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Epiphenomenalism and the epistemic argument
epiphenomenalism
property dualism
epistemic argument
inferential knowledge
events
The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents.
cris.lastimport.wos | 2024-04-09T20:40:57Z | |
dc.abstract.en | The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents. | pl |
dc.affiliation | Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych | pl |
dc.contributor.author | Rostek, Jan - 245074 | pl |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-11T07:36:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-09-11T07:36:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | pl |
dc.date.openaccess | 0 | |
dc.description.accesstime | w momencie opublikowania | |
dc.description.additional | Online First 2023-07-31. Bibliogr. s. [18-19]. Finansowanie: Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange | pl |
dc.description.physical | [1-19] | pl |
dc.description.publication | 1,6 | pl |
dc.description.version | ostateczna wersja wydawcy | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0 | pl |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1874-6349 | pl |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-5150 | pl |
dc.identifier.project | PPI/APM/2018/1/00022 | pl |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/318575 | |
dc.language | eng | pl |
dc.language.container | eng | pl |
dc.pbn.affiliation | Dziedzina nauk humanistycznych : filozofia | pl |
dc.rights | Dodaję tylko opis bibliograficzny | * |
dc.rights.licence | CC-BY | |
dc.rights.uri | * | |
dc.share.type | otwarte czasopismo | |
dc.subject.en | epiphenomenalism | pl |
dc.subject.en | property dualism | pl |
dc.subject.en | epistemic argument | pl |
dc.subject.en | inferential knowledge | pl |
dc.subject.en | events | pl |
dc.subtype | Article | pl |
dc.title | Epiphenomenalism and the epistemic argument | pl |
dc.title.journal | Acta Analytica | pl |
dc.type | JournalArticle | pl |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |