective realist approach to truth-aptitude. As for the second aim, I consider several possible motivations for denying that sentences about propositional attitudes cannot be true, which do not rely on any substantial theory of truth. I also argue that even if we reject the strong form of irrealism about propositional attitudes, there is still space left for a moderate version of anti-realism concerning this domain. Such a position does not deny that propositions ascribing propositional attitudes might be described as true or false, but they are still not to be treated in a strongly realist manner. The anti-realistic element of this approach consists either in denying that the propositional attitudes are causally relevant or in claiming that they do not form natural kinds.
dc.affiliationpl
Wydział Filozoficzny : Instytut Filozofii
dc.contributor.authorpl
Posłajko, Krzysztof - 114410
dc.date.accessionpl
2019-08-05
dc.date.accessioned
2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.available
2016-11-22T16:35:48Z
dc.date.issuedpl
2016
dc.date.openaccess
0
dc.description.accesstime
w momencie opublikowania
dc.description.numberpl
2 (94)
dc.description.physicalpl
133-144
dc.description.pointspl
15
dc.description.publicationpl
1,8
dc.description.version
ostateczna wersja wydawcy
dc.description.volumepl
24
dc.identifier.issnpl
1230-6894
dc.identifier.projectpl
2014/15/D/HS1/02722
dc.identifier.projectpl
ROD UJ / P
dc.identifier.uri
http://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/32658
dc.identifier.weblinkpl
https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/821/626
dc.languagepl
pol
dc.language.containerpl
pol
dc.rights*
Udzielam licencji. Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowa
dc.rights.licence
OTHER
dc.rights.uri*
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode.pl
dc.share.type
otwarte czasopismo
dc.subject.enpl
irrealism
dc.subject.enpl
propositional attitudes
dc.subject.enpl
deflationism
dc.subject.enpl
realism
dc.subject.plpl
irrealizm
dc.subject.plpl
nastawienia sądzeniowe
dc.subject.plpl
deflacjonizm
dc.subject.plpl
realizm
dc.subtypepl
Article
dc.titlepl
Irrealizm a nastawienia sądzeniowe
dc.title.alternativepl
Irrealism and propositional attitudes
dc.title.journalpl
Filozofia Nauki
dc.typepl
JournalArticle
dspace.entity.type
Publication
Affiliations

* The migration of download and view statistics prior to the date of April 8, 2024 is in progress.

Views
1
Views per month
Downloads
poslajko_irrealizm_a_nastawienia_sadzeniowe_2016.pdf
2