

A Return of Forced Migration in Turkey?¹

ABSTRACT

Taking into consideration that emergency state was lifted in southeast of Turkey in 2002, but migration continued and negative net migration from Kurdish inhabited regions still have grown. It can be argued that between 2002 and 2015 there was a more voluntary flow of internal migration. It was based more on economic and educational needs and pull factors than push factors connected with physical conflict, which was the case during the 1980s and especially the 1990s in Turkey.

With the failure of the peace process and drastic aftermath of coup attempt it can be argued that these changes will result in the wave of forced migration in the country. These processes can strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity in Turkey which will stimulate a wave of forced migration both in its internal and external aspects. The article aims at analyzing the events and their results which are connected with deterioration of security in Turkey, and that can lead to the rise in forced migration. It starts with a general overview of circumstances leading to resolution of armed conflict. The second part of the article points to some estimations of deadly consequences of it and closes with an attempt to search for some indicators of the beginning of a new wave of forced migration in Turkey.

Voluntary – or relatively less insecurity-driven – spatial mobility appeared to be a significant part of overall Kurdish migration between the first and the second decade of the 21st century. This was a result of stabilization in Southern Kurdistan (Autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq) and democratic reforms in Turkey which culminated in a peace process (or more literally a solution process – *çözüm süreci*) between the Turkish government and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). I have previously advocated for recognizing and studying this new wave of migration

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both in Turkey and among Kurds (see: Kaczorowski 2015; Kaczorowski 2016). Taking into consideration that emergency state was lifted in southeast of Turkey in 2002, but migration continued and negative net migration from Kurdish inhabited regions still have grown. It can be argued that between 2002 and 2015 there was a more voluntary flow of internal migration. It was based more on economic and educational needs and pull factors than push factors connected with physical conflict, which was the case during the 1980's and especially the 1990s in Turkey (see: Jongerden 2007). Migrants from that period did experience difficulties and conflicts connected with moving to a different place, but these hardships were of different nature than struggles of IDP's who faced problems with legal recognition, registration and often lacked previously established networks of people coming from the same family or province (*hemşehri*) (see: Çelik 2012). Consequently it can be argued that the period of 2002-2015 was stable in the political sphere which was more inclusive for Kurdish initiatives and open legal and social atmosphere allowed to intensify growth of Kurdish civil society initiatives.

Unfortunately with the failure of the peace process and return to armed conflict with PKK and devastating results of curfews in Southeastern Turkey it can be argued that this change in Turkish political landscape will result in the wave of forced migration, mostly consisting of people escaping from demolished districts of Kurdish inhabited cities and from villages affected by military operations. Moreover the emergency state imposed in the whole country in the aftermath of the coup attempt will strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity in Turkey which will stimulate a wave of forced migration. This can be argued also on a theoretical basis as most Turkish and international scholars of migration point to military and physical conflict as a crucial factor influencing migration (see: Gezici and Keskin 2005; Filiztekin and Gökhan 2008: 6-7; Sirkeci 2009).

The presented article aims at analyzing the events and their results which are connected with deterioration of security in Turkey, and that can lead to the rise in forced migration. It starts with a general overview of circumstances leading to resolution of armed conflict. The second part of the article points to some estimations of deadly consequences of it and closes with an attempt to search for some indicators of the beginning of a new wave of forced migration in existing data on internal migration in Turkey.

EVENTS LEADING TO IMPOSITION OF CURFEWS²

On June 7, 2015, marked the historical outcome of parliamentary elections in Turkey. Elected political representation included delegates of ethnic and religious minorities – Roma, Armenian and first Yezidi deputy. For the first time in the history of Turkish Republic, the party sympathetic to the Kurdish minority and their problems (People's Democratic Party – Turkish shortcut HDP) passed very high 10% threshold. Despite the fact that the partial reason of installment of such threshold, after 1984 military coup, was to prevent the Kurdish political movements' involvement. These elections were also special as due to their result, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's *Justice and Development Party* (Turkish shortcut – AKP) for the first time in 13 years could not reign alone. The result seemed to show also Turkish public's rejection of the presidential system intensively promoted by the ruling party and President Erdoğan. It was also the time when the peace process between Turkish state and *Kurdistan Workers Party* (PKK) was in a kind of crisis because of different stances towards *Democratic Union Party* (Kurdish shortcut PYD) fight with Islamic State in Northern Syria (Western Kurdistan). Clashes between guerrilla fighters in rural areas and Turkish army were, however, limited and there was a lot of hope for peace connected with ongoing talks between HDP and the government. Lots of Turkish figures also expected that legitimization of HDP in parliament will lead to completion of PKK's withdrawal of arms which began in 2013.

Hopes created as the result of June elections were turned into dust in late July when the AKP's government announced Turkey's war on terror officially aimed against both IS and PKK, but with significant focus on bombing and arresting people affiliated with the second organization. Turkey has provided the United States the access for its Incirlik base, vital for conducting air attacks on IS targets, however, Turkish jets bombed mainly PKK bases in country's southeast (Northern Kurdistan) and Northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan – where in Qandil mountain are perceived headquarters of the organization). Many leftist activists were arrested

² The article includes enumerations of arrests, victims of violence, terror and persecution. This data is surely incomplete and I apologize for that. More than a detailed relation of events it serves as an illustration of deteriorating situation of security in Turkey which indicates new wave of forced internal migration and emigration.

and first curfews were imposed in cities of the Southeast. Officially the reason for fighting PKK was the murder of two policemen by youth organization sympathetic to PKK – Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (Turkish – *Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareket* YDG-H). The group – operating mainly in Kurdish cities and Kurdish inhabited districts of large Turkish metropolis – has before committed some extrajudicial killings of people allegedly connected with IS. Killing of the policemen was, in YDG-H's view, a retaliation for Turkish services negligence (or perceived by many Kurds – complicity) in terrorist bombing in Suruç (near the border with Syrian Kurdistan) which left 31 leftist activists dead and more than hundred people wounded. According to YDG-H, the executed policemen were in some way connected to IS or organization of the bombing.

This deterioration of relations was preceded by bombing in HDP's rally in Diyarbakir, and many government and presidential statements indicating that: „Kobane will fall”, „Islamic State is less dangerous than PYD” and that it is a more tolerable neighbour than Syrian Kurdish organization with its ties to PKK. The war on terror announced by Turkey was aimed at improving Turkish international image in the time of pressure from international public for the country to engage more actively the fight with IS. Some allegations from voices both inside and outside of the country were raised about government's negligence or even compliance with activities of IS. For the first time in its history Erdoğan's moderately Islamic party embraced to such an extent a nationalistic agenda. Resurrecting armed conflict with leftist Kurds corresponded also to political strategy of gaining votes from far-right – necessary for a return to a single party rule. It can be noted, however, that along this strategy, all achievements of peace process were destroyed and ultra-nationalistic discourse was raised to the main stream debate.

When AKP indeed benefitted from increasing support of nationalists and gained advantage in snap elections of November, relations with Kurds were not stabilized but more curfews were imposed and even more fierce measures were taken to fight resistance in Kurdish populated regions. After securing 317 places in the parliament from the total of 550 the ruling party can govern single-handedly but still does not have a majority allowing it to propose a referendum about presidential

system (this would be 330 seats) or impose it without (400 seats needed)³. Some like Diyarbakır based journalist – Frédérique Geerdink, hypothesized that continuation of military conflict with leftist Kurds is aimed at earning more deputies by encouraging delegates of Nationalistic Movement Party (Turkish shortcut MHP) to enter AKP. Geerdink was herself arrested and deported from Turkey in September 2015 on the grounds of being a journalist who supports „terrorism”. Expected growth of seats can be achieved also by banning HDP which can eventually lead to attributing votes to party with second best result in Kurdish regions – AKP. Moreover, ongoing tactics against PKK were supported by army which perceives PYD success in northern Syria as a greatest threat for Turkey in the region. While attacking PKK affiliate – PYD directly in Syria might have drawn fierce criticism from the West, Turkish state tried to weaken the organization in Turkey and in Iraq. These military and political objectives seemed to overshadow – in the eyes of state – the costs of civilian repression, deaths and deterioration of living conditions in the Southeast. The situation reminding the one which occurred in the 1990s – the darkest era of Turkish army where thousands of Kurdish villages were burnt or expelled.

DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES OF CURFEWS AND SECURITY OPERATIONS


According to the report of Human Rights foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı – TİHV*), curfews affected 1377 000 people as they were imposed 58 times in 7 cities and 19 districts. Between August 16 and January 8 there were 162 civilian victims including 32 children, 29 women, and 24 elderly people (over 60 years old). Almost half of this tragic toll (79 civilian deaths) was taken between December 11 and January 8. Victims included also people who were shot in their homes. It is impossible to distinguish which deaths might have been caused by YDG-H fighters and not Turkish forces as at the time there was no examination of civilian casualties, and there were cases where it was impossible to obtain the dead

³ This situation can however change in extraordinary atmosphere after the attempted army coup on July 15th 2016.

and bury them, as military operations were continued. It is however known that bombing of Çınar police station in Diyarbakır left among others 5 civilians dead including 2 children.

Human Rights Watch published in December 2015 the report presenting collected statements of people in the areas under curfews. The organization underlined the need for reduction in using un-adequate force from the side of Turkish army and thorough examination of civilian deaths. Amnesty International has also called authorities of countries to stop collective punishment of Southeast inhabitants (HRW 2015).

The estimation calculated at the end of April 2016 by Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, pointed to 1,5 million people affected by curfews. Since announcement of first such state in August 15, until April 20, 2016, the Turkish operations and fights with YDG-H have led to 338 civilian deaths (including 30 elders, 69 women and 78 children). Moreover, 93 people who died during the curfews were not identified as they were buried immediately. Kurdish activists pointed to destruction of 5,000 houses, while Turkish Ministry of Health have calculated that until March 2016, 355 000 people were forcibly internally displaced (see: Rudaw 2016). The excessive use of force by Turkish authorities was assessed also in the reports prepared by more conservative muslim organization – Mazlumder – The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (2016a, 2016b). The following map prepared by Ali Zifan illustrates places in which Turkish army operations were conducted.



Source: Ali Zifan [CC BY-SA 4.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>)], via Wikimedia Commons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Turkish-PKK_rebellion.svg

Severe results of Turkish armed operations ending in destruction of whole neighborhoods in Kurdish inhabited cities – including the ones residing in the historical Sur district of Diyarbakır (Kurdish: Amed or Diyarbekir) have caused calls from many commentators to recognize them as *urbicide* – deliberate destruction of social urban space of a targeted group. Matthieu Gosse – a French geographer, in an article published in *La revue Urbanités*, underlined not only physical but also symbolic indicators of such a process: Turkish nationalistic slogans on the walls of many buildings, covering the historical city walls with giant Turkish flag, closing and damaging the house of *dengbêj* (which aimed at preserving and reviving Kurdish oral tradition), occupation of municipal museum by the army and deterioration of rich Christian heritage in the city (both by gunfire and racist inscriptions), which was often underlined by the HDP ruled municipality: Syriac church of the Virgin Mary, Chaldean Church in March Petyun and Armenian Catholic Church (Gosse 2016).

The symbolic aspect of return to persecution of Kurdish movements in Turkey was also connected with police raids which started in late July 2015. Vast majority of them were aimed at PKK and not IS. During the arrests, there were many Kurdish activists accused of collaboration with PKK. Moreover, the sole call for stopping the excessive use of force in operations in the Southeast proved to be persecuted by the authorities. Scholars from many universities across the Turkey and from abroad, who signed the petition called „Academics for peace” faced public defamation and criminal charges. They were called „helpers of terrorist” and „traitors”, their names were also published in a pro-governmental newspaper with derogatory connotations. Most of signatories from Turkey faced charges, some were fired or forced to leave their university posts. Human Rights Watch estimated in March 2016 that three academics were jailed, 30 removed and 27 suspended as consequence of signing the petition (HRW 2016). Some journalists and human rights jurists were also arrested, among them the head of Human Rights Foundation of Turkey and professor of Istanbul University – Şebnem Korur Fincancı. Fincancı was released in July but charges against her were upheld, their consequences could result in the penalty of 14 years in prison (CCS 2016). After the attack of TAK in Ankara in March 2016, President Erdoğan has called for a legal change allowing inclusion of journalists and academics in the pursuit of aiding „terrorism”

(see: HRW 2016). This can result in widespread arrests of people who in any way criticize Turkish policy and operations in the country's southeast. It may result also in self-censorship and silencing dissent against the government, but most definitely in rise of the atmosphere of constant threat of being legally persecuted.

EMERGENCE OF NEW KURDISH ARMED GROUPS

Fight against the police and army was led mainly by radical youth sympathizing with PKK who organized themselves as Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (*Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareket* – YDG-H). The group was formed shortly before the peace process in 2013. In contrast to rural guerilla of PKK it operates mainly in Kurdish cities and Kurdish inhabited districts of large Turkish metropolis. Officials of KCK – a military wing of PKK – have at several times declared that they do not have full control over YDG-H. PKK itself can be treated as a political party gathering a wide range of leftist sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, including those who taking example from its captured leader – Abdullah Öcalan's urge for peace, does not see physical conflict as a way to gain Kurdish rights. Calls for peaceful resolution were raised especially by Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), and its leader Selahattin Demirtaş has spoken about uselessness of violence. On the other hand, radical youth tactics are not condemned as widely as are Turkish forces which are perceived by Kurds as a primary source of oppression and occupier. That was the reason behind the declaration of autonomy in many Kurdish regions under curfews.

In December 2015, new force, aiming at supporting YDG-H's in a wider spectrum was proclaimed. Taking up the name of Civil Protection Units – (Kurdish – *Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl* – YPS), which is a close reference to Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) defending the autonomy of Rojava. During the declaration of *YPS Botan* in Cizre: Civil Protection Units were described as a result of exercising legitimate right of Kurdish people against the „physical, political and cultural genocide perpetrated by Turkish army”. It was also stated that the group takes the same stance as youth who organized YDG-H and was created in need of further enlarging their cause. YPS announced that they goal was also to demand

the Turkish state to pay for policy of assimilation, occupation and forced migration of Kurds. The announcement called to arms all the Youth of Botan districts (stating their names in Kurdish: Cizîr, Sîlopya, Hezex, Şirnex, Nisebîn, Kerboran), however, the authors underlined that their struggle was not a sole struggle for self-rule of Kurdish people, but a struggle for freedom of the whole Turkish public (people). Some assumed that it was just a change of name from YDG-H, but declaration of gathering wider support can show signs of more direct cooperation between PKK's guerilla and radical urban youth, and an attempt to call for protection of declared autonomy. There were also some rumors that rural guerilla would come to cities and join the battle side by side with youth.

Such a general call to arms maybe a result of some leftist Kurds' perception of being pressed to the limits by the state by its continuation of violent policy against Kurdish society. As many commentators point out, there are some factors that can be attributed to radicalization of a part of Kurdish Youth. Young people of YDG-H and YPS were usually raised in the 1990s in the atmosphere of a total war, their families could have been expelled from their native villages, fathers spent years in jail. They themselves, often with limited economic opportunities, might have lived in constantly instable conditions. Exemplary to the situation was a constant threat of being arrested just for sole participation in a peaceful protest for Kurdish rights. This atmosphere of insecurity might have rendered them radical, with a sense of no solution than violence which in effect might have caused in some of them the lack of respect for human life.

Another organization fighting against Turkish state but with more deadly and public consequences was *Kurdistan Freedom Falcons* (in Kurdish: *Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan* – TAK). Allegedly separated from PKK in 2004, the group since the following year executed some bombings (including the one on Taksim Square in Istanbul in 2010) which targeted not only Turkish army and police but also civilians. Their actions drew public attention and condemnation in 2016 as bombing of a bus with soldiers in Ankara in February brought 29 (including 16 civilian) deaths and the following attack in the city's central district in March, killed 37 people – mostly civilians. Although the group claimed their separation from PKK which was perceived by Falcons as using too „humanistic” approach, the public of Turkey widely recognized the terrorist attack in March as done by PKK.

Representatives of PKK's headquarters have on several occasions denied involvement in the attack and control over TAK – described as autonomous, hidden and allegedly not very known (in terms of personal involvement) to PKK group. Members of parliament elected from HDP lists, including its leaders have also strongly condemned these attacks. However, international and Turkish commentators (including publicists and scholars) pointed to ambiguous ties between TAK and PKK. It has been argued that given negative approach to other armed groups and organizations representing Kurds in earlier decades, PKK at least did not stop the TAK, and attacks accomplished by the organization would have been very difficult to prepare with no use of previous PKK guerilla experience and networks. Falcons did address Abdullah Öcalan as a leader of Kurdish people and claimed that their attack was a retaliation for 300 civilian casualties of the security operation in Cizre (see: Porter 2016; Geerdink 2016). Their ideology, however, still remains connected with Kurdish separate state which is contrary to the idea of Democratic Confederalism and Turkification which has been announced and promoted in recent years by Öcalan. Some pointed also to the atmosphere of radicalization of Kurdish youth in the wake of IS siege on Kobane and worsening of situation in Turkey's southeast. In such condition it is probable that radicalized Kurdish youth would be difficult to control and not regard traditional PKK hierarchy or familial ties. They did, however, respect the ceasefire announced by PKK before the Turkey's parliamentary elections in November 2015.

It has been observed that violent actions of YDG-H and PKK can strongly negatively influence both short-term and long-term goals of leftist Kurds in Turkey. Some way of negotiation with the state appears to be necessary in the future in order to achieve an autonomy or just secure peaceful political functioning (see Dalay 2016; Geerdink 2016). Returning to military measures was also negatively perceived by many from Turkish public opinion who called for the end of violent ways of dealing with Kurdish question in the aftermath of HDP's passing the election threshold in June 2015. The international and domestic image of PKK was arguably most negatively affected by terrorist attacks of TAK aiming at civilians. The organizations are often perceived as being somehow connected despite that their representatives did state otherwise. Most of the respondents of qualitative research conducted by Serhun Al (2016) in the areas affected by curfews did not

support violent methods used by YDG-H. The participants of the study pointed to deterioration of security of their livelihoods and relatives. However, Turkish army and police were still perceived as the primary aggressor because of the destruction of neighborhoods and excessive use of force. Measures used by the army were widely regarded as inadequate to relatively much worse equipped tactics of urban guerilla of young radicals.

OTHER FACTORS OF DETERIORATION OF SECURITY – THE AFTERMATH OF COUP ATTEMPT

Arrests and police raids intensified after the failed coup attempt organized by the group within the army (designated by the government as tied with Fetullah Güllen but likely having radical kemalist connections). The coup attempt resulted in at least 265 deaths. President Erdoğan has also suggested that following chants of his supporters on the streets, if the parliament agreed, death penalty could be reinstated in the country in order to punish the ones who stood behind the coup. In the aftermath, with the goal of purging the country from supporters of the coup 2839 army members were arrested and authorities ordered detainment of 2745 prosecutors and judges (Yuhas et al. 2016). Some of the judges and jurists have written letters to international law associations (including their colleagues from Poland) sharing their pain and feeling of insecurity waiting for being arrested. Among these letters underlined were claims of surprise in being enlisted on the warrant and perception of being persecuted just for legal criticism towards government (Gazeta.pl 2016).

In the scope of the attempt to purge the country from coup supporters 15 000 employees of public education in Turkey were suspended, government also called for resignation of 1577 deans of both state and private universities. Licenses of 21000 employees in private education were revoked, 100 people working in intelligence were forced to leave, 2156 people from staff of various governmental offices were dismissed, 30 governors of provinces and 47 governors of districts were removed. Additionally 20 internet sites covering news were blocked (Euronews 2016). The Higher Education Board (Yükseköğretim Kurulu – YÖK) requested all of academics on foreign delegations to come back for the examination

and proclaimed temporary ban on any foreign delegations of scholars (see: Yeung 2016). The atmosphere in the wake of the coup affected also the press. The Turkish edition of weekly comic satire *Le Man*, prepared a special issue on the coup attempt, however, it was forced by the police not to release it⁴. In the evening of 20 July, President Erdoğan announced the imposition of the state of emergency in the country, expecting it to last for three months. The Turkish army following the coup continued its operations against PKK, as it was illustrated by the airstrike in which 20 guerilla militants in Northern Iraq were killed (HDN 2016).

From the perspective of the government and its supporters the aftermath of the coup can be understood as careful and legitimate examination of civil servants' backgrounds in order to prevent further coup attempts and punish those who prepared the one organized on July 20, 2016. Regardless of normative evaluation of the events in the aftermath of the coup, dismissing thousands of employee's of both public and private institutions connected with arresting of hundreds will definitely affect their families and people of immediate proximity. This will most probably result in the rise of atmosphere of insecurity (at least for the mentioned people), and it will contribute to overall strengthening of insecurity in Turkey and growing influence of push factors both within internal migration in the country and emigration from Turkey.

Even before the coup, Turkey was perceived as a country threatened by Islamic and radical leftist terrorism. This perception was strengthened by the IS attack on Atatürk airport at the end of June 2016, which left 36 people dead and 147 injured. The airport is the largest in the country and the place transferring not only travelers to Turkish Riviera, but also several countries in Asia and Africa (see: Tuysuz and Almasry 2016) . Deterioration of the situation of security in regards to Turkish state's policy was also noticed by international organizations, an illustrative for this fact can be a report by Statewatch – an organization monitoring liberties in Europe. Emanuela Roman, Theodore Baird, and Talia Radcliffe (2016) who prepared the report argued that Turkey could not be treated as a *safe country* in terms of

⁴ Both front-pages of the issue made a reference to the coup and contemporary success of the *Pokemon Go* game suggesting that both sides of the coup were religious conservatives and that people with knives and bats on the streets were ready for lynching Alevi's and Syrian refugees (see: Bianet 2016).

international conventions. They underlined that the state had severe problems with guarding rights connected with definitions of a *safe country*: no risk of persecution, no risk of physical harm and non-refoulement (which means protection from sending migrants back to areas where they are threatened). This means that the country has problems with direct physical danger of being attacked by terrorists, excessive use of force by the army or police and also the legal framework does not support protecting personal security of its citizens.

Growing insecurity in Turkey affects also Western Europe, as the European Union by signing the deal with Turkish officials agreed to provide financial support, grant visa-free travel in immediate future and stimulate countries integration with the community in exchange for reducing migration flow. Problems with democracy, rule of law and ongoing military operation in country's Southeast were the reasons why many western commentators called the deal unethical. Especially that many representatives of the EU have been perceived by many (including Turkish public opinion) as reserved towards further integration with Turkey and in a way obstructing the process prior to the migrant crisis. The promise to stimulate integration was not made in 2011 when the country was proclaimed by many as a model of democracy for country's affected by Arab Spring, but it happened in 2015 when the political sphere was restrictive and arguably in the worst situation since 2002. Turkey was meant to reduce migration to Europe significantly by providing aid to refugees. However the country can produce its own forced migrants abroad as a consequence of growing domestic insecurity.

SOME INDICATORS OF THE WAVE OF FORCED MIGRATION

Achieving accurate data on internal displacement and forced migration is a difficult task, especially when processes stimulating it – in this case military operations, curfews and conflict with YDG-H and PKK – are still ongoing. Additionally in many cases it can be almost impossible to distinguish economic migration from conflict-driven, having in mind that Turkish Southeast was for years characterized by high levels of economic insecurity (see e.g.: İçduygu et al. 1999). As mentioned before Turkish ministry of health gave 350 000 as the number of displaced people due to the conflict

with PKK in January 2016. According to Russia Today, 300 000 people were forced to leave their homes due to the curfews until December 2015. Contemporarily the number of people can be much higher as the curfews and operations continued. Other factors like coup attempt and emergency state in its aftermath have strengthen the role of push factors for internal migration in the country. Looking at official statistics on internal migration in Turkey in 2015, it cannot be directly interpreted that forced migration dominated internal migration in that year. The biggest rise in out-migration was, however, experienced by the Southeastern Anatolian region (in the period of 2014-2015 comparing to 2013-2014 it has risen by 25 093 and negative net migration risen⁵ by 19 881) although the proportionally biggest rise was in Eastern Black Sea region (in the period of 2014-2015 negative net migration more than tripled comparing to 2012-2013). The data can be seen in the attached table.

Bölge (1. düzey) Region (Level 1)	Net göç Net migration							
	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015
Toplam-Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TR1 İstanbul	26 675	39 481	102 583	121 782	30 461	66 321	14 336	50 543
TR2 Batı Marmara Western Marmara	30 074	12 573	14 599	15 861	25 052	19 260	46 448	20 643
TR3 Ege- Aegean	34 692	16 563	955	1 225	25 355	15 741	46 115	32 247
TR4 Doğu Marmara Eastern Marmara	82 161	42 570	37 579	42 824	37 090	47 044	56 189	72 167
TR5 Batı Anadolu Western Anatolia	20 063	31 544	39 128	50 308	26 194	28 227	39 239	50 138
TR6 Akdeniz Mediterranean	19 449	4 790	5 479	- 11 797	- 10 524	- 7 018	3 441	159
TR7 Orta Anadolu Central Anatolia	- 34 299	- 19 170	- 34 624	- 33 878	- 15 862	- 18 621	- 25 860	- 25 394
TR8 Batı Karadeniz Western Black Sea	- 19 529	- 10 842	- 50 720	- 39 557	- 14 393	- 25 678	- 34 818	- 19 652
TR9 Doğu Karadeniz Eastern Black Sea	- 5 622	1 585	- 22 703	- 24 949	18 495	- 9 223	- 4 556	- 15 180
TRA Kuzeydoğu Anadolu Northeastern Anatolia	- 58 268	- 32 588	- 30 104	- 27 973	- 34 434	- 42 765	- 43 088	- 46 512
TRB Ortadoğu Anadolu Centraleastern Anatolia	- 39 613	- 33 207	- 33 255	- 61 679	- 27 091	- 26 972	- 46 797	- 48 629
TRC Güneydoğu Anadolu Southeastern Anatolia	- 55 783	- 53 299	- 28 917	- 32 167	- 60 343	- 46 316	- 50 649	- 70 530

Kaynak: Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi sonuçları, 2008-2015

Source: The results of Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), 2008-2015

Yabancılar kapsamamıştır.

Foreign population is not included

⁵ The net-migration decreased from – 50 649 to – 70 530, in order to better illustrate it I have used the words "the negative net-migration increased".

Bölge (1. düzey) Region (Level 1)	Verdiği göç Out-migration ⁽¹⁾					
	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015
Toplam-Total	1 985 917	2 045 720	1 942 874	2 122 454	2 254 607	2 287 542
TR1 İstanbul	336 932	328 663	354 074	371 601	424 662	402 864
TR2 Batı Marmara Western Marmara	89 752	90 149	84 276	99 543	101 113	114 957
TR3 Ege- Aegean	184 640	190 979	170 489	189 098	189 490	204 334
TR4 Doğu Marmara Eastern Marmara	162 675	164 586	162 615	173 425	180 965	182 293
TR5 Batı Anadolu Western Anatolia	182 562	184 218	177 798	200 077	208 817	199 629
TR6 Akdeniz Mediterranean	200 003	219 315	206 925	219 509	222 621	233 715
TR7 Orta Anadolu Central Anatolia	138 677	134 765	117 130	132 541	142 812	136 246
TR8 Batı Karadeniz Western Black Sea	183 046	174 374	157 816	187 639	195 633	185 588
TR9 Doğu Karadeniz Eastern Black Sea	113 098	110 220	86 614	114 398	118 470	121 186
TRA Kuzeydoğu Anadolu Northeastern Anatolia	98 728	100 345	97 734	111 784	123 105	127 477
TRB Ortadoğu Anadolu Centraleastern Anatolia	124 025	164 354	139 320	134 247	148 095	155 336
TRC Güneydoğu Anadolu Southeastern Anatolia	171 779	183 752	188 083	188 592	198 824	223 917

Kaynak: Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi sonuçları, 2008-2015

Source: The results of Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), 2008-2015

Yabancılar kapsamamıştır.

Foreign population is not included

Source: TÜİK 2016, modified table generated from Turkish Statistical Institute's website

Looking at the data from the perspective of division into 26 sub-regions (groups of provinces divided according with standard NUTS2 for Turkey), some sub-regions affected by the conflict like Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan and Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl and Tunceli did not experience rise in negative net-migration while some other did not significantly differ than in previous years (e.g. Van, Muş, Bitlis and Hakkari). The biggest rise of negative net-migration among Kurdish inhabited sub-regions concerned: Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt (from -18769 in 2014 to -32403 in 2015, the biggest change since 2012) and Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır (from -24459 to -30346 also the biggest change since 2012). As stated before the biggest rise in the negative net-migration in the whole Turkey concerned the sub-region

of the Black Sea (Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane) (see: TUIK 2016). It has to be noted that the data based on Addressed Based Population Registration System depend on official registrations and calculations of municipalities, especially in the case of displaced people leaving their homes in hurry. There can be a large group of migrants and IDP's not included in the official reports. The higher growth of out-migration in 2015 comparing to previous years can be, however, an indicator of a growing wave of migration from Kurdish inhabited provinces. Rise in insecurity of Kurdish inhabited sub-regions can, however, strongly influence official data in the future when internal migrants will be registering in new locations as a result of leaving their homes due to feeling rising physical and economic threat.

CONCLUSION

Imposition of curfews in Kurdish inhabited regions and the military conflict between Turkish army and PKK, YDG-H and TAK since July 2015 have affected 1.5 million people, resulted in destruction of whole districts of cities, death of hundreds of civilians and displacement of at least 350 000. Additionally it can be argued that massive layoffs and investigations in the aftermath of the coup attempt in July 2016 will strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity among Turkish citizens which can result in a new wave of forced migration in Turkey.

Unaware to many in the West, there is an ongoing internal war in Southeastern Turkey, led by the state against radical young sympathizers of Kurdistan Workers Party – PKK. Because the state imposed emergency operations people are unable to lead their normal daily lives, and they are in danger of getting shot in a cross-fire every day. In predominantly Kurdish inhabited cities' districts, such as Diyarbakır's historical Sur access to healthcare and external space is highly restricted. Waste is not removed, there are food shortages, electricity is often turned off and clean water is a scarce resource. People who have to leave their houses are rushing through the streets waving improvised sticks with a white piece of cloth in order to underline that they are civilians.

One can hope that eventually circles oriented on peaceful achievement of Kurdish rights will dominate and Turkish state will stop the excessive use of force. These hopes, however, contemporary are not very high as President Erdoğan announced complete breakdown of the talks with anyone connected to PKK. The emergency state imposed in the wake of the coup attempt in July 2016 can lead to further arrests among Kurdish activists, continuation of military operations and diminish chances of peace talks. At the same time most attempts at urging for limiting destructive military operations during curfews were treated by Turkish officials as „treachery” and helping the „terrorism”. This was particularly visible in the reaction to the academic petition raising awareness of casualties caused by the curfews. Many of signatories employed by Turkish universities faced criminal charges (often under infamous article 301 describing defamation of Turkish nation or state). Even more employees from the education sector faced investigations in the aftermath of the coup.

As growing international support in solidarity with Turkish academics rises, it can be noted that more people in Europe started to pay attention to events taking part in Turkey.

A possibility of return to a peaceful solution of the conflict is still present as indicated for example by continuous functioning of legal pro-Kurdish leftist HDP party. The events analyzed in the article which happened in Turkey in 2015 and 2016, point to emergence of return of forced migration within the country.

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