The essay Symploke as a figure of mimesis in Plato’s philosophy is an attempt to reconstruct two different models of mimesis in Plato’s thought. The first model (Repulic) is ontological and based on the notion of truth as manifestation of real being (eidos or physis). Here, a copy or imitation is but a non-being, an appearance, or "a weak being" that participates in the true being only to a very small extent. The second model (The Sophist) is epistemological and based on the notion of truth as resemblance between an object and a copy. Here, an image is good if it is perfectly similar to the object it represents. Both models of mimesis cannot be treated separately. Their subtle interpenetration can be seen in the Platonic figure of symploke (a "plexus") from The Sophist, in which being and non-being, truthfulness and falsity unexpectedly show their paradoxical unity.