The Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers) is the main EU’s legislative body. To deal with overwhelming amount of legislation, it created an organizational structure made up of working groups at the bottom, special senior committees in the middle and ministers at the top. Although many studies exist about the division of labour between them, little explains the conditions under which these formations play important role in decision-making. The study fills this lacuna. By implementing social constructivist approach, it investigates the impact of the Council’s structure on direct involvement of ministers in law-making. A statistical analysis is conducted to examine this question, based on legislative proposals endorsed in the Council during 2000-2004 period. Four findings emerge from the analysis. Firstly, formal aspects of decision-making, such as legislative procedure, voting rule and legal instrument, do not affect ministers activity. Secondly, no effect of preference divergence between ministers is identified. Thirdly, the substance of legislative act plays important role as salience and European Parliament amendments increase ministers involvement. Lastly, the Council formation to which ministers belong has impact on their great activity. It is likely in Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council whereas unlikely in Agriculture and Fisheries Council, Judicial and Home Affairs Council and Economic and Financial Council.