In this paper I analyze the concept of plurality from metaphysical (ontological) and axiological points of view. My main argument says that there is a mutual and inseparable relationship between two metaphysical states: multitude and unity. It implies that considerations concerning the axiological dimension of pluralism do have to take into account that fundamental state of affair. Moreover, it shows how dialectical tensions between multitude and unity set up the whole range of values and anti-values. In both cases the point is that the more predominant one of the metaphysical states is, the more plausible is that anti-values will appear. Social and political life seems to be a very good example of the aforementioned metaphysical regularity. It engages both multitude and unity and then it tries to overcome them. This struggle clearly indicates that subjects of social (resp. political) community must face up the metaphysical states which both their community and they themselves are based on. My claim is that to be a value or anti-value for pluralism in terms of social and political life means simply that subjects recognize and define their position in light of multitude and unity. This job requires more or less deep insights into the metaphysical nature of the world.